Press & News

Jerry Maatman Quoted in Labor Law Reports
01/10/2006

Jerry Maatman was quoted extensively in the December 28, 2005 issue of Labor Law Reports, a weekly newsletter highlighting developments in labor law published by CCH Incorporated. The article (“USSCt: walking time is compensable”) highlights the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling regarding a case brought by production workers for a meat products manufacturer seeking compensation for the time they spent “donning and doffing” their protective gear and walking to their work site. The Court ruled that “donning and doffing” and walking time were compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, in a related case involving poultry processing workers, the Court recently ruled that the time workers spend waiting to don the first piece of gear prior to the start of the workday is not compensable, as the pre-donning wait time is not part of the continuous workday.

“It’s a narrow ruling under the FLSA and fact-specific, but it has broad implications that extend beyond the meat-packing industry to all pay practices in all industries,” management attorney Gerald Maatman warned. “Employers should be identifying the activities that are `preliminary’ and those that are `postliminary’ to the workday,” Maatman advised. “In essence, when does the workday start and when does it end, whether or not safety gear is involved?” While the amounts per individual may be small, taken together in the case of a large class, the impact could be substantial, he observed. “The cumulative amounts involved in a collection action are what drive these cases,” he said.

Maatman notes employees checking emails or voice mails before leaving for work, or stopping to pick up supplies or tools on the way to work, as examples of how this ruling could affect a variety of industries. “There will undoubtedly be more litigation in other industries,” Maatman predicted.

In the same issue of Labor Law Reports, in an article entitled “FLSA collective action avoided at outset,” Maatman analyzes the recent denial of plaintiff’s motion for conditional class certification under the FLSA in the case Barfield v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. (in which Seyfarth represented New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.) Plaintiff Anetha Barfield, who worked for various temp agencies which supply health care workers to approximately 50 city-run health care facilities, alleged that the Health and Hospitals Corp. employed a system-wide policy which uses temps in a way that evades the obligation to pay overtime. She sought certification of her action as a collective action under Section 216 of the FLSA in order to include 17,000 other health care professionals who, she alleged, were “similarly situated.”

Maatman explained that the first step in the process governing certification of collection actions is the plaintiff’s motion to conditionally certify the lawsuit as a collective action, and the second step comes after discovery, when the defendant may seek to have the collective action de-certified. What was unusual in Barfield, Maatman pointed out, was that at a very early point in the case, the judge took a close look at the complaint and the information submitted to the court by the parties on the issue of whether or not there was a class of similarly situated individuals. Before defendants even filed an answer to plaintiff’s motion to certify the class, the court held a hearing to enable it to determine whether there was a class of similarly situated individuals. After the hearing, the court ruled that there was an insufficient showing by the plaintiff to warrant certifying a class.

The ruling is one of a handful of cases that is favorable for the defense in allowing an employer to preemptively stop an FLSA collective action, Maatman observed. It is important because employers in every industry across the country have been deluged with FLSA collective actions.

“The ruling is unique as FLSA rulings go because it is very defendant-oriented. It is unusual because there are no standards or guidelines in 216(b) for the court to use in determining whether there is a class of similarly situated individuals. It is the exceptional case where a judge would not grant a plaintiff’s motion to certify an FLSA case as a collective action,” he noted.

The ruling impacts all FLSA collective actions in all industries and contains some important lessons for employers to use to resist collective actions from the outset, Maatman suggested. “I would expect employers to utilize this ruling to request a more rigorous process before a court certifies a collection action. It gives the employer a chance to demonstrate why it would be inefficient and costly to allow a plaintiff to launch a large case based solely on the allegations contained in the complaint,” he said.