About Our Cover

Yes, we know: California is a contiguous part of the North American continent. Yet seventeenth-century mapmakers saw it otherwise. When they outlined the western contours of our region, they extended the Gulf of California far north, to make California appear as a yam-shaped island in the Pacific Ocean.

If such maps are now historical oddities, they still reflect the persistent view that California is a world apart. Carey McWilliams explored this theme in his 1946 classic, *Southern California: An Island on the Land*. He argued that Southern California is, metaphorically, an island in profound cultural ways. Much the same is true of California writ large when it comes to labor and employment law. So while early maps were cartographically incorrect, their symbolism remains powerful.

Any picture of California as an island apart is especially vivid as of 2019. While the executive branch of our national government remains generally more friendly toward business, every branch of California’s government is extraordinarily solicitous to the interests of employees, labor unions, and the plaintiffs’ bar.

So much for the island. What about the star and the grizzly bear? Discerning readers will recall that these figures adorn our state flag, where they appear above the logo “California Republic.” All these features harken back to 1846, when American settlers in Mexican Alta California staged the Bear Flag Revolt to declare a republic independent from Mexico. (The star and logo pay homage to the Lone Star Republic of Texas, which broke free of Mexico in 1836.) The California rebels got lucky: the Mexican-American War soon intervened to dislodge the California territory from Mexican control. California, in 1850, became our thirty-first state.

The legacy of the Bear Flag Revolt continues today: fiercely independent state politicians—especially since the 2016 election—have proclaimed California’s right to chart its own course on such vital matters as the environment, health care, immigration, and the right to use marijuana.

And perhaps nowhere is Californian independence more prominent than in the area of employment law. Federal labor law hit high tide in the 1930s, with the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The high tide returned in the 1960s—bringing us the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act—and returned yet again in the 1990s, bringing us the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act. In the Golden State, meanwhile, the waves of employment regulation have risen ever higher, even while federal regulations have ebbed. This book highlights differences between federal and California law in key areas of interest to employers that operate both in California and in the rest of America. In virtually every case, the California version more heavily favors employees, plaintiffs, and labor unions, at the expense of business. The point, of course, is that companies used to doing business elsewhere can find California employment law a real bear.

Hence our cover.
Authors’ Note

At annual intervals since the turn of this century, we’ve cataloged how California law deviates from prevailing American labor and employment law. The result—this steadily growing volume—summarizes legislative, judicial, and regulatory developments that have made California a uniquely challenging environment for private employers. (We do not address special challenges facing public employers or government contractors.) We highlight these California peculiarities to help corporate counsel and human resources professionals avoid legal pitfalls, without treating what is provided here as the final word (a point emphasized in the disclaimer that follows).

This 2019 edition contains contributions from many Seyfarth lawyers, all members or friends of our California Workplace Solutions Group: Rachel Abanonu, Michael Afar, Nabeel Ahmad, Pantea Ahmadi, Brian Ashe, Nicole Baarts, Jeff Berman, Candace Bertoldi, Holger Besch, Dan Birnbaum, Jonathan Brophy, Bob Buch, Debbie Caplan, Mehga Charalambides, Caitlyn Crisp, Chris Crosman, Justin Curley, Catherine Dacre, Phillip Ebsworth, Chantelle Egan, Pam Devata, Tim Fisher, Lindsay Fitch, Kerry Friedrichs, Amanda Fry, Nick Geannacopulos, Rachel Gradstein, Mattt Graffigna, Jaclyn Gross, Carrie Grove, Minal Haymond, Josh Henderson, Christine Hendrickson, Ari Hersher, Gaye Hertan, Eric Hill, Timothy Hix, Timothy Hoppe, Dana Howells, Christopher Im, Jessica Jensen, Gregory Kantor, Michael Kopp, Namrata Kotwani, Kristina Launey, Lara Levine, Paul Leaf, Patty Lee, Lauren Leibovitch, Elizabeth Levy, Leo Li, Eric Lloyd, Brian Long, Allison Loomis, Zaher Lopez, Aaron Lubeley, Laura Maechtlen, Elizabeth MacGregor, Eric May, Ryan McCoy, Chelsea Mesa, Robert Milligan, Jennifer Mora, Ilana Morady, Jennifer Murikami, Jennifer Nunez, Meagan O’Dell, Angelo Paparelli, Beth Pelliconi, Kristen Peters, Dana Peterson, Jamie Pollaci, Jill Porcaro, Monica Rodriguez, David Rosenberg, Eric Ruehe, Timothy Rusche, Michelle Scannell, Joshua Salinas, Sam Schwartz-Fenwick, Emily Schroeder, Josh Seidman, Tatyana Shmygol, Joan Smiles, Jared Speier, Michael Stevens, Pritee Thakarsey, Tiffany Tran, Christopher Truxler, Coby Turner, Annette Tyman, Ryan Tzeng, Parnian Vafaeania, Pamela Vartabedian, Bethany Vasquez, Jinouth Vasquez Santos, Myra Villamor, Olivia Wada, Michael Wahlander, Elisabeth Watson, Geoffrey Westbrook, Shireen Wetmore, Daniel Whang, Mason Winters, Simon Yang, Julie Yap, Fontaine Yuk, and Ann Marie Zaletel.

To keep up with the latest peculiarities of California employment law, please subscribe to Seyfarth’s award-winning California Peculiarities Employment Law Blog: www.calpeculiarities.com/subscribe.

David Kadue and Colleen Regan, Co-Editors in Chief

Important Disclaimer

We have been representative, not exhaustive, in cataloging California peculiarities. This book is general commentary, not legal advice. We disclaim liability as to anything done or omitted in reliance on this publication. Readers should refrain from acting on any discussion in this publication without obtaining specific advice applying current law to particular circumstances. Thus, while we aim to provide authoritative information, this book is not legal advice. (From A Declaration of Principles adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations.)

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Introduction

When employers across America face a labor or employment law issue on the Left Coast, they often hear “California is different.” For better or worse, California is different. California is also important, both as the nation’s most populous state and as a notorious trend-setter in employment law.

Several sources have influenced California’s continuing expansion of employee rights (and employer obligations). The chief source has been the extensive legislation codified in the California Labor and Government Codes. Also significant have been expansive judicial decisions. These decisions have come not only from state judges but also from federal judges applying California law. Most of these federal judges are within the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, the circuit most friendly to plaintiffs’ rights (and the circuit most often reversed by the United States Supreme Court). A final important source would be the interpretations issued by the administrative agencies that California has empowered to enforce various aspects of its employment law.

This volume assumes extensive knowledge of federal labor and employment law in the private sector. Our principal focus is on the peculiar aspects of California law that can bewilder even the most sophisticated private employers who are used to doing business elsewhere.

Highlighted immediately below are some important areas of California labor and employment law. We do not cover California law comprehensively, but rather simply aim to raise consciousness (a California term) about certain legal issues. (Elsewhere herein is a full-form disclaimer.)

The reader with particular subjects in mind can consult the Table of Contents and Glossary (at the front of this volume) and the Index of Terms and the Index of Statutory Provisions (at the back).

So what’s peculiar about California employment law? Here’s an overview:

“Bounty Hunter” or “Sue Your Boss” Lawsuits

California, uniquely among federal and state governments, has a Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), which empowers aggrieved employees to sue as private attorneys general to enforce wage and hour law. PAGA

- creates civil penalties—generally $100 per employee per pay period for a first violation and twice that for further violations—for employer failures to comply with numerous, often obscure, provisions of the California Labor Code and the IWC Wage Orders,

- permits aggrieved employees to step into the shoes of the California Labor Commissioner, to collect these civil penalties, and to keep, as a bounty, 25% of the take (see §§ 5.15, 7.24),

- permits PAGA actions to proceed even where the aggrieved employee has agreed, in an arbitration agreement, to waive representative claims (see § 5.2), and

- permits PAGA claims on behalf of all aggrieved employees even when they cannot satisfy the requirements for a class action (see § 5.15).
Leaves

California, going far beyond federal leave law,

- creates a right to unpaid leave for up to four months (or 17.33 weeks) for pregnancy-related disabilities, in addition to any available family leave and any related disability leave (see § 2.1),
- imposes family-leave obligations not only on larger employers (those with at least 50 employees), but also on many smaller employers (those with at least 20 employees) (see § 2.3),
- enables employees who are on authorized family leave to claim state paid family leave benefits, for up to six weeks (see § 2.4),
- allows employees who are victims of certain crimes and of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to take time off to attend to issues in court and to seek treatment or relocation assistance (see §§ 2.6, 2.7),
- permits employees who accrue paid sick leave to use up to one-half their annual entitlement for “kin care” (to attend sick relatives) (see § 2.10),
- treats paid time off as the equivalent of sick leave (for purposes of “kin care”) if the paid time off can be used for any purpose (see § 2.10),
- creates a right to unpaid leave of up to ten days for employees married to military personnel who themselves are on leave from a military conflict (see § 2.12),
- entitles employees to accrue up to 24 hours or three days of annual paid sick leave, which can accumulate up to 48 hours or six days (see § 2.14), and
- creates a right to paid leave for organ or bone marrow donation (see § 2.15).

Employee Privacy—Protected Activities and Confidential Information

The California Constitution uniquely creates a right to privacy that governs private as well as public employers. California also has enacted statutes that in various ways prohibit employer intrusions into, or interference with, various forms of employee personal conduct. Specifically, California

- forbids employers to discriminate against employees or applicants for lawful off-premises, off-duty conduct (see § 3.1),
- entitles employees to designate attorneys to negotiate on their behalf with employers regarding conditions of employment (see § 3.4),
- forbids employers to inquire about certain marijuana-related convictions, or about participation in pre- or post-trial diversion programs, or about convictions that have been judicially dismissed or ordered sealed (see § 4.2),
• forbids unconsented tape-recording of confidential communications (see § 4.6),

• forbids audio and videotaping of restrooms, locker rooms, and changing rooms (see § 4.6),

• entitles employees to workplace privacy against intrusions by their employer (see § 4.6).

• forbids employers to request or require employees or job applicants to disclose personal social media usernames or passwords (see § 4.8), and

• forbids use of credit background checks for most positions (see § 4.11).

Arbitration Agreements

California legislators and courts, taking their cue from the plaintiffs’ bar, have systematically discriminated against employer-mandated arbitration agreements. California has repeatedly invented special reasons not to enforce arbitration agreements, despite the pro-arbitration policy of the Federal Arbitration Act that the U.S. Supreme Court has often applied to preempt state rules—both legislative and judicial—that frustrate arbitration by design or effect. California has succeeding in subjecting arbitration agreements to certain peculiar conditions that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to correct. Under California’s peculiar law, arbitration agreements

• must be “mutual,” requiring the employer as well as the employee to use arbitration instead of litigation in initiating claims (including claims for injunctive relief to prevent unfair competition),

• must (as to statutory claims) provide full discovery and have the employer pay all costs unique to arbitration,

• must permit employees to bring representative PAGA actions in court,

• generally cannot shorten statutes of limitations, and

• typically are unenforceable if they have more than one “unconscionable” provision—notwithstanding the general rule that courts will sever unenforceable provisions and enforce the rest (see § 5.2.).

Litigation Issues

California has tilted the litigation playing field to the advantage of plaintiffs suing employers, deviating from the law of many jurisdictions by

• forbidding predispute waivers of jury trial (see § 5.1),

• forbidding employers to impose forum-selection or choice-of-law agreements that would avoid California courts or California law (see § 5.3),

• creating broad-ranging contract and tort theories by which an employee can challenge a wrongful termination (see §§ 5.4, 5.5, 5.6),
limiting the efficacy of summary judgment motions and other procedural devices that would narrow unmeritorious litigation (see §§ 5.7, 6.5),

expanding potential liability of employers to employees for defamation and negligent misrepresentation (see §§ 5.8, 5.9),

expanding employer liability to third parties for employee torts (see § 5.10),

creating one-sided rules favoring prevailing plaintiffs, but not prevailing defendants, who seek recovery of attorney fees and costs (see §§ 5.12, 6.13),

encouraging wage and hour class actions (see § 5.14), and

permitting plaintiffs' lawyers to obtain private contact information for the defendant's current and former employees, subject only to their individual decisions to affirmatively opt out, even where the current plaintiff is not even a member of the proposed class and the lawyers are trolling for new clients, and even if the employees have signed forms telling their employer they do not want to be contacted by third parties (see §§ 4.10, 5.14, 5.15).

Immigrant Workers

California historically—and especially in resistance to the Trump Administration—has taken the lead in protecting undocumented persons against federal immigration-control efforts. Some thus call California America's largest "sanctuary state." Among its other acts of defying federal authority in this respect, California has enacted the California Values Act, aimed to limit the extent to which state officials will enforce federal immigration law.

California law now prevents police from asking people about their immigration status or from participating in most federal immigration enforcement actions, limits law enforcement communication with federal immigration authorities, prevents jails from detaining a criminal suspect for federal immigration authorities (unless the person has been convicted of certain crimes), and forbids landlords to report the immigration status of their renters.

California’s resistance to federal immigration law fully extends to the workplace. California, to protect immigrant workers,

- makes a plaintiff's immigrant status irrelevant to employer liability,
- generally forbids inquiries into a person’s immigration status during a legal proceeding,
- rejects arguments that its pro-immigrant protections are preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act,
- forbids employers to discriminate against employees for updating names and social security numbers,
- forbids employers to allow immigration raids at their work sites without a court order,
- forbids employers to reverify employment eligibility of current employees,
California has also extended the definition of national origin discrimination to include any adverse action that an employer takes against an individual for holding a special driver’s license that California makes available to those who cannot prove that they are authorized under federal law to work in the United States (see §§ 6.2, 6.6).

**Disability Discrimination**
California, going beyond federal law on disability discrimination (as stated in the Americans with Disabilities Act),

- defines “disability” very broadly to include conditions, as well as impairments, that create any restriction on a major life activity,
- expressly requires employers to engage in an interactive process regarding accommodations requested by disabled employees, and
- effectively requires employers to deal with an employee on leave through the employee’s attorney (see § 6.3.).

**Age Discrimination**
California, going beyond federal law on age discrimination (as stated in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act),

- categorically forbids employers to rely on compensation levels in deciding which employees to dismiss, if that criterion adversely affects employees over age 40, and
- endorses the adverse impact theory of liability in age discrimination, without recognizing an employer defense for reliance on reasonable factors other than age (see § 6.4).

**Harassment**
California, going beyond federal law on harassment (based on interpretations of federal discrimination law),

- applies harassment law to all private employers, no matter how small,
• requires all employers to distribute to all employees a detailed fact sheet on sexual harassment, and requires employer harassment policies to have specified content,

• protects from harassment not only employees and applicants but also various classes of individuals—such as independent contractors, unpaid interns, and volunteers—who usually do not qualify as employees,

• requires large employers to train supervisors (and all rank-and-file employees) to prevent sexual harassment,

• requires sexual harassment training for janitorial employees,

• requires harassment training for supervisors to address “abusive conduct” (bullying), without regard to discriminatory conduct,

• makes both supervisors and co-workers personally liable for perpetrating discriminatory workplace harassment,

• makes employers vicariously liable for supervisor-perpetrated harassment, using a broad definition of “supervisor,”

• specifies that sexual harassment may be actionable even if not motivated by sexual desire,

• denies employers the Ellerth/Faragher defense, which absolves employers of liability if they took reasonable measures to prevent and correct harassment and if the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use those measures, and

• forbids contractual provisions that would limit disclosure of sexual harassment allegations (see § 6.5).

**National Origin Discrimination**

California, going beyond federal law on national origin discrimination (as stated in Title VII),

• generally forbids English-only rules in the workplace (see § 6.6), and

• defines “national origin discrimination” to include discrimination against a person for holding a special driver’s license that California makes available to undocumented residents (see §§ 6.2, 6.6).

**Pay Equity**

California, going beyond federal law on pay discrimination (as stated in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act),

• entitles employees to challenge pay disparities on the basis of race and ethnicity as well as sex,

• allows equal-pay claims even where the compared employees do not work in the same establishment,

• permits equal-pay claims where the compared jobs are merely “substantially similar,”
• limits the factors an employer may cite to justify a pay disparity and requires that the cited factors justify the entire pay differential,

• forbids employers to rely on the factor of prior salary as the sole basis to justify a pay disparity,

• forbids employers to inquire into an external job applicant’s compensation history, and

• requires employers to provide applicants, upon their “reasonable request,” with “the pay scale” for the sought-after position (see § 6.7).

Sex Discrimination
California, going beyond federal law on sex discrimination (as stated in Title VII),

• entitles women as well as men to wear pants in the workplace (see § 6.8), and

• has expanded the prohibition against sex discrimination to include discrimination because of “breastfeeding or medical conditions related to breastfeeding” as well as discrimination because of “gender,” defined to mean “actual sex” or perception thereof, including the employee’s “gender, gender identity, and gender expression,” and expressly protects transgender individuals (see § 6.9).

Religious Discrimination
California, going beyond federal law on religious discrimination (as stated in Title VII),

• explicitly protects religious dress and grooming practices,

• requires religious accommodation absent “undue hardship,” which California defines much more narrowly than federal law does, and

• forbids employers to use segregation in the workplace as a means of a religious accommodation (see § 6.10).

Wage and Hour
California, going beyond federal wage and hour law (as stated in the Fair Labor Standards Act),

• requires employers to provide paid sick leave (see § 2.14),

• requires employers to provide new hires with written notice of such things as pay rates, paydays, employer names, as well as any other information the Labor Commissioner deems “material and necessary” (see § 16.1),

• requires employers to provide, with each payment of wages, a highly detailed itemized statement, with heavy penalties for even technical non-compliance (see § 16.3),
• imposes a high minimum wage, and requires that employers pay separately for each hour of work, including the unproductive time of piece-rate and commissioned employees (see § 7.2),

• requires employers to pay time-and-one-half premium overtime pay requirements for work over eight hours a day, and for work on a seventh consecutive work day, as well as for work over 40 hours a week (see § 7.4),

• requires employers to pay doubletime for work over 12 hours a day, and for work over eight hours on a seventh consecutive work day (see § 7.4),

• requires employers to provide employees with paid rest breaks and paid recovery periods and unpaid meal periods, and to pay an additional hour of pay for each day of violation (see §§ 7.8, 7.9),

• requires employers, upon pain of large penalties, to provide suitable seats to employees where the nature of the work reasonably permits (see § 7.11),

• requires employers to reimburse employees for ordinary business expenses (see § 7.13),

• imposes detailed reporting requirements for payment of piece rates (see § 7.14),

• requires written agreements for commissions (see § 7.15),

• requires pro rata payment of bonuses where employment ends for reasons beyond the employee’s control (see § 7.16),

• deviates from federal law by imposing a pro-employee formula for computing overtime pay on “flat sum” bonuses for nonexempt employees (see § 7.16), and

• restricts certain employers in their staffing and scheduling of employees (see §§ 7.21, 7.22).

Vacation
California, addressing a subject matter not regulated by federal law,

• treats paid vacation as wages earned and vested on a daily basis,

• requires that all unused vacation be paid upon termination of employment at the final rate of pay, regardless of when the vacation was earned or whether the employee was eligible to take vacation,

• treats as the equivalent of vacation any paid time off that can be used for any purpose, including some floating holidays and some sabbaticals, and

• prohibits “use it or lose it” vacation provisions, although employers may place a “reasonable” cap on the further accrual of vacation pay for employees who fail to take enough paid vacation. (See § 7.18.)
Employee Access to Information
California, going beyond federal law on employee access to information,

- entitles employees and former employees access to, and copies of, personnel and payroll records upon request (see § 10),

- requires employees to post a wide variety of notices, listed in part at www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/WorkplacePostings.html, and

- requires a notice to new hires, on a single form, regarding the name of the employer, rates of pay, the identity of the workers’ compensation carrier, and other such basic information. (See § 9.)

Covenants Not to Compete
California broadly bans even narrowly drawn restraints on trade and thus complicates employers’ efforts to enforce various employee covenants traditionally enforceable in other states, including many (if not all)

- reasonable covenants not to compete,

- customer non-solicitation clauses, and

- employee non-solicitation clauses (see § 12).

Workers’ Compensation
California makes it unlawful, absent “business necessity,” to dismiss an employee on workers’ compensation leave even pursuant to a policy setting a uniform maximum length for all leaves (see § 17).

Independent Contractors
California is generally hostile to businesses that contract with workers as independent contractors instead of employees. California requires defendants rather than plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof as to whether a plaintiff is an employee or an independent contractor, and has permitted plaintiffs challenging their classification as independent contractors to rely on secondary factors to show employee status, even where the primary factor of the right to control indicates independent contractor status (see §19.2). Most significant of all, California presumes that a company hiring a worker is the worker’s employer unless the hirer can meet the “ABC” test: (A) the worker is free from the hirer’s control and direction in performing the work, both under the contract of hire and in fact, (B) the worker performs work outside the hirer’s usual course of business, and (C) the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed. (See § 19.6.) California imposes fines of up to $25,000 on employers who willfully misclassify employees as independent contractors (see § 19.7).
Preface to the 2019 Edition

New Legislation and Regulations

A 19th century jurist famously observed that no one’s “life, liberty or property is safe while the Legislature is in session.” To many employers, that thought comes to mind whenever the State Assembly and Senate convene in Sacramento. And with good reason. Here are the reflections of Governor Jerry Brown as he left office in January 2019: “The Democratic constituencies want more money and more laws. I take a different view. We have too many damn laws. The coercive power of the state should be invoked sparingly. They tell me almost all of the bills that I have vetoed have been reintroduced.”¹ Now, with the relatively conservative Governor Brown no longer on the scene, it is a sure bet that the comrades he has left behind in Sacramento will move with unrestrained gusto to create still more onerous challenges for California businesses, re-passing bills that Governor Brown vetoed and passing additional bills reflecting still more initiatives unfriendly to employers’ interests.

Meanwhile, the Legislature in 2018 was as busy as ever. A spokesman for the California Labor Federation (representing more than 1,200 labor unions) gleefully pronounced 2018 a “stellar year”: “California continued to be on the leading edge of delivering economic justice to working people.”² Here are highlights of the Legislature’s accomplishments, all effective January 1, 2019, unless otherwise noted.

- **Paid Family Leave.** Legislation effective January 2018 removed the seven-day waiting period for eligible employees to receive family temporary disability benefits (under the paid family leave program, which provides wage replacement benefits to workers who take time off work to care for a seriously ill family member or to bond with a minor child within one year of birth or placement). Now additional legislation removes the reference to a seven-day waiting period in the Unemployment Insurance Code, since the waiting period rule has been removed. (See § 2.4.)

- **Lactation locations.** Employers, subject to a narrow undue-hardship exemption, must make reasonable efforts to provide, for lactation, a special room or location (that is not a bathroom), though a temporary location is permissible if certain conditions apply. (See § 2.2.)

- **The paid sick leave revolution continues.** In May 2018, San Francisco published new rules interpreting its PSL ordinance, which is the granddaddy of municipal PSL mandates. (See § 2.14.)

- **Restricting consideration of applicants’ conviction histories.** California has further restricted an employer’s ability to base hiring decisions on conviction records by requiring employers to consider only a “particular conviction” relevant to the job. (See § 4.2.)

- **San Francisco modifies its Fair Chance Ordinance.** In 2018, the City and County of San Francisco Board of Supervisors amended the Fair Chance Ordinance, expanding coverage down to the California threshold of five employees, requiring employers to wait until making a conditional offer of employment before inquiring about convictions, increasing penalties for non-compliance, creating a private right of action, forbidding employers to consider convictions more than seven years old, and adding a new category of “off limits” information—convictions for conduct later decriminalized (such as certain marijuana offenses). (See § 4.2.)
Sexual harassment complainants get more defamation protection. The Legislature has codified a defense of qualified privilege (available whenever the communicator has acted without malice) for (1) employees who report sexual harassment to their employer based on credible evidence, (2) those who communicate information to an employer about sexual harassment, and (3) those who communicate to prospective employers about determinations that a former employee engaged in sexual harassment. (See § 5.8.)

Special PAGA exemption for certain unionized construction employers. A new PAGA exemption protects union-organized construction companies whose employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. (See § 5.15.)

In-court protection for undocumented immigrants. Emergency legislation effective in May 2018 prohibits the disclosure of an individual's immigration status in open court in a civil or criminal action unless the party wishing to disclose the information requests a confidential hearing and the judge deems the evidence relevant and admissible. (See § 5.17.)

Confidentiality restrictions in agreements settling claims for sex discrimination. Settlement agreements entered into after 2018 cannot prevent the disclosure of information related to civil or administrative complaints of sexual assault, sexual harassment, and workplace harassment or discrimination based on sex, although an agreement can (1) preclude the disclosure of how much was paid in settlement and (2) protect the claimant's identity, if the claimant has requested anonymity and the opposing party is not a government agency or public official. (See § 6.5.)

Employers now potentially liable for all forms of harassment caused by non-employees. Employers formerly subject to liability for sexual harassment perpetrated by non-employees now face such potential liability with respect to all forms of unlawful harassment (removing the “sexual” limitation in Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1)).

Playing field in harassment cases tilted further in the plaintiffs’ favor. Dissatisfied with certain judicial decisions enabling employers to avoid liability for harassment, the Legislature has amended the FEHA to (1) broadly define the concept of hostile work environment, (2) reject a restrictive Ninth Circuit interpretation on what constitutes a hostile environment, (3) reject the use of the “stray remarks doctrine” in hostile environment cases, (4) reject the view that liability for sexual harassment can depend on the type of workplace, and (5) endorse the view that harassment cases are rarely appropriate for summary judgment. (See § 6.5.)

California requires human trafficking awareness. Hotel and motel employers generally must provide interactive human trafficking awareness training to employees likely to interact with human trafficking victims. (See § 6.5.)

Banning waivers of rights to testify about criminal activity or sexual harassment. No contractual provision can waive a party’s right to testify in a legal proceeding (if required or requested by court order, subpoena, or written administrative or legislative request) regarding criminal conduct or sexual harassment on the part of the other contracting party, or the other party’s agents or employees. (See § 6.5.)
Expanding required harassment training. Employers with 50 or more employees—already required to conduct biennial supervisory training to prevent sexual harassment—must supplement their training content to include training for rank-and-file employees. (See §§ 6.5, 9.1).

Strengthening ban against sexual harassment in professional relationships. The Legislature has added examples of professional relationships—“elected official,” “lobbyist,” and “director or producer”—in which sexual harassment is prohibited and authorizes actions even where the professional relationship may be easily terminated. (See § 6.5.)

Requiring sexual harassment education by talent agencies. Talent agencies now must provide education on sexual harassment prevention, retaliation, and reporting resources. (See § 6.5.)

FEHC promulgates regulations against national origin discrimination. New regulations reflect a broad definition of national origin, codify case law, and intensify already strict regulations prohibiting harassment, discrimination, and retaliation based on national origin. (See § 6.6.)

Clarifying the salary inquiry ban. Private and public employers must not ask job applicants about their prior salary, compensation, or benefits. Employers may use that information in setting pay only if the applicant voluntarily discloses that information, without prompting. Employers must also provide, upon a job applicant’s reasonable request, the pay scale for the position sought. The Legislature has now clarified the meanings of “applicant,” “pay scale,” and “reasonable request.” (See § 6.7.)

Imposing ever higher minimum wage. In accordance with a previously established series of hikes in the minimum wage (set to increase in yearly steps to $15 by 2022, with inflation-adjusted increases thereafter), California’s minimum wage is now $12.00 for larger employers (see § 7.2).

Late first meal break allowed for certain truck drivers. A new exemption allows well-paid rural truck drivers who transport livestock feed to “remote, rural areas” to take a meal period after the sixth hour of work if their regular rate of pay is at least one and one-half times the state minimum wage and the driver is subject to overtime pay. Drivers must still be provided a second meal period no later than the tenth hour of work. (See § 7.8.)

Certain on-duty rest breaks allowed in petroleum facilities. As of September 2018 there is a limited exemption from rest-break requirements for workers holding “safety-sensitive positions” in petroleum facilities, if they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement and subject to Wage Order No. 1. (See § 7.9.)

Joint liability for customers of delinquent drayage motor carriers. The DLSE must post a list of carriers with unsatisfied wage judgments and the carriers’ customers will be liable for future wage violations of the same nature. (See § 7.20.)

Joint liability for construction contractors and subcontractors. Since January 2018, direct contractors have been liable for a subcontractor’s failure to pay wages and fringe benefits. Legislation enacted in 2018 repeals the provision that relieved direct contractors for liability for anything other than unpaid wages and fringe or other benefit payments or contributions owed. (See § 7.20.)
• **Employee’s right to a copy of itemized wage statements.** A new amendment clarifies that employees have the right “to receive” a copy of—not just inspect or copy—their wage statements. (See § 16.3.)

• **Corporate boards must have women members.** Under a first-in-the-nation law, every publicly held corporation headquartered or incorporated in California must, by the end of 2019, have on its board of directors at least one woman, and by the end of 2021 every such corporation must have a minimum number of board seats filled by women in proportion to the total number of seats. (See § 20.8.)

### Judicial Developments

Here are some highlights from decisions rendered in 2018 or 2019 by courts applying California law.

#### Supreme Court Deviates From Norms To Create Burdens for California Businesses

• **Supreme Court invents pro-plaintiff rule on what a hiring business must do to classify workers as independent contractors.** The Supreme Court, considering the Wage Order definition of employee, went beyond the issue framed for decision and invented its own rule, holding that someone hiring a worker is the worker’s employee unless the hirer can meet an onerous “ABC” test. (See §§ 7.20, 19.6.)

• **Supreme Court invents pro-plaintiff rule for calculating overtime pay on “flat sum” bonuses.** Deviating from analogous federal law, the Supreme Court adopted the DLSE’s peculiar view and imposed a formula that would more than triple the amount of overtime premium pay that would be due on any bonus paid as a flat sum. (See § 7.16.)

• **Supreme Court declines to follow the federal de minimis doctrine.** The Supreme Court has rejected the de minimis doctrine that federal courts recognize under the FLSA, concluding that such a rule does not necessarily apply to California claims for unpaid minimum and overtime wages. (See § 7.4.)

#### Other Disappointing Judicial Developments

• **Supreme Court upholds application of Credit Reporting Act.** The Supreme Court has rejected an employer’s argument that the ICRAA is unconstitutionally vague and has held that an employer had to obtain the plaintiff’s written authorization under ICRAA before conducting or procuring a background investigation. (See § 4.11.)

• **Arbitration agreement voided because Spanish version was defective even though English version was not.** The Court of Appeal held that a PAGA waiver was unlawful and while the English version of the arbitration agreement stated that this offending provision was severable, the Spanish version failed to do so. Even though the English version said that the English version controlled over any translated version, the Court of Appeal found the employer “negligent” or “deceptive” and invalidated the entire agreement. (See § 5.2.)

• **Plaintiff entitled to collect attorney fees on unsuccessful claims.** The Court of Appeal has affirmed an award of $86,160 in attorney fees incurred to obtain just $4,250 in waiting-time penalties. (See § 5.12.)
Particularly pugilistic PAGA plaintiffs vindicated. Two separate Court of Appeal decisions expanded the reach of PAGA to situations where the plaintiff suffered no relevant injury—not even deemed injury.

— One decision permitted a PAGA plaintiffs to seek civil penalties for technically inadequate wage statements even where there is no basis to assert that the plaintiff suffered an actual or even a deemed injury as a result of the technical defect. (See § 5.15, 16.3.)

— The other decision permitted PAGA plaintiff affected by one Labor Code violation to seek civil penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of other aggrieved employees, even though the plaintiff himself was unaffected by those other violations. (See § 5.15.)

Trial court lacks discretion to reduce waiting time penalties. The Court of Appeal has held that a trial court cannot reduce the statutory penalty called for by a willful late payment of termination wages. (See § 7.5.)

Alternative workweek schedule requirements applied strictly against employers. The Court of Appeal affirmed an award of unpaid overtime, interest, penalties for untimely termination pay and inaccurate wage statement penalties, and attorney fees against an employer that relied on an AWS fashioned by its predecessor and that could not prove it had meet all the technical requirements. (See § 7.7.)

Business owner held personally liable for unpaid wages. The Court of Appeal held that a restaurant owner could be held personally liable for civil penalties for violations of overtime pay and minimum wage, under a statute specifying liability for persons “other than the corporate employer,” even absent any allegation that the employer had engaged in fraud, failed to follow corporate formalities, or was inadequately capitalized. (See § 7.19.)

Employee non-solicitation clause invalidated. The Court of Appeal struck down, as an unlawful restraint of trade, a provision in an employment confidentiality agreement that forbade the nurse recruiters to solicit other employees to leave the employer’s service for up to one year following the nurse recruiters’ termination of employment. (See § 12.3.)

No-employment provision in settlement agreement can be unlawful restraint of trade. The Ninth Circuit invalidated a settlement agreement by which the plaintiff waived any right to employment with the defendant or its future affiliates, where the defendant had a large economic footprint in the relevant California market. (See § 12.3.)

Some Glimmers of Hope

Anti-arbitration provisions in Ralph and Bane Acts held preempted by FAA. The Court of Appeal has struck down, as FAA-preempted, 2014 legislation that restricted arbitration of Ralph and Bane Act claims to voluntary agreements that are not a condition of employment. (See § 5.2.)

Employers fight back: employers’ association sues to declare PAGA unconstitutional. Filed by the California Business & Industrial Alliance (CABIA), this lawsuit is a counterpunch by aggrieved employers.
CABIA is a trade organization of business executives and entrepreneurs, inspired by one business owner’s personal experience with an oppressive PAGA lawsuit. (See § 5.15.)

- **Court denies “theft of labor” claim.** The Court of Appeal rejected a novel claim that failure to pay commissions amounted to stealing property, in violation of the Penal Code. (See § 5.21.)

- **Rounding practices upheld.** The Court of Appeal, recognizing that California wage laws are patterned on federal statues, rejected a challenge to an employer’s practice of rounding time to the nearest quarter hour. (See § 7.4.)

- **Meal period not denied by providing employee discounts only for meals eaten on premises.** The Ninth Circuit held that an employer limiting its meal-price discount to meals eaten on premises (in order to avoid abuse of the discount) did not thereby keep employees under the employer’s control and fail to relieve them of all duties during the meal period. (See § 7.8.)

- **Meal period not denied even if short meal periods are recorded, if employees had opportunity to take full meal period but declined to do so.** The Court of Appeal has affirmed that employers need not ensure that no work is done during a provided meal period, if the employee provided with a meal period is at liberty to use the period for whatever purpose the employee desires. (See § 7.8.)

- **Union can waive meal period entitlements on behalf of represented employees.** The Court of Appeal has recognized that employers can rely on collective bargaining agreements to waive the first meal period for employees working shifts of up to six hours. No “magic words” are needed for the CBA to meet the requirement that a statutory right must be waived in clear and unmistakable language. (See § 7.8.)

- **Health care workers can waive second meal periods even for shifts exceeding 12 hours.** Though it took California courts many years to recognize this point, the Supreme Court finally has upheld the validity of a Wage Order that permits health care employees to waive their second meal period even if they are working more than 12 hours. (See § 7.8.)

- **Temporary employment agency not responsible for client employer’s meal period violations.** The Court of Appeal held that a staffing agency that had its own compliant policy on meal periods was not required to police the meal periods of its employees who worked on a client employer’s premises, and that the staffing company was not vicariously liable for the client employer’s own violations. (See §§ 7.8, 7.20.)

- **Gas station owner not joint employer of manager employed by management company.** The Court of Appeal rejected the use of the ABC test in the joint-employer context and held in any event that a gas station owner was not the joint employer of a station manager employed by a company in charge of station operations. (See § 7.20.)

- **Wage statements need only report information for current pay period.** The Court of Appeal has rejected a novel claim that wage statements must record events that are not accounted for until a later pay period. (See § 16.3.)
Wage statements adequate if they accurately report what was paid, and need not report what should have been paid. The Court of Appeal held that it was adequate for a wage statement to record the hours actually worked and the pay actually received, and did not have to record the overtime wages due and unpaid in light of the employer’s defective alternative workweek schedule. (See § 16.3.)

Buck stops with employer, not payroll company. The Supreme Court held that a payroll company could not be held liable for its client company’s failure to pay its employees. The Supreme Court rejected the theory that the payroll company could be liable to unpaid employees on a theory that they were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the payroll company and the client company. The Supreme Court also rejected the theory that the payroll company was liable for negligence in calculating wages and negligent misrepresentation. (See § 16.3.)

Issues Pending Review in 2019 Before the Supreme Court:

We expect the California Supreme Court in 2019 to issue several decisions addressing issues in private employment:

- **When is an arbitration remedy broad enough to preclude an employee’s resort to a Berman hearing?** In *OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho*, rev. granted, No. S244630 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2017), the Supreme Court agreed to decide these issues: “(1) Was the arbitration remedy at issue in this case sufficiently affordable and accessible within the meaning of *Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109 to require the company’s employees to forego the right to an administrative Berman hearing on wage claims? (2) Did the employer waive its right to bypass the Berman hearing by waiting until the morning of that hearing, serving a demand for arbitration, and refusing to participate in the hearing?” (Case fully briefed.) (See § 5.2.)

- **Is a PAGA suit for unpaid wages immune from arbitration?** In *Lawson v. Z.B., N.A.*, rev. granted, No. S246711 (Cal. Jan. 26, 2018), the Supreme Court agreed to decide this issue: “Does a representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) seeking recovery of individualized lost wages as civil penalties under Labor Code section 558 fall within the preemptive scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)?” (Case fully briefed.) (See § 5.2.).

- **Does federal labor law preempt a claim for termination wages?** In *Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Associates*, rev. granted, No. S245607 (Cal. Jan. 10, 2018), the Supreme Court agreed to decide this issue: “Is plaintiffs’ statutory wage claim under Labor Code section 201 subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because it requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement?” (Case fully briefed.) (See § 5.2.)

- **Can a PAGA plaintiff settle his individual wage and hour claims and still pursue his PAGA action as an “aggrieved employee”?** In *Kim v. Reins International California, Inc.*, 18 Cal. App. 5th 1052 (2017), rev. granted, No. S246911 (Cal. March 28, 2018), the Supreme Court agreed to decide this question: “Does an employee bringing an action under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 1698 et seq.) lose standing to pursue representative claims as an ‘aggrieved employee’ by dismissing his or her individual claims against the employer?” (Case fully briefed.) (See § 5.15)
Can an employee seeking unpaid wages use the tort of conversion? In Voris v. Lampert, rev. granted, No. S241812 (Cal. July 12, 2017), the Supreme Court agreed to decide this issue: “Is conversion of earned but unpaid wages a valid cause of action?” (Case fully briefed.) (See § 5.21.)

Does California’s peculiar ban on averaging wages apply even where employees have received at least the minimum wage for all hours worked? In Certified Tire & Service Centers Wage and Hour Cases, rev. granted, No. S248726 (Cal. Jan. 16, 2019), the Supreme Court deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., discussed below.

Does an employee engage in compensable work while waiting for the employer to inspect a bag the employee chose to bring to work? In Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., rev. granted, No. S243805 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2017), the Supreme Court accepted a request from the Ninth Circuit, 870 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2017) (certifying question), to decide this issue: “Is time spent on the employer’s premises waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages or bags voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees compensable as ‘hours worked’ within the meaning of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 7?” (Case fully briefed.) (See § 7.3.)

Is walking to and from a time clock compensable hours worked? In Stoetzl v. State of California, rev. granted, No. S244751 (Cal. Nov. 9, 2017), the Supreme Court agreed to decide this issue: “Does the definition of ‘hours worked’ found in the Industrial Wage Commission’s Wage Order 4, as opposed to the definition of that term found in the Federal Labor Standards Act, constitute the controlling legal standard for determining the compensability of time that correctional employees spend after signing in for duty and before signing out but before they arrive at and after they leave their actual work posts within a correctional facility?” (Case fully briefed.) (See § 7.3.)

Rest breaks for ambulance attendants on 24-hours shifts. In Stewart v. San Luis Ambulance, Inc., No. S246255 (Cal. Jan. 3, 2018), the Supreme Court accepted a request from the Ninth Circuit, 878 F.3d 883 (certifying question), to decide these issues: (1) “Under the California Labor Code and applicable regulations, is an employer of ambulance attendants working twenty-four hour shifts required to relieve attendants of all duties during rest breaks, including the duty to be available to respond to an emergency call if one arises during a rest period?” (2) “Under the California Labor Code and applicable regulations, may an employer of ambulance attendants working twenty-four hour shifts require attendants to be available to respond to emergency calls during their meal periods without a written agreement that contains an on-duty meal period revocation clause? If such a clause is required, will a general at-will employment clause satisfy this requirement?” (3) “Do violations of meal period regulations, which require payment of a ‘premium wage’ for each improper meal period, give rise to claims under sections 203 and 226 of the California Labor Code where the employer does not include the premium wage in the employee's pay or pay statements during the course of the violations?” (Supplemental briefs due.) (See § 7.9.)

Can an employee collect unpaid wages from the payroll company? In Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC, rev. granted, No. S238941 (Cal. Feb. 15, 2017), the Supreme Court agreed to decide this issue: “Does the aggrieved employee in a lawsuit based on unpaid overtime have viable claims against the outside
vendor that performed payroll services under a contract with the employer?” The Supreme Court issued its decision in February 2019. (See §§ 7.20, 16.3.).

- **Does California employment law apply to non-California residents who work in California on a transitory basis?** In *Ward v. United Airlines* and *Oman v. Delta Air Lines*, Nos. S248702 and S248726 (Cal. July 2, 2018), the Supreme Court accepted requests by the Ninth Circuit—889 F.3d 1068 and 889 F.3d 1075 (certifying questions)—to address five issues: (1) “Does California Labor Code section 226 apply to wage statements provided by an out-of-state employer to an employee who resides in California, receives pay in California, and pays California income tax on her wages, but who does not work principally in California or any other state?” (2) “The Industrial Wage Commission Wage Order 9 exempts from its wage statement requirements an employee who has entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in accordance with the Railway Labor Act (RLA). (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11090(1)(E).) Does the RLA exemption in Wage Order 9 bar a wage statement claim brought under California Labor Code section 226 by an employee who is covered by a CBA?” (3) “Do California Labor Code sections 204 and 226 apply to wage payments and wage statements provided by an out-of-state employer to an employee who, in the relevant pay period, works in California only episodically and for less than a day at a time?” (4) “Does California minimum wage law apply to all work performed in California for an out-of-state employer by an employee who works in California only episodically and for less than a day at a time? (See Cal. Labor Code, §§ 1182.12, 1194; Cal. Code Regs., § 11090(4).)” (5) “Does the *Armenta/Gonzalez* bar on averaging wages apply to a pay formula that generally awards credit for all hours on duty, but which, in certain situations resulting in higher pay, does not award credit for all hours on duty? (See *Gonzales v. Downtown LA Motors*, LP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18; *Armenta v. Osmose, Inc.* (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 460.” (Reply brief due.) (See § 7.23.)

- **Is an employer’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike an employee’s suit affected by the employer’s alleged discriminatory motive?** In *Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.*, *rev. granted*, No. S239686 (Cal. March 1, 2017), the Supreme Court agreed to decide this issue: “In deciding whether an employee’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination, and defamation arise from protected activity for purposes of a special motion to strike, what is the relevance of an allegation that the employer acted with a discriminatory or retaliatory motive?” (Case fully briefed.) (See § 21.3.)

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1 “*What Will I Not Miss?* In California, a Long Farewell From Jerry Brown,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2019, at A14.

1. California Employment Law Agencies

Most statutory provisions regulating California employers appear in the Labor Code or the Government Code. Statutory provisions are available online at www.leginfo.ca.gov. The Department of Industrial Relations, which interprets Labor Code provisions, has information online at www.dir.ca.gov. The Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which interprets employment discrimination provisions in the Government Code, has information online at www.dfeh.ca.gov.

Below is a partial listing of California employment law agencies.¹

- Agricultural Labor Relations Board
- California Apprenticeship Council
- CAL-OSHA Appeals Board
- CAL-OSHA Standards Board
- Commission on Health and Safety and Workers’ Compensation
- Department of Fair Employment and Housing
- Department of Industrial Relations
- Division of Apprenticeship Standards
- Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
- Division of Labor Statistics and Research
- Division of Occupational Safety and Health
- Division of Workers’ Compensation
- Employment Development Department
- Fair Employment and Housing Commission (old)
- Fair Employment and Housing Council (new)
- Industrial Medical Council
- Industrial Welfare Commission
- Labor and Workforce Development Agency
- State Compensation Insurance Fund
- State Mediation and Conciliation Service
- Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

1.1 The Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH), Enforcing the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)

The DFEH, founded in 1959, enforces the FEHA and other civil rights laws, including the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Ralph Civil Rights Act. The DFEH investigates and prosecutes allegations of discriminatory practices in employment, housing and public accommodations, and discriminatory practices involving “hate violence.”²

Formerly, California had a Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC), which promulgated regulations,³ conducted administrative hearings on DFEH complaints, levied fines, and awarded damages. The FEHC also ordered employers to implement written harassment policies and post notices of violations. In 2013, however, the
Legislature abolished the FEHC and, with it, the administrative adjudication of FEHA claims. In the FEHC’s place is a Fair Employment and Housing Council (new FEHC), located within the DFEH. The new FEHC consists of seven volunteer members appointed by the Governor, with the power to issue regulations but without the power to adjudicate. The FEHC continues to announce plans of new regulatory projects, including interpretations of the CFRA and the FEHA.

The DFEH, meanwhile, now has authority to file lawsuits to seek all remedies, including attorney fees, after it first engages in mandatory dispute resolution through its internal Dispute Resolution Division, which offers its services free of charge to the parties. The Legislature has also established a Fair Employment and Housing Enforcement and Litigation Fund to hold attorney fees and costs awarded to the DFEH in civil actions, which the Legislature can use to help defray the DFEH’s costs.

The DFEH can file class actions challenging systemic discrimination. It obtained a favorable state trial court ruling concerning the workplace rights of transgender individuals. But the DFEH’s attempt to bring suit to enforce Title I of the federal ADA was struck down by a federal district court judge, who concluded that the DFEH had acted in excess of its authority.

Regulations interpreting the FEHA prohibit discrimination and harassment based on gender identity or gender expression, prohibit discrimination against persons who hold the special driver’s license that can be issued to undocumented persons, impose new requirements on course content and recordkeeping for harassment-prevention training, impose new requirements for the content and distribution of discrimination- and harassment-prevention policies, and assert authority for the DFEH to pursue “non-monetary preventative remedies” against an employer, even in the absence of evidence of discrimination or harassment.

Regulations effective in 2018 address discrimination and harassment based on national origin. (See § 6.6.)

1.2 The Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA)

The Labor and Workforce Development Agency emerged from a 2002 consolidation of various state departments—the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR), the Employment Development Department (EDD), the Workforce Investment Board, the Employment Training Panel, the Public Employment Relations Board, Business Investment Services, the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, and the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB). The LWDA was organized to provide more efficiency in California’s workforce training programs, and to coordinate enforcement and worker disability programs operated by DIR and EDD.

In 2017, as the Trump Administration got underway, the LWDA reaffirmed its commitment to protecting the rights of immigrant workers:

Just because the federal administration has changed, our laws and policies have not. … We will not tolerate the use of immigration status as a tool of retaliation against workers who are pursuing their rights under California law. … The California Labor and Workforce Development Agency and its partner departments reiterate that we never ask for—or do we collect—the immigration status of any worker who files a health and safety or wage theft claim with our offices. It has been longstanding state policy that our labor laws apply to all workers, regardless of immigration status, and that the immigration status of a worker is unnecessary information to enforcing our laws.
1.3 Department of Industrial Relations (DIR)

The DIR exists to improve working conditions and advance employment opportunities in California. The DIR oversees the Division of Workers Compensation, Cal-OSHA, the Industrial Welfare Commission (see § 1.4), the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (see § 1.5), and the Division of Apprenticeship Standards. The DIR has formed a Labor Enforcement Task Force, to combat the underground economy in California, thereby reducing the prevalence of underpaid wages and taxes. The Task Force includes representatives of many government branches, such as the DIR, the EDD, the Contractor’s State Licensing Board, the Bureau of Automotive Repair, the California Attorney General, and the Department of Insurance.

1.4 Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC)

The IWC, a five-member body appointed by the Governor, ascertained the hours and conditions of labor and employment in various occupations, trades, and industries, investigated the health, safety, and welfare of those employees, and promulgated wage orders that have the force of statutes (see § 7.1). Initially established in 1913, the IWC spent its first 60 years focusing on the wages, hours, and working conditions of women and children. To this end, the IWC—beginning in 1916—promulgated a series of industry- and occupation-wide wage orders, prescribing various minimum requirements with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions to protect the health and welfare of women and child laborers. The IWC’s jurisdiction broadened to employees generally in the 1970s, after courts held that female-protective violation was unlawful.

Before 2000, the IWC was the body that set overtime as well as other wage and hour requirements. It acted in a quasi-legislative capacity, promulgating wage orders that set rules for wages, hours, and working conditions that differed from one industry to another.

During a Republican administration, in 1997, the IWC eliminated daily overtime from the wage orders. In response, after Democrat Gray Davis became governor in 1998, the Legislature amended the Labor Code to reinstate daily overtime requirements and to enshrine various employee protections into the Labor Code so that they could never again be altered by the IWC. The wage orders remain in effect, but the IWC is precluded from promulgating Wage Order rules that conflict with the Labor Code.

Although the California Legislature defunded the IWC in 2004, the IWC wage orders remain in effect, and are enforced by the DLSE.

1.5 The California Labor Commissioner

1.5.1 Complaints for unpaid wages with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE)

The head of the DLSE is known as the “Labor Commissioner.” Employees claiming unpaid wages may file a claim with a local DLSE office, which will investigate. The DLSE has no jurisdiction over bona fide independent contractors and only limited jurisdiction over claims by federal, state, county or municipal employees, and employees working under collective bargaining agreements.
The DLSE, through its Bureau of Field Enforcement, has focused its enforcement and collection efforts in particular industries, such as the car wash, restaurant, construction, garment, and agriculture industries. The Labor Commissioner has heralded a public awareness campaign—“Wage Theft Is A Crime”—to educate workers about their wage and hour rights. As of 2018, the Labor Commission has expanded authority to investigate an employer—with or without a complaint being filed—when the Labor Commissioner, during a wage claim or investigation, suspects retaliation or discrimination.

The DLSE schedules settlement conferences and administrative hearings (called “Berman hearings”) before Deputy Labor Commissioners in various branch offices throughout the state. Within ten days after service of the notice and the complaint, the defendant (the employer) may file an answer. Within 30 days of the complaint, the DLSE notifies the parties whether a hearing will be held, whether the DLSE will prosecute the matter itself, or whether no further action will be taken. A hearing, if held, is to occur within 90 days of that determination. A continuance of a hearing is rarely granted. Claims that involve a large number of employees and records may attract the attention of the DLSE’s Bureau of Field Enforcement, which may require the employer to undergo an audit.

The DLSE can seek liquidated damages for an employer’s failure to pay minimum wage, and has three years to collect statutory penalties and fees. Moreover, a Labor Commissioner order, decision or award, once final and filed with the county recorder, creates a lien on the employer’s real property as if it were a final judgment creating a judgment lien.

The conference. The conference determines if the claim can be resolved without a hearing. The parties bring evidence to support their positions, but do not testify under oath. If the case is not resolved at the conference, then the Deputy Labor Commissioner determines whether to dismiss the claim or set the matter for a hearing.

The Berman hearing. This hearing occurs in an informal setting, but is a formal proceeding. The parties and witnesses testify under oath, and the proceedings are tape-recorded. The hearing officer is not bound by formal rules of evidence and has wide discretion to accept evidence and decide whether to assess penalties. Within 15 days of the hearing, the Labor Commissioner serves on the parties an Order, Decision, or Award (ODA), setting forth the hearing officer’s decision and the amount awarded, if any.

Can employees waive a Berman hearing in an arbitration agreement? In 2011, the California Supreme Court held that waiver of the Berman hearing would contravene public policy, and that California law prohibiting waiver of a Berman hearing is not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. The United States Supreme Court then reversed this decision and remanded for further consideration in light of its decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion. On remand, the California Supreme Court yielded and reversed itself and agreed that the FAA would preempt any categorical ban on a Berman-hearing waiver. The California Supreme Court nonetheless held that California’s policy against unconscionability might still apply to void an arbitration provision that would deprive an employee of the right to a Berman hearing before arbitration is required. A case addressing the circumstances under which an arbitration process is sufficiently accessible to permit the enforceable waiver of a Berman hearing is now pending before the Supreme Court. (See § 5.2.)
Appeal to civil court. Within ten days after service of notice of an ODA, a party may seek judicial review by filing an appeal to the court. The court clerk will then schedule a trial de novo—the parties will try the case again from the start, with each party presenting evidence and witnesses.

The Labor Code discourages employer appeals from DLSE awards by requiring that the appealing employer post a bond, by making interest run on the amount of the award, by entitling the employee to costs and attorney fees on the appeal even if the award on appeal is less than the award from the Labor Commissioner (so long as the award is greater than zero), and by permitting the employee to raise new claims on appeal that the employee failed to raise before the DLSE.

Undertaking required of employer on appeal. Employers who appeal a DLSE award must post with the reviewing court an undertaking in the amount of the award. Employers wishing to appeal must first post the undertaking. An employer’s failure to timely post the undertaking—or to request an indigency waiver—is jurisdictional, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction and leaving the employer without recourse. If the employer loses at trial or withdraws its appeal, then the employer must pay the amount of the award within ten days of the court’s judgment or withdrawal of the appeal; otherwise, the undertaking will be forfeited to the employee.

Interest. All awards accrue interest (at the legal rate of 10%) from the date due to the date paid.

Costs and attorney fees. The DLSE may represent a claimant who cannot afford counsel. In an appeal from an ODA, the appealing party who is “unsuccessful” is liable for the other party’s costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal. Although appealing employees who received less from the court than was awarded by the DLSE are “unsuccessful” in this sense, the California Legislature has deemed that an appealing employee “is successful if the court awards an amount greater than zero.”

New employee claims can arise at trial. In one case, an employee prevailed before the Labor Commissioner on claims for unpaid overtime. When the employer appealed from the ODA for a trial de novo in court, the court permitted the employee to add new claims.

1.5.2 Complaints for retaliation

The DLSE also hears complaints that a person has suffered discrimination in violation of law under the jurisdiction of the DLSE.

1.5.3 Records inspection

The Labor Code permits the DLSE to inspect the records of any “employer” to determine if the minimum wage has been paid, and to “enforce the payment of any sums found, upon examination, to be due and unpaid to the employees.”

1.5.4 The DLSE Manual

The DLSE published, in 2002, a comprehensive Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual, available online (www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Manual-Instructions.htm) and subject to periodic updates. DLSE interpretations typically favor the view of the law that is most onerous for employers. The Manual itself deserves no judicial respect, as it amounts to an “underground regulation”—an administrative pronouncement that an agency issues
without giving notice of a proposed regulation and an opportunity for the public to comment. The Manual is very useful, however, to the extent that it summarizes opinion letters (discussed immediately below) that the DLSE has issued in specific situations.

1.5.5 DLSE opinion letters

The DLSE has issued opinion letters in response to particular situations presented by individual employees and employers. The precise amount of judicial deference owed to DLSE opinion letters is unclear. The interpretations found in these opinion letters lack the legal respect owed to a formal administrative interpretation. Emphasizing this point, one of the first executive orders of the Schwarzenegger Administration—Executive Order S-2-03—placed DLSE opinion letters “under review to determine their legal force and effect” and emphasized that DLSE opinions “are advice in specific cases only.” The DLSE under the Schwarzenegger Administration withdrew certain opinion letters, principally involving the alternative workweek, bonuses, compensatory time off, use of vacation time to offset partial-day absences for salaried employees, and caps on vacation-pay earnings.

Nonetheless, California courts interpreting wage orders have suggested that the “DLSE’s interpretation of an IWC [wage] order is entitled to great weight.” Courts seem to adopt or reject the reasoning of a DLSE opinion letter depending on whether the court independently finds the DLSE’s reasoning persuasive.

1.5.6 Compliance Monitoring Unit

The DLSE’s Compliance Monitoring Unit (CMU) focuses on enforcing prevailing-wage requirements on public works. Awarding bodies must notify the CMU, through the Public Works Chapter, each time a public works contract is awarded.

1.5.7 Labor Commission enforcement enhanced

The Labor Commissioner can hold hearings to determine whether an employer is liable for civil penalties. Under legislation called “A Fair Day’s Pay Act,” the Labor Commissioner can conduct hearings to determine whether a “person acting on behalf of an employer” should be held personally liable for an employer’s violations, and can seek payment from successor employers. The Labor Commissioner can file liens on property in California for unpaid wages and the other compensation, penalties, and interest owed to an employee.

The Labor Commissioner can enforce local laws regarding overtime and minimum wage provisions and issue citations and penalties for violations, provided the local entity has not already cited the employer for the same violation. The Labor Commissioner can also issue citations and penalties to employers who violate the expense-reimbursement provisions of Labor Code section 2802.

As of 2018, the Labor Commissioner or an employee may seek injunctive relief—such as reinstatement pending resolution of the claim—upon a mere finding of “reasonable cause” that a violation of the law has occurred. The Labor Commissioner may also issue citations to persons it determines to be responsible for violations, directing specific relief.
1.6 California Employment Development Department (EDD)

1.6.1 General administration

The EDD collects payroll taxes for the state and administers programs concerning Job Service, Unemployment Insurance, State Disability Insurance (SDI), Paid Family Leave (PFL) benefits, the Workforce Investment Act, and the Welfare-to-Work program.

SDI is a partial wage-replacement insurance plan for California workers, funded through mandatory employee payroll deductions. SDI provides short-term benefits to eligible workers who suffer a loss of wages when they cannot work due to a non-work-related illness or injury, or a medically disabling condition resulting from pregnancy or childbirth.

The EDD also administers the employee-funded PFL program, which provides partial wage-replacement for employees who are eligible for an otherwise unpaid leave to care for an ill or injured family member.51

1.6.2 Payroll tax audits regarding independent contractor classifications

As California’s largest tax collection agency, the EDD conducts payroll tax audits of California businesses, often after workers have filed claims for unemployment insurance benefits against businesses that have not paid any payroll taxes with respect to those workers. The EDD frequently challenges the classification of workers as independent contractors instead of employees. During a payroll tax audit, the EDD obtains accounting records and visits on-site. The review period is generally up to three years. The audit aims to see if everyone paid for services was properly classified as an employee or independent contractor and if wages and taxes were properly reported. Audits, if they go badly for the employer, can result in an assessment of additional taxes and penalties due. The employer may petition for a reassessment or for a hearing before an administrative law judge.

The significance of correct classification looms especially large in light of the hefty potential civil penalties for employers and their outside, non-attorney advisors who engage in “willful misclassification” of workers as independent contractors.52

1.6.3 EDD regulations and checklists

The EDD has issued comprehensive regulations to apply the common law to questions of whether workers are employees or independent contractors. The regulations state that the most important factor is the right of the principal to control the manner and means of accomplishing the desired results, but also list ten other factors to consider.53 The regulations give guidance on the specific application of these rules in a number of particular industries, including real estate, home health care, computer services, newspaper distribution, process servers, banking, and cosmetology.54 A comprehensive EDD checklist provides guidance in determining whether the service provider is an employee or an independent contractor.

1.7 California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (UIAB)

The UIAB hears claims for unemployment and disability benefits. These cases are appeals from administrative determinations made by the EDD. The UIAB also hears petitions from taxpayers concerning assessments made by the EDD’s Tax Branch. The initial hearings and decisions are heard in eleven Offices of Appeals throughout
the state. These offices conduct the first level of appeal. An administrative law judge presides, and takes tape-
recorded testimony under oath (see § 15.3). A losing party at the first level may appeal to the second level.\textsuperscript{55}

1.8 Division of Workers’ Compensation (DWC)

Workers’ compensation cases brought by injured workers (“applicants”) are heard by workers’ compensation
referees employed by the DWC. Rehabilitation disputes are heard by a consultant in the DWC Rehabilitation Unit,
whose decision can be appealed to a workers’ compensation referee. Any settlement of a workers’ compensation
case must be in the form of a compromise and release, extinguishing liability in return for a stipulated amount,
which must be approved by a workers’ compensation referee. The standard form used to effect a compromise
and release (“C&R”) will not release an individual’s civil claims against the employer.\textsuperscript{56} Applicants’ attorney fees
also must be approved by a workers’ compensation referee, and are generally 9-15% of the settlement amount.\textsuperscript{57}

1.9 Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB)

The WCAB is a seven-member judicial body appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. It reviews
petitions for reconsideration of decisions by workers’ compensation administrative law judges of the DWC and
regulates the adjudication process by adopting rules of practice and procedure. A WCAB decision is reviewable
only by the appellate courts.

1.10 Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH)

The DOSH protects workers and the public from safety hazards by enforcing occupational and public safety laws
and providing information and consultative assistance to employers, workers, and the public about workplace and
public safety matters. The DOSH, through the Cal-OSHA Enforcement Unit, inspects California workplaces based
on worker complaints, accident reports, and high hazard industries.

Penalties for Cal/OSHA violations are assessed per citation, and can run from several hundred dollars to tens of
thousands of dollars.\textsuperscript{59}

DOSH has amended its regulations to (1) increase the “look back” period from three years to five years to
determine if there is a “repeat” violation of a safety order, (2) allow a repeat citation for any prior employer
violations in the state (as opposed to repeat citations to a fixed establishments or within the region for businesses
that have no fixed establishments), and (3) allow a repeat citation for a substantially similar violation, hazard, or
condition (as opposed to the “same violation” under former law).\textsuperscript{59}

DOSH’s broader authority to issue repeat citations could have significant ramifications for employers, in that
penalties for repeat citations can reach $70,000 per violation.\textsuperscript{60}

The Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board, a three-member quasi-judicial body appointed by the
Governor and confirmed by the Senate, handles appeals from private and public sector employers regarding
citations issued by DOSH for alleged violations of workplace safety and health laws and regulations.\textsuperscript{51}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[1] For more information, see www.ca.gov.
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2 As of June 2013, disability discrimination complaints were the most common, followed by retaliation, race and gender discrimination, and sexual harassment. For more information, see www.dfeh.ca.gov.
3 The old FEHC, as one of its last acts, on December 30, 2012, promulgated long-awaited regulations on disability (2 Cal. Code Regs §§ 7293.5–7294.4) and pregnancy (2 Cal. Code Regs §§ 7291.2–7291.18).
7 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(e).
8 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11024.
9 2 Cal. Code Regs §§ 11023(b),(c).
10 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11023(a).
12 For more information, see www.labor.ca.gov.
13 Lab. Code § 1173.
17 Some industries historically have heavily relied on immigrant labor. California has enacted measures in recent years to protect immigrant workers (see §§ 3.5, 5.17, 6.6).
18 The campaign targets workers in low-wage industries (e.g., agriculture, garment, construction, and hospitality) and uses numerous languages to better reach immigrant workers. The websites, in English and Spanish, are www.wagetheftisacrime.com/ and www.robosuesueloedsuncrimen.com.
19 SB 306, codified in Labor Code §§ 98.74, 1102.61, 1102.62 and amending Labor Code § 98.7(b)(2).
20 See Lab. Code §§ 98(a) and 98.3.
21 Lab. Code § 98.
22 Lab. Code § 98(a).
23 Lab. Code § 200.5(a). In 2013, the Court of Appeal held that, as long as a claimant is consistently pursuing remedies in any forum—administrative or judicial—the statute of limitations on a wage claim will be subject to equitable tolling, but this decision was then depublished by the California Supreme Court. Bain v. Tax Reducers, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 4th 110 (2013), rev. denied and ordered not to be officially published, No. S213850 (Cal. Dec 11, 2013).
24 Lab. Code § 98.2.
29 Lab. Code § 98.2(a).
31 Lab. Code § 98.2(b). In years past, employers would sometimes timely appeal from DLSE orders within the 10-day statutory deadline, but may post the bond or cash deposit until later, because of financial or practical difficulties. But the Court of Appeal has held that the 10-day deadline applies to the undertaking requirement as well as the notice of appeal. Palagin v. Paniagua Construction, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 124, 140 (2013).
33 Id.
34 Lab. Code § 98.1(c).
35 Lab. Code § 98.4.
36 Id.
37 Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group, 29 Cal. 4th 345, 370 (2002) (before amendment of Labor Code section 98.2(c), either party seeking de novo appeal of Labor Commissioner order, whether employer or employee, was liable for the other side’s fees and costs unless trial court judgment was more favorable to the appealing party than was the award from which the appeal was taken).
39 Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1114-20 (2007) (employee who claimed only overtime and waiting-time penalties before the DLSE could add, during the trial de novo on the employer’s appeal, additional claims for missing meal and rest breaks and inadequate wage-itemization statements).
40 Lab. Code § 98.7. This provision has not been held to be an employee’s exclusive remedy for discrimination of this sort. See generally § 5.5.2.
41 Lab. Code § 1195.5.
42 Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal. 4th 557, 576 (1996) (no deference owed to DLSE’s Enforcement Manual, because it was not promulgated in conformity with Administrative Procedures Act). See also McFarland v. Guardsmark, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that employee who agrees to on-duty meal break when working more than 10 hours and not fewer than 12, and rejecting contrary interpretation set forth in DLSE Manual as “void regulation”), aff’d, 588 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2009); Areso v. CarMax, Inc., 195 Cal. App. 4th 996, 1007 (2011) (“we afford no deference to the statement in the DLSE manual, because it was not properly adopted); California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan, 112 Cal. App. 4th 16, 28 (2003) (rejecting as void a long-standing DLSE “underground regulation” limiting professional exemption for teachers to teachers in colleges that offer a baccalaureate degree).
46 Lab. Code §§ 96, 98.
47 Lab. Code §§ 96.8, 238, 238.2, 238.3, 238.4, 238.5, and 558.1.
48 Lab. Code §§ 558, 1197, 1197.1, and 2802.
49 SB 306, 2017 bill adding Lab. Code §§ 98.74, 1102.61, 1102.62.
50 Lab. Code § 98.74(a).
51 For more information, see www.edd.ca.gov.
52 Lab. Code §§ 226.8 and 2753. Penalties range from $5,000 to $25,000 per violation.
55 For more information, see http://www.cuiab.ca.gov/index.asp (visited Feb. 6, 2019). UIAB decisions can have binding effect. In Happy Nails & Spa of Fashion Valley v. Su, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1459 (2013), ordered not officially published (Nov. 20, 2013), the Court of Appeal held that once the UIAB found that cosmetologists were independent contractors, the Labor Commissioner was collaterally estopped to pursue penalties on the basis that the workers were really employees.
56 Claxton v. Waters, 34 Cal. 4th 367, (2004) (standard preprinted form used to settle workers’ compensation claim releases only those claims within scope of the workers’ compensation system, and not claims asserted in separate civil actions); Camacho v. Target Corp., 24 Cal. App. 5th 291 (2018) (reversing summary judgment for employer as to statutory discrimination claims and tort claims; mandatory preprinted C&R form, amended since Claxton, does not release claims outside workers’ compensation system and expressly disclaims any intent to do so). A different result obtained in Jefferson v. Department of Youth Authority, 28 Cal. 4th 299, 304 (2002), only because there the parties in an attachment to their settlement agreement clearly expressed their intent to settle matters outside the scope of workers’ compensation.
57 For more information, see www.dir.ca.gov/DWC.
60 8 Cal. Code Regs § 336(g).
61 For more information, see http://www.dir.ca.gov/DOSH.
2. Leave and Accommodation Statutes

2.1 Pregnancy Disability Leave

Under the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (PDLL), California employers with five or more employees must grant up to “four months” (17.33 weeks) of unpaid leave per pregnancy to employees disabled by pregnancy or pregnancy-related conditions, regardless of whether the employer allows disability leaves generally. Regulations state that the reinstatement must be to the exact same position (as opposed to an equivalent or comparable position), and that the employee is entitled to a written guarantee of reinstatement upon request. A pregnancy-disabled employee who exhausts her four months of PDLL leave also may be entitled to additional leave under the FEHA, as a reasonable accommodation for a disability.

Note that California thus requires a pregnancy disability leave, not a maternity leave. Employers who grant motherhood leaves (unrelated to disability) without also granting fatherhood leaves arguably discriminate against male employees because of their gender.

The PDLL requires further accommodations, such as temporary transfers, for conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. A California employer may transfer an employee over her objection only if she seeks a reduced schedule or intermittent leave and a transfer would better accommodate her needs. California employers must maintain and pay for group health benefits during the employee’s pregnancy disability leave as if she were actively working during the leave, up to a maximum of four months within a 12-month period (commencing on the date the pregnancy disability leave begins). Employers must maintain health coverage for up to seven months if employees take their full PDLL leave and then their full CFRA leave for baby bonding.

Employers must not interfere with or restrain the exercise or attempted exercise of PDLL rights.

2.2 Lactation Accommodation

In 2010, Congress amended the FLSA to require employers to provide employees with a reasonable amount of unpaid break time in a private location (other than a bathroom) to express milk for their children of up to one year in age. In so doing, Congress followed the lead of California, which since 2002 had entitled employees to take unpaid breaks to express milk in a private location (other than a toilet stall), in close proximity to the work area, unless this break time would “seriously disrupt the operations of the employer.” California then, in legislation effective in 2019, amended its statute to require that the lactation location be other than a “bathroom.”

The California standard remains more lactation-friendly than the federal standard: California extends lactation-accommodation benefits to all employees, not just nonexempt employees, and California requires lactation accommodation regardless of whether the employee is expressing milk for the employee’s own child.

The FEHA includes breastfeeding and related medical conditions within its very expansive definition of “sex” (see § 6.2), and thus forbids California employers to discriminate against those who breastfeed.

San Francisco ordinance. San Francisco employers must provide, for employees who want to express milk, a clean, private space that includes a place to sit, has access to electricity, and has a surface space for a breast pump. The space must be in close proximity to a sink with running water and a refrigerator. If such a space does
not exist, then the employer must create it, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. San Francisco employers must provide notice of their lactation accommodation policy to employees upon hiring.\(^{15}\)

2.3 Family Care and Medical Leave

Under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), an eligible employee of an employer with at least 50 employees within 75 miles of the employee’s worksite is entitled to unpaid leave of up to 12 workweeks in a 12-month period for reason of (1) birth, adoption, or foster-care placement of a child, or (2) serious health condition of the employee or the employee’s child, spouse, registered domestic partner, or parent.\(^{16}\)

California employers must not interfere with an employee exercising or attempting to exercise CFRA rights.\(^{17}\)

Since 2018 California’s New Parent Leave Act has required even more employers (those with at least 20 employees within 75 miles of the employee’s worksite) to provide parental leave to eligible employees (those who have worked more than 12 months and at least 1,250 hours).\(^{18}\) These employees are entitled to unpaid leave of up to 12 workweeks in a 12 month period to bond with a new child within a year of the child’s birth, adoption, or foster care placement. An employer employing both parents need not provide more than 12 weeks in total to the employees, and may choose to grant the leave for both parents simultaneously.\(^{19}\) Employers must maintain coverage for group health plans while the employee is on leave, but can recover costs for employees who decide not to return after their leave exhausts, if the reason not to return is something other than a serious health condition (or other circumstances beyond the employee’s control).\(^{20}\)

The California requirements not only cover more employers than does the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (which is limited to employers of at least 50 employees), but also provide more employee entitlements. The CFRA entitles an employee to intermittent leave for bonding without the employer’s permission, and the basic minimum duration of that leave generally is two weeks.\(^{21}\) Further, California employers cannot require “medical facts” (e.g., symptoms or a diagnosis) and certain other information that the FMLA would permit as part of a medical certification, and also cannot obtain a second or third medical opinion as to the serious health condition of a family member (as opposed to the employee’s own medical condition, where second and third opinions are permitted).\(^{22}\)

The CFRA also imposes additional employer requirements with respect to pregnant employees. An employee who has taken a pregnancy disability leave of up to four months under the California PDLL may take an additional 12 weeks of CFRA leave to bond with her child (or for any other CFRA-qualifying reason), during which the employer must continue health insurance coverage.

2.3.1 Employee right to rely on spokesperson while on leave?

Ordinarily, an employer can discipline an employee on leave who refuses to communicate. But a California appellate decision reversed a summary judgment for an employer that had dismissed an employee on leave for refusing to respond to repeated follow-up inquiries regarding his condition, and for insisting instead that any communication be through his wife or his workers’ compensation attorney or his physician. To the employer, this was a clear case of insubordination, warranting dismissal, but the Court of Appeal found a triable issue of whether the employer itself had been reasonable in insisting on direct communication with its employee. The employee’s psychiatrist had advised him to avoid stressful situations and he had felt “too stressed out” to speak with his
employer directly. The Court of Appeal concluded that “nothing precluded [the employer], at a minimum, from contacting [the workers’ compensation] attorney,”23 and that the record thus supported an inference that the employer had unreasonably refused to communicate with the employee’s representatives.

### 2.3.2 Expansive definition of serious health condition

The California Supreme Court has reversed a summary judgment in favor of a hospital that had dismissed a technician for absenting herself under suspicious circumstances and then defying an order to return to work.24 She had submitted a physician’s note supporting a 30-day leave for “medical reasons,” which the employer disputed by sending her to a second physician, who opined that she could return to work without restrictions. The employer relied on this second opinion in firing the plaintiff. The technician sued the hospital for firing her without following CFRA procedures, arguing that the hospital’s failure to seek yet a third medical opinion stopped the hospital from challenging her serious health condition.

The California Supreme Court made two rulings. First, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a third opinion was required, the Supreme Court held that an employer can challenge an employee’s assertion of a serious health condition without having to use the CFRA’s dispute resolution method of obtaining a binding determination on the employee’s condition from a third, jointly chosen, health care provider. This was a narrow employer victory through a 4-3 vote.

Second, by an equally narrow margin, the California Supreme Court rejected the employer’s argument that the employee’s ability to perform a similar job during her absence conclusively disproved her claim that she had a “serious health condition” that made her “unable to perform the functions of a technician’s position.” Rather, the Supreme Court thought that this fact was merely “strong evidence” for the employer to take to the jury.

### 2.3.3 Expansive construction of requests for CFRA leave

The Court of Appeal revived the claim of an employee who had been discharged for excessive absenteeism.25 The employee admittedly never requested CFRA leave and the managers who discharged him relied on his habitual absences, without knowing he had been hospitalized. Yet the Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment against him, holding that he arguably had requested CFRA leave—thereby triggering an employer duty to inquire into his situation—when he submitted a medical form indicating he had been in the hospital.

### 2.3.4 Employer response obligations clarified

CFRA regulations provide a deadline for the employer’s response.26 An employer need not affirm or deny a request within five business days, but rather must “respond to” a request within that time. It is sufficient, therefore, for an employer to address a request and seek additional information from the employee; the employer need not reach its final decision within the five-day period.27

### 2.3.5 Leave granted to care for same-sex spouse

Same-sex marriages are now lawful.28 An employee may take CFRA leave to care for a same-sex spouse with a serious health condition. The federal Department of Labor has revised the definition of “spouse” for purposes of taking FMLA leave. Under the FMLA, spouse is defined as “a husband or wife as defined or recognized under
state law for purposes of marriage in the state where the employee resides, including ‘common law’ marriage and same-sex marriage.”

2.3.6 Absence of “honest belief” defense?

In a case now depublished, the Court of Appeal held that the “honest belief” defense available to an employer in many discrimination contexts does not apply to a CFRA claim. Rather, an employer denying leave in the belief that the employee is abusing leave must be factually correct in that belief: the employer could not “simply rely on an imprecisely worded and inconsistently applied company policy to terminate an employee on CFRA leave without adequately investigating and developing sufficient facts to establish the employee had actually engaged in misconduct warranting dismissal.”

On review, the California Supreme Court declined to rule on the viability of the “honest belief” defense, as it ruled for the defendant on another ground.

2.3.7 San Francisco work arrangement leave

The San Francisco Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance gives employees of covered employers the right to request a flexible or predictable work arrangements to care for a child, a covered family member with a serious health condition, or a parent over age 65. To be eligible, an employee must have worked for the employer for at least six months, must regularly work at least eight hours per week, and must work within the San Francisco City limits. A request by an eligible employee triggers various procedural requirements. The employer must meet with the employee about the request within 21 days of the request and respond in writing to the employee’s request within 21 days of that meeting. An employer may deny the employee’s request for bona fide business reasons such as cost, detrimental effect on customer needs, inability to organize work among other employees, or insufficiency of work during the periods the requesting employee proposes to work.

2.4 Paid Family Leave

Employees of private California employers who take time off work to care for a seriously ill child, spouse, parent, or domestic partner or to bond with a new child are entitled to up to six weeks of Family Temporary Disability Insurance (FTDI) benefits (i.e., Paid Family Leave (PFL) benefits) during a 12-month period. An employee can claim these benefits at any time after being employed. The program is administered in conjunction with the state disability insurance program, with insurance payments funded by an employee payroll tax.

The level of benefits provided to individuals in the PFL and State Disability Insurance (SDI) programs for periods of disability and family leave increased from 55 percent of base wages to either 60 or 70 percent, depending on the applicant’s income. An employer may require an employee to take up to two weeks of earned but unused vacation leave prior to the employee’s initial receipt of FTDI benefits.

The PFL law does NOT create leave rights. Thus, an employee eligible for PFL benefits is not entitled to reinstatement unless the leave is otherwise protected by law (e.g., FMLA or CFRA), and employers need not provide employee benefits during the paid leave unless other statutes (e.g., family leave statutes) provide for continuation of benefits.
Under a broad definition of “family,” family temporary disability wage replacement benefits are available for family leaves regarding not only a seriously ill child, spouse, parent, or domestic partner, but also a seriously ill grandparent, grandchild, sibling, and parent-in-law. Pay is also available for leave to bond with a minor child within one year of the birth of the child or the placement of the child in connection with foster care or adoption.  

2.4.1 San Francisco Paid Parental Leave Ordinance

San Francisco’s Paid Parental Leave Ordinance (SFPPLO) requires employers who regularly employ at least 20 employees to provide full pay (up to a cap) for up to six weeks of leave. Eligible employees may already receive wage replacement through the California PFL, but San Francisco employers must supplement the PFL pay, providing employees with their full pay, up to the benefits cap established by the California EDD (as described below).

Employees, to be eligible for leave, need 180 days of employment with the employer. Part-time or temporary employees, to be eligible, need to spend at least 40% of their total weekly hours (and eight hours per workweek) for the employer within San Francisco’s geographic boundaries. Only those employees who apply for and receive PFL wage replacement for the purpose of bonding with a new child are eligible for SFPPLO pay.

Employers may also mandate use of up to two weeks of accrued vacation before the supplemental pay is due, and these two weeks count toward the employer’s requirements to provide supplemental pay for a total of six weeks. Employers also may require an employee to obtain PFL benefits to be eligible for the supplemental pay.

Employees are entitled only up to a maximum benefit derived by formula. An employer need not provide SFPPLO pay that exceeds a state cap on income (for the purposes of PFL). The maximum weekly PFL pay for claims effective in 2019 is 60% or 70% of a wage cap set at $2,2027. That cap would make SFPPLO pay a maximum of 30% or 40% of $2,027 per week. Changes in the percentage of income replacement by PFL and the state income cap will affect the supplemental amount San Francisco employers must pay.

2.5 Accommodation of Addicts and Illiterates

Employers of 25 or more employees must provide a “reasonable accommodation” (e.g., an unpaid leave) for employees who wish to participate in alcohol or drug rehabilitation programs or adult literacy programs, and must take reasonable steps to safeguard the privacy of the employee who has enrolled in a rehabilitation program.

2.6 Time Off for Court Appearances (Jury Duty, Witness Leave, etc.)

California employers must grant unpaid leave to, and must not discriminate against, employees who (1) are summoned for jury duty or for a court appearance as a witness, (2) appear in court to seek relief as a victim of domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault, or (3) are victims of certain felonies or are closely related to such victims. Generally a condition of leave is giving reasonable notice to the employer.
2.6.1 Jury duty

An employer may require that employees on jury duty report to work when not called to serve on a jury. Although employers who provide paid jury duty typically limit the pay to two weeks, both federal and California law generally require, as a condition of exempt status, that exempt employees receive a salary of a fixed amount per week regardless of the amount worked that week, so that a partial-week jury leave may amount, as a practical matter, to fully paid leave for exempt employees.

2.6.2 Victim-related court appearances

California employers must not discharge, discriminate, or retaliate against an employee who takes time off, after giving reasonable advance notice (where feasible), to appear at any proceeding involving the right of a victim of any of certain crimes. The law specifies that the information needed to certify the absence can include a police report, court order, or medical documentation. A “victim” protected under this law includes the employee or the employee’s spouse, parent, child, sibling, or guardian.

2.7 Victimhood Accommodation

California has created rights for individuals who are victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking. These individuals not only may need to miss work for victim-related judicial proceedings (see § 2.6.2), but also may have special safety and medical needs.

2.7.1 Safety accommodations

California employers must engage in an interactive process and provide reasonable accommodations—absent undue hardship—for employees victimized by domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking who have disclosed that status and who have requested a safety accommodation while at work. Reasonable accommodations may include such “safety measures” as modified schedules, changed telephone numbers, and installation of locks. The employer, in considering a reasonable accommodation, may require certification of the employee’s continued victim status.

2.7.2 Medical leaves

California employers with 25 or more employees must permit employees who are victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to take time off work to obtain victim-related services, such as medical attention, psychological counseling, or help in safety planning.

2.8 Time Off for Good Deeds and Training for Same

California employers must allow employees to take leaves of absence to serve as volunteer firefighters, peace officers, and emergency rescue personnel. Also qualifying for leave status is volunteer service with the Civil Air Patrol. Employers with 50 or more employees must also allow temporary leaves of absence to enable employees to engage in fire, law enforcement, or emergency rescue training. Employees subjected to an adverse employment action for taking time off for these reasons can seek reinstatement and recovery of lost wages and work benefits. A willful violation of this law may constitute a misdemeanor.
2.9 Voting Leave

California employers must post, at least ten days before each statewide election, a notice that employees who lack time to vote during nonworking hours may take paid leave of up to two hours to vote.\(^{55}\) This time off to vote should be at the start or end of the regular work shift, whichever allows the most time for voting.\(^{56}\)

2.10 School Parent Leave

Employers with 25 or more employees at the same location must grant unpaid leave of up to 40 hours each year to an employee who is a parent to participate in various activities of the parent’s child in grades kindergarten through 12, or at a licensed child care provider.\(^{57}\) Among the activities covered are finding and enrolling in school or licensed child care activities, and addressing a school or child-care-provider emergency.\(^{58}\) “Child care provider or school emergency” includes a request that the child be picked up from school or child care, an attendance policy that prohibits the child from attending the school or licensed child care provider, behavioral or discipline problems, closure or unexpected unavailability of the school or child care provider (excluding planned holidays), and a natural disaster.\(^{59}\) An eight-hour-per-month limit applies to leave for non-emergency activities.\(^{60}\) Employers must not discriminate against an employee for taking time off for these activities.\(^{61}\) Employers also must not discriminate against an employee who, at a teacher’s request, appears in school as the parent or guardian of a suspended pupil.\(^{62}\) The law defines “parent” expansively to include a parent, guardian, stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent of—or a person who stands in loco parentis to—a child.\(^{63}\)

2.11 Kin Care Leave

Under the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act, all California employers must provide paid sick leave to all employees for their own or a family member’s illness or injury and other specified reasons.\(^{64}\) (See § 2.14 below.) Meanwhile, under the “kin care” statute,\(^{65}\) employers also must permit employees to use in a calendar year the amount of sick leave that accrues during six months, for certain purposes, including the diagnosis, care, medical treatment, or preventive care of any “family member”—a spouse, registered domestic partner, grandparent, grandchild, sibling, parent, or child. Both “parent” and “child” are defined very broadly to cover all varieties—natural, adopted, foster, step, ward, or in loco parentis.\(^{66}\)

Thus, for example, an employee who accrues six days of sick leave throughout a year may use up to three days of leave to care for family, while an employee who receives a grant of six sick days at the beginning of a year may use all six days of leave to care for family. In light of the new paid sick leave law, which does not distinguish between time off for the employee’s own medical condition and time off to attend to a family member (each being a legitimate reason to use statutory paid sick time), the “kin care” rule has limited relevance. The rule applies practically only to grants of sick leave in excess of the statutory minimum of 24 hours (or 3 days) annually.

Employers who provide paid time off (PTO) may unwittingly subject themselves to additional kin care requirements, as PTO (personal time off that can be taken for any reason, including illness) can be considered a form of additional sick leave.\(^{67}\)
The California Supreme Court has ruled that the kin care statute does not apply to sick leave policies that provide for an uncapped number of compensated sick days for an employee’s own illness, but rather applies only to sick leave policies that provide for measurable amounts of accrued sick leave.\(^6\)

California employers must grant kin care leave to—and must not discriminate against—an employee who attempts to use kin care leave, and must not count that leave as an absence that may lead to discipline of the employee.\(^6\) Aggrieved employees are entitled to reinstatement and actual damages, or one day’s pay, whichever is greater. Employees who prevail in a court action are entitled to attorney fees.\(^7\)

California employers must not deny an employee the right to use sick leave for kin care purposes and must not take discriminatory action against an employee for using—or attempting to exercise the right to use—sick leave for those purposes.\(^7\)

The Court of Appeal has rejected an argument that ERISA preempts the application of kin-care requirements for an employer that uses trusts to provide paid sick leave.\(^2\)

### 2.12 Military Leave

The California Military and Veterans Code contains sections comparable to the language in the federal USERRA, and also provides additional employee rights, especially for public sector employees, and protects service members for state call-ups. California employers must not discharge a returning employee who was on active military duty with the National Guard, except for cause, within one year after being restored to the position. Violation of the California statute is a misdemeanor.\(^7\)

The DOL, in interpreting the federal USERRA, defines “employer” broadly to include any person who pays salary or wages for the work performed, or who has control over employment opportunities—including someone who has been delegated the performance of employment-related responsibilities (other than functions that are purely ministerial in nature). The DOL thus opines that individuals can be subject to personal liability for USERRA violations.\(^4\) Here, remarkably, the California version of the law is less plaintiff-friendly, for the Court of Appeal has ruled that individuals cannot be personally liable for violating California’s military leave statute.\(^5\)

### 2.13 Military Spousal Leave

California employers with 25 or more employees must grant up to ten days of unpaid leave to employees married to members of the active military service who themselves are on leave from a combat zone.\(^7\) Employees who work an average of at least 20 hours per week are eligible for military spousal leave if they are spouses of a “qualified member” of the military. A “qualified member” is a member of the U.S. Armed Forces deployed to a combat zone, or a member of the National Guard or Reserves who has been deployed anywhere during a military conflict.

Employees requesting leave must notify the employer of their intention to take time off within two business days of receiving official notice that the employee’s spouse will be on leave from military deployment. There is no provision allowing an employer to deny or delay the leave. Because the law establishes no cap on the aggregate amount of time off, it appears that the employee can take the full ten days off on each qualifying occasion. The statute states that spousal leave shall not prevent an employee from taking a leave that the employee “is
otherwise entitled to take," suggesting that an employer cannot require an employee on military spousal leave to concurrently use other leave that the employee is entitled to take.

Employers must not retaliate or otherwise discriminate against employees requesting military spousal leave.

### 2.14 Paid Sick Leave

In America generally, employers need not pay a worker on sick leave. Not so in California. California has followed the lead of San Francisco, which, in 2007, became the first American city to mandate paid sick leave (“PSL”) for private employees.

#### 2.14.1 California Paid Sick Leave Law

In 2014 California became the second state (after Connecticut) to impose a state-wide PSL law. The Healthy Workplaces Healthy Families Act (the California Paid Sick Leave Law) created a poster requirement, an amended Wage Theft Prevention Act Notice requirement, and a PSL entitlement provision (including PSL accrual).

The California PSL law covers virtually all employees (including part-time, temporary, and seasonal employees) who work in California for 30 or more days within a year.

Rate of accrual. Covered employees accrue one hour of PSL for every 30 hours worked. An employer may select a different accrual method so long as the accrual is on a regular basis that gives employees no less than 24 hours of PSL or paid time off by the 120th calendar day of employment, or in each 12-month period.

The accrual rate for exempt employees is based on a presumed 40-hour workweek, except that an exempt employee whose normal workweek is less than 40 hours accrues PSL based on that employee’s normal workweek. Employees must be permitted to carry over all their unused PSL to the following year, but employers may cap the accrual of PSL at 48 hours or six days. Instead of using the accrual method, employers can choose to give covered employees at least three days or 24 hours of PSL at the beginning of each year; under this option, no one-hour-per-30-hour accrual or carry-over is required.

The law does not require an employer to provide additional paid sick days if (1) the employer has an existing paid leave or PTO policy, (2) the employer makes the paid leave available under the same conditions as stated in the law, and (3) the existing policy either (a) satisfies the accrual, carry-over, and use requirements of the law or (b) provided PSL or paid time off to a class of employees before 2015, pursuant to a PSL policy or a PTO policy that used an accrual method different than providing one hour per 30 hours worked, provided that the accrual is on a regular basis so that an employee has no less than one day or eight hours of PSL or paid time off within three months of employment each calendar year, or each 12-month period, and the employee was eligible to earn at least three days or 24 hours of PSL or paid time off within nine months of employment.

Employers can limit use of PSL to 24 hours or three days during each year of employment (whichever is more generous). Employers may set a reasonable minimum increment, not to exceed two hours, for an employee’s use of PSL.

Permitted uses of PSL. Employees become eligible to use PSL on their 90th day of employment, after which they are eligible to use PSL as it accrues.
Employees may use PSL not only for their own illness, but also to care for an ill child (regardless of age or dependency status), parent (which is broadly defined and includes, among others, parents-in-law), spouse or registered domestic partner, grandparent, grandchild, and sibling. Additionally, employees who are victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking may use PSL to seek aid, treatment, or related assistance.

Calculating sick pay. While an employer may calculate sick pay for exempt employees “in the same manner as the employer calculates wages for other forms of paid leave time,” employers must choose between two peculiar methods of calculating PSL for nonexempt employees. The first method entails “dividing the employee’s total wages, not including overtime premium pay, by the employee’s total hours worked in the full pay periods of the prior 90 days of employment.” The alternative method is to calculate sick pay using “the same manner as the regular rate of pay for the workweek in which the employee uses paid sick time, whether or not the employee actually works overtime in that workweek.” In other words, use the “regular rate” of pay as though calculating overtime, inclusive of incentives, shift differential, etc., without adding the overtime premium. A 2016, a DLSE opinion letter declared that all commissioned employees, whether or not exempt from overtime requirements, must be paid using the 90-day method: dividing the employee’s total wages, not including overtime premium pay, by the employee’s total hours worked in the full pay periods during the prior 90 days of employment.

Payout of unused PSL. Employers need not pay out unused PSL upon employment separation. An employer must, however, restore to a rehired employee any unused PSL if the employee is rehired within one year of the separation.

Posting. The California PSL law includes a posting requirement (see § 9.1). Also, employers must now include information about PSL rights in the Wage Theft Prevention Act Notice that employers must provide to nonexempt employees upon hire (see §§ 9.2.2, 16.1.2). In addition, the amount of PSL an employee has available must appear on either the employee’s itemized wage statement (see § 16.3) or in a separate document provided to the employee on the designated pay date.

Record-keeping. The California PSL law requires employers to keep records, for three years, documenting the hours worked and the PSL accrued, and to make those records available for inspection by the Labor Commissioner or the employee (see § 11).

Co-existence with ordinances. The California PSL law does not preempt any local PSL ordinance. For each provision or benefit, the employer must provide whichever is most generous to the employee. With the way thus clear, several California municipalities have piled on with their own PSL ordinances, creating entitlements beyond what California law provides.

2.14.2 San Francisco Paid Sick Leave Ordinance

The San Francisco Paid Sick Leave Ordinance (PSLO), enacted in 2007, is the granddaddy of paid sick leave (PSL) mandates. Under the PSLO, workers accrue an hour of PSL for each 30 hours worked. Accrued PSL carries over year to year, subject to a cap. For employers with fewer than ten workers there is a cap of 40 hours and for other employers there is a cap of 72 hours. Employees may take leave not only for their own illness but also to care for a child, parent, spouse, domestic partner, or other designated person. (One consolation is that employers need not pay out unused PSL upon termination of employment.)
The list of covered family members matches state law, but has San Francisco’s additional concept of PSL to care for a “designated person.” While state law allows “front loading” of PSL once a year, the PSLO addresses the concept of front-loading PSL, somewhat differently. Employers may grant an advance of PSL, which halts accruals until the employee has worked enough hours to earn the amount of the grant. San Francisco employees can earn more PSL than under state law and face no limit on the amount of annual use.

In 2018 the San Francisco Office of Labor Standards Enforcement (OLSE) published new rules interpreting the PSLO. The new rules state that if an employee is jointly employed, and at least one employer is covered by the PSLO, then each employer must comply with the PSLO. The rules follow California law to determine if an employee is jointly employed. The OLSE notes, by way of example, that joint employment can occur when an employer uses a temporary staffing agency, leasing agency, or professional employer organization. The ordinance also applies to an employee who may live in San Francisco and work from home, or who make stops in San Francisco to work (for example, to make pickups or deliveries), if the employee works in San Francisco at least 56 hours within a calendar year.

The new rules also provide guidance on calculating the rate of pay for sick leave and generally track statewide standards. Like state law, the new PSLO rules require different rate-of-pay calculations for exempt and nonexempt employees. Although the PSLO does not define “regular rate of pay” or “exempt employee,” the new rules defer to the DLSE on calculating the regular rate of pay, and state that exempt or nonexempt status depends on whether the employee is exempt from overtime requirements under the FLSA and California law. If an individual is exempt, and no other form of paid leave is provided, the employee must be paid the designated salary without any deduction for sick time taken. But the time taken can be applied against the employee’s sick leave balance.

The PSLO entitles employees to use accrued PSL as of the 90th day of employment. For rehired employees, if an employee was separated from the employer and rehired within one year, all previously accrued, unused PSL must be reinstated. Where an employee separates from an employer before the 90th day of employment and is rehired within one year, the new rules clarify that the original period of employment counts toward the 90-day usage waiting period. For example, if an employee separates from an employer after working for 45 days, and then one month later is rehired, the employee must work another 45 days before the employer needs to permit the employee to use accrued PSL. The new rules make clear that many PSL practices that have been deemed reasonable in a CBA remain so, even if the CBA does not explicitly waive or refer to the corresponding PSLO section.

### 2.14.3 Oakland Paid Sick Leave Ordinance

The City of Oakland’s PSL ordinance, passed by voters in 2014, applies to any employee who “in any workweek performs at least two (2) hours of work in Oakland.” The definition of “employer” includes indirect employers, such as businesses who hire through staffing agencies. The substantive provisions are similar to San Francisco’s Paid Sick Leave Ordinance—as it existed at the time. The Oakland ordinance requires that employees earn one hour of PSL for every 30 hours worked, up to a maximum of 40 hours for employees of small businesses (fewer than ten employees) and a maximum of 72 hours for all others. Sick leave can be used for the employee, a wide array of covered family members, and designated persons. As is the case with the current San Francisco ordinance, PSL begins to accrue on hire, and can be used beginning on the 90th day of employment. Front-loading 72 hours
isn’t recognized as valid under the Oakland ordinance. Unlike the California Paid Sick Leave Law, the rate at which Oakland PSL is paid is an employee’s regular hourly or salaried rate in effect at the time of PSL.

### 2.14.4 Emeryville Paid Sick Leave Ordinance

Emeryville’s PSL ordinance is part of a minimum wage law, similar to the Oakland ordinance. The Emeryville PSL ordinance covers employers regardless of location if the employer’s employees work at least two hours a week within Emeryville city limits. The basic entitlement is a maximum of 48 PSL hours for employees of small businesses (55 or fewer employees within Emeryville city limits) and 72 hours for employees of large businesses (56 or more within Emeryville city limits). In any given year, employees may use PSL up to the applicable maximum. Front-loading the entire annual amount is allowed and if front-loading is used, no carry over is required. If PSL is accrued rather than front-loaded, then state law accrual standards apply. Emeryville defines “family member” to include a designated individual if the employee has no spouse or registered domestic partner. In addition to all the same uses as allowed by state law. Emeryville employees may use their PSL to provide care for a guide dog, signal dog, or service dog (their own or a family member’s or a designated individual’s). Owners of other service animal species are out of luck.

### 2.14.5 Berkeley Paid Sick Leave Ordinance

Berkley’s PSL ordinance became effective in 2017. This ordinance, like San Francisco’s, requires an accrual rate of one hour per 30 hours worked. Employers are covered regardless of location if they have employees who work two or more hours a week within Berkeley city limits. Small businesses (fewer than 25 employees) may cap accrual of paid sick leave at 48 hours as well as limit use of paid sick leave to 48 hours within a calendar year. Employers with 25 or more employees may cap accrual of paid sick leave at 72 hours but may not limit use of paid sick leave. Employers can front-load paid sick leave at the beginning of each year as long as employees can accrue additional leave after working enough hours to have accrued the amount that is front-loaded. Berkeley employees can add a designated person to the category of covered family members. After an initial use of one hour, sick time can be used in 15-minute increments. Sick leave need not be cashed out on termination, but sick leave must be restored if the employee is rehired within 12 months. Employers must, each pay period, report on a paystub or other notice how much paid sick leave time employees have accrued.

### 2.14.6 Los Angeles Paid Sick Leave Ordinance

Los Angeles joined the PSL parade in 2016. Los Angeles defines “employee” to include any individual who performs two or more hours per week within the geographic boundaries of the City of Los Angeles, regardless of whether the individual is a city resident and regardless of whether the individual is legally authorized to work. The Los Angeles ordinance excludes government employees and employees who are exempt from state minimum wage laws. “Employer” is defined as including “a corporate officer or executive, who directly or indirectly or through an agent or any other person, including through the services of a temporary service or staffing agency or similar entity, employs or exercises control over the wages, hours or working conditions of any Employee.” Thus, the Los Angeles ordinance might hold corporate officers and executives individually accountable. Los Angeles employees can use up to 48 hours of PSL in “each year of employment, calendar year or 12-month period.” Unused PSL shall carry over to the following year of employment, but may be capped at 72 hours. Employers may set a higher cap or no cap. Employers can choose either (1) “frontloading” (providing the entire 48 hours to an employee at the beginning of each year) or (2) having PSL accrue at the rate of one hour for every 30 hours.
worked. While state law provides that if an employer front-loads, then unused PSL does not carry over, with the unused balance simply being replaced by the new grant, Los Angeles is different. Under the Los Angeles ordinance, up to 72 hours must carry over year to year. So, while a Los Angeles employee can use only 48 hours of sick pay in a year, the employee can carry over 72 hours of PSL (or more, if the employer allows it).

The universe of family members is broader under the Los Angeles ordinance. Family includes not only children (biological, adopted, step, loco parentis), siblings, spouses, registered domestic partners, parents (including parents of the spouse or domestic partner), grandparents, or grandchildren, but also “any individual related by blood or affinity whose close association with the employee is the equivalent of a family relationship.”

2.14.7 Santa Monica Paid Sick Leave Ordinance

Santa Monica’s PSL provisions took effect in 2017. The Santa Monica ordinance excludes government employees and employees who are exempt from the state minimum wage laws. Santa Monica employees working at least two hours per week in the City and working for small businesses (having 25 or fewer employees) earned up to 32 hours of PSL in 2017 and earn up 40 hours in 2018. Employee in larger businesses (with at least 26 employees) earned up to 40 hours of PSL in 2017, and will earn up to 72 hours in 2018. The accrual rate is one hour for every 30 hours worked, and employees carry over earned PSL each year up to the caps noted above. Employers can front-load rather than have employees accrue PSL per hour, as long as the employer provides leave consistent with the required amounts. Other PSL designs are possible so long as they meet or exceed ordinance requirements. In terms of covered family members and reasons for use of PSL, and pay rate, Santa Monica follows state law.

2.14.8 San Diego Paid Sick Leave Ordinance

The San Diego PSL became effective in 2016. Unlike other ordinances, San Diego’s specifically excludes not only employees who are exempt from state minimum wage laws, but also employees paid a subminimum wage under a specific license, employees of publicly subsidized summer or short-term youth employment programs, and student employees, camp counselors, and program counselors of organized camps. The San Diego ordinance is mostly congruent with state law as to covered family members (San Diego makes a point of covering half, adopted, and step-siblings). The ordinance is also congruent with state law on reasons for using PSL, except that San Diego adds two additional triggering events: when the workplace is closed due to a public health emergency, or when the employee is providing care or assistance to a child whose school or child care provider is closed by order of a public official due to a public health emergency.

The San Diego PSL ordinance appears to differ from state law on the rate of pay for PSL. Per the implementing ordinance, nonexempt employees are paid “at the same regular rate of pay for the workweek in which the employee uses earned PSL.” FAQs state: “Employees accrue leave by the hour, not by a specific wage rate. When used, these hours must be paid at the hourly rate the employee earns at the time the employee uses the earned PSL.” San Diego’s PSL ordinance (1) allows employers to cap an employee’s total accrual of PSL at 80 hours (80 hours is the maximum carryover), (2) allows employers to front-load no fewer than 40 hours of PSL at the beginning of each “benefit year” (a regular and consecutive twelve-month period, determined by the employer), and (3) contains a use limit of 40 hours of PSL per year.
2.15 Paid Leave for Organ or Bone Marrow Donation

Under the Michelle Maykin Memorial Donation Protection Act, California employers must allow eligible employees to take paid leaves of absence to donate an organ or to donate bone marrow. An employee who has been employed by the employer for at least 90 days may take up to five business days of paid leave during any one-year period to donate an organ. The one-year period is measured forward from the date an employee’s leave begins. An employer may require an employee to use up to five days of earned but unused sick leave or vacation or paid time off during the initial bone-marrow donation leave, and up to two weeks of earned but unused sick leave or vacation or paid time off during the initial organ-donation leave. These leaves are not a break in service for purposes of an employee’s right to salary adjustments, sick leave, vacation, annual leave, or seniority, and employers must maintain and pay for group health coverage during the leaves. These leaves do not run concurrently with FMLA and CFRA leaves. Employees returning from leave generally must be reinstated to their same position or an equivalent position.115

1 DFEH regulations define the four months as the equivalent of what the employee works in four months (17.33 weeks). If an employee’s hours vary from month to month, then the average number of hours per week is used, calculated by looking back for 17.33 weeks. 2 Cal. Code Regs §§ 11042(a)(1), 11035(f).
2 DFEH regulations define pregnancy-related conditions to include morning sickness, preeclampsyia, pre- and post-natal care, and post-partum depression. 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11035(f).
3 Gov’t Code § 12945(a)(1).
4 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11043(a).
5 Sanchez v. Swissport, Inc., 213 Cal. App. 4th 1331 (2013) (employee placed on bed rest during most of her pregnancy, and then terminated after 19 weeks of pregnancy leave—three months before her due date—may have been entitled to entitled to additional, disability leave, under the FEHA, if the employer could not show that the extended leave would have imposed an undue hardship on the company); 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11047.
6 Gov’t Code § 12945(c).
7 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11041(c).
8 Gov’t Code § 12945(a)(2)(A). Employers may recover from employees the premium paid to maintain their coverage during a leave to the extent that (1) employees fail to return to work after the pregnancy disability leave and (2) the failure to return from leave is for a reason other than (a) taking leave under the California Family Rights Act or (b) the continuation, recurrence, or onset of a condition that entitles the employee to a pregnancy disability leave or other circumstances beyond the employee’s control.
9 An even longer leave could be required if pregnancy-related conditions require further leave under the reasonable-accommodation provisions of the FEHA. See Sanchez v. Swissport, Inc., 213 Cal. App. 4th 1331 (2013); 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11047.
10 Gov’t Code § 12945(a)(4).
11 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (employee who needs to express milk “for her nursing child for 1 year after the child’s birth” is entitled to (a) reasonable break time and (b) a private place, other than a bathroom, that is free from intrusion).
14 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 3d 961 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (denying motion to dismiss gestational surrogate’s claims for failure to accommodate and discrimination where she expressed milk for the child she delivered for several months and then continued to express milk for her own health benefits and for donation purposes).
16 Gov’t Code § 12945.2.
17 Gov’t Code § 12945.2(f) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, any right protected by this section.”). This legislation, effective in 2012, aimed to incorporate parallel restrictions in the federal FMLA.
18 Gov’t Code § 12945.6(a).
19 Gov’t Code § 12945.6(e).
20 Gov’t Code § 12945.6(d).
21 On two occasions, an employee has a right to take intermittent CFRA bonding leave of less than two weeks’ duration. 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11090(d).
22 See generally 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11091(b)(2).
26 The deadline for the employer’s response is five business days. See 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11091(a)(6).
27 Olofsson v. Mission Linen Supply, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1236 (2012) (noting, however, that employer could have avoided litigation with a more meticulous leave-request process: the employer took weeks to calculate how many hours the employee had worked during the preceding 12 months, before finally concluding he was ineligible for leave). The employee had requested unpaid FMLA/CFRA leave to care for his mother. The employer denied the request because he had not worked enough hours within the past 12 months. Between the employee’s request for leave and the employer’s denial, the employee spoke several times with supervisors and HR representatives about his request, with the employer providing a leave request form and asking the employee to submit a doctor’s letter corroborating the need for leave.


30 Richey v. AutoNation, Inc., 210 Cal. App. 4th 1516, 1537, 1540-41 (2012), rev. granted, No. S207536 (Cal. Feb. 13, 2013). The Court of Appeal reversed a judgment confirming an arbitration award for the employer, which had fired an employee while he was on CFRA leave, in the belief that he was misusing his leave by working part-time at the restaurant he owned. The Court of Appeal concluded that the arbitrator had committed clear legal error by accepting an “honest belief” defense, because that defense wrongly relieved the employer of its burden to prove the employee actually abused his medical leave by working at another job while on leave.


32 The City of San Francisco has clarified that the ordinance covers employers with at least 20 employees anywhere. Thus, if the employer has 20 or more employees anywhere in the world, then the ordinance would apply as to any employee working in San Francisco.

33 AB 2587, amending Unemp. Ins. Code § 33013.1 to remove the seven-day waiting period reference.

34 Unemp. Ins. Code § 2708.


42 Lab. Code §§ 1025, 1041. Under Section 1025, employers need not provide rehabilitation where (i) rehabilitation would cause undue hardship for the employer or (ii) the employer is denying employment because (a) the employee cannot perform duties because of the current use of alcohol or drugs, or (b) the employee cannot perform duties without endangering the health or safety of the employee or others.

43 Lab. Code § 1026.


45 Lab. Code § 230(a).

46 Lab. Code § 230.5(a)(1),(b)(1). The specified offenses, listed in Section 230.5(a)(2), include vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, felony child abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or death, assault resulting in the death of a child under eight years of age, felony domestic violence, felony physical abuse of an elder or dependent adult, felony stalking, solicitation for murder, “serious felony,” hit-and-run causing death or injury, felony driving under the influence causing injury, and sexual assault.

47 Lab. Code 230.5(b)(2).

48 Lab. Code 230.5(f).

49 Lab. Code § 230(f).


51 Lab. Code § 230.3.

52 Lab. Code §§ 1501-1507 (unpaid leave of not less than ten days per calendar year).

53 Lab. Code § 230.4 (temporary leaves of absence not to exceed an aggregate of 14 days per calendar year).


55 Election Code § 14000 et seq.

56 Election Code § 14000(b).


58 Lab. Code § 230.8(a)(1)(A), (B).

59 Lab. Code § 230.8(e)(2).


61 Lab. Code § 230.8(d).


63 Lab. Code § 230.8(e)(1).

64 Lab. Code § 245 et seq.

65 See Lab. Code §§ 245.5(b), 246.5(a).

66 DLSE Opinion Letter 2003.05.21, at 6 (PTO that employer implicitly permits to be used for sick leave constitutes sick leave for purposes of kin care).

Similarly, the San Francisco Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance, effective in 2014, prohibits retaliation for requesting time off to care for a family member, even if the employee has no sick time available. See § 2.14.

By one reading of the poorly drafted statutory language, the anti-retaliation provisions of the “kin care” statute, Section 233, protect from retaliation the employee’s use of sick time for the employee’s own needs. That is because Section 233 forbids retaliation against an employee for using or attempting to use sick leave “to attend to an illness or the preventive care of a family member, or for any other reasons specified in subdivision (a) of Section 246.” (Emphasis added.) Section 246.5(a)(1), meanwhile, addresses the diagnosis, care, preventive care, or treatment of an existing health condition for “an employee or an employee’s family member.” (Emphasis added.)

Airline Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. United Airlines, Inc., 223 Cal. App. 4th 706 (2014) (because trusts in question were not “bona fide separate trusts,” ERISA preemption did not apply).

Military & Veterans Code § 394.5 et seq.

20 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(1)(i) and DOL comments in preamble to same. See also 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(i).


Military & Veterans Code § 395.10.

Id. § 395.10(d), (e).

Lab. Code § 246(a). The California Paid Sick Leave Law does not apply to (1) employees whose employment is governed by a valid CBA that provides for payment of wages, hours of work, working conditions, overtime premiums, regular hourly rate of pay not less than 30 percent greater than the state minimum wage, paid sick leave or similar leave, and final and binding arbitration of disputes regarding the paid sick days provision, (2) construction employees covered by CBAs with specified provisions, (3) certain air carrier and flight personnel, and (4) certain public-sector working retirees. See Lab. Code § 245.5(a).

Lab. Code § 246(b)(1).

Lab. Code § 246(b)(2).

Lab. Code §§ 246(d), (l).

Lab. Code §§ 246(e), (d).

Lab. Code § 246(e)(2). If an employer modifies the accrual method used in the policy in place before January 1, 2015, then the employer must comply with any accrual method set forth in the California Paid Sick Leave Law or provide the full amount of leave at the beginning of each year of employment, each calendar year, or each other 12-month period. Id.

Lab. Code § 246(d).

Lab. Code § 246(j).

Lab. Code § 246(c).

Lab. Code §§ 245.5(c), 246.5(a)(1).

Lab. Code § 246.5(a)(2).


Lab. Code § 246(l)(1) & (2)


Lab. Code § 246(g)(1), (2).

Lab. Code § 247(a).


Lab. Code § 246(i).

Lab. Code § 247.5.

Lab. Code § 245(b).

San Francisco Administrative Code Ch. 12W


Id. Rule 10.

Id. Rule 6.

Id. Rule 5.

Id. Rule 4.

Oakland Municipal Code Title 5, Chapter 5.92, Section 5.92.030.


Office of the City Attorney, City of Oakland, Frequently Asked Questions, Measure FF (Feb. 5, 2015)


Id. FAQs 32-35.


Id. § 187.04(G).


Lab. Code §§ 1508-1513.
3. Employee Privacy—Protected Activities

Unlike the United States Constitution, which generally applies only to governmental action, the California Constitution reaches certain aspects of private employment. Indeed, California prides itself on having in its constitution “a document of independent force and effect particularly in the area of individual liberties.”

The California Constitution expressly protects the individual’s right to privacy. One aspect of “privacy” is personal autonomy—the individual’s interest in making lifestyle choices free of unwarranted interference (see § 3 herein). Another aspect is the individual’s interest in being free of unwarranted intrusion (see § 4). The California Constitution and various statutes further both interests.

3.1 Off-Duty, Off-Premises Lawful Conduct—Including Marijuana Use

Broadly worded provisions of the Labor Code forbid employers to discriminate against an employee or applicant for lawful off-premises conduct during nonworking hours. The Labor Code gives employers only two statutory safe harbors: (1) employers may require an employee to sign a contract to avoid any conduct that “is actually in direct conflict with the essential enterprise-related interests of the employer and where breach of that contract would actually constitute a material and substantial disruption of the employer’s operation,” and (2) employers may require a firefighter to sign a contract limiting the firefighter’s “consumption of tobacco products on and off the job.”

Although these provisions were enacted in 1999 and 2001, it remains unclear exactly what they add to a plaintiff’s rights. Even before their enactment, a court citing the California constitutional right to privacy upheld a judgment of tortious discharge against IBM in favor of a marketing manager fired for her romantic involvement with a manager who worked for a rival firm. The cases interpreting these provisions have suggested that they are not as broad as a literal reading of them might suggest and that they merely codify existing constitutional rights, rather than adding a new basis for a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. One case upheld the dismissal of a supervisor who was fired for dating his subordinate in violation of his company’s anti-fraternization policy. A second case upheld the dismissal of a hospice employee who was suspected of engaging in an unlawful investment scheme.

As of 2018, California has legalized recreational use of marijuana. This change itself does not affect an employer’s right to have policies prohibiting the workplace use of cannabis by employees and prospective employees. But it’s a safe bet that California, anxious as ever to lead the way in creating further employee protections, will soon join other states in forbidding employers to discriminate against applicants and employees authorized to use medical marijuana.

3.2 Disclosure of Wages

California employers must not prohibit employees from disclosing the amount of their wages. More specifically, employers must not (1) require an employee to refrain, as a condition of employment, from disclosing the amount of the employee’s wages, (2) require an employee to waive the right to disclose the amount of the employee’s wages, or (3) discriminate against an employee for disclosing the employee’s wages. A California appellate court has interpreted “wages” in this context broadly to include bonuses. Similar provisions appear in California’s
pay-equity law. Under these provisions, employers must not forbid employees to (1) disclose their own wages, (2) discuss the wages of others, (3) inquire about other employees’ wages, or (4) aid or encourage other employees to exercise those rights. The Legislature added an afterthought for those employees who do not want to discuss their own or others’ wages: “Nothing in this section creates an obligation to disclose wages.”

3.3 Disclosure of Working Conditions

California employers must not forbid employees to disclose information about working conditions. More specifically, as to working conditions, an employer must not (a) require an employee to refrain from disclosing information, (b) require an employee to waive the right to disclose information, or (c) discharge, formally discipline, or otherwise discriminate against an employee for disclosing information. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that this law may invalidate a clause in an arbitration agreement forbidding the sharing of information about the specifics of an arbitration case. This law may be preempted by federal labor law to the extent that it concerns merely concerted complaints about working conditions and not health or safety complaints.

This California law runs roughly parallel to NLRA law that empowers employees to engage in concerted activity for their mutual protection. But California has not adopted the doctrine, espoused by the Obama NLRB, that employers run afoul of the law when they require employees to observe confidentiality during workplace investigations.

3.4 Right to Designate Counsel

California employers must not discriminate against an employee for designating a representative to bargain over conditions of the employee’s employment. Courts have construed this provision to empower an employee to designate an attorney to bargain with respect to conditions of employment, and to prohibit an employer from firing an employee who has made that designation. The Court of Appeal has held that an employer’s refusal to deal with its employee’s workers’ compensation attorney raised a triable issue as to whether the employer had failed to comply with its duty, under the FEHA, to engage in an interactive process to see if it was possible to accommodate the employee’s disability.

Nonetheless, a California employer may still insist on dealing directly with an employee, without the presence of counsel when investigating employee misconduct or assessing employee job performance.

3.5 Employee Whistleblowing

California employers must not retaliate against employees who have—or are perceived to have—engaged in whistleblowing activities protected under Labor Code sections concerning working conditions or pay.

3.5.1 Labor Code § 1102.5—general whistle blower statute

For many years, Section 1102.5 was a straightforward whistleblower protection statute. It provided that California employers must not discipline an employee for disclosing information to a governmental or law enforcement agency with a good-faith belief that the information evidenced noncompliance with state or federal law. But judicial interpretation and statutory amendments have expanded the scope of this prohibition in various directions. Protected activity now includes reports (1) about violations of local as well as state and federal law, (2) that
involve only co-worker or third-party wrongdoing, regardless of whether disclosing the information is simply part of the employee’s job, and (4) that went to the employer rather than to the government.

The Court of Appeal has held that a sheriff’s deputy qualified for protection under Section 1102.5 even though he was not the first employee who had reported the alleged unlawful conduct and thus was not really the one who “disclosed” it.

Section 1102.5 also prevents employers from taking retaliatory action in a belief that “the employee disclosed or may disclose” relevant information. The Court of Appeal has clarified that Section 1102.5 forbids employers to terminate “perceived whistleblowers,” even if in fact the employee never reported a violation. And plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing under this statute. Section 1102.5 also prohibits retaliation against employees for being a family member of an employee who has, or who is perceived to have, engaged in protected activities under these provisions.

Upon proof that the employee’s protected activity was “a contributing factor in the alleged prohibited action,” the employer must prove by “clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in [protected] activities.”

Violation of this statute makes the employer liable not only for damages but for a civil penalty of $10,000.

### 3.5.2 Labor Code § 98.6(a)—reports to Labor Commissioner

California employers must not discriminate against an employee or applicant for filing a bona fide complaint relating to rights under the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner, for making a written or oral complaint of unpaid wages, or for initiating or testifying in a PAGA proceeding. Section 98.6’s protections extend to “the exercise by the employee or applicant … on behalf of himself, herself, or others of any rights afforded him or her.” A Section 98.6 plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement, recovery of lost wages and benefits, and a $10,000 civil penalty.

### 3.5.3 Labor Code § 1197.5(k)—reports under the Fair Pay Act

California employers must not discharge or in any manner discriminate against employees who invoke or assist in the enforcement of Labor Code section 1197.5, a section that also protects employee rights to disclose their own wages, discuss the wages of others, inquire about another employee’s wages, and aid or encourage other employees to exercise rights under Section 1197.5.

### 3.5.4 Labor Code §§ 6310-6311—safety and health reports

No person may discriminate against any California employee for making any oral or written comment to government agencies with jurisdiction over employee safety or health, for instituting or testifying in any employee health or safety proceeding, or for exercising other rights relating to employee safety or health. Protected activity also includes reporting a work-related fatality, injury, or illness, requesting access to occupational injury or illness reports and records, and exercising any rights protected by the federal OSHA. California employers must not dismiss an employee for refusing to perform work in violation of occupational health or safety standards, where the violation would create a “real or apparent hazard” to an employee.
3.5.5 Government Code § 12940(h)—FEHA complaints

No person may discriminate against any person for opposing a practice forbidden by the FEHA or for filing a complaint, testifying, or assisting in any FEHA proceeding.

3.5.6 Business and Profession Code § 2056—health care advocacy by physician

No person may retaliate against a physician for advocating medically appropriate health care for the physician’s patients.36

3.5.7 Health and Safety Code § 1278.5—healthcare advocacy

California health facilities cannot retaliate against employees or medical staff for complaining to the facility, to an accrediting agency, or to a governmental entity, or for participating in any investigation of the facility’s quality of medical care.37 A “rebuttable presumption” of unlawful retaliation by the facility arises if its “responsible staff” knows of an individual’s protected activity and if the facility takes adverse action against the individual within 120 days of the filing of a grievance or a complaint.38

3.5.8 Retaliation by reporting immigration issues because of exercise of rights

California employers must not report or threaten to report to a government agency the suspected citizenship or immigration status of an employee, former employee, prospective employee (or that of the individual’s family members) in retaliation for the individual’s exercise of rights under California laws.39 The definition of “unfair immigration-related practices” includes filing or threatening to file false reports to a state or federal agency, contacting or threatening to contact immigration authorities, and certain unauthorized uses of immigration documents.40 Persons subject to unfair immigration-related practices have a private right of action, and a court may order government agencies to suspend business licenses.41

3.6 Refusal to Undergo Medical Treatment or Exam

The California constitutional right of autonomy can protect an employee’s right to determine the course of medical treatment or lack thereof. An employee thus could sue an employer for relying on confidential medical information to require that the employee enroll in a 30-day inpatient alcohol treatment program as a condition of employment.42

3.6.1 Protection for refusing to provide certain medical information

Under a Civil Code provision, California employers must not discriminate against employees for refusing to sign a release of medical information to the employer, although employers may take “such action as is necessary in the absence of medical information due to an employee’s refusal to sign an authorization.”43 The Court of Appeal has rejected a claim based on this provision, holding that an employer could fire an employee for refusing to undergo a job-related fitness-for-duty exam where the examiner would have reported to the employer no medical information other than whether the employee was fit for duty.44
3.6.2 Fitness-for-duty exam upon return from medical leave

Under the FMLA, when an employee’s physician certifies that the employee can return to work from leave, the employer must return the employee to work. The Court of Appeal has held that an employer may require a fitness-for-duty medical examination upon the employee’s return from leave, so long as the examination is job-related and a business necessity under the specific circumstances.45

3.7 Changing personal information

California employers must not discharge, retaliate, or take adverse action against an employee because the employee “updates or attempts to update his or her personal information based on a lawful change of name, social security number, or federal employment authorization document.”46

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2 Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”).
3 Lab. Code §§ 96(k), 96.6(a).

Section 96 provides: “The Labor Commissioner and his or her deputies and representatives authorized by him or her in writing shall, upon the filing of a claim therefore by an employee, or an employee representative authorized in writing by an employee, with the Labor Commissioner, take assignments of: … (k) Claims for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or discharge from employment for occurring during nonworking hours away from the employer’s premises.”

Section 98.6 provides: “(a) No person shall discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because the employee or applicant engaged in any conduct delineated in this chapter, including the conduct described in subdivision (k) of Section 96 … . (b) Any employee who is discharged, threatened with discharge, demoted, suspended, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of his or her employment because the employee engaged in any conduct delineated in this chapter, including the conduct described in subdivision (k) of Section 96 … shall be entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by such acts of the employer.”

4 Lab. Code § 96.6(c)(2)(A).
5 Lab. Code § 96.6(c)(2)(B).
6 Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 248 (1984) (observing “close question of whether those rules or regulations permit IBM to inquire into the purely personal life of the employee. … [T]he right of privacy, a constitutional right in California … , could be implicated by the IBM inquiry.”). In upholding a jury verdict for the employee, the Rulon-Miller court relied on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, with the constitutional discussion as background, rather than relying directly on the constitutional right to privacy itself.
7 Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Co., 113 Cal. App. 4th 525 (2003) (supervisor could be terminated for violating company policy against dating subordinates); Labor Code section 96(k) does not describe any public policy but rather “simply outlines the types of claims over which the Labor Commissioner shall exercise jurisdiction”.
8 Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 120 Cal. App. 4th 72 (2004) (case manager fired on suspicion of participating in Ponzi scheme has no public policy claim for wrongful termination based on first amendment of Constitution or on Labor Code sections 96(k) or 98.6).

9 Health & Safety Code § 11362.1 (“it shall be lawful under state and local law” for persons at least age 21 to use cannabis up to certain quantities for certain purposes).
10 Health & Safety Code § 11362.45(f) (Section 11362.1 does not affect “[t]he rights … of public and private employers to maintain a drug and alcohol free workplace or require an employer to permit or accommodate the use, consumption, possession, transfer, display, transportation, sale, or growth of cannabis in the workplace, or affect the ability of employers to have policies prohibiting the use of cannabis by employees and prospective employees, or prevent employers from complying with state or federal law”). See also § 6.4.3 (California employers can deny employment to users of medical marijuana, notwithstanding the 1996 Compassionate Use Act).
13 Labor Code § 1197.5(k)(1).
14 Lab. Code § 232.5.
15 Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1079 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2007).
17 Banner Estrella Med. Ctr., 362 NLRB 137 (2012) (employer rule prohibiting employee complainants from discussing the matter with their coworkers during an ongoing investigation violated Section 7 of the NLRA) with Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 256, 265 (1998) (employer’s investigation policy was appropriate in part because the policy ensured confidentiality).
18 Lab. Code § 923.
22. Labor Code §§ 98.6, 1102.5, and 6310.
24. McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco, 213 Cal. App. 4th 443, 471 (2013) (Section 1102.5 “protects employee reports of unlawful activity by third parties such as contractors and employees, as well unlawful activity by an employer”)
25. id. at 469 (“employee’s report of illegal activity can ... constitute protected conduct under [Section 1102.5(b)] even if she ‘was simply doing her job’ in making the report”).
26. Lab. Code § 1102.5(a),(b) (law protects not only reports to “a government or law enforcement agency,” but also reports “to a person with authority over the employee, or to another employee who has authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance”).
27. Hager v. County of Los Angeles, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1541, 1548 (2014) (rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff did not “disclose information” where suspicions of unlawful conduct had already been reported by others).
29. Diego v. Pilgrim United Church of Christ, 231 Cal. App. 4th 913 (2014) (teacher allegedly fired because the preschool director mistakenly believed she had complained to the Community Care Licensing Division of the California Department of Social Services, resulting in an unannounced inspection of the preschool).
30. See Lab. Code § 244(a) (plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies or procedures to sue under a Labor Code section, unless the section expressly requires exhaustion—and Section 1102.5 does not).
31. Labor Code §§ 98.6, 1102.5(h), and 6310.
33. Lab. Code § 1102.6(c).
34. Lab. Code § 98.6(a).
35. Lab. Code § 98.6(b).
37. Health & Safety Code § 1278.5(b) (providing for civil penalties of up to $25,000 and remedies for employees or medical staff suffering retaliation).
39. Lab. Code §§ 244, 1019. Section 244 defines “family member” to include a spouse, parent, sibling, child, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, cousin, grandparent or grandchild related by blood, adoption, marriage or domestic partnership.
40. Lab. Code § 1019(b).
41. Lab. Code § 1019(d).
45. White v. County of Los Angeles, 225 Cal. App. 4th 690 (2014) (while employer cannot seek a second opinion regarding fitness for work prior to restoring the employee to employment from an FMLA leave, employer may, if not satisfied with the employee’s health care provider’s certification, seek its own evaluation of the employee’s fitness for duty, at the employer’ own expense; employee here was fired for refusing to submit to fitness-for-duty exam).
4. **Employee Privacy—Protection From Intrusions**

The California Constitution expressly protects the individual’s right to privacy. Unlike the United States Constitution, which generally restrains only governmental action, the California Constitution can restrain private employers. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has called the California Constitution “a document of independent force and effect particularly in the area of individual liberties.”

California’s constitutional privacy provision protects both aspects of privacy: the interest in being free of unwarranted interference with personal autonomy (see § 3 herein) and the interest in being free of unwarranted intrusions (see § 4). The California Constitution and various statutes further both interests.

### 4.1 Drug Testing

#### 4.1.1 Privacy issues

Drug testing (through urinalysis and other specimen testing) implicates the California right to privacy. While drug testing of employees for reasonable suspicion is permissible in California, random testing is not, absent (1) a federal legal mandate to do so or (2) a strong case that the particular class of employees being tested would pose some imminent safety or health threat, with irremediable consequences, if allowed to work under the influence of drugs.

Testing job applicants appears to accord with the guidance provided by California courts. The Ninth Circuit has upheld an employer’s “one strike” rule, authorized by a collective bargaining agreement, providing that an applicant who tests positive on a pre-employment drug screen is permanently disqualified.

Under a San Francisco ordinance, a private employer can have an employee’s blood or urine specimen tested only if the employer has reasonable grounds to believe the employee’s faculties are impaired on the job and the employee works in a position in which impairment presents a clear and present danger to the physical safety of the employee, another employee, or the public. Employers must not engage in random or company-wide testing of blood or urine specimens.

#### 4.1.2 Disability discrimination issues

Disability discrimination laws protect privacy to the extent that they prohibit certain examinations or questions. For peculiar California law on this point, see § 6.3.4.

### 4.2 Questions about Certain Arrests and Convictions

#### 4.2.1 State law

California, unlike federal law, forbids various forms of employer inquiries about the arrests and convictions of applicants and employees.

**Questions about arrests.** California employers generally must not ask applicants, employees, or *any other source* about the arrest of an applicant or employee that did not lead to a conviction.
Questions about certain convictions or diversion programs. California employers must not ask about an applicant’s or employee’s referral to, and participation in, any pretrial or posttrial diversion program, and must not ask employees about judicially dismissed, sealed, or expunged criminal convictions.

California employers cannot ask applicants about certain marijuana-related convictions more than two years old. Plaintiffs’ lawyers exploited this provision to seek $26 million for 135,000 unsuccessful applicants who had unlawfully been asked if they had marijuana convictions. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, even though none of them actually had marijuana convictions to reveal. The Court of Appeal provided some adult supervision here, reversing the judgment while observing, “Plaintiffs’ strained efforts to use the marijuana reform legislation to recover millions of dollars from Starbucks gives a bizarre new dimension to the everyday expressions ‘Coffee Joint’ and ‘Coffee Pot.’”

Asking applicants about convictions. California’s “ban the box” statute forbids private and public employers from asking about convictions on initial job applications. About 30 states have similar legislation, in addition to 15 cities and counties—including Los Angeles and San Francisco—that have enacted local legislation applying to private and public employers.

California employers subject to the law generally may procure a background report or ask applicants about criminal convictions only after extending them a conditional offer of employment. And California employers can rely on conviction history to deny employment only after making “an individualized assessment” of whether the conviction “has a direct and adverse relationship” with the job’s “specific duties … that justify denying the applicant the position.” That assessment must consider the nature and gravity of the offense, the time that has passed since completion of any sentence, and the nature of the job. An employer so intending to deny employment must notify the applicant of its “preliminary decision” and provide a copy of the conviction history report, with notice of the applicant’s right to respond before the decision becomes final. And an employer finalizing its preliminary decision must notify the applicant of rights to pursue the matter further. Employers can inquire about an applicant’s “particular conviction” under limited circumstances, mostly involving cases where a law requires consideration of criminal history.

4.2.2 San Francisco ordinance limiting inquiries into criminal history

Under the “Fair Chance Ordinance” (designed to help rehabilitate ex-offenders by giving them a “fair chance” at employment), San Francisco employers of five or more employees must not ask job applicants about certain arrests or criminal convictions at all, and must not ask about other conviction history until after making a conditional offer of employment. San Francisco employers also must not inquire about or consider infractions, convictions that are more than seven years old (measured from date of sentencing), or any conviction for an offense that arises out of conduct that has since been decriminalized (measured from date of sentencing). Further, any criminal conviction, in order to disqualify a job candidate, must bear a “direct relationship” to the position the candidate is seeking. That is, the conviction must have a “direct and negative bearing on that person’s ability to perform duties or responsibilities necessarily related to the employment position.” The ordinance also imposes special notice, posting, and recordkeeping requirements on covered employers.

In 2018 San Francisco amended its Fair Chance Ordinance to align, in some respects, with California’s ban-the-box law. For violations occurring after October 1, 2018, employers are subject to increased penalties for non-compliance: $500 for the first violation; $1,000 for the second violation; and $2,000 for further violations (under
the initial Ordinance, the maximum penalty was $50). The amended Ordinance grants aggrieved individuals a right to file a civil action, if they file a complaint with the OLSE and exhaust their administrative remedies. San Francisco bars covered employers from considering convictions that are more than seven years old (measured from the date of sentencing) and infractions. The Board further amended the Ordinance to add a new category of “off limits” information: convictions that arise out of conduct that has since been decriminalized.

### 4.2.3 Los Angeles ordinance limiting inquiries into criminal history

Under the Fair Chance Initiative for Hiring Ordinance (FCIHO), employers with ten or more employees in the City of Los Angeles may not procure a background screen for employment purposes or even ask about criminal history until making a conditional offer of employment, contingent only on the results of the background screen.  

The LA Bureau of Contract Administration has posted an Individualized Assessment and Reassessment Form, which employers are expected to complete if they make a preliminary decision to reject an applicant based on criminal history. The Bureau’s form addresses both individualized assessment and reassessment. Most of the form reflects what is expected to be the initial individualized assessment, which would be delivered with the pre-adverse action notice and any federal or state disclosures, such as the summary of rights, and a copy of the consumer report. If applicants provide additional information about their criminal record after receiving the pre-adverse package, the employer must complete the reassessment portion of the document and provide it with the final adverse action notice.

### 4.3 Polygraph Tests

California employers must not require, as a condition of employment, an applicant or employee to take a polygraph, lie-detector test, or “similar” test. Employers may request a person to take such a test, but only after first advising the person, in writing at the time of the test, that the employer cannot require the test.

### 4.4 HIV Testing

Unless used for insurance purposes, California employers must not use the results of an HIV test to determine insurability or suitability for employment.

### 4.5 Genetic Testing

California employers must not, directly or indirectly, subject applicants or employees to tests for the presence of a genetic characteristic.

### 4.6 Tape Recording and Videotaping

#### 4.6.1 Confidential communications

It is a crime for a California employer or employee to surreptitiously tape record a confidential communication. Violators are liable for civil penalties in amounts of up to $5,000 per violation, or three times any actual damages, whichever is greater. The recording may not be used as evidence, except to prove a violation of the statute.
4.6.2 Restrooms, locker rooms, changing rooms

California employers must not use or cause to be made any video- or audio-taping of employees in a restroom, locker room, or any room that the employer has designated for changing clothes, unless authorized by court order.28

4.6.3 Secret videotaping in open areas

The California Supreme Court has held that employees have the right to privacy, even in an open workplace, against intrusions by members of the general public.29 The California Supreme Court in one case held that employees have reasonable expectations of privacy against their employer, with respect to their activities in a closed shared office.30 The employees sued their employer upon discovering that it had installed a covert video camera in order to catch night-time intruders into the office shared by the plaintiffs, who worked only during the day. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs could sue for invasion of privacy even if the camera never actually observed them, on the theory that mere intrusion into their workplace solitude was actionable. The Supreme Court reversed this odd result, but agreed with the plaintiffs that the employer had intruded upon their privacy. The Supreme Court ruled for the employer because the surveillance—being narrowly tailored in place, time, and scope, and reflecting legitimate business concerns—was not highly offensive and never caught the plaintiffs on videotape.

4.7 Medical Records

4.7.1 Civil Code § 56

California employers must establish procedures to keep employee medical records confidential (e.g., implementing a security system restricting access to medical information).31 California employers must not—unless complying with court orders, administering employee benefits, litigating medical issues the employee has put in controversy, or determining eligibility for medical leaves—use or disclose medical records unless the employee has signed a special release.32 California employers must not discriminate against an employee who refuses to sign that release, but may take necessary action in the absence of medical information if the employee refuses to sign the release.33 (See § 3.6.1.) The release must meet several requirements, e.g., the language must be separate from other language, and must be in no smaller than 14-point font. Moreover, the release must be signed only to authorize the release of medical information, be limited in time and purpose, specify who may disclose the information, and contain an advisory that the employee is entitled to a copy of the release.34

4.7.2 Labor Code § 3762—workers’ compensation insurers

In workers’ compensation proceedings, the employer’s insurance carrier or a third-party administrator often receives medical information about an employee (in, for example, a deposition transcript or medical report). The Labor Code forbids disclosure of this information to the employer, except as to (1) the diagnosis of the condition for which workers’ compensation is claimed or treatment is provided, and (2) information needed to modify the employee’s work duties.35
4.8 Social Security Numbers and Other Personal Information

4.8.1 Limits on use of SSNs

No person may print an individual’s social security number (SSN) on materials mailed to the individual, publicly post SSNs, print them on password cards, or require their use to access a website.36 Nor may a person require an individual to transmit a SSN over the Internet unless the connection is secure or the SSN is encrypted.37

4.8.2 Duty to protect personal information

California businesses owning personal information—such as SSNs, driver’s license numbers, credit card members, medical information—must “maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”38 A business that “discloses personal information about a California resident pursuant to a contract with a nonaffiliated third party”—e.g., an employer that releases personal information when contracting with third parties for payroll, benefits administration, or background check purposes—must “require by contract that the third party implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”39

4.8.3 Social media password and access protections

California employers must not request or require employees or job applicants to divulge personal social media account information. The term “social media” broadly encompasses all digital or electronic content, including videos, photographs, blogs, podcasts instant-text messages, email, online services or accounts, and Internet website profiles.40 Specifically, employers cannot ask or demand that employees or applicants (1) disclose user name or account password access to access a personal social media account, (2) access personal social media in the employer’s presence, or (3) divulge any personal social media.41 Employers must not take any adverse action for refusing or failing to comply with such a request or demand.42

Employers still may, however, ask employees to divulge personal social media reasonably believed to be relevant to investigating suspicions of employee misconduct or violations of law, so long as the employer uses the social media solely for that or a related investigation or proceeding.43 And employers can still request this information for the purpose of accessing an employer-issued electronic device.44

4.8.4 Other personal information

The Court of Appeal has upheld an employee’s right to sue her employer on the basis that her supervisor had informed the workforce that the employee suffered from bipolar disorder. Although the defendant won summary judgment against this claim for invasion of privacy—on the ground that the alleged disclosure was oral only and not reduced to a writing—the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that “disclosure in a writing is not required to maintain a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts.”45
4.9 Duty to Disclose Security Breaches of Computerized Personal Information

California businesses owning any computerized data including unencrypted (and, in some instances, encrypted) personal information must, upon breach of the security of that information, notify the affected persons “in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay.” Among the items considered protected information are medical information and health insurance information.

California mandates a special format for the notice to individuals affected by a breach. The notice must be in plain language and must be titled “Notice of Data Breach.” The notice must use at least 10-point font and include the following “clearly and conspicuously displayed” headlines: “What Happened,” “What Information Was Involved,” “What We Are Doing,” “What You Can Do,” and “For More Information.” The relevant statute also includes a template notice of breach that will “be deemed to be in compliance with” these new format requirements.

4.10 Personnel Records

In a lawsuit, the personnel files of California employees often are unavailable to the party seeking them until (1) there is a notice given to the employees and (2) the employees have the opportunity to object in court to the disclosure of their files.

Employee privacy rights have yielded, however, when respect for privacy rights would hinder the pursuit of a class action against an employer. Courts have permitted class-action counsel alleging wage and hour violations to obtain the name, address, and telephone number of every current and former employee belonging to the allegedly aggrieved class, so long as the employee did not, after receiving notice, object in writing to contact by plaintiffs’ counsel. In Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal rejected the employer’s suggestion to shield private employee information unless the employee affirmatively agreed to be contacted. Belaire-West reasoned that “no serious invasion of privacy” was involved, as what was involved was only “contact information, not medical or financial details.” Belaire-West allowed an opt-out procedure and did not require an opt-in procedure, because “there was no evidence of any actual or threatened misuse of the information” and because the “prompt payment of wages due an employee is a fundamental policy of this state.”

California courts have exalted the class-action procedure over employee privacy rights even when employees are on record as wanting to be left alone. In one case, where the defendant’s employees had signed forms stating that they did not want to be contacted by plaintiffs’ lawyers, the defendant argued that these forms revealed a heightened expectation of privacy that justified only opt-in discovery of the employees’ private contact information. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, ordering disclosure of employee addresses and telephone numbers unless the employees affirmatively opted out of the disclosure process.

And in some circumstances courts have even ordered disclosure of employee home addresses without permitting the affected individuals to object to their privacy being invaded.
4.11 Background Checks

The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requires employers to give certain notices and access rights to applicants and employees on whom an employer is requesting a background report, and to give these individuals a chance to correct inaccuracies in the report. Compliance with the FCRA is complicated. Here we highlight some ways in which California’s analogous statutes differ.

4.11.1 Credit reports

The California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) governs certain credit-history information that a consumer credit reporting agency reports for use in evaluating an individual’s fitness for employment or other permissible purposes. While resembling federal law on this subject, California law also requires employers to provide, on the form authorizing the credit report, a check-box that the individual can use to request a copy of the report, and, when notifying the consumer of any adverse action, to identify the consumer credit reporting agency providing the report. If the individual has indicated a desire for a copy of the report, then the user must request that a copy be provided to the individual when the user requests its copy from the credit reporting agency. The report to the user and to the individual subject must be provided contemporaneously and at no charge.

California generally prohibits using credit reports for employment decisions. “Credit report” does not include verification of past employment or income that does not otherwise include credit information (such as credit scores, records or history). Credit reports are permissible as to the following eight job categories, if the applicant or employee receives written notice of which of these categories applies:

1. managerional positions (as defined in the “executive” exemption in the Wage Orders),
2. positions in the California Department of Justice,
3. sworn peace officer or other law enforcement position,
4. positions for which the information is required to be obtained or disclosed by law,
5. positions involving regular access to bank or credit card information, social security numbers, dates of birth (for a purpose other than routine solicitation and processing of credit card applications in a retail establishment),
6. positions where the person can enter into financial transactions on behalf of the company (includes being a named signatory on employers bank or credit card account, authorization to transfer money or enter contracts),
7. positions involving access to proprietary or confidential information, and
8. positions with regular access to cash totaling $10,000 or more of the employer, a customer or client during the workday.

4.11.2 Investigative consumer reports

The California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) governs the use of reports received from investigative consumer reporting agencies on an employee’s or applicant’s “character, general reputation,
personal characteristics, and mode of living.” 68 Unlike the federal FCRA, which limits the definition of an “investigative consumer report” to information gathered from personal interviews with the subject’s neighbors and associates, the California ICRAA definition extends to collection of information from any source.

The aptly named ICRAA is an especially annoying statute, authorizing not only an action for actual and punitive damages plus attorney fees, but also the greater of actual damages or civil penalties of $10,000 per violation. 69 There is little case law interpreting whether these penalties apply to each report or each “violation” under the statute.

**Constitutional questions.** Some defendants have challenged the constitutionality of ICRAA as applied to criminal records requested for either tenancy or employment purposes. The California Supreme in 2018 rejected that challenge, holding that the ICRAA is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to employment background checks. The Supreme Court thus eliminated one threshold defense in ICRAA cases and reinforced the importance of being familiar with the requirements of both ICRAA and the CCRA.70

**Background checks.** California applicants and employees, unlike individuals in most of America, have a right to see the investigative consumer report even if no adverse action has occurred. The employer must provide on the authorization form a box that an individual can check to request a copy of any report that is sought for reasons other than suspicion that the subject of the investigation has engaged in wrongdoing or misconduct. 71

The ICRAA also imposes detailed requirements. Thus, a California employer asking an employee or applicant to sign a form authorizing the employer to obtain an investigative consumer report from a reporting agency must disclose, in a writing consisting solely of the disclosure, information such as the following:72

- the permissible purpose for obtaining the report,
- that an investigative consumer report may be obtained (as the FCRA requires),
- that the report is being obtained for employment purposes (as the FCRA requires),
- that the report may include information on the individual’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living (as the FCRA requires),
- the nature and scope of the investigation requested (which the FCRA requires only if the individual asks),
- the name, address, telephone number, and website of the investigative consumer reporting agency that will conduct the investigation (the website information is beyond what the FCRA requires),73
- that the investigative consumer reporting agency will, on reasonable notice, permit the individual to inspect the agency’s files for information on the individual (beyond what the FCRA requires),
- that the individual may obtain a copy of the file, by paying the actual cost of duplication (beyond what the FCRA requires), and
- that the individual may obtain a summary of the file information by telephone, with proper identification (beyond what the FCRA requires). 74
Moreover, there are California-specific limits on what may be reported by a background screening company. For example, under the FCRA, there is no longer any time limit affecting the search for records of criminal convictions for applicants making $75,000 or more. California is different. A California report generally must not contain reports of convictions that precede the report by more than seven years regardless of an applicant’s contemplated salary.

*Online child care job posting.* California has enacted extra requirements for online child care job posting services (including unlicensed childcare providers) and the background check service providers that service those companies. Unlike the rules outlined above, which focused on the subject of the background screening, this new requirement focuses on informing parents of the availability of background screens. Childcare services providers’ websites must now include a notice informing parents how to access free background screen information and a description of the types of background screens available from their website. Background check services providers have more extensive notice requirements, including a detailed description of what is included in the background check and a chart listing the databases searched, the sources of the data, date ranges, information on the frequency with which the information is updated, a description explaining how the databases are checked, and a list of counties for which no data was available.

*Investigations into suspicions of wrongdoing.* The ICRAA notice, authorization, and disclosure requirements do not apply if an investigative consumer reporting agency is used to investigate suspicions of wrongdoing or misconduct (although certain adverse action requirements in the FCRA and ICRAA do apply).

*Employer-generated reports.* While the federal FCRA applies only if the employer uses a consumer reporting agency, the California ICRAA applies to an employer’s own investigative efforts to the extent that they involve obtaining certain public records without the use of a consumer reporting agency. Public records include records of arrest, indictment, conviction, civil judicial action, tax lien, and outstanding judgment. If a California employer takes adverse action as a result of receiving such a public record, then the employee has an unwaivable right to receive a copy of the record.

The first ICRAA appellate case, decided in 2005, involved an employer who had fired the plaintiff when he confessed that he had a felony conviction. The employer induced that confession by interrogating the plaintiff after obtaining, off the Internet, a copy of a judicial decision mentioning his felony. Eight business days after the interrogation, the employer gave the plaintiff a copy of the Internet records. The plaintiff then sued for untimely disclosure, seeking the minimum $10,000 penalty for an ICRAA violation. The Court of Appeal made two holdings of interest: (1) the employer could not avoid ICRAA disclosure requirements by arguing that its dismissal of the plaintiff resulted from his admission to a felony conviction instead of from the employer’s receipt of the Internet report; the court aggressively read the ICRAA to say that the employer must disclose a copy of the public record if an adverse action was taken under circumstances in which the record was obtained and (2) no specific deadline applies to the required disclosure; rather, the employer must furnish a copy “of any public record uncovered in a background check within a reasonable time after an investigation concludes.” Here, the Court of Appeal held, as a matter of law, that eight business days following the plaintiff’s interrogation was a reasonable time in which to furnish a copy of the relevant documents, especially since the employer’s due diligence in asking the plaintiff about his criminal record served to verify that the background “information was accurate and not the result of identity theft or otherwise erroneous.”
The employer must also provide a copy of all public records obtained even if no adverse action occurs, upon “completion” of the investigation, unless the individual has checked a box, on a written form, to waive the right to receive a copy of the public records.\(^{86}\)

**Criminal history information.** Litigants have disputed whether criminal history information is “character” information governed by the ICRAA or “creditworthiness” information governed by the CCRAA. A California federal district court held, in 2012, that the ICRAA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to background reports containing criminal history information. The federal court, reviewing the two statutes and their legislative history, concluded that an item of information can be subject to either the ICRAA or the CCRAA, but not both. The criminal history information at issue in the case pertained to both the plaintiff’s character and creditworthiness. The federal court held that because there was no rational basis to decide that the information should be governed by one statute versus the other, the ICRAA was unconstitutionally vague in that situation and so the federal court dismissed the ICRAA claim.\(^{87}\) But the California Supreme Court has since held that the ICRAA is not unconstitutionally vague and that employers can comply with both statutes simultaneously.\(^{88}\)

### 4.12 Psychological Tests

California applicants have successfully challenged, as an unlawful invasion of privacy, psychological tests (such as the MMPI—the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) that require them to answer questions about their religious beliefs and sexual orientation, even though the test answers were used by only the professional administrators of the test and not by the employer itself.\(^{89}\)

Pre-employment psychological examinations are forbidden just as pre-employment medical examinations are (see § 6.3.2).

### 4.13 Fingerprinting

Absent an exception, California employers must not fingerprint employees to provide information to a third person who could use the information against the employee.\(^{90}\)

### 4.14 Photographing

California employers must not photograph employees to provide information to a third person who could use the information against the employee.\(^{91}\) If an employee photograph is required, then the employer must pay the cost.\(^{92}\)

### 4.15 Subcutaneous Identification Devices

Subverting the aspirations of intrusive employers (as well as certain concerned parents of wayward teenagers), the California Freedom from Subcutaneous Identification Device Act (our unofficial title only) forbids any person from requiring any individual to undergo the subcutaneous implanting of an identification device.\(^{93}\) An identification device is anything that can transmit personal information, such as a person’s name, address, telephone number, email address, date of birth, driver’s license number, religion, ethnicity or nationality, photographic, social security number, bank or credit card account number, etc.\(^{94}\)
4.16 Email Usage

California employers can minimize employee expectations of privacy by issuing clear written policies. Some employees might expect to have privacy in their electronic communications, even when enabled by the employer's technology, but the Court of Appeal has held that an employee's communications to her attorney on her work computer, via work email, were not confidential and thus not protected by the attorney-client privilege, even though the employee had used her company-issued private password and had deleted the email messages. The employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy because her employer had a written policy, which she had signed, stating that company technology resources should be used only for company business, that employees must not use company resources to send or receive personal emails, and that the company would monitor its computers for compliance with the policy.

2. Loder v. City of Glendale, 14 Cal. 4th 846 (1997) (upholding applicant testing as part of generally applicable pre-employment exam, where employer's "substantial interest" overcame "relatively minor" intrusion on expectation of privacy, but disallowing testing of current employees seeking promotion), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); see generally Hill v. NCAA, 7 Cal. 4th 1 (1994) (privacy rights depend in part on reasonable expectation of privacy, and invasion of privacy can be justified by "countervailing interests" or by consent). See also Pilkington Barnes Hind v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 4th 28 (1998) (upholding suspicionless applicant testing).
3. Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1989). The EEOC tried to nudge federal law in California's direction in 2012, in the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm. The EEOC argued that pre-employment inquiries about arrests not resulting in convictions have had a disparate impact on applicants in protected classifications such as national origin and race, and that use of arrest records "is not job related and consistent with business necessity." This approach would still leave employers free, of course, to consider the underlying facts that led to the arrest.
4. Starbucks I, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1990) (mandatory drug testing of computer programmer was breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as it was an unwarranted intrusion under California Constitution's privacy provisions; plaintiff was not a safety employee and no other compelling interests justified the testing). Luck's "compelling interest" test for non-safety-related private sector drug testing was disapproved in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 56-57 (1994).
5. Starbucks II, 657 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2011) (amended opinion issued on denial of rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc) (policy challenged not on privacy grounds but rather on the theory that "one strike" rule discriminated against former addicts on the basis of disability).
6. AB 1008, codified in Gov't Code § 12952, repealing Labor Code § 432.9. Exceptions exist for certain types of arrests for peace officers and health care employees. See also Gov't Code § 12952(a)(3) (employers, in checking conviction history on an applicant, generally must not consider or relay information about arrests not followed by conviction, about referrals to pretrial or posttrial diversion program, or about convictions that have been sealed, dismissed, expunged, or statutorily eradicated by law).
7. Lab. Code § 432.7(a)(1).
8. Lab. Code § 432.7(a)(1). By special exception, community youth athletic programs may request criminal history information from the Department of Justice for both volunteer coaches and hired coach candidates. Penal Code § 11105.3.
10. Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 4th 1436 (2008) (Starbucks I). The mischief did not end there. The trial court then permitted class counsel to conduct further discovery to find a "suitable" class representative, and ordered Starbucks to review job applications to find former job applicants with prior marijuana convictions to reveal to class counsel, unless the applicants affirmatively opted out to a neutral administrator. In Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 4th 820 (2011) (Starbucks II), the Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate against this discovery, noting that by providing for the disclosure of job applicants with minor marijuana convictions, the lower court ironically was violating the very privacy rights contained in "marijuana reform legislation" that the class action purported to enforce.
11. AB 1008, codified in Gov't Code § 12952, repealing Labor Code § 432.9. Exceptions exist for cases where the law requires a criminal history background check for the position in question. Note that California in some cases requires a criminal background check. Effective 2017, transportation network companies (e.g., Uber, Lyft) must obtain a criminal background report on each participating driver. A transportation network company must not contract with or employ any driver who (i) is registered on the United States Department of Justice National Sex Offender Public Website, (ii) has been convicted of any of certain terrorism-related or violent felonies, or (iii) has been convicted, within the last seven years, of any misdemeanor assault or battery, any domestic violence offense, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or any of a specified list of felonies. Public Util. Code § 5445.2.
12. Gov't Code § 12952(a). Exceptions apply for special jobs. Id. § 12952(d).
Government Code § 12952 (c)(5) (employer must inform applicant of any existing procedure employer has for applicant to challenge the decision or request reconsideration, and of the applicant’s right to file a complaint with the DFEH).

[16]

The ordinance would permit a conviction check after a live interview, but under state law the employer must first make a conditional offer of employment.

[17]

Lab. Code §§ 4901-4920.

[19]

The ordinance would permit a conviction check after a live interview, but under state law the employer must first make a conditional offer of employment.

[18]

49 S.F. Police Code §§ 4901-4920.

[20]

Los Angeles, Mun. Code, Art. 9, Ch. 18, § 189 et seq. Under the Los Angeles Fair Chance Initiative for Hiring (Ban the Box). The definition of “employee” extends to those individuals who are working an average of two hours per week within the geographic limits of Los Angeles, even if those two hours are telecommuting from an LA address. Id. § 189.01(I).

[21]


[22]

Lab. Code § 432.7(m).

[23]

The ordinance would permit a conviction check after a live interview, but under state law the employer must first make a conditional offer of employment.

[24]

Gov’t Code § 12940(a).

[25]


[26]


[27]

Pen. Code § 632(d).

[28]

Lab. Code § 129080(f) (“Except as [used for insurance risk purposes], the results of an HIV test, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 120775, that identifies or provides identifying characteristics of the person to whom the test results apply, shall not be used in any instance for the determination of insurability or suitability for employment.”).

[29]


[30]


[31]

Civ. Code § 56.20(a).

[32]

Civ. Code § 56.20(c).

[33]

Civ. Code § 56.20(b).

[34]


[35]

Lab. Code § 3762(c).

[36]

Lab. Code § 1798.85(a)(1)-(2), (4)-(5).

[37]


[38]

Lab. Code § 1798.81.5(b).

[39]

Lab. Code § 1798.81.5(c).

[40]

Lab. Code § 980(a).

[41]

Lab. Code § 980(b)(1)-(3).

[42]

Lab. Code § 980(e).

[43]

Lab. Code § 980(c).

[44]

Lab. Code § 980(d).

[45]

Ignat v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 4th 808, 819 (2013) (“limiting liability for public disclosure of private facts to those recorded in a writing is contrary to the tort’s purpose, which has been since its inception to allow a person to control the kind of information about himself made available to the public—in essence, to define his public persona”).

[46]

Civ. Code § 1798.82(a).

[47]

Civ. Code § 1798.82(h)(1)(D), (E).

[48]

Civ. Code § 1798.82(d).

[49]

Civ. Code § 1798.82(d)(1).

[50]

Id.

[51]


[52]

See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1985.6, 2020.410(d) (requiring notice to individual when individual’s employment records are being subpoenaed).

[53]

One exception occurred when an appellate decision struck down a discovery order that an employer identify the applicants who had reported marijuana convictions on their job applications. Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 4th 820 (2011). In another victory for privacy, an appellate court in a wrongful-termination case protected from disclosure, via interrogatory answers, personal information that the plaintiff had sought regarding the age, job information, date of termination, and reason for termination of the defendant employer’s former employees. Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. App. 4th 640, 655-56 (2011) (trial court abused discretion in ordering answers to interrogatories without evaluating whether a compelling need for information outweighed third-party privacy and whether less intrusive means would yield the information sought, without giving sufficient notice affording former employees a simple, reasonable means of objecting to disclosure of personal information, and without providing for protection of any information ultimately disclosed).

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Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court (Martinez), 169 Cal. App. 4th 958 (2008) (employees’ execution of release forms objecting to employer’s disclosure of contact information to third parties did not preclude discovery of contact information in class action against employer for violation of wage and labor laws).

[56]

Stone v. Advance Am., 2010 WL 5892501, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99754 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (distinguishing Belaire-West Landscape and ordering that contact information be produced for former employees employed during the class period, without prior notice to them, where plaintiff claimed former employees during class period were percipient witnesses).

[57]


[58]

Id. at 561-62

[59]

Id. at 562.

[60]

Id. (quoting Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists, 63 Cal. App. 4th 563, 571 (1998)).

[61]

Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court (Martinez), 169 Cal. App. 4th 958 (2008) (employees’ execution of release forms objecting to employer’s disclosure of contact information to third parties did not preclude discovery of contact information in class action against employer for violation of wage and labor laws).

[62]

Stone v. Advance Am., 2010 WL 5892501, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99754 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (distinguishing Belaire-West Landscape and ordering that contact information be produced for former employees employed during the class period, without prior notice to them, where plaintiff claimed former employees during class period were percipient witnesses).

[63]


[64]

Civ. Code § 1785.1 et seq.
Civ. Code § 1785.20.5(a).
Civ. Code § 1785.20.5(a).
Lab. Code § 1024.5.
Lab. Code § 1024.5(c)(1).
Lab. Code § 1024.5(a)(1)-(8). There is an exemption for financial institutions subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. Under Civil Code section 1785.20.5(a), the disclosure to the consumer when a credit report is ordered for employment purposes must identify the applicable exception under Labor Code section 1024.5.
Civ. Code § 1785.20.5(a).
Civ. Code § 1785.20.5(a).
Lab. Code § 1024.5(c)(1).
Lab. Code § 1024.5(a)(1)-(8). See Connor v. First Student, Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 1026, 1038 (2018) (holding that both the ICRAA and CCRAA may apply to the same report and that an employer may be responsible for simultaneously complying with the obligations of both statutes).
Civ. Code § 1786 et seq.
Civ. Code § 1786.2(c).
Civ. Code § 1786.50(a)(1).
See Connor v. First Student, Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 1026, 1038 (2018) (holding that both the ICRAA and CCRAA may apply to the same report and that an employer may be responsible for simultaneously complying with the obligations of both statutes).
Civ. Code § 1786.16(b)(1)(c).
Civ. Code § 1786.16(a)(2).
California employers procuring a report must also disclose the website of the investigative consumer reporting agency. Civ. Code § 1786.16(b)(1)(c).
Civ. Code § 1786.18(a)(7) (investigative consumer reporting agency may not report records of convictions that from date of disposition, release, or parole antedate report by more than seven years). Section 1786.18(b)(2) exempts reports for employers explicitly required by government regulatory agencies to check for certain records.
Civ. Code § 1786.22(b).
Civ. Code § 1786.16(b)(B)(vi). If the investigative consumer agency does not have a website, then the consumer must receive a telephone number to learn about the investigative consumer agency’s privacy practices, including whether the consumer’s personal information will be sent outside the United States or its territories. Civ. Code § 1786.16(a)(2)(B)(vi).
Civ. Code § 1786.22(b).
Civ. Code § 1786.53(b)(1)-(3). Copies of the records must be provided within seven days. Id.
Civ. Code § 1786.53(b)(1)-(3). Copies of the records must be provided within seven days. Id.
Lab. Code § 1051.
bid. § 18890.2(a-b).
bid. § 18890.2(c).
Civ. Code § 1786.16(c).
Morgan v. Morlaux, Miller, Meyer & Nelson, 126 Cal. App. 4th 323 (2005) (holding—in opinion that superseded the lower court decision and that did not reach the ICRAA issues—that trial court could look beyond the pleadings and weigh evidence when deciding how likely a vexatious litigant was to prevail), aff’d on other grounds, 40 Cal. 4th 780 (2007).
bid. at 336.
Id.
Moran v. The Screening Pros, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158598 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012), appeal pending, No. 12-57246 (9th Cir.) (argued Feb. 2, 2015 and then stayed pending resolution of Connor v. First Student Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 1026 (2018)). The plaintiff sued Screening Pros for issuing a background check report on him that contained his criminal history, in violation of the ICRAA. Screening Pros moved to dismiss, successfully arguing that ICRAA is unconstitutionally vague as to criminal history information, leaving persons of reasonable intelligence unable to tell whether that information is “character” information that the ICRAA governs or “creditworthiness” information that the CCRAA governs. This distinction matters because the ICRAA imposes stricter duties and more severe penalties—such as the option to seek $10,000 in statutory damages in lieu of damages. Following the California Supreme Court’s decision in Connor v. First Student, the parties in Moran submitted supplemental briefing that, as of January 2019, was fully briefed and pending before the Ninth Circuit.
Lab. Code § 1051.
bid.
Lab. Code § 401.
Civ. Code § 52.7.
Civ. Code § 52.7(h)(1)(3).
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (assuming that a police officer sending personal text messages while using a police-issued pager had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their content).
5. Litigation Issues

California stacks the litigation deck in favor of employees suing employers. Supporting this one-sided treatment typically is the supposition that employers have ample resources while suing employee do not, and the asserted public policy that California should encourage employees to invoke the numerous statutory provisions designed to protect them from oppressive employers. Accordingly, to compensate for perceived inherent inequalities in employer-employee bargaining power, and to promote workforce fairness, California has

- made jury trials available to suing employees, while permitting courts to deny jury trials in certain wage and hour cases to defending employers (see § 5.1),
- often refused to enforce employer-mandated arbitration agreements (see § 5.2),
- refused to enforce employer-mandated venue-selection and choice-of-law agreements (see § 5.3),
- created a common law tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy (see § 5.4),
- expanded theories of contract liability for wrongful termination (see §§ 5.5, 5.6),
- tilted the procedural playing field against employers seeking summary judgment (see § 5.7),
- broadened employer liability for defamation (see § 5.8),
- broadened employer liability for misrepresentation (see § 5.9),
- broadened employer liability to third parties for employee torts (see § 5.10),
- permitted full tort remedies for violations of employment discrimination statutes (see § 5.11),
- created one-sided rules for awarding attorney fees and costs to prevailing parties (see § 5.12),
- encouraged class actions against employers to pursue wage and hour claims (see § 5.13), and
- applied unfair competition laws to create a longer limitations period for employment claims (see § 5.14).

5.1 Special Rules for California Jury Trial

5.1.1 Employers can’t avoid jury with mandatory predispute jury waivers

In many states, employers have avoided jury trials while maintaining the procedural advantages of litigating in court by agreeing with employees and applicants to have employment disputes heard by a judge sitting without a jury. This predispute selection of a bench trial avoids the risk of unpredictable, excessive jury verdicts while also retaining the right to seek judicial appellate review. In California, however, it’s different. The California Supreme Court has held that these agreements are invalid, on the ground that waiving a jury trial requires a specific statutory authorization, such as the California Arbitration Act.¹ (A concurring justice, calling California “out of step with the authority in other state and federal jurisdictions—most of which have permitted predispute jury
waivers” urged the California Legislature to authorize predispute waivers of jury trial, to permit trials by the court. No such statutory development appears likely.)

5.1.2 Employers sometimes can be deprived of a jury trial

While juries often sympathize with individuals who sue corporations, those plaintiffs are less sympathetic in certain cases, such as when they have signed contracts saying they were independent contractors and now claim employee benefits on a claim that they were really employees, or when they have earned large dollars as a salaried employee and now seek overtime pay on a claim that their employer had misclassified them as exempt. Although California employers should be entitled to a jury trial in these cases, plaintiffs have circumvented that right by asserting their claims under the Unfair Competition Law, which enables them to recover unpaid monies as a matter of equitable relief decided by the court sitting without a jury. And even when plaintiffs also sue under the Labor Code (on which a jury trial is available), some courts have tried the UCL claim first, without a jury, to reach a result that makes a jury trial unnecessary.

5.2 California’s Hostility to Arbitration of Employment Disputes

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) promotes the enforceability of arbitration agreements, including those made in the employment context. The FAA declares that courts can invalidate contractual agreements to arbitrate only on the same grounds that would cause courts to invalidate contractual promises generally, such as on the grounds of unconscionability or duress. Thus, the FAA preempts special state rules that single out arbitration agreements for disfavor. Accordingly, courts throughout America generally enforce agreements by which parties agree to arbitrate rather than litigate in court. In 2018 the U.S. Supreme Court once again reiterated that federal law—the Federal Arbitration Act—guarantees enforcement of arbitration contracts to the same extent that contracts generally are enforced. In this case the Court joined the California Supreme Court in rejecting a plaintiff’s argument that arbitration agreements with class-action waivers run afool of the National Labor Relations Act and its protection of concerted activity by employees for their mutual aid and protection. (See § 5.2.)

But California historically has discriminated against arbitration agreements. Some of this hostility appears expressly in California statutes. One Labor Code section, for example, purports to void any agreement to arbitrate wage disputes. Although the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987 struck down this section as preempted by the FAA, the Legislature left this section on the books, as a snare for the employer that moves to compel arbitration without establishing that the relevant transaction was in interstate commerce and thus within the scope of the FAA. Other examples of blatant statutory anti-arbitration animus appear in the Ralph Act and Bane Act, which, by a 2014 amendment, require that any waiver of procedural rights with respect to a violation must be “knowing and voluntary … and expressly not made as a condition of … providing … services.” In a 2018 decision the Court of Appeal recognized that this provision runs afool of the FAA mandate against state rules that single out arbitration provisions for suspect status, and thus reversed a trial court order refusing to direct Ralph and Bane Act claims to arbitration in accordance with a mandatory employment contract.

5.2.1 The U.S. Supreme Court’s rejections of California decisions hostile to arbitration

California’s notoriously anti-arbitration attitude repeatedly has provoked the U.S. Supreme Court to invoke the FAA to strike down California-erected obstacles to arbitration.
First, in 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court, overturning the California Supreme Court, held that franchisees suing under California’s Franchise Investment Law must abide by their contractual agreement to arbitrate.\textsuperscript{14} Second, in 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts a California Labor Code section that authorizes non-union employees to sue for unpaid wages “without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.”\textsuperscript{15} Third, in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a California Court of Appeal decision that empowered the Labor Commissioner, instead of an arbitrator, to decide the validity of an arbitration agreement signed by entertainment workers suing under the California Talent Agencies Act.\textsuperscript{16}

Fourth, in 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in \textit{AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion}\textsuperscript{17} held that the FAA preempts California’s \textit{Discover Bank} rule, which invalidated class-action waivers in arbitration agreements.\textsuperscript{18} Later that year, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on \textit{Concepcion} to vacate a California Supreme Court decision that had found an arbitration agreement contrary to public policy and unconscionable because it required employees to waive their right to an adjudicatory hearing (a “Berman hearing”) before the Labor Commissioner.\textsuperscript{19} The U.S. Supreme Court directed the California Supreme Court to reconsider that decision in light of \textit{AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion}.\textsuperscript{20}

The California Supreme Court responded to that direction in a decision acknowledging that the FAA, as interpreted by \textit{Concepcion}, preempts any categorical bar on Berman hearing waivers. Nonetheless, the decision insisted that unconscionability could still be found, on a case-by-case basis, and that a Berman hearing waiver may be considered a relevant factor supporting an ultimate finding of unconscionability.\textsuperscript{21}

Fifth, in 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court, in \textit{DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia},\textsuperscript{22} reversed a Court of Appeal decision that had affirmed a refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement containing a class-action waiver. The Court of Appeal, in interpreting the arbitration agreement, had failed to follow general contract principles and instead had followed a rule of contractual interpretation uniquely hostile to arbitration. This approach failed to give “due respect … to the federal policy favoring arbitration.”

Another U.S. Supreme Court ruling, which California courts variously will evade or follow, is that parties who have not contracted for class arbitration may not be forced to arbitrate class claims.\textsuperscript{23} The California Supreme Court has undercut the effect of that ruling by holding that, absent clear language otherwise, arbitrators, rather than courts, get to decide whether the arbitration agreement authorizes class arbitration (see § 5.2.4).

\subsection*{5.2.2 Unconscionability doctrine used to invalidate arbitration agreements}

In America generally, employers make arbitration agreements a condition of employment. Such agreements have certain common features: they generally waive court and jury trial while reserving the employer’s right to seek judicial relief for trade-secret violations; they limit discovery; they share the costs of arbitration between the parties; and they sometimes even limit the remedies available and the time in which to file a claim. California casts a peculiarly disapproving gaze on all of these provisions. The leading case is the California Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in \textit{Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services}.\textsuperscript{24} Under \textit{Armendariz} and its progeny, California courts refuse to enforce arbitration agreements if they are “unconscionable,” and define unconscionability very broadly.\textsuperscript{25}

A contract is unenforceable if it is unconscionable both procedurally and substantively. Procedural unconscionability involves oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. Procedural unconscionability typically exists where the employer imposes an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, with no
realistic chance for the employee to bargain. Substantive unconscionability involves terms that the court deems unreasonably one-sided.

**California’s broad view of procedural unconscionability.** Some employers have sought to eliminate problems with substantively unconscionable arbitration agreements by eliminating procedural unconscionability. They have sought to do this by proposing written arbitration agreements that employees can reject simply by opting out of the agreement within a reasonable time, such as 30 days, so that the resulting agreement, even if deemed substantively unconscionable, could nevertheless be enforceable because it is not procedurally unconscionable. But then came the California Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in *Gentry v. Superior Court (Circuit City Stores, Inc.)*. Gentry decided that even an easily understood one-page opt-out form may be insufficient to avoid a finding of procedural unconscionability. Thus, Gentry, disagreeing with the Court of Appeal and with two Ninth Circuit cases, refused to accept that Circuit City’s arbitration program—which permitted employees to opt out of the program within 30 days of written notice and even advised that employees could consult an attorney about the opt-out decision—was free of procedural unconscionability. Gentry reasoned that the opt-out form gave employees a “highly distorted picture of the arbitration Circuit City was offering,” such that only “a legally sophisticated party” would have understood the relative advantages of judicial litigation; also, Gentry speculated that employees “likely” “felt at least some pressure not to opt out of the arbitration agreement.” A dissenting opinion argued that there were no grounds to find that Circuit City had unfairly coerced or induced employees not to opt out of the arbitration program.

Often contracting parties expressly incorporate other documents by reference, a practice that is enforceable so long as the documents are readily available. This permissible contractual practice of incorporation by reference should be appropriate in arbitration agreements as well as other agreements, as the Federal Arbitration Act would forbid any special rule that disfavors arbitration agreements. And so it is that throughout most of America an arbitration agreement will mention rules of arbitration that a party can easily retrieve through the Internet or otherwise. Although the Court of Appeal once held that an arbitration clause in a mandatory employment agreement was procedurally unconscionable because the employer had failed to provide the employee with a complete copy of the arbitration rules, the California Supreme Court then clarified the point that a mere failure to attach arbitration rules does not itself make an arbitration agreement unconscionable; rather, a failure to attach the rules will call for closer scrutiny of the “artfully hidden” rules to see if they are substantively unconscionable.

Another decision found procedural unconscionability where the employer failed to give the employee enough time to review the agreement or have it reviewed by legal counsel, and failed to give the employee a copy of the signed agreement. And, in a non-employment case with potential implications for employment arbitration agreements, the Court of Appeal has found procedural unconscionability where an arbitration agreement was presented in English to renters of mobile home spaces who did not understand English.

A Ninth Circuit opinion, applying California law, found procedural unconscionability where the employer, having presented the arbitration agreement on a “take it or leave it” basis, also failed to provide the actual terms of the arbitration policy to the employee during the three weeks after they had agreed to be bound by it as a condition of employment.

**Requiring an odd form of “mutuality.”** *Armendariz* held that any arbitration agreement imposed on an employee is substantively unconscionable if it lacks a “modicum of bilaterality.” One example of unconscionability, California style, is an arbitration agreement carving out certain claims that an employer, rather than an employee,
would be likely to bring, absent reasonable justification for such a carve-out. The agreement in *Armendariz* was unconscionable because, while it generally subjected all claims to arbitration, it carved out claims for injunctive relief, which typically would be brought by the employer (to restrain unfair competition) rather than by the employee.  

Through this expansive anti-arbitration reasoning, some California courts thus have held that an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable if it permits the parties to pursue court claims that would likely be more valuable to employers than to employees. (Of course, there is nothing inherently “unfair” about reserving certain claims for litigation if, as the public policy favoring arbitration implies, arbitration is an acceptable substitute for litigation. So by saying that it is unfairly one-sided for the agreement to leave certain claims unaffected by the agreement to arbitrate, California courts reveal their bias against arbitration.)

**Inventing special requirements for statutory claims.** *Armendariz* created certain minimum requirements that mandatory arbitration agreements must meet to be substantively conscionable as to statutory claims: (1) providing for neutral arbitrators, (2) providing for discovery sufficient for the employee to secure information needed to present the claim, (3) requiring a written decision to permit limited judicial review, (4) providing for all relief that would be available in court, and (5) requiring the employer to pay all of the costs unique to arbitration, such as the arbitrator’s fees. A court may save an arbitration agreement by interpreting it as implicitly requiring these conditions, unless the agreement itself is expressly to the contrary.

Courts following *Armendariz* have struck down arbitration agreements as substantively unconscionable when they provide employers with greater rights than they would have in court. One provision disfavored on this ground has been a clause providing for prevailing-party attorney fees on a FEHA claim, without limiting the defendant’s right to fees to those cases where the employee’s claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or brought in bad faith.” Other provisions found to be substantively unconscionable have included neutrally worded arbitrator selection provisions that, as a practical matter, would result in an arbitrator of the employer’s choosing, and fee provisions that apportion arbitrator’s fees equally among parties at the outset of the arbitration.

Although *Armendariz* arose in the context of statutory employment discrimination claims, courts have applied its special requirements to other statutory claims as well. These rulings—which ultimately rely on a judicial prejudice that litigation is inherently superior to arbitration—thus betray an anti-arbitration bias that conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act, which requires courts to place arbitration contracts on an equal footing with contracts generally.

**Hostility toward default discovery limitations.** In a 2017 decision, the Court of Appeal held that provisions in an arbitration agreement that limited discovery were unconscionable where “the default discovery allowed … is low, the burden placed on [the claimant] to justify additional discovery is somewhat greater than a simple showing of need or good cause, and [the claimant] has established as a factual matter that she will likely need to conduct at least three to five times the number of depositions allowed.”

**Limited severability in arbitration agreements.** Courts generally will save and enforce a contract by using a “blue pencil” to sever out unenforceable provisions, leaving the rest of the agreement intact. California is different. California courts will decline to sever offensive provisions in an arbitration agreement in order to enforce the remainder of the agreement. *Armendariz* upheld the trial court’s refusal to sever the offending provisions because (1) there were multiple unlawful provisions (both a limitation on damages and an “unconscionably unilateral
arbitration clause”) and (2) they permeated the entire agreement. Furthermore, the employer’s post-dispute offer to waive the offending provisions did not save the day: “No existing rule of contract law permits a party to resuscitate a legally defective contract merely by offering to change it.”

A 2018 Court of Appeal decision refused to enforce an arbitration agreement because it found that an invalid PAGA waiver was not severable, even though the agreement said it was severable. A car wash employee sued his employer for wage and hour violations, alleging both individual claims and a representative PAGA action. The employment handbook—provided to all employees in both English and Spanish—required arbitration of employment disputes and denied rights to bring a PAGA action. The English version said the PAGA-denial provision was severable, so that if was invalid the rest of the agreement would be enforceable, but the Spanish version said the PAGA-denial provision was not severable. The employee had agreed to arbitration by signing both the English and the Spanish handbook acknowledgements. In ruling against the employer, the Court of Appeal reasoned that although the English version stated that in the event of any Spanish-English difference that the English version would control, the difference between versions was at best negligent and at worst deceptive and created an ambiguity to be construed against the employer, the drafting party, particularly since the arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion.

Hostility toward shortened statutes of limitations. Employers often seek to have employees agree to shorten the time in which the employee can sue. California courts, being hostile to those efforts, have struck down one-year limitations periods that appear in arbitration agreements, reasoning that such a short period would unfairly preclude an employee from relying on legal theories that could extend the deadline for suing. While one court upheld a six-month limit on employee claims measured from termination of employment, another court found such a provision unenforceable, where it limited an otherwise-applicable four-year statute of limitations to six months.

A 2008 Court of Appeal decision upheld, against a FEHA claim, a one-year limitations period imposed by an arbitration agreement, where the period did not unreasonably restrict the plaintiff’s ability to vindicate his FEHA rights, but then the California Supreme Court took that decision off the books by granting review of the case. The Supreme Court’s own decision, in 2010, declined to address the viability of the one-year statute of limitations.

In 2017, a Court of Appeal decision held that even a one-year limitations period imposed by an arbitration agreement would be unreasonably short for a FEHA claim. And it was not enough that the agreement authorized the arbitrator, for good cause, to extend the limitations period: the employer “cannot rely on that provision to excuse an otherwise substantively unconscionable limitations provision … . A provision delegating authority to the arbitrator to resolve questions of unconscionability is itself unconscionable.”

Meanwhile, employees reneging on promises to arbitrate need not fear that their arbitration claim-filing deadline looms while they pursue a court action to evade arbitration. In California, if an arbitration agreement requires that arbitration be initiated by a deadline, commencing a court action by that deadline tolls the arbitration claim-filing deadline until 30 days after a final judicial determination that the party must arbitrate instead of litigate, or 30 days after the judicial action ends, whichever date occurs first.
5.2.3 Judicial reluctance to find employee consent to arbitration

Just as a judge can invoke unconscionability to avoid enforcing an arbitration agreement, so too can a judge find that the employee never consented to the agreement in the first place. Thus, where an employer sought to enforce an arbitration clause in its employee handbook, the Court of Appeal refused to enforce an agreement because the agreement appeared within a lengthy employee handbook, because the agreement was not called to the plaintiff’s attention, because he did not specifically agree to arbitration, because the handbook stated that it was not intended to create a contract, and because the handbook provided that it could be amended unilaterally by the employer, thereby rendering any agreement illusory.51

California courts have ensnared employers in traps of their own making when the employer handbook containing an arbitration policy comes with a disclaimer (as too many handbooks do) that the handbook is “not a contract.” In one case the Court of Appeal, while giving lip service to the “strong policy favoring contractual arbitration,” emphasized that this “policy does not extend to parties who have not agreed to arbitrate.”52 The Court of Appeal thus upheld the denial of arbitration because the handbook containing an arbitration policy came with a welcome letter stating that the handbook was “not intended to … create any legally enforceable obligations.”53

In yet another example of anti-arbitration judicial creativity, the Court of Appeal refused to compel arbitration against an employee who was subject to a handbook containing an arbitration agreement. There was no actual consent to arbitration because the handbook said that employees would be required to sign an arbitration agreement, yet the employer could not produce any such agreement. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the handbook had evinced an intent that the employee’s consent would be obtained only through a signed separate agreement, which here the employer had failed to produce.54

The Court of Appeal has also upheld a refusal to compel arbitration on the ground that the employer had failed to prove that the electronic signature on the arbitration agreement was really that of the employee. The Court of Appeal relied on the technicality that the employer, in the declaration supporting its petition to compel arbitration, had failed to state sufficient facts regarding the employer’s electronic system to show reasons for believing that the electronic signature was in fact the act of the employee.55

In the context of a collective bargaining agreement, the Court of Appeal has held that a CBA did not require arbitration of Labor Code claims for unprovided meal and rest breaks and for unpaid wages where the employer could not show that the CBA had a “clear and unmistakable wavier of a judicial forum,” which, the Court of Appeal said, must “specify the statutes for which claims of violation will be subject to arbitration.” The employer’s petition to compel arbitration was thus properly denied because the CBA in question lacked that specific language.56

5.2.4 Using California public policy to discriminate against arbitration agreements

Sometimes explicitly, and sometimes implicitly, California courts have struck down arbitration agreements on the basis that California public policy prefers litigation to arbitration. This pro-plaintiff policy preference runs counter to the Federal Arbitration Act’s decree that courts are not to discriminate against arbitration agreements. But the
numerous slap-downs of California courts by the U.S. Supreme Court on this subject (see § 5.2.1) have not yet had a sufficient deterrent effect.

**California’s ultimately unsuccessful efforts to invalidate class waivers in arbitration agreements.** For many years, the California Supreme Court clung to the notion that public policy prevented the enforcement of arbitration agreements that waived the right to participate in a class action. This notion that class actions were immune from arbitration agreements was known as the *Gentry* rule, named after a 2007 California Supreme Court decision that said: “We conclude that at least in some cases, the prohibition of classwide relief would undermine the vindication of the employees’ unwaivable statutory rights and would pose a serious obstacle to the enforcement of the state’s overtime laws. Accordingly, such class arbitration waivers should not be enforced if a trial court determines, based on the factors discussed below, that class arbitration would be a significantly more effective way of vindicating the rights of affected employees than individual arbitration.”

In 2014, however, the California Supreme Court finally acknowledged that, under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, class waivers in arbitration agreements are enforceable, notwithstanding state public policy, because of the preemptive strength of the Federal Arbitration Act.

In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that class waivers are enforceable under the FAA and rejected an argument that they unlawfully interfere with employee rights to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection under the National Labor Relations Act.

California’s preference for having the arbitrator decide whether class arbitration is authorized. A threshold issue for arbitration agreements is who decides whether class arbitration is permitted—the court or the arbitrator? Federal courts have held that this gateway question is for the court to decide. A factor promoting that allocation of decisional authority is that the arbitrator who would be empowered to decide the question of class arbitration would face a conflict of interest, in that the arbitrator would have strong financial incentives to multiply arbitral fees by permitting class arbitration to proceed.

But here, as elsewhere, California has deviated from the norm. In *Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive*, a 2016 decision, the California Supreme Court considered an arbitration agreement that did not expressly address whether class arbitration was authorized. The agreement simply stated that it covered any “claim, dispute, or controversy” between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the question of “who decides” whether class arbitration is available—the court or the arbitrator—should be answered by interpreting the arbitration agreement under state contract law. The result, the Supreme Court found, was that the arbitration agreement in question allocated the question of class arbitration to the arbitrator.

**California’s invalidation of representative-action (PAGA) waivers in arbitration agreements.** While California has yielded to federal authority with respect to enforcing class waivers in arbitration, the same has not been true as to waivers of the right to bring PAGA representative actions. For some time, California appellate courts disagreed whether courts should enforce arbitration agreements by which the parties waive the right to participate in representative actions, such as PAGA actions. The California Supreme Court finally addressed that issue in 2014, in *Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC*. *Iskanian* acknowledged that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s policy against class-action waivers in arbitration agreements, but also held, against the weight of federal authority, that representative actions are *not* subject to mandatory arbitration.
The Court of Appeal, in 2017, expanded on *Iskanian* to conclude that predispute waivers of the judicial forum in a PAGA claim are unenforceable, and that the predispute/postdispute boundary is not crossed until the pertinent employee is authorized to commence a PAGA action as an agent of the state: “Only after employees have satisfied the statutory requirements for commencing a PAGA action are they in a position to determine what trade-offs between arbitral efficiency and formal procedural protections best safeguard their statutory rights.”

**Invalidation of agreements to arbitrate claims for public injunctive relief.** Another example of California’s hostility to arbitration is its “*Broughton-Cruz Rule*”: arbitration provisions are unenforceable as against public policy if they require arbitration of injunctive claims brought for the public’s benefit. Thus, a plaintiff, alleging that Citibank’s “Credit Protector” insurance plan violated the UCL and other statutes, invoked the *Broughton-Cruz Rule* in an effort to disregard an arbitration agreement and seek judicial injunctive relief against deceptive practices.

The Court of Appeal rebuffed this effort, holding that the plaintiff must arbitrate because the *Broughton-Cruz Rule* conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeal declined to extend *Iskanian*’s reasoning to create a PAGA-like exception for the *Broughton-Cruz Rule*. The Court of Appeal reasoned that in a PAGA action, unlike a UCL action, the state retains “primacy over private enforcement efforts,” with the PAGA plaintiff being required to give advance notice to the state and to await state action before suing. In a UCL action, by contrast, the state is not the “real party in interest,” and so the PAGA exception set forth in *Iskanian* did not save the *Broughton-Cruz Rule* from FAA preemption. The Court of Appeal explained: the FAA “preempts all state-law rules that prohibit arbitration of a particular type of claim because an outright ban, no matter how laudable the purpose, interferes with the FAA’s objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms.”

But then the California Supreme Court took review of the case and, in 2017, reversed the Court of Appeal. The high court ruled that waiving injunctive relief meant to prohibit unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public is contrary to California public policy. Moreover, the high court concluded, a state rule forbidding such a waiver is not preempted by the FAA, because the *Broughton-Cruz Rule* applies to all contracts and is not limited to arbitration agreements.

### 5.2.5 Qualified aversion to meaningful judicial review of arbitration awards

**Hostility to federal “manifest disregard of law” standard.** Although the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes judicial review of arbitral awards in only very limited situations—generally involving a misbehaving arbitrator federal courts have authorized vacating awards where the arbitrator has exhibited a “manifest disregard” for controlling law. They have done so even after the U.S. Supreme Court, in 2008, held that parties cannot contract to supplement the grounds for vacating or modifying the award provided by the FAA. California courts, however, have refused to recognize the “manifest disregard” standard of review. Thus, for example, an employer was denied meaningful judicial review of a wrongful termination arbitral award that granted $225,000 in emotional distress damages without evidence of severe mental injury and that imposed $1 million in punitive damages without citing evidence to support the award. The Court of Appeal refused to review these legal outrages, because California law, unlike federal law, does not permit vacating an arbitration award merely because the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. (The result in California might now differ, of course, if the arbitration agreement itself provides for broadened judicial review. See below.)

By contrast, if an arbitrator legally errs in favor of an employer, that could be grounds for vacating the award. The California Supreme Court ruled in 2010 that an arbitrator makes “a clear error of law,” giving grounds to vacate
the award, if the arbitrator made a procedural error that deprived an employee of a hearing on the merits of a statutory employment claim.\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{Negotiated review of arbitral awards.} Employers have sought to hedge against run-away arbitral awards by bargaining for judicial review of arbitration awards for “clear error of law” and for “lack of substantial evidence” to sustain the award. That review would exceed the review provided by arbitration statutes, which very narrowly limit judicial scrutiny of an arbitration award to such matters as whether the arbitrator had a personal bias or clearly exceeded the arbitrator’s authority.\textsuperscript{76} California courts once held that extra-statutory judicial review of an arbitration award is forbidden,\textsuperscript{77} although one court upheld, as not unconscionable, a provision in an arbitration agreement that a second arbitrator can review an arbitration award in the same manner as an appellate court would review a trial court judgment.\textsuperscript{78}

Surprisingly welcome news came in 2008, in a non-employment case, in which the California Supreme Court held that parties can contract for judicial review of legal error in arbitration awards.\textsuperscript{79} The California Supreme Court reached this holding even though the United States Supreme Court had recently held that the Federal Arbitration Act does not permit the parties to expand the scope of judicial review beyond those grounds specified by the FAA.\textsuperscript{80} Announcing a special “California rule,” the California Supreme Court held that the parties may agree to have expanded judicial review of an arbitration award. The Supreme Court found support for this rule in a California statutory provision for vacating an arbitration award when “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers.”\textsuperscript{81} The Supreme Court thus enforced (as a matter of California, not federal, law) a provision in an arbitration agreement that “[t]he arbitrators shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any such error.”

5.3 Hostility to Employer Mandated Forum Selection and Choice of Law

Court throughout American generally enforce forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions. But in California it’s different. California has shown special hostility to these provisions in the employment context. A California statute forbids employers to require employees who reside and work in California to agree, as a condition of employment, to litigate or arbitrate employment disputes either outside of California or under another state’s laws. The only exception is where the employee was individually represented by a lawyer in negotiating an employment contract.\textsuperscript{82}

Even before this statute hobbled employer efforts to select a venue and applicable law, California courts were reluctant to enforce forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions. One Court of Appeal decision reasoned that an arbitration agreement, by choosing Texas law to govern the parties’ disputes, was unconscionable. The Court of Appeal faulted Texas law for not recognizing an unconscionability defense, for not recognizing a private right of action to enforce wage and hour protections, for imposing a one-year statute of limitations, and for permitting the defendant to recover attorney fees and costs it could not recover under California law.\textsuperscript{83} The Court of Appeal addressed which state—California or Texas—had the greater interest in enforcing its law in this circumstance: “We acknowledge the value and efficiency to [a Texas-based company] of having a predictable, uniform wage-and-hour regime wherever it does business nationally, and we do not minimize the priority Texas may place on providing a hospitable legal climate for Texas-based employers that is conducive to such uniformity. But when weighed against the countervailing interest of California in ensuring that its statutory protections for California-based workers are not selectively disabled by out-of-state companies wishing to do business in this state, we
think California has the materially greater interest. … [T]he parties’ choice of Texas law will not be enforced ‘for the obvious reason’ that it would be contrary to ‘fundamental policy’ in California to do so.”

In another decision pitting California law against Texas law, the Court of Appeal ruled against another Texas-based company. Its agreement with an employee had a forum-selection clause that required any lawsuit against the company be heard in Texas. The employee nonetheless sued in California when asserting claims for unpaid overtime pay, meal and rest premium pay, and penalties for inadequate wage statements. Although the trial court found the forum-selection clause enforceable and stayed the lawsuit, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the clause had the potential to operate as a waiver of the employee’s unwaivable statutory rights under the Labor Code. The Court of Appeal ruled: “Although a party opposing enforcement of a forum selection clause ordinarily bears the burden to show enforcement would be unreasonable or unfair, the burden is reversed when the underlying claims are based on statutory rights the Legislature has declared to be unwaivable. In that instance, the party seeking to enforce the forum selection clause has the burden to show enforcement would not diminish unwaivable California statutory rights, otherwise a forum selection clause could be used to force a plaintiff to litigate in another forum that may not apply California law.” The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s stay order because the employer had “failed to show a Texas court would apply California law, and therefore the Texas-based company failed to meet its burden to show enforcing the forum selection clause would not diminish the unwaivable statutory rights on which [the plaintiff] bases her claims.”

5.4 Public Policy Claims for Wrongful Employment Actions

California permits employees to seek economic, non-economic, and punitive damages from employers who have fired or demoted them in violation of public policy.

5.4.1 Broad definition of public policy

Admitting that the “term ‘public policy’ is inherently not subject to precise definition,” the California Supreme Court has sought to put some defining boundaries around it. First, the public policy must be clearly established and substantial, and stem from a constitution, a statute, or an administrative regulation. Second, the policy must be established for the benefit of the public as a whole, and not just for the individual. Third, the policy must sufficiently describe prohibited conduct to give employers adequate notice. Nonetheless, as seen below, these limits encompass a broad variety of lawsuits.

Examples of public policy supporting a lawsuit. Most Labor Code provisions could support a wrongful termination claim, as the provisions typically make violations a crime (usually a misdemeanor), and thus presumably express policies that are clearly established and for the benefit of the public. The same would be true of any statutory antidiscrimination provision.

5.4.2 Examples of absence of public policy

Employer can insist on arbitration. A California appellate court has rejected the wrongful termination claim of an employee fired for refusing to sign an arbitration agreement. The court rejected the argument that the employer violated public policy by requiring employees to waive the right to jury trial, because the parties could, consistent with public policy, agree to waive jury trial as part of an arbitration agreement.
No general public policy favoring lawsuits. A California appellate court has rejected the wrongful termination claim of an employee who sued a client of the employer, as no public policy (even in California) generally favors the prosecution of a lawsuit.\(^{92}\)

No public policy against advising high schoolers to gain weight. A California appellate decision reversed a jury verdict of wrongful termination claim for a high school teacher fired for reporting a football coach’s advice to students to use creatine. Displaying a rare exercise of Californian judicial restraint, the Court of Appeal noted that while there may be “sound policy reasons” to bar coaches from recommending weight-gaining substances to students, “any such prohibition must be enacted explicitly by the legislature, not implicitly by the courts.”\(^{93}\)

Workers’ compensation remedies for retaliation are exclusive. The Court of Appeal has held that a worker fired for filing a workers’ compensation claim could not sue for the tort of wrongful termination on that basis, because the Labor Code provision forbidding retaliation for such a filing also limits the remedy for that retaliation. The Court of Appeal reasoned that allowing a plaintiff to sue in tort for a violation of that provision would permit remedies and procedures broader than those provided by the statute itself, and thus concluded that the Labor Code provision cannot serve as the basis for a tort claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy.\(^{94}\)

**5.4.3 Retaliatory discharge claims**

Retaliatory discharge claims generally arise in one of four situations: the employee was fired or demoted for (1) a performing a statutory obligation (e.g., jury duty), (2) refusing to break the law (e.g., committing perjury), (3) exercising (or refusing to waive) a statutory or constitutional right or privilege, or (4) reporting in good faith an alleged violation of a statute of public importance.\(^{95}\) Here are examples of permitted wrongful termination claims.

Performing a statutory obligation. California employees can sue for breach of public policy when they are fired or demoted for taking time off to serve as an election officer.\(^{96}\)

Refusing to break the law. California employees can sue for breach of public policy when they are fired or demoted for

- refusing to engage in illegal price-fixing,\(^{97}\)
- refusing to implement a fraudulent pricing scheme,\(^{98}\) or
- defying an employer’s instruction to commit perjury.\(^{99}\)

Exercising a constitutional or statutory right. California employees can sue for breach of public policy when they are fired or demoted for

- accepting employment in breach of an invalid noncompete covenant with a prior employer,\(^{100}\)
- claiming in good faith (even if mistakenly) entitlement to overtime premium pay,\(^{101}\)
- refusing to submit to a random drug test, in violation of constitutional privacy provisions that apply to private as well as public employers.\(^{102}\)
• refusing to enroll in an inpatient alcohol rehabilitation program,\textsuperscript{103}
• resisting sexual harassment that violates constitutional provisions forbidding sex discrimination by private as well as public employers,\textsuperscript{104}
• hiring a lawyer to negotiate conditions of employment,\textsuperscript{105}
• appearing on a radio show to support political candidate in a local election and to criticize Member of Congress for supporting the candidate’s opponent,\textsuperscript{106}
• taking leave under the California Family Rights Act,\textsuperscript{107} or
• discussing with co-workers the fairness of the employer’s bonus system,\textsuperscript{108}

**Reporting a suspected violation of law.** California employees can sue for breach of public policy when they are fired or demoted for

• reporting an alleged violation of a health and safety statute,\textsuperscript{109}
• reporting a death threat by a co-worker,\textsuperscript{110}
• raising reasonable suspicions of company practices violating federal safety regulations,\textsuperscript{111}
• investigating and reporting suspected unlawful acts,\textsuperscript{112}
• reporting violations of federal immigration law,\textsuperscript{113} or
• protesting an unlawful deduction from a paycheck.\textsuperscript{114}

California law protects employees even from preemptive retaliation, where an employer takes adverse action against them in anticipation of their reporting unlawful workplace conduct.\textsuperscript{115} One appellate decision extended this thought in favor of an employee who was suing for breach of public policy on a theory that the employer constructively discharged her because she was a potential witness in a claim for sexual harassment: “Employer retaliation against employees who are believed to be prospective complainants or witnesses for complainants undermines this legislative purpose just as effectively as retaliation after the filing of a complaint. To limit FEHA in such a way would be to condone ‘an absurd result’ … that is contrary to legislative intent.”\textsuperscript{116}

Related discussions appear in sections on employee whistleblowing (§ 3.5) and FEHA retaliation (§ 6.11).

**5.4.4 Other wrongful discharge claims**

California courts have also permitted tort claims to challenge employment actions that conflict with public policy, without regard to whether the employee has engaged in protected activity, such as where the employee allegedly was fired.
for reasons forbidden by an employment discrimination statute, even if the plaintiff has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies that the statute provides and even if the limitations period for filing suit under that statute has expired,\textsuperscript{117} or

to avoid paying commissions, in violation of the Labor Code.\textsuperscript{118}

In yet another extension of employer liability, an appellate decision has held that a low-wage employee who quit his job could sue for constructive discharge for failing to reimburse his auto expenses. The decision reasoned that because the employer’s failure to reimburse expenses effectively reduced the employee’s pay below the minimum wage, the employer arguably created an intolerable work condition for the employee that justified his decision to quit.\textsuperscript{119}

5.4.5 Wrongful actions short of termination

California has extended the public policy tort to “wrongful demotion,” permitting an employee to sue for a disciplinary demotion imposed for reasons contrary to public policy.\textsuperscript{120}

The Court of Appeal, in a semi-heroic refusal to yield to the temptation of judicial activism, has declined to create a tort for a wrongful failure to renew an employment contract, reasoning that there is no “termination” of an employment ending by the terms of the employment contract.\textsuperscript{121} This employer victory was qualified, however, in that the Court of Appeal also noted that the employee could pursue a statutory retaliation claim based on the same allegations (a firing in retaliation for raising workplace safety concerns), because the non-renewal, while not a “termination,” could be an “adverse employment action.”\textsuperscript{122} Moreover, although the facts of this case did not raise the issue, a plaintiff in some other case might cobble together a “wrongful termination” claim if the employment contract had an automatic renewal clause or if the employer permitted the employee to work past the contractually set termination date.

5.4.6 Protection of registered sex offenders—Megan’s Law

California’s Megan’s Law\textsuperscript{123} calls for the Department of Justice to publicize, via an Internet website,\textsuperscript{124} the whereabouts of sex offenders. Megan’s Law is named after a seven-year-old girl who was raped and killed by a known child molester who had moved close to Megan’s family without the family’s knowledge. That tragedy inspired the family to lobby for laws enabling people to know where sex offenders live, so that people may better protect themselves and their children. Many states now have a Megan’s Law. The California version forbids firing an employee because of the employee’s listing on the Megan’s Law website, as the law authorizes use of information disclosed pursuant to the law “only to protect a person at risk” and prohibits use of the information for purposes relating to employment.\textsuperscript{125} A person aggrieved by a “misuse” of Megan’s Law information may sue for actual damages, punitive damages, and a civil penalty of up to $25,000.\textsuperscript{126}

Employees may still use independent means, such as background checks, to learn whether an applicant or employee is a convicted sex offender.\textsuperscript{127} Indeed, some employers, such as school districts, must not hire convicted sex offenders, and must perform due diligence to fulfill that duty.\textsuperscript{128}
5.5 Claims for Breach of Contract of Continued Employment

5.5.1 Implied contracts to dismiss only for good cause

California formally recognizes the doctrine of employment at will, which gives both employee and employer the contractual right to end the employment relationship without cause or prior notice. California also recognizes, however, that circumstances may create an implied contract that requires the employer to make important employment decisions only for “good cause.”

The ease of plaintiff’s proof. California judges routinely invite juries to find an “implied-in-fact contract” of continued employment, by which an employee can be discharged only for “good cause.” The jury may infer such a contract from common incidents of employment, such as longevity, personnel policies or practices, assurances of continued employment, good performance reviews, merit raises, industry practices, and friendly pats on the back.

The problem with traditional disclaimers. Because California juries can so easily infer an implied contract of continued employment, the presumption of employment at will is, as a practical matter, reversed: juries often will require “good cause” for discharge unless the parties have expressly provided, in writing, for employment at will. Moreover, unilateral statements by the employer to this effect are not necessarily conclusive.

The only reasonably effective way for employers to ensure at-will status is to have the employee sign contract-like statements to that effect. An at-will provision in an express written agreement signed by the employee cannot be overcome by a contrary implied agreement. To preclude jury findings of implied promises of continued employment, express employment-at-will statements should also appear everywhere the employer states a policy regarding factors the employer will consider in terminating or changing the terms of employment, and in confidentiality agreements and other agreements that the employee signs.

California employers sometimes make the mistake of relying on certain disclaimer language that generally works outside California. Employers traditionally sought to shield themselves from implied-contract claims by placing disclaimers in handbooks and job applications to the effect that “this [handbook] [application] policy is not a contract.” That language can have unintended consequences for the California employer who wishes to use the handbook as a shield against claims for breach of implied contract. In one case, at-will language in a job application failed to preclude a contract claim, because the application also contained broad “no contract” language; the Court of Appeal reasoned that the application could not “establish a binding employment condition [i.e., at-will employment] while at the same time expressly providing that neither the application nor subsequent communications can create a binding employment condition or contract.” A better approach, under California law, would be to state that the employment-at-will language is contractual and that other language appearing in the document in question—whether it be a handbook, job application, or employment policy—is not a promise of continued employment.
**Actions short of termination.** The implied-contract action, like the tort claim for breach of public policy, extends to “wrongful demotion.” The California Supreme Court has recognized an enforceable promise not to be demoted without good cause.135

**Procedural violations.** The theory of implied contract may also challenge an employer’s failure to follow promised pre-termination procedures. The California Supreme Court has held that an employee might be able to recover on the basis that he would not have been dismissed in a reduction in force had the employer followed its own RIF procedures.136

### 5.5.2 Standard for “good cause”

**Balancing test.** The standard of “good cause” for dismissal or demotion formally permits the employer to rely on any legitimate, nontrivial reason for dismissal. Here again, though, the latitude that the law appears to give to employers may be more nominal than real. A standard California jury instruction permits juries to apply the “good cause” standard in a discretionary fashion, balancing the employee’s interest in continued employment against the employer’s interest in operating the business efficiently and profitably.137 (Which way do you suppose the balance tips when the scale is administered by a jury of the plaintiff’s peers?)

**“Good cause” in cases of misconduct.** In cases of suspected misconduct, an employer may have good cause for dismissal even if the employer’s belief in the existence of misconduct turns out to be factually mistaken. But a California employer that relies on a factually mistaken ground for dismissal must show that it conducted an “appropriate investigation,” which typically must include private interviews of witnesses, adequate documentation, and an opportunity for the accused to address the allegations.138

### 5.6 Claims for Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Under California law, each employment contract necessarily implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. An employer breaches the covenant by any action, taken in bad faith, that deprives an employee of the benefit of the express terms of the contract. An employer might breach the implied covenant even where there is no breach of an express contract, such as where an employer dismisses a salesperson to avoid paying a commission on a sale that the salesperson has already completed,139 or misleads an employee into taking a job in reliance on a reasonable assumption that he would have a chance to perform his job to the good faith satisfaction of the employer, and revokes the offer before the new hire begins work.140

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not impose substantive terms beyond those to which the parties actually agreed, and thus cannot transform an at-will employment contract into a contract terminable only for good cause. To the extent that a plaintiff claims a breach of the implied covenant simply on the basis that she was fired without good cause, the claim lacks merit.141

### 5.7 Limited Effectiveness of Common Defenses and Procedural Devices

#### 5.7.1 Workers’ compensation preemption

In many states, the workers’ compensation act generally provides the exclusive remedy for a work-related injury, and thus preempts claims based on that injury. One California exception to that general rule is that an employee
can pursue a FEHA claim for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation without regard to workers’ compensation exclusivity. California has gone a step further, to permit employees to pursue tort claims for intentional and even negligent infliction of emotional distress, notwithstanding the workers’ compensation act, where the tort claim stems from conduct (such as FEHA violations) alleged to violate public policy. California courts have reasoned that the employer’s conduct was not one of the “normal risks of employment” covered by the workers’ compensation act. In recent years, however, a moderating trend of authority has limited these kinds of tort actions, recognizing that employer misconduct in connection with normal employment decisions is within the compensation bargain, even if the misconduct was arguably outrageous and intended to cause emotional harm.

It still remains the case, though, that some California courts permit intentional tort claims to proceed against employers even though they arise out of employment. A 2017 Court of Appeal decision permitted an employee to pursue a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress for conduct that was also retaliatory under the FEHA. This decision reverted to a prior, discredited view that conduct violating the FEHA necessarily “falls outside the compensation bargain” and thus can be subject to an IIED claim. This decision may be a classic case of bad facts making bad law. The defendant supervisor, knowing that the plaintiff was supporting another employee complaining of discriminatory conduct, ostracized the plaintiff in the workplace, encouraged her to lie to investigators, pursued her at home and in the office to see if she did so, and verbally and physically attacked her after she disobeyed.

5.7.2 Exclusive statutory remedies—not

In many states, if a statute forbids conduct and provides a remedy for a violation, then the statutory remedy is exclusive for that conduct. California is different. For example, an employee alleging age discrimination may sue for wrongful termination under the public policy against age discrimination established by the FEHA, without complying with the FEHA’s administrative requirements (that is, the employee may bring a tort claim based on the public policy expressed in an antidiscrimination statute, independent of a claim brought under the antidiscrimination statute itself).

5.7.3 Summary judgment—not so fast

In America generally, and particularly in the federal system, courts use summary judgments to weed out weak lawsuits. A defendant (almost always the employer in an employment case) can file such a motion and expect it to be heard relatively quickly, often within five weeks. Not so in California.

Special pro-plaintiff notice requirement. A California party moving for summary judgment in an employment case (almost always the defendant) must give 75 days of notice. This period gives plaintiffs plenty of time to take multiple depositions and to conduct additional written discovery, specifically designed to defeat the summary judgment motion, by establishing issues of contested material fact that must be decided by a jury. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment (almost always the plaintiff) also can often delay the hearing still further to conduct even more discovery.

General judicial hostility toward summary judgment. Judicial hostility towards summary judgment in California employment cases arose vividly in Nazir v. United Airlines, which reversed a summary judgment while devoting many pages to criticizing the defense counsel (while leaving unscathed the corresponding conduct of the
The court took this occasion to share various prejudices against summary judgment in employment cases:

- Summary judgment “is being abused, especially by deep pocket defendants to overwhelm less well-funded litigants.”

- “[C]ourts are sometimes making determinations properly reserved for the factfinder, sometimes drawing inferences in the employer’s favor, sometimes requiring the employees to essentially prove their case at the summary judgment stage.”

- “[M]any employment cases present issues of intent, and motive, and hostile working environment, issues not determinable on paper. Such cases, we caution, are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment, however liberalized it be. … Its flame lit by [U.S. Supreme Court decisions encouraging the use of summary judgment motions to weed out nonmeritorious cases], … summary judgment has spread … through the underbrush of undesirable cases, taking down some healthy trees as it goes.’ …This we cannot allow.”

The Court of Appeal took another swipe at summary adjudication for employers in a lawsuit that a female construction worker brought to challenge inaccessible and unsanitary portable toilets. The trial court granted summary adjudication against the employee’s claim for punitive damages because, as a matter of law, no managing agent of the employer had engaged in or ratified any oppressive, malicious, or fraudulent conduct. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the managing agent’s declaration, filed in support of the motion for summary adjudication, did not state “sufficient evidence.” This holding came even though the declarant clearly enumerated his job duties, which involved “interfacing with stakeholders on the Project, contract administration, operations and personnel oversight, and making sure the Project was completed according to the contract.”

The Court of Appeal supposed that “a trier of fact could reasonably infer [that this manager] exercised substantial authority and discretion regarding a broad range of issues involving the Project, including compliance with [the employer’s] policies and the hiring, supervision, and laying off of Project employees.”

To make matters still worse for litigation-weary employers, a 2018 FEHA amendment codified California’s hostility to summary adjudication in harassment cases by stating: “Harassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment. In that regard, the Legislature affirms the decision in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal. App. 4th 243 and its observation that hostile working environment cases involve issues ‘not determinable on paper.’”

### 5.7.4 Plaintiff’s income tax returns privileged from discovery

In America generally, a plaintiff suing a former employer for wrongful termination must produce income tax returns, which contain information directly relevant to claims of lost income. California is different. California courts have held that individuals have a privilege to withhold income tax returns in response to discovery requests.

### 5.7.5 Limits to statutes of limitations

Under federal law, an employee challenging a wrongful dismissal generally must sue within a period of time that begins with the notice of the employee’s termination of employment. The notice may precede the actual termination of employment by weeks or months. California law is different. For a California plaintiff, the time to
sue for wrongful termination does not start to run until the actual termination of employment. The same lenient standard favors a plaintiff suing on a breach of contract: the Court of Appeal has held that an employee’s claim against an employer for breaching its promise to permit “senior” employees to continue employment under relaxed sales quotas did not accrue when the employer announced it would no longer honor the promise, but rather accrued only later, when the employer first counseled an employee for failing to meet sales quotas contrary to the relaxed quotas.

And California courts also recognize a version of the “continuing violation” doctrine, which permits suit on unlawful actions occurring outside the limitations period if a course of conduct, continuing into the limitations period, has not reached a state of “permanence” and consists of acts “sufficiently similar in kind,” occurring with “sufficient frequency,” even if the employee already knew of facts sufficient to sustain a claim at a time preceding the limitations period.

The Court of Appeal has rejected a defendant’s reliance on a contractually shortened statute of limitations in a sexual harassment lawsuit. The Court of Appeal concluded that a six-month statute of limitations was “unreasonable and against public policy.”

5.7.6 Statute of Frauds not a defense

Plaintiffs suing for breach of a contract of continued employment, requiring good cause for dismissal, often rely on alleged oral promises made many years ago, by managers no longer with the employer. The Statute of Frauds, found in virtually every state, generally provides that a contract must be in writing to be enforceable, if by its terms the contract is not to be performed within one year from its inception. One might think that an oral contract of continued employment, contemplating performance for a period of more than one year, is subject to the Statute of Frauds. Not so in California. The California Supreme Court has held that the Statute of Frauds defense is unavailable because an oral employment contract could possibly be completed within one year, in that, within one year, the employee could quit or die or be fired for good cause. The Supreme Court’s reasoning thus relied on the possibility of a first-year failure of performance of an oral employment contract, even though California’s Statute of Frauds itself addresses only actual performance of the contract.

5.7.7 Federal labor preemption generally not a defense

Employers sometimes argue that a state law claim is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and thus must proceed, if at all, only under a collective bargaining agreement. But in California this defense fails when the claim arises, as it typically does, under independent state law and does not require interpretation of the CBA. The Ninth Circuit has held that even where applying the CBA terms might affect the outcome, no preemption applies if one need only “look at” the terms of the CBA.

5.7.8 Limits on cross-complaints

One weapon in an employment defendant’s arsenal is a cross-complaint against the plaintiff for the plaintiff’s own actionable conduct. California limits the effectiveness of such a cross-complaint, however, by authorizing a specialized motion—an “anti-SLAPP” motion—which permits a plaintiff to argue that the cross-complaint should be stricken on the ground that it is simply a litigation tactic.
When a female employee sued both her employer and her co-worker for sexual harassment, the co-worker defendant cross-complained against her for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), based on her allegations to the police, to a nurse, and to an HR manager. When the plaintiff then filed an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court dismissed the cross-complaint and required the co-worker to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed, because the anti-SLAPP statute protected the plaintiff’s allegations in that they were made in connection with matters under review by an official proceeding or body, and because the co-worker could not demonstrate a likelihood that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation and IIED claims.\textsuperscript{169}

5.8 Defamation Claims

5.8.1 Self-compelled publication

Ordinarily, a defamation claim requires proof that the defendant published the defamatory statement to third parties. California is different. It joins a few other jurisdictions in recognizing the doctrine of “self compelled publication.” Suppose that an employer fires an employee for suspected theft, while privately reminding the employee that theft is a dismissible offense under company policy. Suppose further that the employee is not really a thief, but really just meant to borrow the company's money. Suppose now that the fired employee, seeking a new job, feels compelled to tell prospective employers that theft was the reason that the prior employer gave for the dismissal. Peculiarly in California, these facts may create liability for defamation, even though the former employer never told anyone (other than the fired employee) about the theft, if the plaintiff was “compelled” under the circumstances to publish the defamatory statement. The doctrine of “self compelled publication” has obvious implications for exit interviews. Employers have tried to avoid liability under this theory by following a strict policy against giving out any information about former employees except for the dates of employment; such a policy would tend to undermine any contention that an employee reasonably felt compelled to disclose the prior employer’s reasons for terminating employment.\textsuperscript{170}

5.8.2 References by former employers

California expressly recognizes a privilege for a former employer to say whether it would rehire a current or former employee.\textsuperscript{171} The statutory language is so vague, however, that it is conceivable that an employer still could be liable for defamation if it was motivated by ill will to state that a former employee would not be eligible for rehire. Some employers disclose information on former employees based on written authorizations signed by those former employees. But California law does not recognize a waiver of liability as to future intentional acts, so that an employer allegedly providing false information could still be sued for intentional defamation, notwithstanding the former employee’s written authorization for the employer’s disclosure.\textsuperscript{172}

5.8.3 Privileges inspired by #MeToo movement

Legislation effective in 2019 specifies that three types of communications regarding sexual harassment are deemed privileged—immune from a defamation claim unless they were made maliciously (with complete disregard for the truth or false accusations made out of spite, ill will, or hatred). The three forms of non-malicious communications enjoying this protection are (1) reports of sexual harassment made by an employee to the employer based on credible evidence, (2) communications regarding sexual harassment allegations between the
employer and “interested persons” (such as witnesses or victims), and (3) statements made to prospective employers as to whether a decision to rehire would be based on a determination that the former employee engaged in sexual harassment.\textsuperscript{173}

5.9 Misrepresentation Claims

5.9.1 Employer liability for fraudulent inducement

Labor Code section 970 authorizes double damages for an employee who has been induced to change from one place to another by false promises regarding employment.

Many states refuse to use the doctrine of promissory estoppel to aid an employee who leaves a job to accept an at-will job that never materializes. California is different. Even if the plaintiff has left an at-will employment, the California employer inducing the plaintiff to leave another’s employ can be liable under theories of promissory estoppel\textsuperscript{174} or promissory fraud\textsuperscript{175} for the income the plaintiff lost by leaving the prior employer in reliance on the new employer’s pre-hire promises. A California court held that a plaintiff who was hired by an at-will employer with false promises of compensation, and who was fired six months later for complaining about the broken promises, could recover the compensation that he would have earned with his former employer, which would have re-hired him but for its strict no-rehire policy.\textsuperscript{176}

5.9.2 Employer liability for too-generous references: negligent referral

A California employer that gives a reference praising a former employee, while failing to report facts showing the employee’s dangerous tendencies, may be liable for intentional or negligent misrepresentation. A school district that praised a former employee for his ability to work with children, while failing to report his misconduct with children, was subject to a misrepresentation suit by a child whom the employee molested in his new employment.\textsuperscript{177}

5.9.3 Employer liability for blackballing

Labor Code section 1050 makes an employer liable for treble damages for misrepresentations to prevent a former employee from obtaining new employment.

5.10 Employer Liability for Employee Torts

5.10.1 Negligent retention

An employer is liable for injuries to a third party caused by an employee who had known propensities to cause such harm.\textsuperscript{178}

5.10.2 Good Samaritan protection

Like many states, California has a Good Samaritan statute, designed to encourage people to assist victims of dire emergencies. That is because the common law, while imposing no duty on a person to come to a victim’s aid, does require due care of a person who chooses to administer aid. To encourage helping behavior by people who would be inclined to act as Good Samaritans but for this fear of liability, the California Legislature enacted a
statute that gave immunity from liability to “any person ... who renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency.”\textsuperscript{179} The California Supreme Court, acting in its historical tradition of expanding liability at every opportunity, held in a 2008 decision that this protection was limited to those who provided “emergency medical care.”\textsuperscript{180} In reading “medical” into the statute, the Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of a defendant who had removed her friend from a wrecked automobile immediately following an accident, inadvertently aggravating the friend’s spinal injuries in the process.

The dissenting opinion in this 4-3 decision pointed out that the majority’s rewriting of the Good Samaritan statute—immunizing only medical assistance—would legally jeopardize all rescue and transportation efforts, so that a person would be at legal risk while pulling a victim from a burning building and would be legally protected only while administering CPR to the victim on the sidewalk. The dissent doubted that the Legislature intended “results so illogical, and so at odds with the clear statutory language.”\textsuperscript{181} The dissent was right: the Legislature responded by amending the statute to include both “medical” and “non-medical” emergency care.\textsuperscript{182}

5.10.3 Intentional torts

The traditional rule is that an employee’s actions are within the scope of employment—and thus binding on the employer—only if they are motivated, in whole or part, by a desire to serve the employer’s interest. Deviating from this rule, California courts have expanded employer liability by reasoning that an employee’s willful, malicious, and even criminal torts can fall within the scope of employment. In California, the employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s conduct—even if that conduct is not authorized or ratified—if the employment predictably creates the risk that employees will commit torts of the type for which liability is sought. The Court of Appeal applied this expansive notion of tort liability in holding that an auto-supply store could be liable to a customer who had been assaulted by the store’s employee. The employee had hit the customer in the head with a metal pipe when the customer criticized the employee for giving an inadequate response to a question about the price of motor oil. The Court of Appeal concluded that this physical eruption, stemming from a customer interaction, could be a predictable risk of retail employment.\textsuperscript{183}

5.10.4 Unintentional torts

Under the traditional “going and coming” rule, employers are not liable for torts that their employees commit on their way to and from work, because commuting employees are not acting within the scope of their employment.\textsuperscript{184} But California courts have created a “required vehicle” exception to the going-and-coming rule, reasoning that an employer derives an incidental benefit from its employee’s use of a vehicle where that use is an express or implied condition of employment.

The Court of Appeal has reversed a summary judgment for the employer of an employee who hit someone with her car on her way home from work, even though the accident occurred while the employee was deviating from her normal route home to obtain some frozen yogurt and attend a yoga class. The Court of Appeal broadly reasoned: “Because the employer required the employee to use her personal vehicle to travel to and from the office and make other work-related trips during the day, the employee was acting within the scope of her employment when she was commuting to and from work.”\textsuperscript{185} And “the planned stops [for yoga and yogurt] were not so unusual or startling that it would be unfair to include the resulting loss among the other costs of the employer’s business.”\textsuperscript{186}
But the “required vehicle” exception applies only when the employee is under a duty to bring the vehicle to work—either as a matter of daily duty or as a matter of duty on the day of the accident. The Court of Appeal reversed judgment against an employer where the employee was under no such duty: on the day of the accident he was not required to drive, not assigned any job duties outside the workplace, and not using his vehicle for work purposes.

5.11 Employment Discrimination Litigation

California forbids all the kinds of employment discrimination forbidden by federal statutes, plus quite a few more (see § 6.2).

5.11.1 No caps on damages

Under federal law—Title VII, ADA, and the ADEA—monetary remedies for employment discrimination are subject to certain limits, such as caps on compensatory and punitive damages for Title VII lawsuits and the absence of emotional distress recovery for ADEA lawsuits. Further, some states, such as Washington, do not recognize claims for punitive damages. California is different. A California plaintiff who prevails in any kind of employment tort suit—common law or statutory—is entitled to recover the full panoply of tort damages, including uncapped economic damages and non-economic damages, and punitive damages, as well as costs, and in a discrimination suit is entitled to recover not only reasonable attorney fees but also expert witness fees.

And under California law, unlike federal law, attorney-fee awards can often dwarf damage awards (see § 5.12).

5.11.2 Additional claims for physical violence

California employees discriminated against with acts of violence and intimidation have a private right of action in addition to the rights they already have under ordinary discrimination statutes.

5.11.3 Far greater scope of liability for employment discrimination

In many ways California’s discrimination provisions have a greater breadth, provide more remedies, and are easier for plaintiffs to pursue than are the corresponding provisions under federal law (see § 6.1).

5.12 Anti-Employer Attorney Fees Provisions

5.12.1 Wage claims

For claims seeking unpaid minimum wages or overtime premium pay, California favors plaintiffs with a one-way fee-shifting provision that entitles only the prevailing employee to recover attorney fees. For claims seeking other forms of unpaid wages, a prevailing employee remains entitled to attorney fees, while the prevailing employer is so entitled only if the employee sued in bad faith.

Section 218.5 of the Labor Code originally provided, in an even-handed way, for prevailing-party attorney fees as to wage claims that did not involve minimum wages or overtime premium wages. Employers invoked this statute when they defeated claims seeking pay for denied meal periods or rest breaks. Employers could say that those
claims were claims for “wages” because the California Supreme Court, after all, had held, in a 2007 decision, that meal and rest pay was a “wage,” not a “penalty.”

In 2012, however, in *Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection*, the California Supreme Court deprived employers of this leverage. *Kirby* determined that claims for meal and rest pay are not claims for “wages” after all, but rather are claims for violation of the employer’s obligation to provide meal and rest breaks. *Kirby* implied that if the claims had involved wages instead of penalties, then an award of attorney fees to the prevailing employer would have been appropriate.

The attention thus focused on Section 218.5 prompted the Legislature in 2013 to amend the statute to tilt the playing field still further in favor of plaintiffs. Now, while Section 218.5 continues to entitle employees to attorney fees when they win claims for unpaid wages, the statute entitles prevailing employers to attorney fees only if the court finds that the employee brought the lawsuit in bad faith. Meanwhile, as to actions for unpaid minimum or overtime premium wages, it remains the case that only the successful employee—and never the successful employer—is eligible to recover attorney fees.

The Court of Appeal has denied an employer prevailing-party attorney fees where the claim was for split-shift premium pay (considered to be a claim for minimum wages), but has allowed attorney-fee applications where the claim was for reporting-time pay (considered to be a claim for unpaid wages at the employee’s regular rate).

### 5.12.2 Court-enhanced attorney fees by use of multipliers

Under federal statutes authorizing an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party, the award is simply the product of (a) the hours reasonably expended on the winning effort times (b) the reasonable rate for those hours. There is no after-the-fact multiplier or enhancement to augment the plaintiff’s reward for pursuing a risky case. A California appellate court once agreed with this result, opining that an attorney-fee enhancement would “at best serve no purpose and at worst encourage pursuit of unmeritorious claims.” But the California Supreme Court disagreed, holding that trial courts can grant an enhanced attorney-fee award to compensate plaintiff’s attorneys for the risk that they assume in taking a case on a contingent fee basis.

The Court of Appeal has held that the trial court could grant an enhanced fee award to class-action plaintiffs’ counsel who took a PAGA case that raised significant complex legal issues of first impression.

### 5.12.3 Attorney fees awarded even if plaintiff doesn’t win

Sometimes plaintiffs seek prevailing-party attorney fees even though all they arguably accomplished was simply a voluntary change in the defendant’s course of conduct. The United States Supreme Court has rejected attempts to rely on this “catalyst” theory of fee recovery. California is different. The California Supreme Court has endorsed the recovery of attorney fees for a plaintiff if the defendant changes its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by, the plaintiff’s lawsuit. The California Supreme Court thus permitted qualifying plaintiffs—who never won their lawsuit—to recover not only (1) attorney fees for litigating the underlying lawsuit but also (2) a multiplier on those fees, (3) attorney fees for litigating their entitlement to attorney fees, and (4) a multiplier on the fees for litigating entitlement to fees. This development led the dissenting justice to note forlornly: “The majority today goes further than this court has ever gone before—indeed, so far as I can tell, further than any other court has ever gone—in permitting plaintiffs to win large attorney fee awards. … Lest
California truly become a mecca for plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys throughout the country, we need to be at least somewhat in step with the rest of the country.”

In the wage and hour context, California has departed from the conventional view that courts should reduce attorney-fee awards to account for the plaintiff’s lack of success. A 2018 Court of Appeal decision held that the employer, on appeal from a Labor Commission award, owed the plaintiff $86,160 in attorney fees and costs even though she minimally prevailed on but one of her three claims, winning just $4,250: “[The employer] chose to appeal and seek a trial de novo after suffering only a relatively modest loss before the commissioner, having defeated two other claims for which [the plaintiff] sought considerably higher damages. If [the plaintiff] consequently was required to incur substantial attorney fees to retry the entire case, including issues on which she did not prevail before the commissioner, defendant has only itself to blame.”

5.12.4 Attorney-fee awards can dwarf actual recoveries

In federal cases, the amount of attorney fees awarded to a plaintiff generally must be in reasonable proportion to the plaintiff’s success. In California it’s different. The Court of Appeal has refused to reduce a $1.1 million attorney-fee award where the plaintiff failed to succeed on certain claims and won only a $30,500 jury award. The California Supreme Court corrected a similar situation in 2010. A plaintiff winning an $11,500 FEHA verdict had sought $871,000 in attorney fees. The trial court denied the fee request because the recovery was so modest that the case could have been brought in a court of limited jurisdiction (with recoveries limited to $25,000). When the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny attorney fees in a FEHA case solely because the amount of the damages award was modest, the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and upheld the trial court, concluding that the trial court could deny attorney fees on the basis of the plaintiff’s minimal success and the grossly inflated fee request.

Yet California courts continue to countenance grossly disproportionate fee awards. The Ninth Circuit has applied California law to uphold an award of $700,000 in attorney fees to a plaintiff where the jury, while rejecting most of her claims, had awarded her just $30,000 in damages.

5.12.5 Windfall fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys in class action settlements

Federal courts, to protect the interests of unnamed class members, often restrict the fees awarded to the plaintiffs’ attorneys to a maximum of 25% of the common-fund settlement, absent “special circumstances.” In California it’s different. The California Supreme Court—approving attorney fees amounting to a full one-third of the common fund—has held that an attorney fee is not unreasonable merely because it is a fixed percentage of the common fund. In the wage and hour case in question, the plaintiffs’ attorneys estimated that their lodestar (hours worked times hourly billing rate) would be about $3 million, but successfully claimed fees in excess of $6 million (one-third of a $19 million gross settlement).
5.13 Unfair Competition Claims

5.13.1 The Unfair Competition Law (UCL)

California’s vaguely worded UCL permits lawsuits for any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice.” Wage and hour plaintiffs often add a UCL claim to obtain a four-year statute of limitations instead of the three-year statute that applies to Labor Code claims generally.

The UCL authorizes only limited remedies: it does not permit damage awards or a remedy of nonrestitutionary disgorgement (e.g., return of profits that an employer has realized through Labor Code violations). Nor does the UCL authorize recovery of penalties due for untimely payment of termination wages.

The UCL does authorize injunctive relief and any order “necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” The California Supreme Court thus held that an action seeking restitution for unpaid overtime wages could proceed as a representative action under the UCL, and that the four-year statute of limitations applied even though the underlying wage claim was governed by a three-year statute.

Plaintiffs have used the UCL to circumvent a defendant employer’s right to jury trial. The Court of Appeal has upheld a trial court’s decision to have a wage and hour claim tried to the court, without a jury, over the defendant’s objection, on the basis that the UCL claim encompassed the traditional wage and hour claims and that the UCL claim is one for equitable relief, for which no jury trial is available. The Supreme Court decided to review this decision (on other grounds), making it unfit to cite as precedential authority.

Historically, a UCL action also permitted the plaintiff to seek restitution on a class-wide basis without satisfying the usual requirements of class certification. This rule was amended by Proposition 64, discussed below, to require a UCL plaintiff who seeks class-wide relief to meet class certification standards.

5.13.2 Proposition 64

Proposition 64, enacted by a vote of the People of California in November 2004, reformed the UCL by requiring that a private UCL plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” and have lost “money or property” as a result of the challenged business practice, and by requiring that UCL plaintiffs suing on behalf of others must satisfy the requirements for a class action claim.

5.14 The Wage and Hour Class Action Explosion

5.14.1 California peculiarities favoring wage and hour class actions

The number of class action lawsuits alleging violations of the California Labor Code has continued to rise. While just 29 were filed in 2000, 120 were filed in 2005, and they have continued to rise in frequency since.

The following factors make class actions particularly attractive to wage and hour plaintiffs in California.

- California wage and hour law differs from federal law in important ways, such that an employee who is exempt from federal overtime pay requirements often is not exempt under California law.
California procedural rules facilitate class actions for violation of wage and hour obligations. Federal wage and hour claims, under the FLSA, require an “opt-in” procedure, meaning that collective actions proceed to the extent that employees want to join the suit. California procedural law, however, does not permit opt-in class actions, meaning that employees will belong to the class unless they affirmatively opt out. One 2006 Court of Appeal decision permitted plaintiffs to have the best of both worlds by alleging FLSA violations while proceeding with an opt-out-only theory of class certification that characterized the FLSA violations as violations of the California UCL. And the Ninth Circuit has similarly approved a plaintiff’s tactic of using the UCL as a vehicle to assert a FLSA claim, without being bound by the FLSA’s procedural safeguards such as the requirement that employees must affirmatively opt into the case in order to participate in it.

California gives plaintiffs’ lawyers a constitutional right to communicate with potential class members, and requires employers to allow those lawyers to obtain the names and addresses of potential class members, notwithstanding their privacy interests.

Virtually every Labor Code claim entitles the prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees.

California has permitted wage and hour claims to proceed under its UCL, which has an extraordinarily long (four-year) statute of limitations.

California courts show extraordinary deference to pleaded allegations. Federal courts require all plaintiffs, including wage and hour plaintiffs, to specify facts to support a plausible claim for relief if a complaint is to survive a motion to strike or to dismiss. California is different. As one appellate decision stated, while overruling a trial court that had dismissed class allegations on the defendant’s demurrer: “In this action, as in the vast majority of wage and hour disputes, class suitability should not be determined on demurrer.”

California courts, in considering class certification, are not required to use the “rigorous analysis” that the U.S. Supreme Court has required of federal courts.

Thus, to defeat class certification, employers often must bear the enormous expense of filing or defeating a motion based on extensive evidence regarding the suitability of the claim for class treatment. Wage and hour plaintiffs thus gain enormous leverage over employers by seeking class treatment, which exponentially magnifies the employer’s potential exposure to monetary liability. A plaintiff seeking class certification need only identify a sufficiently numerous class that has a well-defined community of interest, a concept that embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact, (2) class representatives with claims typical of the class, and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.

5.14.2 Judicial endorsement of wage and hour class actions

The California Supreme Court, in its 2004 Sav-On Drug Stores case, issued a decision favoring class certification of a wage and hour case involving whether the employer had properly classified certain managers as exempt. Sav-On emphasizes that if one reasonably might conclude from the record that common issues predominate over individualized ones, then a trial court’s certification order should not be disturbed on appeal. Sav-On states that
decisions regarding predominance are for the trial court to determine, and the trial court’s decisions should not be lightly overturned.  

While Sav-On does not mandate certification in exempt/nonexempt classification cases, the opinion has a pro-certification tone, stating that class actions are “encouraged” in the wage and hour context. Furthermore, the Supreme Court suggested that if an employer categorically reclassified all the subject employees as nonexempt without changing their duties, that could fairly be taken as an admission that the position had been misclassified all along. The Supreme Court also suggested that class treatment could be supported by the employer’s failure to audit the performance of its exempt employees to see if particular employees truly were functioning in an exempt capacity.

Sav-On identified several issues plaintiffs could establish through common proof:

- Whether the employer deliberately misclassified nonexempt employees as exempt.
- Whether the employer implicitly conceded the employees in question were nonexempt when it reclassified them all from exempt to nonexempt.
- Whether any given task within the limited universe of tasks that managers performed qualifies as exempt or nonexempt.
- Whether a manager following the employer’s reasonable expectation for performing the job would spend most working time on exempt duties.

Sav-On concluded that a trial court could rationally conclude that those common issues predominated over individualized issues concerning how managers actually spent their time. Dismissing concerns that these cases could prove unmanageable, Sav-On noted that the trial court had broad discretion as to how to handle individualized issues once the class issues were resolved. Sav-On gave minimal guidance as to how to carry out those proceedings, but it encouraged trial courts to be “procedurally innovative” in fashioning procedures to resolve remaining individualized issues efficiently.

The California Supreme Court affirmed these general class certification principles in Brinker, a 2012 case, by holding that a trial court considering certification need not decide issues that affect an element of the certification standard, if they are unnecessary to the ultimate certification decision.

After Brinker, California courts have extended this pro-certification rationale even further, ruling that certification should turn on whether a plaintiff’s theory is susceptible to common proof, and minimizing the individualized inquiries necessary to determine which putative class members, if any, actually experienced a violation of the Labor Code.

Meanwhile, California appellate decisions going the other way (in the employer’s favor) either were not published or suffered the indignity of being depublished by the California Supreme Court.
5.14.3 Some limits to use of the class device

In 2014, the California Supreme Court, in *Duran v. U.S. Bank*, corrected some but not all the ways that plaintiffs in wage and hour cases had abused the class device to disadvantage employers. *Duran* vacated a $15 million judgment that the trial court had entered on the basis of flawed statistical sampling in a case alleging that a bank had misclassified certain employees as outside salespersons. *Duran* limited the circumstances in which statistical sampling can establish class-wide liability. In particular, *Duran* ruled that courts cannot use sampling to deprive a defendant of its due process right to present affirmative defenses as to all class members. Perhaps most important, *Duran* reaffirmed that the plaintiff bears the burden to establish that class certification is appropriate, and ruled that trial courts, before deciding whether to certify a class, must determine that a class trial would be manageable.

The plaintiffs in *Duran* alleged that U.S. Bank had misclassified them as “outside salespersons” to make them exempt from overtime. That exemption requires that the employee spend most of the working time making sales outside the office. The trial court certified a class even though declarations showed that some putative class members met this requirement while others did not. The trial court adopted a trial plan that took sample testimony from 20 class members plus two named plaintiffs, and then extrapolated the findings to the entire class for purposes of liability and damages. The trial court excluded all evidence that class members outside the sample group were in fact exempt, and concluded—based only on the sample evidence—that all class members had been misclassified. The trial court determined damages by extrapolating from the sample, despite a 43% margin of error, and thus awarded $15 million to the class.

On the bank’s appeal in *Duran*, the Supreme Court agreed that the class should have been decertified and ordered a new trial. *Duran* confirmed that a defendant has a due process right to “litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.” Thus, “any trial must allow for the litigation of affirmative defenses, even in a class action case where the defense touches upon individual issues.” If statistical sampling is to be used at all for proving liability in a class action, then it must comport with due process and use sound methodologies: (a) the sample size must be “sufficiently large to provide reliable information about the larger group,” (b) the sample must be random and free of selection bias, and (c) the approach must yield results within a reasonable margin of error. Furthermore, trial courts should evaluate any proposals for statistical sampling before certifying a class, and they must decertify classes that prove unmanageable.

The Court of Appeal returned to this case in 2018, affirming an order denying class certification because the plaintiffs failed to show the case was manageable as a class action. Agreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeal noted that the defendant’s affirmative defenses “would appear to require a host of ‘mini-trials.’” There were also “multiple flaws” in the plaintiffs’ trial plan, including an inability to “use representative sampling to establish an aggregate restitution award.” The Court of Appeal thus concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying class certification.

Although *Duran* did not reject the use of statistical sampling to establish class-wide liability, the decision makes it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to use that approach. *Duran* also reaffirmed the requirement that class litigation be manageable, a requirement that California lower courts, until then, had often ignored. The decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeal after remand demonstrate that manageability concerns and the lack of a viable trial plan can be an obstacle to class certification.
In a refreshing application of *Duran*, a Court of Appeal decision in 2018 upheld the denial of class certification where the plaintiffs—property inspectors claiming to be insurance employees misclassified as independent contractors—proposed a trial plan that would have denied the defendant its right to due process. The plaintiffs proposed that their expert would testify by relying on hearsay evidence contained in his survey of class members. The Court of Appeal rejected this affront to due process: “[a]lthough an expert `may rely on inadmissible hearsay in forming his … opinion … and may state on direct examination the matters on which he … relied, the expert may not testify as to the details of those matters if they are otherwise inadmissible.' ” The Court of Appeal explained: “Defendants have the right to defend against plaintiffs’ claims by impeaching the evidence supporting them. … Plaintiffs’ proposed procedure forestalls defendants’ exercise of this important right.”

5.14.4 Broad pre-certification class discovery

In an assist to class action lawyers, the Court of Appeal has held that the original plaintiff need not even belong to the asserted class to have standing to obtain pre-certification discovery. At issue was an order permitting pre-certification discovery to identify class members who might become substitute plaintiffs in place of the original plaintiff. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s ruling that the rights of absent class members outweighed the potential for abuse of the class procedure.

5.14.5 Tolerance for successive class actions tolling the limitations period

Under federal law, the limitations period is tolled by the filing of a class action—until the denial of class certification—under the so-called *American Pipe* doctrine. But that tolling applies only for successive individual claims by members of the putative class; the limitations period is not tolled for successive class actions. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed this point in a 2018 decision: “Upon denial of class certification, may a putative class member, in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or promptly filing an individual action, commence a class action anew beyond the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations? Our answer is no. *American Pipe* tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing unnamed class members to join the action individually or file individual claims if the class fails. But *American Pipe* does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration of the statute of limitations.”

But in California it’s different. In *Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant, Inc.*, a 2018 decision, the Court of Appeal gave plaintiffs’ counsel the remarkable gift of allowing a class action filed in 2016 to relate back to a class action filed in 2007 (moving the limitations period, for wage claims, back to 2003). The beleaguered defendant in *Fierro* argued that the limitations period on any class claim had begun to run in 2010, when the trial court in the first action issued an order denying class certification, so the 2016 class suit was untimely. But *Fierro* concluded that tolling was continued by the plaintiff’s appeal of that order and by the filing of an amended complaint. *Fierro* justified this Cal-peculiar result by pointing to differences between federal and California law. *First*, in federal court the denial of class certification is an interlocutory order, not reviewable as of right until after the entry of final judgment, while California recognizes a death-knell doctrine that allows immediate appeal of the denial of class certification. *Second*, in federal court, an order is final for purposes of res judicata until reversed or set aside, while in California an order remains non-final while an appeal is pending. *Third*, federal courts allow further class certification motions where a previous motion is denied, while California courts do not allow successive motions for class certification, because the denial of class certification is appealable. *Fierro* concluded that these differences between federal and state civil procedure justified tolling the limitations period for class actions, because to deny tolling in a California action would encourage a multiplicity of actions before the order denying
class certification is final. Fierro thus held that (1) American Pipe tolling applies to the dismissed class claims during the pendency of an appeal from an order sustaining without leave to amend a demurrer to the class claims in a complaint, and (2) where the trial court denied a motion to certify a plaintiff class on the basis that the named plaintiff was not an adequate class representative and the named plaintiff amended the complaint in an effort to provide an adequate class representative, American Pipe tolling recommences upon the filing of the amended complaint.\textsuperscript{263}

5.15 Bounty-Hunting (PAGA) Claims for Labor Code Violations

California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 is a bane to employers and a boon to plaintiffs’ lawyers. PAGA is perhaps the California peculiarity par excellence. It has no precise precedent or analog in the American legal system. The stated purpose of PAGA was to enlist employee plaintiffs to stand in for the California Labor Commissioner to enforce the Labor Code, on the rationale that the Labor Commissioner lacks the resources to enforce the law and that the pre-existing lack of governmental enforcement and the relative lack of civil penalties were failing to provide employers with sufficient deterrents to breaking the labor laws. PAGA aimed to fix these perceived problem by authorizing employees to sue in the Labor Commissioner’s stead to seek civil penalties that go to the state and to “aggrieved employees” in the proportions of 75% and 25%.

As interpreted by California courts, PAGA now permits any current or former employee of any California company to sue the company on behalf of all “aggrieved employees” for massive civil penalties for virtually all violations of the Labor Code—no matter how trivial the violation and regardless of any actual injury—so long as the plaintiff has suffered a single violation.

For those who remember their maritime history, PAGA may bring to mind the letter of marque—a governmental license issued to enterprising ship captains that authorized them to fit out an armed vessel to capture enemy merchant shipping, through acts that otherwise would constitute piracy. Today’s PAGA pirates are enterprising plaintiffs’ law firms who use PAGA as a vehicle to coerce employers to pay large settlements that often depend on hypertechnical and trivial violations of the Labor Code.

Plaintiffs like to bring PAGA suits because

- PAGA creates private rights of action to sue for Labor Code violations that previously only the Labor Commissioner could address,
- PAGA creates massive, unlimited civil penalties and multiplies potential liability still further because it empowers employees to sue on behalf of others as well as themselves, and because in doing so they need not meet the requirements of a class action,
- PAGA enables a plaintiff affected by one violation to seek penalties for all violations,
- PAGA enables massive discovery of private information such as the contact information of a company’s employees, and
- arbitration agreements waiving representative PAGA claims are unenforceable.
5.15.1 The PAGA legislation

While federal and state governments create civil penalties for certain statutory violations, the mission of enforcing these penalties is typically entrusted to public officials who exercise prosecutorial discretion. California is different. The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) created two significant problems for California employers. First, as of 2004, new civil penalties apply to violation of all Labor Code provisions “except those for which a civil penalty is specifically provided.” (See § 7.24.) Second, “aggrieved employees” may sue, in lieu of the Labor Commissioner, to recover the civil penalty, with the plaintiff and other aggrieved employees to collect 25% of the penalties (the remainder going to the state). The prevailing plaintiff also can recover costs and attorney fees. Recovery of civil penalties is not available, however, if the LWDA or its agencies or employees already have cited the same facts and theories to seek penalties.

The California Supreme Court enhanced PAGA’s power still further in 2009, when it held that PAGA authorized individuals to sue under PAGA without having to satisfy the requirements of a class action, on the rationale that “an action to recover civil penalties ‘is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties.’ ”

5.15.2 PAGA amendments

Reform legislation has mitigated certain aspects of PAGA. The principal reform measures were as follows.

DLSE exhaustion requirement. Employees challenging certain Labor Code violations must, before suing, give written notice to the LWDA of the specific violation, to enable the LWDA to investigate and cite the employer for the violation, in which case a private lawsuit cannot proceed. The LWDA has 60 days to notify the employee that it intends to investigate the alleged violation, in which case a private lawsuit cannot proceed. If the LWDA gives notice that it does not intend to investigate or the LWDA does not act with 65 days, then the employee may file a PAGA action.

A PAGA claim is deficient if the notice to the LWDA and the employer failed to provide sufficient “facts and theories” for the alleged Labor Code violation. And the Court of Appeal has held that a PAGA plaintiff who complains of untimely termination wages on behalf of all aggrieved employees cannot proceed if the LWDA notice refers only to the plaintiff’s own situation.

For a few specified violations, the employer has an opportunity to cure the violation within a limited time after the employee’s notice.

Some courts have diminished the significance of PAGA exhaustion requirements by holding that plaintiffs may pursue certain penalties without first contacting the DLSE. These are “statutory penalties”—those that employees could collect directly, pre-PAGA (e.g., waiting-time penalties). These courts would apply the exhaustion requirement only as to “civil penalties,” defined as those penalties that only the Labor Commissioner could collect absent a PAGA action. Courts thus have held that while employees must exhaust LWDA remedies as to any claim for “civil penalties,” employees need not contact the LWDA before suing for “statutory penalties.”

Further diminishing the practical significance of the exhaustion requirement was a 2008 decision in which the Court of Appeal held that PAGA claims added in an amended complaint relate back to the original complaint, if the claims rest on the same misconduct and the same injury. But this decision failed to address the exhaustion
requirement, and courts since have recognized that the failure to properly notify the LWDA and the employer is fatal to a PAGA claim.\textsuperscript{277}

**Judicial discretion to reduce penalties.** A court may exercise discretion to reduce the amount of civil penalties if they otherwise would be “unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”\textsuperscript{278} Some courts have awarded nearly $3 million in civil penalties in connection with default judgments.\textsuperscript{279}

**Court approval of settlements.** The court must “review and approve any settlement” of a PAGA action, regardless of whether the settlement includes an award of penalties. Further, a copy of a proposed settlement must be provided to LWDA at the same time that it is submitted to the court.\textsuperscript{280} Courts have approved PAGA settlements involving payments to the LWDA of less than 0.1% of a common settlement fund.\textsuperscript{281} But one federal district court rejected a $100 million class action settlement because it allocated only 1%--$1,000,000—to PAGA penalties.\textsuperscript{282}

**Anti-retaliation provision.** California employers must not retaliate against any employee for bringing a PAGA claim.\textsuperscript{283}

**Exemption for notice, posting, and filing violations.** Employees cannot maintain PAGA lawsuits for petty violations such as failures to post notices or file notices, although this exemption does not cover “mandatory payroll or workplace injury reporting.”\textsuperscript{284}

**Repeal of job-application provision.** Employers no longer must (as was once required by former Labor Code section 431) file a copy of their job application forms with the DLSE. The Legislature thus removed the basis for what would be a particularly annoying “gotcha” PAGA lawsuit.

**Exemption for unionized construction employers.** Legislation effective in 2019 created a PAGA exemption for construction employers whose employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.\textsuperscript{285}

### 5.15.3 Further PAGA peculiarities

**Immunity to arbitration agreements.** The California Supreme Court enhanced PAGA’s power in 2014, in \textit{Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles},\textsuperscript{286} which found a PAGA exception from the general rule that class-action waivers in arbitration agreements are enforceable. \textit{Iskanian} reasoned that a PAGA claim differs from a class action in that PAGA plaintiffs act as private attorneys general, on behalf of the State of California—an entity that never agreed to arbitrate.\textsuperscript{287} While federal district courts both before and after \textit{Iskanian} reached the opposite conclusion,\textsuperscript{288} the Ninth Circuit in 2015 sided with \textit{Iskanian}.\textsuperscript{289} 

**Broad discovery rights.** The California Supreme Court made PAGA more annoying yet in 2017, in deciding \textit{Williams v. Superior Court (Marshalls of CA)}\textsuperscript{290} to clarify the scope of discovery in PAGA actions. A PAGA plaintiff suing a retailer sought personal contact information for thousands of California employees, not just those at the store where he worked. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s discretion to find that the plaintiff had failed to specify good cause to justify the broad discovery sought, but the Supreme Court in \textit{Williams} reversed. \textit{Williams} held that in both class and representative actions “the contact information of those a plaintiff purports to represent is routinely discoverable as an essential prerequisite to effectively seeking group relief.”\textsuperscript{291} \textit{Williams} acknowledged that the Legislature “was aware that establishing a broad right to discovery might permit parties lacking any cause
of action to engage in fishing expeditions to a defendant’s inevitable annoyance,” but granted the right to broad
discovery anyway. Williams reasoned that the plaintiff “was presumptively entitled” to the information and that
the employer had failed to justify withholding the information on any of three grounds: overbreadth, undue burden,
and privacy.

In rejecting the employer’s argument about overbreadth, Williams held that employee contact information was
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The rules for PAGA discovery are the
same as those applied in class actions, where plaintiffs can learn names and contact information of other
potentially aggrieved employees to gather information to support their claims. Williams rejected the employer’s
view that PAGA actions are different because PAGA plaintiffs must show that individuals are “aggrieved
employees.” Instead, for discovery purposes, the plaintiffs need only allege that the employees at issue are
aggrieved.

In rejecting the employer’s argument about undue burden, Williams noted that contact information often appears
in a central database, so it would be the exception rather than the rule that an employer could show that
producing statewide contact information would be too burdensome.

In rejecting the employer’s argument about privacy, Williams affirmed that the rules in place as to wage and hour
class actions apply to PAGA actions as well. Notwithstanding the privacy right in one’s personal contact
information, trial courts cannot preclude discovery of employee contact information or require that employees
affirmatively consent to disclosure before allowing it. Rather, a court can call for a privacy notice that gives
employees the chance to affirmatively opt out, with the default result being disclosure of contact information. In
this connection, Williams reversed published decisions that had required a party seeking discovery implicating
privacy to show a “compelling need” for production. Williams said the degree of the privacy invasion is not always
so great as to require a “compelling need” for production.

While ordering the production of employee contact information in response to interrogatories, Williams
acknowledged that when a party seeks information through other discovery devices, such as demands for
inspection and copying, good cause must be shown before production may be compelled. Williams also
recognized that a PAGA plaintiff must demonstrate “trial manageability,” such that a PAGA claim should be
dismissed if there are too many individualized issues to allow the action to be manageably tried.

**Suing for Wage Order violations.** Courts have permitted aggrieved employees to pursue PAGA claims not only
for violations of provisions appearing expressly within the Labor Code, but also for violations of provisions
appearing only in the Wage Orders. These courts have concluded that Labor Code section 1198 incorporates the
Wage Order provisions by reference. Accordingly, PAGA claims may assert violations of applicable Wage
Orders, including violations of “suitable seating” requirements (see § 7.11). The Wage Orders include regulations
on various other working conditions, such as suitable temperature.

**Recovering wages as civil penalties.** Although the California Supreme Court has announced that a PAGA
“action to recover civil penalties is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and not
to benefit private parties,” the Court of Appeal has concluded that PAGA plaintiffs may obtain “underpaid wages” as part of the civil penalty.

**Seeking wage statement penalties when there was no injury.** A 2018 Court of Appeal decision permitted plaintiffs to seek PAGA penalties for inadequate wage statements even where the wage statement statute itself (Labor Code section 226) would not authorize a penalty in light of the absence of any actual or even deemed injury. (See § 16.3.1.)

**Suing penalties for Labor Code injuries plaintiff himself never experienced.** In 2018 the Court of Appeal permitted a security guard affected by only one Labor Code violation to assert PAGA claims on behalf of aggrieved employees for other Labor Code violations, even though the violations did not personally affect the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that this result conflicts with traditional rules of standing, but reasoned that those rules do not apply to a PAGA case, where the plaintiff is acting not on his own behalf but on behalf of the California Labor Commissioner.

5.16 “The Life Unlitigated is Not Worth Living”

This Californicated paraphrase of Socratic wisdom is not exactly public policy in California, but sometimes it sure seems that way.

**5.16.1 Encouragement of multiple claims**

California judges practically encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to assert all claims possible. The California Supreme Court has stated, “A responsible attorney handling an employment discrimination case must plead a variety of statutory, tort and contract causes of action in order to fully protect the interests of his or her client.” Plaintiff’s attorneys can thus feel obliged to bring many claims, lest clients second-guess their judgment by citing the high court’s wisdom. And in one case, in which the plaintiffs’ attorneys had won a class action judgment against an employer in the amount of $90 million, the Court of Appeal permitted disgruntled class members to sue these highly successful plaintiffs’ attorneys for malpractice, on the ground that they had failed to bring yet an additional claim for still more money.

**5.16.2 No guarantee that plaintiffs need ever pay costs**

In America generally, frivolous litigation faces some deterrent because a plaintiff who loses a lawsuit must pay not only the plaintiff’s own litigation costs but also the defendant’s litigation costs (as well as the defendant’s attorney fees, in very rare circumstances). Yet California is different. It creates no guarantees that the plaintiff who files a bad lawsuit will ever have to pay anything. As to the prevailing defendant’s costs, California courts have held that in certain circumstances the plaintiff is liable for costs only if the plaintiff has the ability to pay. And in 2018 the Court of Appeal extended this pro-plaintiff doctrine still further, holding that a defendant can recover expert witness fees under FEHA only upon showing that the FEHA claim was objectively baseless. In so ruling the Court of Appeal held that the FEHA’s pro-plaintiff protections trumped the general rule that would enable a trial court to award defendants expert witness fees when they had offered to settle for an amount less than the verdict.

And California permits a plaintiff to sue while secure in the knowledge that even the losing plaintiff’s own costs will be paid by someone else. Various states historically have recognized causes of action (e.g., champerty,
maintenance) that can put a party at risk for financing litigation. State bar rules in other states have limited the ability of lawyers to engage in that financing. Not so in California. California does not discourage financing litigation and its state bar rules do not restrict a lawyer from agreeing to advance expenses of a client and even waiving the right to repayment if the client fails to obtain any recovery. Thus, in a 2006 Formal Opinion, the Professional Responsibility and Ethics Committee of the Los Angeles County Bar Association, citing the California Rules of Professional Conduct, ruled that it is permissible for a law firm to cover a client’s litigation costs if the client loses and the prevailing party wins a judgment for its costs.\(^\text{302}\)

And a member of a California-certified plaintiff class need not worry about potential liability for costs in deciding whether to opt out of the class: absent class members cannot be held liable for the defendant’s costs if the defendant wins the lawsuit.\(^\text{303}\)

### 5.16.3 Deficient jury instructions often wrongly favor plaintiffs

The California Judicial Council has commissioned standard jury instructions, such as the California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI), that have misstated the law to the plaintiff’s advantage. Courts have corrected some of these mistakes, by

- rejecting a standard jury instruction that permitted retaliation plaintiffs to prevail simply because their protesting activity was a motivating reason for their discipline, even in the absence of retaliatory intent;\(^\text{304}\)
- rejecting a standard jury instruction that permitted discrimination plaintiffs to prevail where, notwithstanding the presence of some discriminatory motive, the plaintiff would have experienced the same adverse employment action even in the absence of discrimination;\(^\text{305}\)
- holding that a trial court erred in refusing to give a “business judgment” jury instruction that the defendant had submitted. The defendant’s proposed nonstandard instruction, which read: “You may not find that Lucasfilm discriminated or retaliated against … Veronese based upon a belief that Lucasfilm made a wrong or unfair decision. Likewise, you cannot find liability for discrimination or retaliation if you find that Lucasfilm made an error in business judgment. Instead, Lucasfilm can only be liable … if the decisions made were motivated by discrimination or retaliation related to [the plaintiff] being pregnant.”\(^\text{306}\)

### 5.17 Special Protections for Unauthorized Workers

#### 5.17.1 Plaintiff protections

In America generally, the unauthorized work status of plaintiffs can limit their litigation remedies. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that undocumented workers cannot recover back pay for a wrongful termination, because awarding back pay would conflict with federal immigration policy.\(^\text{307}\) In California, it’s different. California legislation—codified in the Labor Code, the Civil Code, and the Government Code—makes the immigration status of a plaintiff irrelevant to any liability and to the remedies available under California law, except to the extent that federal law prohibits a reinstatement remedy.\(^\text{308}\) Moreover, in a proceeding to enforce California law, it is unlawful even to inquire into a person’s immigration status, absent clear and convincing evidence that the inquiry is necessary to comply with federal law.\(^\text{309}\)
Employers have argued that the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) preempts this California legislation, but California courts have held otherwise. A trial court held that IRCA preempted the claims of undocumented workers suing for unpaid wages under California’s prevailing-wage law, because the plaintiffs, under federal law, could not work lawfully in the United States. But the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding “there is no actual conflict between the IRCA and the prevailing-wage law as the state law is not an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the IRCA.” The Court of Appeal reasoned that enforcement of the prevailing wage law “removes a major incentive to hiring undocumented workers.” And as to the point that allowing wage suits by unauthorized workers would encourage illegal immigration, the Court of Appeal simply doubted “that many illegal aliens come to this country to gain the protection of our labor laws. Rather it is the hope of getting a job—at any wage—that prompts most illegal aliens to cross our borders.”

Another California court has held that an undocumented worker who was injured on the job is entitled to workers’ compensation, notwithstanding the employer’s argument that federal immigration law preempts state labor law protections for undocumented workers.

The Ninth Circuit has upheld a $1.1 million dollar jury verdict for an Italian store manager whose Beverly Hills employer dismissed him when his visa expired. The plaintiff claimed that his dismissal breached a contractual promise to dismiss him only for good cause. The employer contended that it had good cause for dismissal because, under IRCA, an employer cannot “continue to employ the alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with respect to such employment.” The Ninth Circuit, while agreeing that compliance with IRCA would be good cause to dismiss, upheld employer liability on the basis that the employer, instead of immediately dismissing the plaintiff, could have granted his request to go on temporary, unpaid leave for a “reasonable period” in order to restore his authorization to work in the United States.

Further obstacles to employer reliance on immigration laws as a defense arose during 2014, when the California Supreme Court decided Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. The plaintiff had sued the defendant for failing to accommodate his disability and for refusing to rehire him in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. The defendant, during the lawsuit, learned that the plaintiff had obtained his job by using a false social security number on his Form I-9 while he, in fact, lacked the legal right to work in the United States. The Court of Appeal, in a rare employer-friendly opinion, held that an undocumented worker who fraudulently claims legal work status cannot recover back pay for a wrongful termination or for a wrongful failure to hire, because the employer could assert the defenses of after-acquired evidence and unclean hands. But Supreme Court in Salas disagreed, holding that the fraudulent plaintiff could still sue his employer and recover damages for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Salas acknowledged that it is a federal crime to use false identification documents to conceal one’s true citizenship or resident alien status, but relied on a California law providing that applicants and employees are entitled to all “protections, rights, and remedies available under state law, except any reinstatement remedy prohibited by federal law, … regardless of immigration status.” Salas therefore held that a worker who cannot legally work in the United States can still sue under FEHA, with the equitable defenses of after-acquired evidence and unclean hands being effective only for the purpose of limiting the remedies and the amount of recoverable damages.
5.17.2 General protection for unauthorized workers

The California Legislature has limited an employer’s ability to deal with employees who have provided false information to secure their jobs. California employers must not “discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate, retaliate, or take any adverse action against an employee because the employee updates or attempts to update his or her personal information based on a lawful change of name, social security number, or federal employment authorization document.”323

A California employer engages in an “adverse action” if it reports or threatens to report to the government the suspected citizenship or immigration status of an employee, former employee, or prospective employee because that person has exercised a right under the Labor Code or other laws.324

Before 2016, California allowed employers in certain circumstances to favor job candidates who were not “aliens.” Under the old law, Labor Code section 1725 defined an alien as “any person who is not a born or fully naturalized citizen of the United States,” and Labor Code section 2015 created a three-fold order of preference for certain California public-works applicants: California “citizens,” U.S. “citizens,” and “aliens.” In 2015, however, the California Legislature repealed Labor Code sections 1725 and 2015.325 As of 2016, employers, even on public works projects, cannot use a citizens preference system to screen applicants. The new law does not require employers to give preferential treatment to noncitizens. And as of 2018, the Legislature has scrubbed from the Labor Code all references to “aliens,” on the thought that this term is outdated and derogatory to immigrant workers.

5.17.3 California employers conscripted in resistance to federal law enforcement

California—led by the Legislature, Governor Brown, and Attorney General Becerra—has resisted federal immigration law enforcement by the Trump Administration. California has asserted, through litigation and various statutes, its traditional police powers to protect all state residents, including undocumented immigrants, from perceived over-reaching by the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Justice. And California has sought to enlist employers in the cause. Under the Immigrant Worker Protection Act, effective in 2018,326 California employers face a series of obligations designed to protect workers from enforcement of federal immigration laws. Employers who fail to abide by the new requirements incur liability for civil penalties in amounts up to $10,000, recoverable by the Labor Commissioner or, in some instances, by the Attorney General. Among a California employer’s new duties:

- Unless an immigration enforcement agent provides a “judicial warrant,” California employers must not voluntarily consent to having the agent “enter any nonpublic areas of a place of labor.”327

- Absent a “subpoena or judicial warrant,” or a notice of inspection of I-9 Forms, California employers must not voluntarily consent to an immigration enforcement agent obtaining access to “the employer’s employee records.”328

- California employers must notify current employees, by posting, of “any inspections of I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification forms or other employment records conducted by an immigration agency within 72 hours of receiving notice of the inspection,” and must give affected employees a copy of I-9 inspection results.329
California employers must not, except as federal law requires, reverify the employment eligibility of any employee. These challenges to federal supremacy sparked a response. In March 2018 the U.S. Justice Department sued California in federal court to seek a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of California statutes addressing immigration issues. On July 4, 2018, the court largely denied preliminary relief to the U.S. government but did grant a preliminary injunction against three provisions of California law: Pending further judicial review, California cannot enforce enactments that prevent employers from (1) giving immigration enforcement officials employment or payroll records without a judicial warrant (except for Form I-9 audits), (2) re-verifying employee I-9 Forms (unless required by federal law), and (3) giving immigration enforcement officials warrantless access to the non-public areas of the employer’s business.

Meanwhile, in a law immediately effective upon Governor Brown’s signing on May 17, 2018, California added a new immigrant protection. The new law prohibits the disclosure of an individual’s immigration status in open court, unless the party seeking to introduce it first persuades a judge in a private hearing, that the evidence is relevant and admissible.

5.18 Employer’s Attorney-Client Privilege

In America generally, an employer can secure a confidential written opinion from an outside law firm and have the firm interview the employer’s employees to learn facts needed to prepare the opinion, all without the fear that later, in litigation, the employer’s legal adversaries can discover what facts the law firm relied upon in rendering its legal advice. That principle applies in California, too, but only because the California Supreme Court granted extraordinary relief to correct the errors of two levels of lower courts. In one wage and hour class action challenging the classification of managers as exempt from overtime pay, the Court of Appeal ruled that it would not disturb a trial-court order that the defendant must turn over to a discovery referee an opinion letter that the defendant had secured from a law firm, for the purpose of having the referee redact out and reveal to the plaintiffs the “facts” that the law firm had relied upon in rendering its legal advice. The California Supreme Court eventually issued a ringing endorsement of the attorney-client privilege, recognizing that confidential attorney-client communications are protected from discovery in their entirety, regardless of whether the facts contained therein are otherwise discoverable, and that courts cannot compel parties to submit documents to in camera review to determine whether the communication is privileged.

5.19 Limits to Protection for Attorney Work Product

Employers defending lawsuits often have defense counsel interview witnesses to investigate the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff’s counsel then asks the defendant employer, during pre-trial discovery, to serve up on silver platter the fruits of the defense counsel’s investigation. In a 2012 case, Coito v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court addressed the degree of protection that courts should give to work product that an attorney creates while obtaining evidence from witnesses. The defense counsel argued that the identity of attorney-selected interviewees was necessarily work product (and thus could be withheld from the plaintiff). Coito rejected this argument, holding that the identities of attorney-selected witnesses must be disclosed unless that would “reveal the attorney’s tactics, impressions or evaluation of the case, or would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney’s industry or efforts.” In another ruling, more favorable to defendants, Coito — acknowledging that a witness statement obtained through an attorney-directed interview deserves “at least
qualified work product protection”—held that the party seeking the statement must show that withholding it would be unjust, and also held that the statement potentially could also be subject to an absolute work product protection, if the statement “reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories.”

Whether an investigation by outside counsel is privileged can depend on whether counsel is performing a legal function or a purely business one. A factual investigation conducted by outside counsel that does not provide legal advice to the employer could nevertheless be subject to both the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine if outside counsel was not merely gathering information, but using expertise to “identify pertinent facts, synthesize the evidence, and come to a conclusion of what actually happened.”

5.20 Employer’s Obligation to Withhold Taxes Due on Damages Judgment

In America generally, an employer who pays money to settle a claim or satisfy a judgment can, and must, withhold income taxes and payroll taxes to the extent that the money represents lost income (back pay and front pay), because to that extent the payment, for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, is wages. So it was that when United Air Lines suffered a judgment in a California wrongful termination case, United withheld taxes from its payment of the judgment. Yet the California Court Appeal, in a 1992 opinion called *Lisec v. United Air Lines*, held that United must pay the plaintiff the full amount of the judgment (and thus take its chances with the IRS) because the Court of Appeal, in an under-analyzed opinion that the IRS itself surely disagreed with, concluded that “the damages award was not ‘wages’ from which United was obliged to withhold taxes.”

This California peculiarity finally came to an end in 2015, when a Court of Appeal decision challenged the *Lisec* holding. In considering a judgment against an employer for lost past and future wages, the Court of Appeal concluded that the employer “chose correctly” when it followed the “prevailing federal view” by withholding payroll taxes. The Court of Appeal observed that *Lisec*, and the cases that have followed it, “represent a dwindling minority view.”

5.21 Can Employees Seeking Unpaid Wages Bring Tort Claims?

Conversion. The tort of conversion consists of a wrongful act to take the property of another. A tort claim can entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages in cases of malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct. Courts traditionally have not recognized a tort action for unpaid wages. Numerous Labor Code provisions already permit employees to sue for prompt payment of wages, as well for civil penalties and attorney fees and costs. Although the California Supreme Court once speculated that an action for conversion might be available in a tip-pooling case (see § 7.19), that was a special situation (the employer allegedly had misappropriated gratuities left for employees), and was not a simple case of unpaid wages.

So it was not surprising when, in 2017, the Court of Appeal, in an unpublished opinion, upheld the trial court’s dismissal of a conversion claim for unpaid wages. The Court of Appeal explained that there was no such thing as valid conversion claim for unpaid wages. But one justice dissented from this conclusion and, even though the decision was unpublished, the California Supreme Court decided to review the decision. The Supreme Court’s own decision is expected in 2019.
“Theft of labor.” The Court of Appeal in 2018 rejected a novel claim that an employer’s failure to pay commissions amounted to stealing property, in violation of the Penal Code.345

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2. Grafton Partners, 36 Cal. 4th at 966 (Chin, J., concurring).

3. Id. at 970.


5. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 4th 713, 737-38 (2010) (equitable issues could be tried first to the judge alone and a bench trial of the equitable issues could dispense with the legal issues and end the case).

6. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The FAA excepts employers “within the transportation industry.” Muro v. Cornerstone Staffing Solutions, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 4th 952, 957 (1996) (upholding denial of motion to compel enforcement of an arbitration agreement that waived class actions, where the plaintiff was a truck driver for defendant’s client, making the agreement not subject to the FAA).

7. Lab. Code § 229 (“Agreements to enforce the provisions of this article for the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.”).


9. Lane v. Francis Capital Mgmt. LLC, 224 Cal. App. 4th 676 (2014) (plaintiff could proceed to trial on wage claim because employer, in moving to compel arbitration, did not show that the relevant transaction was in interstate commerce).

10. Civ. Code § 51.7 (“Ralph Civil Rights Act”) (entitling persons “to be free from . . . any violence, or intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment of . . constitutional or statutory rights”).

11. Civ. Code §§ 51.7(b), 52.1(f).


25. E.g., Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 494 (2008) (upholding denial of motion to compel arbitration of suit for employment discrimination; arbitration agreement was unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, because employee had to sign it to be hired, and because agreement gave arbitrator sole authority to determine arbitrability, required employee to pay costs unique to arbitration, deprived employees of right to recover statutory costs and reasonable attorney fees if employee prevailed, and limited employee to one deposition; trial court could declare entire agreement unconscionable rather than severing unconscionable provisions where unconscionable provisions governing arbitrability, discovery, and costs permeated entire agreement). Ontiveros has since been abrogated as to its conclusion that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable simply by virtue of delegating the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. South Tires v. TracTees, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 231, 248-50 (2014) (recognizing Ontiveros’s abrogation in light of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), which held that such delegation clauses are valid absent a challenge specific to the delegation clause).


27. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1198-1200 (9th Cir. 2002).

28. 42 Cal. 4th at 471-72.

29. Id. at 480-81 (Baxter, J., dissenting).


31. Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th 1237 1246 (2016) (unanimously upholding an arbitration agreement against claims of unconscionability). The agreement, which appeared in a job application, was enforceable even though (i) it was made a condition of employment, (ii) the employer did not provide the employee with a copy of the arbitration rules, (iii) the agreement gave both sides the right to seek provisional judicial relief, (iv) the agreement said the claims subject to arbitration were all employment-related claims, including but “not limited to” a series of claims that only an employee would bring, and (v) the agreement provided for “all necessary steps” to protect “trade secrets and proprietary and confidential information.”
34 Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2013) (employer arbitration policy deemed so one-sided it “shocked the conscience” and was unenforceable under California law).
35 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 117. “Given the disadvantages that may exist for plaintiffs arbitrating disputes, it is unfairly one-sided for an employee with superior bargaining power to impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to accept such limitations when it seeks to prosecute a claim against the employee, without at least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness based on ‘business realities.’ ”). The language about “disadvantages that may exist for plaintiffs arbitrating disputes” betrays a judicial prejudice against arbitration, which is antithetical to the Federal Arbitration Act.
36 Thus, Trivedi v. Curexo Technology Corp., 189 Cal. App. 4th 387, 396-97 (2010), disapproved of a provision permitting the parties to seek judicial injunctive relief while arbitration proceeded, because Trivedi viewed the employer as more likely to seek injunctive relief than the employee. What makes this conclusion particularly peculiar, even for California, is that the California Arbitration Act itself authorizes precisely this sort of interim judicial relief. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.8(b) (party to arbitration agreement may seek provisional judicial relief, if arbitral award “may be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief,” without thereby waiving the right to arbitrate). Finally, in 2016, the California Supreme Court repudiated this holding of Trivedi: “[A]n arbitration agreement is not substantively unconscionable simply because it confirms the parties’ ability to invoke undisputed statutory rights.” Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th 1237 (2016).
37 Trivedi, 189 Cal. App. 4th at 394-95 (arbitration agreement cannot serve to waive statutory rights, and so arbitration clause calling for prevailing-party attorney fees was “substantively unconscionable” because it put the suing employee “at greater risk than if he brought his FEHA claims in court”); see also Wherry v. Award, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1248-49 (arbitration agreement authorizing arbitrator to award costs, including attorney fees, to the prevailing party was substantively unconscionable, because the agreement would cause a losing FEHA plaintiff to pay costs greater than the costs of litigating in court).
38 See Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 923-26 (9th Cir. 2013).
40 Baxter v. Genworth North America Corp., 16 Cal. App. 5th 713, 730 (2017). In upholding a refusal to compel arbitration, the Court of Appeal also cited provisions in the arbitration agreement that (1) prohibited contacting other employees about a claim, (2) shortened the limitations periods, and (3) effectively limited an employee’s right to seek administrative remedies before an arbitration is conducted.
41 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 93. See also Wherry v. Award, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1250 (2011).
42 Juarez v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 5th 1197, 2013 (2018), 2013 (2018). The Court of Appeal breezed past the point that the English version was to control by adopting a cynical, speculative rationale: “At best, the difference in the severability clauses in the English-language and Spanish-language versions of the handbook is negligent; at worst, it is deceptive. Under the circumstances, we construe the ambiguous language against the interest of the party that drafted it. … This rule applies with particular force in the case of a contract of adhesion.” (Depot made the “meaning of severability deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a later date what meaning to assert.” Id. at 2013 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 E.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) (one-year limitations period set forth in an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, as it would bar suits on continuing violations); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Stirten v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1542 (1997) (criticizing one-year limitations provision in arbitration agreement that would not permit tolling).
44 Soltani v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1043-47 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding provision in job application creating post-termination limitations period of six months, but striking down 10-day deadline to give written notice of intent to sue).
45 Pellegrino v. Robert Half International, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 4th 87, 107-110 (2010). The California Supreme Court granted review of this case, albeit on other grounds, so it has been officially depublished. See also Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., 118 Cal. App. 4th 104 (2004) (holding it was unconscionable for employer-imposed arbitration agreement to shorten limitations period to six months from date of violation, as that would “insufficiently protect employees’ right to vindicate statutory protections”)
46 Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 4th 71 (2008), rev. granted, No. S167169 (Cal. Aug. 21, 2008) (raising these issues: (1) What standard of judicial review applies to an arbitrator’s decision on a FEHA claim? (2) Can a mandatory arbitration agreement restrict an employee from seeking administrative remedies for violations of the Act?)
47 Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 4th 665 (2010). Pearson declined to address whether the one-year statute of limitations provided in the arbitration agreement was unlawful and independently rendered the agreement invalid, because the issue was not presented in the petition for review. Id. at 682 n.5.
48 Baxter v. Genworth North America Corp., 16 Cal. App. 5th 713, 731-32 (2017) (reasoning that “[r]educing the time to pursue a claim by as much as two-thirds does not provide sufficient time to vindicate an employee’s statutory rights under the FEHA”).
49 Id. at 732.
51 Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Services, 207 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1522 (2012) (as to arbitration agreements in handbooks, “there must be more than a boilerplate arbitration clause buried in a lengthy employee handbook given to new employees”; “there should be a specific reference to the duty to arbitrate employment-related disputes in the acknowledgment of receipt form signed by the employee at commencement of employment”).
53 Id. at 789.
54 Minut v. Arnel Mgmt. Co., 157 Cal. App. 4th 1164, 1170-71 (2007). See also Gorlach v. Sports Club Co., 209 Cal. App. 4th 1497, 1509 (2012) (declining to enforce handbook arbitration clause because handbook told employees they must sign an arbitration agreement, “implying that it was not effective until (and unless) they did so. Because Gorlach never signed the arbitration agreement, we cannot imply the existence of such an agreement between the parties.”).
Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc., 232 Cal. App. 4th 836, 842 (2014) (affirming order denying petition to compel arbitration where employer did not present enough evidence to show that employee’s electronic signature on the arbitration agreement was in fact the “act of” the employee).


Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 364 (2014) ("Concepcion holds that even if a class waiver is exculpatory in a particular case, it is nonetheless preempted by the FAA. Under the logic of Concepcion, the FAA preempts Gentry’s rule against employment class waivers.").


1 Cal. 5th 233 (2016).

Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 502-03 (2011) (PAGA is a mechanism by which the state itself can enforce state labor laws, and that a PAGA plaintiff is a state proxy or agent and so should be unaffected by a private agreement to arbitrate). The Brown court relied on Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 21 Cal. 4th 1066 (1999) (claims for injunctive relief under the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act are not arbitrable), Cruz v. PacificCare Health Systems, Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 303 (2003) (claims for injunctive relief under the UCL are not arbitrable), and Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1277, 1303 (2009) (PAGA waiver in arbitration agreement invalid because it impedes comprehensive enforcement of the Labor Code). Disagreeing with that view was the Court of Appeal decision that the California Supreme Court reviewed in 2014: Iskanian v. CLS Transp., 206 Cal. App. 4th 499 (2012) (disagreeing with Brown: “[W]e disagree with the majority’s holding in Brown. We recognize that the PAGA serves to benefit the public and that private attorney general laws may be severely undercut by application of the FAA. But we believe that the United States Supreme Court has spoken on the issue, and we are required to follow its binding authority.”), rev. granted, No. S224032 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2012).

Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 364 (2014) (“Concepcion held that the FAA does prevent states from mandating or promoting procedures incompatible with arbitration. The Gentry rule runs afoul of this latter principle. We thus conclude in light of Concepcion that the FAA preempts the Gentry rule.”).

Id. at 384 (“We conclude that the rule against PAGA waivers does not frustrate the FAA’s objectives because, as explained below, the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and the state Agency.”). The Supreme Court held that “where an employment agreement compels the waiver of representative claims,” the agreement “frustrates the PAGA’s objectives” and “is contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, California’s ban on arbitral waivers of representative actions reflects public policy, rather than substantive unconscionability, Poulijon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017).

Julian v. Glenair, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 5th 853, 860 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring such a claim on behalf of the state, is an unenforceable predispute waiver. As any agreement by [the plaintiff employees] was entered into before they were authorized to bring a PAGA claim, the trial court properly denied the petition to compel.”).


Id. at 770 (quoting Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 379 (2014)).

Id. at 761.


Section 10(a) of the FAA empowers courts to vacate an arbitral award only where (1) the award was procured through corruption, fraud, or undue means, (2) the arbitrator was corrupt or evidently partial, (3) the arbitrator committed prejudicial misconduct such as refusing to hear material evidence, or (4) the arbitrator exceeded powers or so imperfectly executed them that a definite award on the subject matter submitted was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).


Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 4th 665, 669-70 (2010) (trial court properly vacated arbitrator’s award that “clearly erred in ruling that the employee’s claim was time-barred,” because award would have deprived the employee of “a hearing on the merits of an unwaivable statutory employment claim”).

See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1286.2 (ground for vacating arbitration award), 1286.6 (grounds for correcting arbitration award).

Crowell v. Downey Community Hospital Foundation, 95 Cal. App. 4th 730 (2002) (parties cannot agree to expand jurisdiction of court to provide judicial review of arbitration awards beyond that provided by statute).


Cable Connections v. DirecTV, 44 Cal. 4th 1334 (2008). The Supreme Court’s reasoning suggests that the parties could also contract to vacate an award that lacks substantial evidence to support it.


Cable. Code § 925. Section 925, effective January 1, 2017, not only invalidates mandatory forum-selection and choice-of-law provision but creates, in subdivision (c), a right of action for employees subjected to such provisions:

(a) An employer shall not require an employee who primarily resides and works in California, as a condition of employment, to agree to a provision that would do either of the following: (1) Require the employee to adjudicate outside of California a claim arising in
California. (2) Deprive the employee of the substantive protection of California law with respect to a controversy arising in California.

(b) Any provision of a contract that violates subdivision (a) is voidable by the employee, and if a provision is rendered void at the request of the employee, the matter shall be adjudicated in California and California law shall govern the dispute.

(c) In addition to injunctive relief and any other remedies available, a court may award an employee who is enforcing his or her rights under this section reasonable attorney's fees.

(d) For purposes of this section, adjudication includes litigation and arbitration.

(e) This section shall not apply to a contract with an employee who is in fact individually represented by legal counsel in negotiating the terms of an agreement to designate either the venue or forum in which a controversy arising from the employment contract may be adjudicated or the choice of law to be applied.

84 Id. at 257.
86 Id. at 144-45.
87 Id. 60.
88 Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 1094 (1992). The high court has given at least good lip service to the idea that the Legislature, not the judiciary, makes public policy in the employment arena: “public policy as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition, and … courts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care and due deference to the judgment of the legislative branch, lest they mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at law. … [C]ourts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy absent some prior legislative expression on the subject.” Id. at 1095 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
89 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Superior Court (Huntington Memorial Hosp.), 16 Cal. 4th 880, 889-90 (1997) (public policy must have support in constitutional or statutory provision, inure to public benefit rather than merely individual interest, be articulated at the time of employee’s dismissal, and be fundamental and substantial); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 670 n.12 (1988) (no public policy implicated where plaintiff told management that co-worker was suspected of embezzlement at his prior place of employment, as the parties, consistent with public policy, could have expressly agreed that plaintiff was not to reveal co-worker’s background).
91 Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1105 (1999); Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 256, 275 (1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer on claim for breach of an implied contract to terminate only for good cause: “While the investigation was not perfect, it was appropriate given that it was conducted ‘under the exigencies of the workaday world and without the benefit of the slow-moving machinery of a contested trial.’”); Serri v. Santa Clara Univ., 226 Cal. App. 4th 830, 873-74 (2014) (affirming summary judgment for employer on breach of implied contract claim, rejecting plaintiff’s claim that a jury should decide whether her misconduct was serious enough to warrant immediate termination under the Cotran good cause standard).
100 Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc., 187 Cal. App. 4th 60, 63 (2010) (reinstating wrongful termination claim of sales employee who was fired when her employer was notified by her former employer that she had signed an agreement prohibiting “from all sales activities for 18 months following” her employment, as this was an noncompete clause invalid under Section 16600's legislative declaration of California's settled legislative policy in favor of open competition and employee mobility”). See also § 12.2.
101 Barbosa v. IMPCO Technologies, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 1116, 1123 (2009) (reversing trial court's nonsuit where employee had called at 160 plaintiff for falsifying time records, after plaintiff offered to repay two hours of claimed overtime pay with excuse that he had been “confused” in claiming the pay in the first place).
104 Rojo v. Kilger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 70-71 (1990) (employee discriminated against because of may sue for breach of public policy as stated in California Constitution Article I, section 8: “A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin.”).
105 Gelini v. Tishgart, 77 Cal. App. 4th 219 (1999) (where plaintiff’s lawyer wrote employer to request better hours and parental leave, jury could find that the employer, in then firing the plaintiff, violated Labor Code section 923, which entitles employees to select their own bargaining representatives).

120 Lab. Code § 2922: “An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.

121 Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month.”


122 Touchstone, 208 Cal. App. 4th at 682; Daly, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 45.

123 Pen. Code § 290.46.


125 Pen. Code § 290.46(e)(1)-(2).

126 See, e.g., Donaleski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2009 WL 1296257, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2009) (Penal Code does not prohibit employer from discharging the plaintiff for a felony conviction even if employer first learned of possible conviction through a co-worker’s statement that the plaintiff’s name appeared on the Megan’s Law Website, where the co-worker had not looked at the website at the employer’s direction and where the employer did not consult the Website or discharge the plaintiff for being listed on the Website, but rather discharged the plaintiff after an independent investigation confirmed the felony conviction).

127 See Edu. Code § 45122.1(a) (school districts must not employ someone “convicted of a violent or serious felony”).

See generally Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Services, 207 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1522 (2012) (declining to enforce arbitration clause contained within a handbook that stated, "This Handbook is not intended to create an employment contract ... ").


Id. v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 345-46 (2000) (triable issue exists that dismissed employees could rely on RIF guidelines as part of implied contract, even though guidelines not distributed to employees generally).

Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 353 n.18 (2000) (“The covenant prevents a party from acting in bad faith to frustrate the contract’s actual benefits. Thus, for example, the covenant might be violated if termination of an at-will employee was a mere pretext to cheat the worker out of another contract benefit to which the employee was clearly entitled, such as compensation already earned.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See, e.g., Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1272-73 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990) (breach of implied covenant may occur when employer made an offer of employment at-at will employment, without stating that the offer was contingent on a credit check, and then, relying on a background check, revoked the offer before the new hire started work); Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 61, 67 (1990) (reversing summary judgment against contractual wrongful termination claim of individual who, in reliance on job offer, moved from California to Tennessee to take the job, only to be denied employment because he made pre-employment visit to office dressed in blue jeans and T-shirt; claim sustainable notwithstanding at-will employment status: doctrine of promissory estoppel gave plaintiff right to assume he would have chance to perform job to the good-faith satisfaction of his employer).

Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Corp., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 352-53 (2000) (summary judgment affirmed as to implied covenant claim: “To the extent Guz’s implied covenant cause of action seeks to impose limits on Bechtel’s termination rights beyond those to which the parties actually agreed, the claim is invalid. To the extent the implied covenant claim seeks simply to invoke terms to which the parties did agree, it is superfluous.”).

See, e.g., M.F. v. Pacific Pearl Hotel Mgmt., LLC, 16 Cal. App. 5th 693, 700 (2017) (workers’ compensation act did not preempt FEHA claim by hotel housekeeper that hotel was liable for negligently failing to prevent her rape by a drunken trespasser whose dangerous presence should have been known to hotel management; “workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine is inapplicable to claims under the FEHA”).


E.g., Miklosy v. Regents of University of California, 44 Cal. 4th 876, 902-03 (2008) (WCA preempts emotional distress claims arising from "risks inherent" in the normal employment relationship; "whistle blower retaliation" is risk inhering in normal employment relationship); Ferretti v. Pfizer, Inc., 2012 WL 3638541, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012) (wrongful termination plaintiff cannot use Cabesuela to support claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, in view of Miklosy); Yau v. Margarita Ford, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 4th 144, 161-62 (2014) (upholding dismissal of IIED claim brought against individual defendant who allegedly gave illegal directions regarding fraudulent warranty claims; after Miklosy, violation of public policy does not support exception to WCA exclusivity); Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 819, 832-33 (2013) (Cabesuela and Leibert have been limited); Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 186 Cal. App. 4th 338, 366–67 (2010) (WCA exclusivity barred claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where employer “berated and humiliated [plaintiff], criticized his job performance, and insulted him with profanities on a regular basis”; “employer’s intentional conduct in connection with actions that are a normal part of the employment relationship ... resulting in emotional injury is considered to be encompassed within the compensation bargain, even if the misconduct could be characterized as ‘manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance.’”).

Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation, 14 Cal. App. 5th 75, 101 (2017) (“we are unwilling to abandon the long-standing view that unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA falls outside the compensation bargain and therefore claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on such discrimination and retaliation are not subject to workers’ compensation exclusivity”).


Id. at 248.

Id.

Id. at 286 (citing law review article authored by Chief Judge Wald of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit).


Id. at 369 (emphasis in original).

Id. at 370.

Id.

Gov’t Code § 12923(e).

Coate v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 113, 115 (1978) (absent a finding of waiver of the privilege, a court may not compel disclosure of joint federal or joint state income tax returns, or information contained therein; privilege of tax returns “facilitate[s] tax enforcement by encouraging a taxpayer to make full and truthful declarations in his return, without fear that his statements will be revealed or used against him for other purposes”).

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See also Morales-Simental v. Genentech, Inc.

Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1054 1071 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting LMRA preemption argument because, although claims depended on language of the CBA, the claims did not substantially depend on a CBA interpretation and could “be resolved by—at most—merely ‘looking to’ the CBAs”).

Civ. Code § 1624(a)(1): “The following contracts are invalid unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent: (1) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof.”

See, e.g., Sciborski v. Pacific Bell Directory, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1152 (2012) (to invoke LMRA preemption, defendant must show claim “cannot be resolved on the merits without choosing among competing interpretations of a collective bargaining agreement and its application to the claim”; CBA interpretation not needed to resolve claim that employer unlawfully used self-help to deduct funds from wages already paid, upon the employer’s unilateral declaration that a commission was unearned).

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McQuirk v. Donnelly, 189 F.3d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1999) (release signed by applicant authorizing former employer to provide information could not, under California law, release future extensions of the statute of limitations). See also Bardin v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co., 70 Cal. App. 4th 494, 507 (1999) (release barred defamation claims against former employer).

AB 2770, 2018 bill amending Civil Code § 47(c).

Toscano v. Greene Music, 124 Cal. App. 4th 685 (2004) (plaintiff, suing for promissory estoppel stemming from defendant’s unfulfilled alleged promise of employment, causing plaintiff to resign from at-will job at former employer, can recover what wages he would have earned from former employer through retirement, to extent damages not speculative).

Fielder v. UAL Corp., 219 Cal. App. 4th 886, 890 (2013). See also Purton v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 4th 495, 509-10 (2013) (reversing summary judgment for Marriott on wrongful-death claim by estate of doctor who was killed by a Marriott bartender who had tended bar at a non-mandatory holiday party and was driving intoxicated; even though the accident occurred after the bartender had returned home, before returning to the road to give a lift to another intoxicated co-worker, Marriott could still be responsible: “a trier of fact could conclude that the party and the drinking of alcoholic beverages benefitted Marriott by improving employee morale and furthering employer-employee relations ... and ... that [the bartender] was acting within the scope of his employment while ingesting alcoholic beverages at the party”).

Id. at 891. Another 2013 appellate decision went the other way, affirming a summary judgment for an employer whose employee, driving a company vehicle, hit another vehicle. In this case the Court of Appeal held that the employee’s trip was “entirely personal” in that it involved a 140-mile detour from his normal commute, and in that it was not taken for the benefit of the company. The risk of this accident...
was thus not even broadly incident to the company’s enterprise. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 220 Cal. App. 4th 87 (2013).


198 Id. at 693.

199 See Commodore Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 221 (1982) (tort-like remedies available under the FEHA); Gov’t Code § 12965(b) (attorney fees and expert witness costs awardable to prevailing plaintiff).

200 Stamps v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 4th 1441 (2006) (Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 and Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, codified in Civil Code sections 51.7 and 52.1, provide separate claims for employee suffering employer’s discriminatory violence and intimidation; while the Unruh Act does not apply to employment discrimination, neither section here is part of the Unruh Act, and both statutes authorize a private right of action in employment cases—Section 51.7 making wrongdoer liable for “actual damages suffered by any person denied that right” and Section 52.1 providing that person whose rights have been interfered with “may institute and prosecute in his own name and on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages”).

201 Lab. Code § 1194 (employee suing for statutory minimum wage entitled to attorney fees); Earley v. Superior Court (Washington Mutual Bank), 79 Cal. App. 4th 1420, 1429-30 (2000) (written notice to class members deciding whether to opt out is not to advise that they could be liable for defendant’s attorney fees if the defendant prevails; the policy stated in section 1194 overrides the general language of section 218.5; court harmonizes the two sections to hold that a prevailing defendant can obtain attorney fees in wage claims generally but not in claims for minimum wage or overtime premium pay). Section 218.5 does not apply “to any cause of action for which attorney’s fees are recoverable under Section 1194.” Lab. Code § 218.5(b).

202 Lab. Code § 218.5(a) (“[f] the prevailing party in the court action is not an employee, attorney’s fees and costs shall be awarded pursuant to this section only if the court finds that the employee brought the court action in bad faith.”). Although “bad faith” is not defined, it is likely that an employer must show that the employee’s claim was brought with knowledge that it was baseless.

203 Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1099 (2007). The result of this pro-employee holding was that the statute of limitations for claims seeking meal and rest pay was three years instead of just one.

204 Kirby v. Immoo Fire Protection, 53 Cal. 4th 1244, 1255, 1257 (2012) (“The question here is whether a section 226.7 claim, which concerns an employer’s alleged failure to provide statutorily mandated meal and rest periods, constitutes an “action brought for the nonpayment of wages” within the meaning of section 218.5. We conclude it does not.”; “[A] section 226.7 claim is not an action brought for nonpayment of wages; it is an action brought for nonpayment of the minimum wage, a wage.”; Id. a 1257 (discussing Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, 40 Cal. 4th 1094 (2007)”To say that a section 226.7 remedy is a wage, however, is not to say that the legal violation triggering the remedy is nonpayment of wages. As explained above, the legal violation is nonpayment of wages or overtime premium pay, and the object of the phrase ‘action brought for’ in section 218.5 is the alleged legal violation, not the desired remedy.”). SB 462, 2013 bill amending Lab. Code § 218.5.

205 Lab. Code § 218.5(a) (described above). The Court of Appeal has held that this statute is procedural and applies to pending litigation, thus depriving employers of attorney fees for cases they won that were filed before Section 218.5 was amended. USS-Posco Industries v. Case, 244 Cal. App. 4th 197, 215-22 (2016).

206 Lab. Code § 1194(a)(4). Alemán v. AirTouch Cellular, 209 Cal. App. 4th 556, 579-84 (2012) (a split-shift claim seeks the minimum wage and is thus subject to Section 1194 provision permitting only recover to recover attorney fees; a reporting-time claim seeks unpaid wages at the regular rate and thus is subject to Section 218.5).


208 Ketchum v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) ("extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper award of attorney fees...").


210 Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (rejecting "catalyst theory" in a FOIA case because the theory would allow an award of attorney fees where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties, would discourage defendants to voluntarily change conduct that may not be illegal, and would foment a "second major litigation requiring analysis of the defendant's subjective motivations in changing its conduct.") FOIA was amended, in 2007, to define "substantially prevailed" to include "a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant's claim is not meritorious, and thus depriving employers of attorney fees for cases they won that were filed before Section 218.5.")


212 Id. at 517-20 (discussing Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, 40 Cal. 4th 1094 (2007) (“To say that a section 226.7 remedy is a wage, however, is not to say that the legal violation triggering the remedy is nonpayment of wages. As explained above, the legal violation is nonpayment of wages or overtime premium pay, and the object of the phrase ‘action brought for’ in section 218.5 is the alleged legal violation, not the desired remedy.”). SB 462, 2013 bill amending Lab. Code § 218.5.

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216 Id. at 579-82.

217 Id. at 585 (Chin, J., dissenting).


219 See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) (“extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S. C. § 1988. Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee.”).


221 Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. App. 4th 410, 416-22 (2008) (in ruling on motion for attorney fees by plaintiff who prevailed in FEHA case, trial court erred in denying fees solely because plaintiff’s recovery was below the $25,000 threshold for general civil jurisdiction), rev. granted, No. S162313 (Cal. May 14, 2008).
See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (approving 28 percent fee as justified by a benchmark of 25 percent adjusted according to specified case circumstances); In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ninth Circuit district courts "typically calculate 25% of the fund as the ‘benchmark’ for a reasonable fee award, providing adequate explanation in the record of any ‘special circumstances’ justifying a departure").
More recently, the Supreme Court, in Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 701, 726 (2013), held that an alleged joint employer’s lack of a lawful written policy on meal and rest breaks was a sufficient basis for certifying a class of technicians, even though many knew they could take breaks, and did so. The Court of Appeal held that the class could be certified on a theory that the defendant unlawfully failed to adopt a policy authorizing and permitting breaks. The theory was that the defendant, as an alleged co-employer, had to ensure that the technicians knew of their break rights. This suggestion that certification can rest on a theory that the defendant failed to adopt a formal break policy, even where the employees knew their rights and exercised them, is another example of a court liberally interpreting Brinker to the plaintiff’s advantage.

The named plaintiffs, debtors of the defendant, were suing for surreptitious telephone monitoring but discovered that they themselves were never monitored; only others were. Id. at 279.

As originally enacted, PAGA split the money collected three ways: 50% to the California General Fund, 25% to the LWDA, and 25% to aggrieved employees, because they were not mentioned in the LWDA notice).

An “aggrieved employee” is one whom the alleged violator employed and against whom an alleged violation was committed. Lab. Code. § 2699(f).

It is uncertain whether PAGA applies to provisions enacted after PAGA’s own enactment. Lab. Code § 2699(f). It was not affective remedies for workers’ compensation injuries.

As originally enacted, PAGA split the money collected three ways: 50% to the California General Fund, 25% to the LWDA, and 25% to the aggrieved workers. As amended, PAGA now sends the State’s 75% portion to the LWDA for labor law enforcement and education. Lab. Code § 2699(c). Section 2699 does not affect exclusive remedies for workers’ compensation injuries. Lab. Code § 2699(i). Section 2699 does not affect the ultimate certification decision).

PAGA establishes civil penalties for all Labor Code provisions “except those for which a civil penalty is specifically provided.” Lab. Code § 2698-2699.

Several California Supreme Court decisions provide limited guidance on the interpretation of PAGA. See, e.g., Tien v. Tenet Healthcare, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1025 (2012) (“trial court does not abuse its discretion if it certifies (or denies certification of) a class without deciding one or more issues affecting the nature of a given element if resolution of such issues would not affect the ultimate certification decision”).

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Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC

E.g., Lucero v. Sears Holdings Management Corp., 2014 WL 6984220 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2014) (“FAA preempts California’s rule against arbitration agreements that waive an employee’s right to bring a representative action under [PAGA] to recover civil penalties for an employer’s Labor Code violations. The Iskanian court concluded the FAA did not preempt the new rule because a PAGA representative claim belongs to the state, and an aggrieved employee simply brings the claim as an agent or proxy of the state. Accordingly, a PAGA representative claim is not subject to a private arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee or the FAA.”) McGill v. Citibank, NA, 232 Cal. App. 4th 753, 758 (2014), rev. granted, No. S224086 (Cal. April 1, 2015); accord Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply, 9 Cal. App. 5th 439 (2017). The U.S. Supreme Court has denied review of this decision. No. 17-254 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017).

Iskanian also established a new rule invalidating predispute waivers of an employee’s right to bring a representative action under [PAGA] to recover civil penalties for an employer’s Labor Code violations. The Iskanian court concluded the FAA did not preempt the new rule because a PAGA representative claim belongs to the state, and an aggrieved employee simply brings the claim as an agent or proxy of the state. Accordingly, a PAGA representative claim is not subject to a private arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee or the FAA.” McGill v. Citibank, NA, 232 Cal. App. 4th 753, 758 (2014), rev. granted, No. S224086 (Cal. April 1, 2015); accord Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply, 9 Cal. App. 5th 439 (2017). The U.S. Supreme Court has denied review of this decision. No. 17-254 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017).

E.g., Lucero v. Sears Holdings Management Corp., 2014 WL 6984220 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2014) (“FAA preempts California’s rule against arbitration agreements that waive an employee’s right to bring a representative PAGA claim!”); Mill v. Kmart Corp., 2014 WL 6706017 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2014) (“federal courts have addressed whether the FAA preempts California’s rule prohibiting the waiver of representative PAGA claims, and all have concluded that it does”) (citing Langston v. 20/20 Companies, Inc., 2014 WL 5355734 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014); Chico v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., 2014 WL 5088240 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014); Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014 WL 4961126 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014) (“Despite the holding of the California Supreme Court, federal law is clear that a state is without the right to interpret the appropriate application of the FAA. District courts within the Ninth Circuit have generally held that PAGA claims are subject to Arbitration Agreements and any waiver clauses within those agreements.”). Accord Parvataneni v. E’Trade Financial Corp., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“An arbitration agreement that denies a plaintiff the right to pursue a representative PAGA claim is still a valid agreement.”); Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The Court must enforce the parties’ Arbitration Agreement even if it might uncertain Plaintiffs from acting as private attorneys general.”); Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (U.S. Supreme Court’s Concepcion decision compels enforcement of arbitration agreement even where agreement would bar representative PAGA claims); Grabowski v. Robinson, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“PAGA claim is arbitrable, and that the arbitration agreement’s provision barring him from bringing that claim on behalf of other employees is enforceable”).

Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 431 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding pre-dispute agreements to waive PAGA claims are unenforceable). For further discussion, see § 5.2.

Williams v. Superior Court (Marshall of CA, LLC), 3 Cal. 5th 531 (2017).

Id. at 551 (internal citations and quotations omitted).


Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009).


Jank v. Rudy, Exelrod & Zieff, 119 Cal. App. 4th 930, 934 (2004) (“While we may share the attorneys’ dismay that their efforts have been rewarded with this lawsuit rather than with the kudos they no doubt expected, and perhaps deserve, we are nonetheless constrained to hold that plaintiff’s claim cannot be rejected out of hand. While it may well be that the attorneys did not breach their duty of care in failing to
proceed under an alternative theory that would have produced a greater recovery, we cannot say, as did the trial court, that there simply was no duty for the attorneys to breach.

See, e.g., Williams v. Chino Valley Indep. Fire Dist., 61 Cal. 4th 97, 115 (2015) (prevailing FEHA defendant should not be awarded costs unless “action was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so”); Seever v. Copley Press, Inc., 141 Cal. App. 4th 1550, 1560 (2006) (defendant’s statutory offer of compromise for sum certain, plus costs and attorney fees “incurred to the date of this offer in the amount determined by the Court according to proof,” was sufficiently definite to constitute valid offer, but trial court abused discretion by awarding defendant more than $60,000 in costs without considering plaintiff’s ability to pay). See also § 6.13.

The statutes regulate information-sharing and conditions in state detention facilities housing noncitizens (AB 103 and SB 54) and limit the

Lab. Code § 90.2 (violations trigger penalties of $2,000-$5,000 for a first violation and $5,000- $10,000 for further violations, recoverable by the Labor Commissioner or Attorney General through a civil action).

Gov't Code § 7285.2 (violations trigger penalties of $2,000-$5,000 for a first violation and $5,000- $10,000 for further violations, recoverable by the Labor Commissioner or Attorney General through a civil action).


59 Cal. 4th at 414.


Lab. Code § 1171.5(b).


Id. at 618.

Id.

Id.


Incalza v. Fendi North America, Inc., 479 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2007).


Incalza, 479 F.3d at 1010-11.


Id. at 416-17.


59 Cal. 4th at 414.

Id. at 419 (citing Gov't Code § 7285(a)).

Id. at 431-32.

Lab. Code §1024.6.

Lab. Code § 244(b) (employer engages in “adverse employment action” for purposes of establishing a violation of rights if employer, in retaliation for the exercise of California statutory rights, reports to a government agency the “suspected citizenship or immigration status” of either the employee, former employee, or prospective employee, or a member of that individual’s family).


Gov't Code § 7285.1 (violations trigger penalties of $2,000-$5,000 for a first violation and $5,000- $10,000 for further violations, recoverable by the Labor Commissioner or Attorney General through a civil action).

Gov't Code § 7285.2 (violations trigger penalties of $2,000-$5,000 for a first violation and $5,000- $10,000 for further violations, recoverable by the Labor Commissioner or Attorney General through a civil action).

Lab. Code § 90.2 (violations trigger penalties of $2,000-$5,000 for a first violation and $5,000- $10,000 for further violations, recoverable by the Labor Commissioner).

Lab. Code § 1019.2 (violations trigger penalties of up to $10,000, recoverable by the Labor Commissioner).

The statutes regulate information-sharing and conditions in state detention facilities housing noncitizens (AB 103 and SB 54) and limit the cooperation that California employers may provide to federal immigration enforcement agents (AB 450).

SB 785, 2018 bill adding Evid Code §§ 351.3, 351.4. The law has a January 1, 2022 sunset date. SB 785—enacted with immediate effect on May 17, 2018—responded to ICE arrests of immigrants in California courthouses, despite the March 2017 admonition of California Chief Justice, Tani Cantil-Sakauye that “[o]ur courthouses serve as a vital forum for ensuring access to justice and protecting public safety. Courthouses should not be used as bait in the necessary enforcement of our country’s immigration laws.”


Colto v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 4th 480 (2012).

Id. at 502 (calling for trial court to conduct camera inspection to see if absolute or qualified work product protection should apply).

Id. at 499-500 (remanding matter for finding whether absolute protection applies to all or part of the recorded witness interviews).


Id. at 76.

Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 592, 603-04 (2010) (“To the extent that an employee may be entitled to certain misappropriated gratuities, we see no apparent reason why other remedies, such as a common law action for conversion, may not be available under appropriate circumstances.”).


Lacagnina v. Comprehend Sys., Inc., 25 Cal. App. 5th 955, 972 (2018) (sustaining grant of nonsuit against “wage theft” claim under Penal Code section 496(c): “If every plaintiff in an employment or contract dispute could also seek treble damages and attorneys’ fees on the ground that the defendant received ‘stolen property’, such claims would become the rule rather than the exception, parties would more frequently assert claims for ‘theft’ in run-of-the-mill commercial disputes, and cases would be harder to settle. We cannot believe the Legislature contemplated, much less intended, those consequences when it enacted section 496, subdivision (c).”)
6. Employment Discrimination Legislation and Litigation

6.1 Comparing California Antidiscrimination Law with Federal Statutes

Some differences between California law and federal law on various aspects of employment discrimination law appear below. In each instance, California law is more onerous for employers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>California statutes</th>
<th>Federal statutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How many employees must an employer have to be covered?</td>
<td>Five employees, as to discrimination generally, and just one, as to harassment.¹</td>
<td>Fifteen employees, as to race, color, religion, disability, gender, national origin, and 20 employees, as to age.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are independent contractors protected?</td>
<td>Yes, as to harassment (see § 6.5).</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are unpaid interns and volunteers protected?</td>
<td>Yes, as to discrimination against unpaid interns,² and yes as to harassment of unpaid interns and volunteers (see § 6.5).</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there caps on punitive and compensatory damages?</td>
<td>No (see § 5.11).</td>
<td>Title VII has caps of $50,000-$300,000, depending on employer size; ADEA does not authorize recovery for emotional distress, and authorizes penalties only in the form of liquidated damages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can plaintiffs be awarded multipliers on attorney fee awards?</td>
<td>Yes (see § 5.12).</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there individual liability for harassment by a supervisor or co-worker?</td>
<td>Yes (see § 6.5).</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it specifically unlawful to “aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce” discrimination?</td>
<td>Yes (see § 6.5).</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the employer automatically liable for a hostile environment created by a supervisor?</td>
<td>Yes (see § 6.5).</td>
<td>Only if employer fails to show the affirmative defense described below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>California statutes</td>
<td>Federal statutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can an employer avoid liability for harassment by supervisors by</td>
<td>No. An employer merely can limit damages, if the employer proves (1) it took</td>
<td>Yes. An employer can avoid liability by showing (1) it took reasonable steps to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>showing that it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct</td>
<td>reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment, (2) plaintiff unreasonably</td>
<td>prevent and correct harassment and (2) plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>harassment and that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to follow those</td>
<td>failed to the steps provided, and (3) reasonable use of steps would have</td>
<td>herself of the steps provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>steps?</td>
<td>prevented at least some of the harm suffered (see § 6.5).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the deadline for filing an administrative complaint?</td>
<td>One year.³</td>
<td>300 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the deadline for suing after getting a right-to-sue letter?</td>
<td>One year.⁴</td>
<td>90 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is a protected disability?</td>
<td>An impairment or condition that simply limits a major life activity, including</td>
<td>An impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, considering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>one that prevents performance of any job, without regard to whether corrective</td>
<td>whether, in the case of visual impairments, corrective lenses that would mitigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>devices or measures mitigate the impact of the impairment (see § 6.3.1).</td>
<td>that limitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are only qualified individuals entitled to reasonable accommodations?</td>
<td>No.⁵</td>
<td>Yes.⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What statuses are protected?</td>
<td>Many statuses beyond those protected by federal law (see § 6.2).</td>
<td>Principally race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, disability,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>oppositional activity, and military service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must a plaintiff overtly oppose an employer’s action to engage in</td>
<td>No, a plaintiff need not opine as to unlawfulness, so long as her conduct</td>
<td>Yes, though Title VII does protect an employee who speaks out about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activity protected from retaliation?</td>
<td>permits the employer to infer that she thinks the employer’s order is</td>
<td>discrimination during an employer’s investigation into another employee’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>discriminatory (see § 6.5).</td>
<td>complaint of discrimination.⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the deadline for filing an administrative claim of discrimination</td>
<td>Yes.⁸</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>California statutes</td>
<td>Federal statutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can an employer, in responding to requests for religious accommodation, segregate the employee to reconcile employee’s religious dress or grooming practice with the employer’s personal-appearance policy?</td>
<td>No.⁹</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can an employer avoid a religious accommodation simply by showing that it would impose a cost that is more than de minimis?</td>
<td>No.¹⁰</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To prevail under a statute prohibiting discrimination “because of” a protected status, must the plaintiff prove that the status was a “but for” cause of the adverse action, or can the plaintiff prevail merely by showing that the status was a “substantial motivating factor”?</td>
<td>Proof of a “substantial motivating factor” is enough, although the employer can avoid damages and reinstatement by pleading and proving a “same decision” defense.¹¹</td>
<td>Proof of merely a motivating factor, where the employer would have taken the same action in the absence of that factor, does not warrant a finding of employer liability.¹²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.2 Additional Protected Bases

California law, like federal law, forbids employers to discriminate against employees and applicants on the usual bases (race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability, and opposition or participation activity). But California law affects smaller employers (those with five or more employees), while Title VII (15 employees) and the ADEA (20 employees) apply only to larger employers.

Moreover, California goes far beyond federal law, to protect a dizzying array of additional statuses:

- any perception by the employer that an individual has a protected characteristic, and any perception by the employer that a person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, a protected characteristic.¹³
- political affiliation.¹⁴
- marital or domestic partner status.¹⁵
- sexual orientation.¹⁶
- sex stereotype.¹⁷
- gender, gender identity, gender expression, and transgender status.¹⁸
pregnancy, childbirth, and medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth,\textsuperscript{19}

breastfeeding or medical conditions related to breastfeeding,\textsuperscript{20}

all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice, including religious dress and grooming practices,\textsuperscript{21}

medical condition (any impairment related to cancer, or a record or history of cancer, and genetic characteristics),\textsuperscript{22}

genetic information,\textsuperscript{23}

military and veteran status,\textsuperscript{24}

testing positive for HIV,\textsuperscript{25}

holding a special California driver’s license for those unable to prove lawful residence in the United States,\textsuperscript{26}

victims of certain crimes taking time off from work to testify,\textsuperscript{27}

various kinds of whistleblowing or claim-filing such as

- disclosing information in the reasonable belief that the information disclosed evidences a violation of law,\textsuperscript{28}

- reporting safety violations,\textsuperscript{29}

- claiming unpaid wages or other violations under the jurisdiction of the California Labor Commissioner,\textsuperscript{30} and

- filing workers’ compensation claims or suffering workplace injuries.\textsuperscript{31}

In more recent years, the Legislature has taken the opportunity to establish still more protected statuses:

- employees who are a family member of an employee engaging in protected activity,\textsuperscript{32}

- employees taking time off to care for children or other family members (expanding the types of situations in which employees may take time off work and expands protection to employees tending to the illness of relatives),\textsuperscript{33}

- employee requesting an accommodation of a disability or religious belief, whether or not the request was granted,\textsuperscript{34} and

- individuals employed under a special license in a nonprofit sheltered workshop or rehabilitation facility.\textsuperscript{35}
6.3 Special Rules for Disability Discrimination

6.3.1 California’s somewhat broader definition of “disability”

The California definition of disability is in some respects broader than the federal definition, even after the federal ADA Amendments Act of 2008 dramatically expanded the federal definition of disability. California authorizes many different types of health care providers to certify a disability, including as physicians, surgeons, marriage and family therapists, and acupuncturists, as well as “podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, nurse practitioners, nurse midwives, clinical social workers, and physician assistants.”

Federal definition of “disability.” Under the federal ADA, “disability” means an impairment that “substantially limits” a major life activity. The 2008 ADA amendments repudiated Supreme Court rulings that had narrowed the scope of what was considered a protected disability. Even under the new expanded federal definition, however, not all impairments are necessarily disabilities. For example, specifically excluded from the federal definition of disability are visual impairments that can be corrected by eyeglasses or contact lenses.

California definition of “disability.” Going beyond federal law, California law defines physical or mental disability very broadly, to include any condition that merely “limits” a major life activity, in the minimal sense that the condition makes achievement of the major life activity “difficult.”

The California definition of disability

- makes certain conditions—autism spectrum, bipolar disorder, blindness, cerebral palsy, clinical depression, deafness, diabetes, epilepsy, heart disease, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, multiple sclerosis, obsessive compulsive disorder, organic brain syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, schizophrenia, and seizure disorder—disabilities by definition,
- covers not only impairments, but conditions,
- considers the limitation on a major life activity without regard to any mitigating measures such as medications, prosthetics, assistive technology, or reasonable accommodations,
- considers “major life activity” to include sleeping, thinking, and interacting with others,
- considers “major life activity” to include any job, with the result that an individual with a condition preventing the performance of a particular job has a disability even if that individual can perform hundreds of thousands of other jobs.

The Court of Appeal has held that severe obesity can be a disability under California law if it has a physiological cause, and a defendant challenging the disability status of a plaintiff’s obesity condition must present scientific or expert evidence that the obesity lacked a physiological cause.

California also protects an employee’s association with persons who have disabilities. For example, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff could sue for association-based disability and wrongful termination when he was fired after informing his employer he would be donating a kidney to his sister, who had a disability (kidney failure).
6.3.2 Disability-related inquiries

California law, like federal law, prohibits pre-employment disability-related inquiries and medical testing. Accordingly, California employers cannot ask applicants about any physical disability, mental disability, or medical condition, or about the severity of a physical disability, mental disability, or medical condition. Nor can California employers seek information to confirm the nature of a medical condition. Notwithstanding these prohibitions, California employers may ask about the ability of applicants to perform job-related functions, may respond to applicant requests for reasonable accommodation, and may require a form of medical employment entrance medical examination.

Ban on “psychological” examination. While federal law forbids only all medical examinations that precede a job offer, California explicitly forbids pre-employment medical examinations and psychological examinations, subject to the exemptions below.

Ban on broad-ranging employment entrance examination. California law, like federal law, generally permits employers to require an “employment entrance examination” of all job applicants seeking to enter the same job classification, so long as the exam occurs after the employment offer and before employment starts. But while federal law permits any medical inquiry in connection with the employment entrance examination, California requires that all aspects of the examination itself be “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” Both federal and California law, meanwhile, permit examinations that are “job related” and “consistent with business necessity.”

Limits on inquiries conducted pre-offer and post-hire. Federal law permits employers to inquire as to a job applicant’s disability before making an offer if the inquiry is “job-related” and “consistent with business necessity.” California permits employers to “inquire into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions,” but does not allow them to conduct examinations. Where an employee has started work, both federal and California law permit disability inquiries and examinations that are “job-related and consistent with business necessity.”

Note, though, that the FEHC, in a 2010 decision, opined that an employer may not require employees requesting accommodations to produce complete medical records to substantiate limitations stemming from a disability, as those records are likely to contain information that is unrelated to the disability and need for accommodation, and therefore is not job-related nor required by business necessity.

6.3.3 Does the employer or the employee have the burden of proof as to qualifications?

Under federal law, a plaintiff suing for disability discrimination must prove that he or she is a qualified individual. The language of the California statute arguably suggests something different: it broadly prohibits discrimination because of a physical or mental disability and then exempts those situations “where the employee, because of his or her physical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her essential duties even with reasonable accommodations, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger his or her health or safety or the health or safety of others even with reasonable accommodations.” One Court of Appeal decision has read this statutory language to mean that the plaintiff’s lack of qualifications is an affirmative defense, to be proved by the defendant employer. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s ability to perform essential duties would be a matter for the
defendant to disprove as part of an affirmative defense rather than a matter for the plaintiff to prove in the plaintiff’s case in chief.\(^65\)

In 2007, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision.\(^66\) Citing statutory language, legislative intent, and well-settled law, the high court concluded that the FEHA, like the ADA, requires the plaintiff to prove an ability to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation. While the Supreme Court thus kept California within the national fold, it did so only barely, by a 4–3 vote. The three dissenting justices would have deferred to the administrative agency charged with interpreting the FEHA, which for many years had treated the inability to perform as an affirmative defense, rather than as part of the plaintiff’s case in chief.\(^67\)

### 6.3.4 Drug testing

California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996 legalized, for purposes of California law, the medical use of marijuana pursuant to a physician’s prescription.\(^68\) The Act does not address whether California employers must accommodate an applicant or employee whose physician has prescribed marijuana to treat a potentially disabling condition such as cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, or migraine.\(^69\) The California Legislature provided a partial answer to this question in 2003, by providing that the Compassionate Use Act does not “require any accommodation of any medical use of marijuana on the property or premises of any place of employment or during the hours of employment.”\(^70\)

This language arguably implies that an employer must accommodate an individual’s use of medical marijuana beyond working hours and off the employer’s premises. Yet, in good news to employers, the California Supreme Court in 2008 held, 5-2, that denial of employment because of an individual’s off-duty, off-premises use of marijuana did not violate the FEHA or any public policy established by California’s constitutional right to privacy.\(^71\) The plaintiff, an engineer, flunked a drug test because he tested positive for marijuana. He provided a physician’s note recommending that he use marijuana to help alleviate his chronic back pain. When he nonetheless was fired for flunking the drug test, he sued the employer for discriminating against him because of his disability and for failing to reasonably accommodate his disability by permitting him to use marijuana in accordance with the Compassionate Use Act. The Supreme Court rejected these claims, holding that the Act merely decriminalizes medicinal marijuana use under California state law and simply does not speak to employment law.

The two dissenting justices accused the majority of “conspicuously lacking … compassion” and putting Californians with marijuana-alleviated symptoms to a “cruel choice” between a medically prescribed treatment and a job.\(^72\) The dissenters argued that the FEHA itself required accommodation where, as here, the employer’s objection was to off-duty conduct that did not affect the employee’s performance of essential job functions. The dissenters conceded, however, that the Compassionate Use Act could not establish a truly fundamental public policy, given the contrary federal law. Indeed, as a later Court of Appeal decision has stated, “Despite this broadly worded statement of intent, the CUA’s approach to the issue of medical marijuana was a relatively modest one: It provided immunity from prosecution for certain conduct that would otherwise be criminal.”\(^73\)

DFEH disability regulations make clear that California employers need not accommodate the use of medical marijuana in the workplace and can enforce their drug use policies when employees test positive for marijuana.\(^74\) Any disciplinary focus must be on the violation of policy, however, and not on any underlying disability that the marijuana use may implicate.
6.3.5 The interactive process and reasonable accommodation

The interactive process. In America generally, employers should follow an interactive process to ensure that they meet their duty to provide reasonable accommodation to an employee with a known disability who needs an accommodation to perform essential functions of a job. Failure to engage in that process is a problem if there was an available reasonable accommodation that the employer would have considered had the process been followed.

In California it’s different. Here employers, in certain circumstances, must follow the interactive process even if it turns out that no reasonable accommodation existed, and must initiate the interactive process when the employer learns about the employee’s disability and the potential need for accommodation—whether from a direct source, from observation, or from a third party. Indeed, California makes it unlawful in itself for an employer to fail to engage in a “timely, good faith, interactive process … to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known … disability.” Thus, the Court of Appeal has upheld a jury verdict against an employer for failing to engage in the interactive process, even though the jury also found that there had been no failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. Acknowledging that federal law (the ADA) would provide no remedy for failing to consider accommodations when in fact no reasonable accommodation was available, the Court of Appeal emphasized that California is different: “FEHA allows an independent cause of action for employees whose employers fail to engage in the interactive process.”

Reasonable accommodation. The California duty to accommodate can require an employer, when aware that a disabled employee can no longer perform the regular job, to explore several options. First, employers must canvass vacant positions to see if there is one to offer to the employee. Second, employers must determine whether a leave of absence would be a reasonable accommodation. There is no specific time limit for how long a leave must be. Applicable regulations state that employees must show that the leave likely would have been effective in allowing the employee to return to work at the end of the leave, with or without further accommodations. FEHA’s reasonable-accommodation requirements may require an employer to provide leave for a pregnancy-disabled employee for a period beyond the four-month maximum leave required under the PDLL. As of 2016, FEHA was amended to expressly prohibit retaliation against a person for requesting accommodation, regardless of whether the request is granted.

The Court of Appeal has gone out of its way to suggest that the FEHA might create a duty “to provide reasonable accommodations to an applicant or employee who is associated with a disabled person.” This decision drew a strong dissent, pointing out that the majority was substantially departing from federal law on the issue of reasonable accommodations in the context of associational disability. Federal courts hold that the ADA does not obligate employers to accommodate employees associated with a disabled person.

California’s disability discrimination regulations specify certain possible reasonable accommodations, such as telecommuting, reserved parking spaces, and acquiring or modifying furniture. Employers may also need to allow “assistive animals” in the workplace as a reasonable accommodation for disabled individuals with visual or hearing impairments. An assistive animal may also constitute a reasonable accommodation to provide emotional, cognitive, or other similar support to a person with a disability. California regulations do acknowledge, however, that the duty to accommodate does not require an employer to make a light-duty position permanent or to lower the employer’s quality standards.
Under federal law, compensatory and punitive damages are not awarded for a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation if the employer demonstrates it acted in good faith, in consultation with the disabled individual seeking an accommodation, to identify and offer a reasonable accommodation that would provide an equally effective opportunity and not cause an undue hardship for the business.\textsuperscript{88} The FEHA seems to have no such savings provision for employers that have acted in good faith.

Highlighting the significance of this difference, the Court of Appeal has held that a reasonable-accommodation plaintiff, seeking damages for lost wages and emotional distress, need not prove an employer was motivated by ill will or animosity.\textsuperscript{89} The plaintiff was a deputy sheriff who, after taking a leave for his injured knee, was denied full reinstatement for many months because the employer mistakenly thought he could not safely perform his essential job functions. In his lawsuit for damages resulting from the delay in reinstatement, the trial court instructed the jury that he needed to prove that the employer had discriminated against him, and the jury ruled against him for failing to make that proof.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the plaintiff deserved a retrial because the jury instruction was erroneous. The Court of Appeal explained that the traditional notions of proving discrimination do not apply in reasonable accommodation cases, where there necessarily is direct evidence of the employer’s motivation. The Court of Appeal concluded that an employer necessarily treats an employee differently “because of” a disability whenever the disability is a substantial motivating factor in the employer’s decision to subject the employee to an adverse employment action. The Court of Appeal held that the employer was liable, as a matter of law, for a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, and remanded for a new trial as to damages.

6.4 Special Rules for Age Discrimination

6.4.1 Salary might not be an age-neutral criterion

In America generally, an employer reducing its workforce to cut costs may select employees for dismissal on the basis of their high salary, even though a higher salary correlates with experience, which in turn correlates with age. California is different. The FEHA declares that “the use of salary as the basis for differentiating between employees when terminating employment may be found to constitute age discrimination if use of that criterion adversely impacts older workers as a group.”\textsuperscript{90}

6.4.2 Adverse impact theory, with no RFOA defense

Until 2005 there was debate over whether federal ADEA claimants could recover on a theory that an employer policy had an adverse impact on individuals over age 40. The U.S. Supreme Court then validated that theory of liability in age cases (just as it had in Title VII cases alleging discrimination because of race, color, religion, and sex). California, meanwhile, previously had declared that “the disparate impact theory of proof may be used in claims of age discrimination.”\textsuperscript{91}

The main defense to a claim of adverse impact is that the policy in question is a business necessity, which is very difficult to prove. Federal law eases that burden on employers somewhat by recognizing that employers can defend an ADEA adverse-impact claim by showing that the challenged policy was based on reasonable factors other than age (“RFOA”).\textsuperscript{92}
California is different. While the ADEA provides for an RFOA defense, the FEHA does not.

### 6.4.3 Publishing ages of entertainment industry employees

Coming to the aid of aging actors—at the behest of the SAG-AFTRA actors’ guild—California legislation has aimed to “ensure that information obtained on an Internet Web site regarding an individual’s age will not be used in furtherance of employment or age discrimination.” The statute requires commercial online entertainment employment service providers to honor subscribers’ requests not to publish age information. The statute suffered an early setback, when, in a constitutional challenge, a federal district court held that the statute infringed upon the website operator’s First Amendment right of free speech.

### 6.5 Special Rules for Discriminatory Workplace Harassment

Federal law on an employer’s duty to prevent and correct harassment consists principally of Title VII’s simple ban on sex discrimination, as interpreted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, by various EEOC policy guidances, and by judicial decisions. While the #MeToo movement has not yet affected federal employment law, it did influence the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which added Internal Revenue Code section 162(q), regarding payments related to sexual harassment and sexual abuse: “No deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for (1) any settlement or payment related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse if such settlement or payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement, or (2) attorney’s fees related to such a settlement or payment.”

While federal law on harassment is relatively sparse, California law is abundant and complex. Generally, application of the FEHA follows Title VII, because the two statutes share the same basic purpose. But California’s statutory and regulatory language specifies many employer obligations that transcend federal law.

#### 6.5.1 Special aspects of California harassment law

California law on workplace harassment exceeds the scope of federal law in many important respects. California harassment law, unlike federal law,

- governs employers of one or more (not 15) employees,
- protects from harassment additional statuses (e.g., marital status and sexual orientation),
- protects from harassment not only employees and applicants but also many kinds of non-employees—such as independent contractors, unpaid interns, and volunteers,
- imposes personal liability on individual perpetrators, including both supervisors and co-workers,
- makes employers automatically liable for harassment by a supervisor, with no recourse to an affirmative defense, except for a defense that affects the amount of damages only,
- has a definition of “supervisor” that is broader than the definition followed under Title VII,
- forbids “any person” to “aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce” harassment.
makes employers liable for perpetrating or permitting sexual favoritism that is “sufficiently widespread” to convey the “message” that management views women as “sexual playthings” or that the way to get ahead is to sleep with the boss, regardless of whether the sexual conduct was unwelcome and regardless of whether the plaintiff herself ever received a sexual advance, 105

requires all employers “to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent harassment from occurring,” 106

requires all employers to distribute to all employees a detailed fact sheet on sexual harassment, 107

requires all employers to write and distribute anti-harassment policies with prescribed content, 108 and

requires larger employers to train supervisors (and rank-and-file employees) on the prevention of sexual harassment. 109

The FEHA does not define harassment, but administrative regulations cite examples of harassment, such as “verbal, physical, and visual harassment, as well as unwanted sexual advances.” 110

6.5.2 Difficulties in distinguishing harassment from management activity

Because individuals can be sued for harassment, and because employers can be liable for supervisory harassment even if the employer was unaware of the harassment and could not have prevented it, California plaintiffs will try to characterize management actions as “harassment” whenever they can. Thus it was in Roby v. McKesson Corp., 111 where a FEHA plaintiff suffering from panic attacks and suing for disability harassment claimed that her supervisor “harass[ed]” her by (1) giving her bad job assignments, (2) ignoring her at staff meetings, (3) unfairly reprimanding her, (4) leaving her off a personal gift list, (5) making her document all telephone calls, and (6) counseling her about her body odor. The jury awarded $1 million in damages for “harassment.” The Court of Appeal reversed this part of the judgment, explaining that “most of the alleged harassment here was conduct that fell within the scope of [the supervisor’s] business and management duties. … While these acts might, if motivated by bias, be the basis for a finding of employer discrimination, they cannot be deemed ‘harassment’ within the meaning of the FEHA.” 112

The California Supreme Court took review of the case, however, and reinstated the harassment verdict, on a rationale that official employment actions can support a claim of unlawful harassment. 113 In doing so, the Supreme Court undermined the effect of its earlier decision, in Reno v. Baird, 114 that individuals are not personally liable for making official employment decisions on behalf of the employer.

6.5.3 Duty to prevent and correct harassment, including mandatory training

Statutory language establishing a general duty to prevent. California employers must “take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent ... harassment from occurring,” 115 and must take “immediate and appropriate corrective action” when harassment occurs. 116

Judicial language on the employer duty to investigate. The Court of Appeal has stated, “FEHA goes even further than the federal statute by requiring that supervisors ‘take immediate and appropriate corrective action’
when harassment is brought to their attention.”117 The Court of Appeal quoted this legislative note to Government Code Section 12940 (not part of the Code but part of its legislative history.)

It is the existing policy of the State of California, as declared by the Legislature, that procedures be established by which allegations of prohibited harassment and discrimination may be filed, timely and efficiently investigated, and fairly adjudicated, and that agencies and employers be required to establish affirmative programs which include prompt and remedial internal procedures and monitoring so that worksites will be maintained free from prohibited harassment and discrimination by their agents, administrators, and supervisors as well as by their nonsupervisors and clientele.118

The Court of Appeal thus held that a supervisor could reasonably believe that he was engaging in a statutorily required (and thus protected) activity when he protested harassing conduct, even though the conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable.119

DFEH fact sheet. California employers must give each employee an official DFEH fact sheet or equivalent information to inform the employee regarding:

- the illegality of sexual harassment,
- the definition of unlawful sexual harassment,
- examples of sexual harassment,
- the employer’s internal complaint process,
- the legal remedies available through government agencies,
- directions on how to contact the agencies, and
- the protection against retaliation for opposing harassment or filing a complaint or participating in an investigation or proceeding.120

Training. In 2018 California expanded the scope of required sexual harassment training: employers of five or more employees must provide sexual-harassment-prevention training to all workers by January 1, 2020.121 Employers must provide sexual harassment training and education to each supervisory employee (and to all rank-and-file employees) once every two years, and must train new supervisors within six months of their assuming their positions.122 The training for supervisors—two hours of “classroom or other effective interactive training” conducted by trainers or educators with knowledge and expertise in the prevention of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation—must include:

- information and practical guidance regarding federal and California law on
- the prohibition against sexual harassment,
- the prevention of sexual harassment,
• the correction of sexual harassment in the workplace,
• the remedies available to victims of sexual harassment; and
• practical examples “aimed at instructing supervisors” in the prevention of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, including harassment based on gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orientation.¹²³

Training for non-supervisory employees—including temporary and seasonal employees—must last at least one hour and contain components on preventing abusive conduct and harassment based on gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orientation.¹²⁴ As of January 2020, seasonal and temporary employees (or any employee hired to work for less than six months) must be trained within 30 calendar days of hire or within the first 100 hours worked, whichever occurs first.¹²⁵ Temporary workers employed by a temporary agency must be trained by the temporary agency.¹²⁶

Although no penalty attaches to an employer’s failure to conduct this mandatory training, that failure can be cited to argue that the employer has breached its statutory duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent workplace harassment. If the DFEH substantiates a complaint against an employer for non-compliance, then the DFEH will work with the employer to secure compliance.¹²⁷ Moreover, in investigating FEHA administrative complaints of discrimination, the DFEH routinely requires proof that a respondent employer has completed the mandated training.

The FEHC has issued Sexual Harassment Training and Education Regulations¹²⁸ that interpret the California training statute as follows.

• Not only full-time employees but part-time and temporary employees and independent contractors count toward the 50-employee threshold.¹²⁹
• Employers are covered if they do any business in California, even though most or nearly all employees work outside California.¹³⁰
• As to supervisory training, only supervisors located in California need be trained.¹³¹
• The required interactive training may be in the form of classroom training, webinar training, or other e-learning, so long as the program will take the participant no less than two hours to complete.¹³² Electronic training meets the requirement of interactivity only if questions from participants are answered within two business days.¹³³
• As to supervisory training, the instruction must include questions and skill-building activities to assess learning, and “numerous hypothetical scenarios about harassment, each with one or more discussion questions so that supervisors remain engaged in the training.”¹³⁴

In 2018 California required that hotel and motel employers (excluding bed and breakfast inns) provide—by January 1, 2020, and once every two years thereafter—at least 20 minutes of interactive human trafficking awareness training to employees likely to interact with human trafficking victims.¹³⁵

In 2018 California also authorized—but did not require—the provision of “bystander intervention training.”¹³⁶
Anti-bullying training. The required training must address “abusive conduct,” defined broadly to include malicious conduct that a reasonable person would find “hostile, offensive, and unrelated to an employer’s legitimate business interests.” Examples include “repeated infliction of verbal abuse, such as the use of derogatory remarks, insults, and epithets, conduct that a reasonable person would find “threatening, intimidating, or humiliating,” and the “gratuitous sabotage or undermining of a person’s work performance.”

Property service worker training. By legislation effective July 2018, California companies that contract to provide janitorial services and thereby retain janitors as either employees or independent contractors must establish biennial sexual violence and harassment prevention training for those workers.

Talent agency training. Talent agencies must provide education on sexual harassment prevention, retaliation, and reporting resources to adult artists, to parents or legal guardians of minors aged 14-17, and to age-eligible minors, within 90 days of retention.

Actions for failure to prevent discrimination or harassment. A California employee has no remedy if an employer fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring, unless actionable harassment or discrimination actually occurred. But the employer risks prosecution by the DFEH for a violation of 12940(k), even in the absence of any actionable harassment or retaliation.

Allegations of “inadequate” investigations. Plaintiffs suing California employers have, with judicial blessing, pointed to alleged inadequacies in employer investigations as proof that a resulting employment decision was discriminatory. The Court of Appeal has indicated that a plaintiff’s expert can testify on whether an employer in a given case has materially deviated from its own personnel standards and practices with respect to an investigation.

6.5.4 Personal liability for perpetrators

Supervisors harassing. In America generally, workplace harassment leads to statutory liability for the employer, not to personal liability for the individual perpetrator, although he may be subject to liability under common law torts such as battery, false imprisonment, and infliction of emotional distress. California is different.

The FEHA imposes personal liability on individual supervisors who perpetrate harassment.

Co-workers harassing. A few states do, like California, make harassing supervisors personally liable under the state antidiscrimination statute. And California goes still further. The FEHA makes even a non-supervisory co-worker personally liable for acts of harassment.

6.5.5 Employer liability for supervisor’s harassment

Vicarious employer liability. Where a hostile environment is created by a “supervisor” (someone with substantial independent authority over a subordinate’s employment status), California imposes automatic liability on the employer (i.e., liability without regard to notice or fault). Federal law gives employers an affirmative defense (the “Ellerth/Faragher” defense) in this kind of case, permitting the employer to avoid liability if (1) it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of
those steps.\textsuperscript{147} California is different. The California Supreme Court has refused to recognize the \textit{Ellerth/Faragher} defense in a harassment case brought under the \textit{FEHA}.\textsuperscript{148}

In place of the federal \textit{Ellerth/Faragher} defense, California recognizes a limited avoidable-consequences defense, which permits employers to reduce damages (but not avoid liability) if the employer proves that (1) it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment, (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use measures the employer provided, and (3) the plaintiff’s reasonable use of those measure would have prevented some or all of the harm.\textsuperscript{149}

**Broad definition of “supervisor.”** The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the analogous federal law (Title VII) to call for a narrow definition of “supervisor,” encompassing only those management-level employees who “are empowered” to take “tangible employment actions” against lower-level employees.\textsuperscript{150} The California statutory language, by contrast, defines “supervisor” broadly, to include any employee with the authority to discipline or direct other employees.\textsuperscript{151}

### 6.5.6 Protection of independent contractors

In America generally, employment discrimination laws protect employees and applicants (and, in the case of retaliation, former employees). Non-employees thus generally lack the protection of employment discrimination statutes. California is different. In California an independent contractor, as much as an employee, is protected from discriminatory workplace harassment.\textsuperscript{152}

### 6.5.7 Sexual assault statute

California has created a separate statutory claim for sexual battery.\textsuperscript{153} There are also separate statutory claims for discriminatory acts of violence and intimidation.\textsuperscript{154}

### 6.5.8 Stalking

California has created a separate statutory claim for stalking.\textsuperscript{155}

### 6.5.9 Sexual harassment in business, service, and professional relationships

California has created a special prohibition on sexual harassment in these non-employment relationships.\textsuperscript{156} Civil Code section 51.9 (the Unruh Act) imposes liability for sexual harassment in a non-employment context involving business, service, and professional relationships (e.g., physician, attorney, real estate agent, loan officer, financial planner, landlord, teacher). Originally, Section 51.9 imposed liability when the plaintiff and the defendant had a business, service, or professional relationship and (1) the defendant made sexual advances, solicitations, sexual requests, demands for sexual compliance, or engaged in other verbal, visual, or physical conduct that was unwelcome and pervasive or severe and based on gender, (2) the plaintiff could not easily terminate the relationship, and (3) the plaintiff suffered resulting economic loss or disadvantage or personal injury.

Legislation effective in 2019 has removed the requirement that the plaintiff could not “easily terminate the relationship” and has broadened the list of professional relationships to include “elected official,” “lobbyist,” and “director or producer.” The new law also makes the DFEH responsible for enforcing sexual harassment claims.
under Section 51.9 and makes it unlawful to deny—or to aid, incite, or conspire in the denial of—a person’s rights related to sexual harassment claims.

### 6.5.10 Special privacy protections for plaintiffs

California courts have prevented defendants in harassment litigation from inquiring into a plaintiff’s victimization by prior sexual assaults, marital difficulties, and sexual conduct with persons other than those for whose behavior the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable.

### 6.5.11 Sexual favoritism

For purposes of federal law, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that the “critical issue” in a sexual harassment case is “whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed,” and that harassment laws are not intended to create a “civility code.” Federal law thus contemplates actionable sexual harassment as involving unwelcome conduct directed at the victim on the basis of the victim’s gender. Under this law, mere objections to unwelcome conduct involving others would not occasion a sexual harassment suit. But in California it’s different.

In *Miller v. Department of Corrections,* the California Supreme Court recognized a claim for sexual harassment even though the plaintiffs themselves had never experienced disparate treatment on the basis of their gender. *Miller* thus permitted two women to sue under the FEHA on the basis that their boss had created a sexually hostile work environment for them by giving unwarranted favoritism to his female lovers. Neither plaintiff claimed that she had been treated worse than men in the workplace or that she had been treated badly because she was a woman. Neither woman received an unwelcome sexual advance and no man had directed any hostile conduct at her. Rather, the women were “sexually harassed” only in the sense that each was offended by seeing other women obtain preferential treatment through sexual cooperation with the boss. Nonetheless, *Miller* held that employer liability could exist on the theory that sexual favoritism within a workplace can be “sufficiently widespread” to convey the “message” that management views women as “sexual playthings” or that the way to get ahead is to sleep with the boss.

*Miller* erroneously stated that it was following federal legal authority in the form of a 1990 EEOC policy guidance. Actually, the guidance is not federal authority but rather is the EEOC’s litigation position, adopted without the benefit of the notice-and-comment process required by administrative rule-making. *Miller* nonetheless quoted, with evident approval, the EEOC’s argument for greater employer liability: “If favoritism based upon the granting of sexual favors is widespread in a workplace, both male and female colleagues who do not welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work environment…regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is directed at them and regardless of whether those who were granted favorable treatment willingly bestowed the sexual favors. In these circumstances, a message is implicitly conveyed that the managers view women as ‘sexual playthings,’ thereby creating an atmosphere that is demeaning to women.” *Miller* thus reasoned “that even in the absence of coercive behavior, certain conduct creates a work atmosphere so demeaning to women that it constitutes an actionable hostile work environment.”

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6.5.12 Sexual desire not necessary to prove

The California Legislature has amended the FEHA to clarify that sexual harassment is prohibited without regard to the harasser’s sexual desire. The amendment overturned an appellate court decision that “created confusion” by holding that a plaintiff in a same-sex harassment case must prove that the harasser harbored a sexual desire for him. Thus, severe or pervasive sexually offensive conduct can create a hostile work environment, so long as the conduct is based on the victim’s gender, regardless of whether the harasser had any sexual interest in the victim.

6.5.13 #MeToo prohibitions on confidentiality clauses

A Code of Civil Procedure section effective in 2019 makes unenforceable any settlement agreement provision that prevents the disclosure of “factual information related to a claim” filed in court or in an administrative action and regarding sexual harassment or retaliation for reporting harassment or discrimination. The section does not prohibit confidentiality as to the amount paid in settlement or the identity of the claimant—if the claimant so requests and if no party is a government agency or official.

A Civil Code provision effective in 2019 makes unenforceable any contractual provision that waives a party’s right to testify in a legal proceeding (if required or requested by court order, subpoena or administrative or legislative request) regarding criminal conduct or sexual harassment on the part of the other contracting party, or the other party’s agents or employees.

A FEHA section effective in 2019 prohibits employers from requiring an employee to release any FEHA claim or right in exchange for a raise or bonus or as a condition of employment or continued employment. This prohibition does not apply to any negotiated agreement to settle a FEHA claim filed in a legal proceeding or through the employer’s internal complaint process.

6.5.14 Expanding liability exposure for harassment

The Legislation, in 2018, created a remarkable series of nudges to judges to favor plaintiffs in harassment cases. The Legislature added a section to FEHA to declare that

- the harassment laws aim to provide all Californians with equal opportunity to succeed in the workplace, and liability for harassment occurs when “the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its victim, so as to dispute the victim’s emotional tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim’s ability to perform the job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim’s personal sense of well-being”;

- plaintiffs need not show that “tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment,” so long as a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find that the harassment so altered working conditions as to “make it more difficult to do the job,” and the Legislature approves the concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg in Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993);

- a single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue of hostile work environment if the conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Brooks v. City of San Mateo,
229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000) shall not be used to determine what conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive under the FEHA;¹⁷⁶

- hostile work environments depend on the totality of circumstances and so—consistent with Reid v. Google, Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 512 (2000) (rejecting “stray remarks” doctrine)—discriminatory remarks may be relevant “even if not made directly in the context of an employment decision or uttered by a nondecisionmaker”;

- liability for harassment should not vary by the type of workplace, notwithstanding any “language, reasoning, or holding to the contrary” in Kelley v. Conco Companies, 196 Cal. App. 4th 191 (2011), and courts should consider the nature of the workplace only when “engaging in or witnessing prurient conduct and commentary is integral to the performance of the job duties”; and

- harassment cases “are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment” and the Legislature approves the decision in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 243 (2009) (an anti-summary judgment screed) and its observation that hostile working environment cases involve issues “not determinable on paper.”

6.6 Special Rules Relating to National Origin

FEHC regulations effective in 2018 clarify prohibitions against discrimination and harassment based on national origin.¹⁷⁷ The regulations define national origin broadly, including not just the national origin of an individual but also the national origin the individual’s spouse or of those with whom the individual associates, as well as a person’s perceived national origin. The expansive definition also includes an individual’s or ancestor’s (actual or perceived) physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics associated with a national origin group, marriage to or association with person of a national origin group, tribal affiliation, membership in or association with an organization identified with or seeking to promote the interest of a national origin group, and name associated with a national origin group.¹⁷⁸ Lest anyone doubt the scope of this definition, the regulations emphasize that “national origin groups include, but are not limited to, ethnic groups, geographic places of origin, and countries that are not presently in existence.”¹⁷⁹

The regulations prohibit employers from having policies that limit or prohibit the use of any language in the workplace—including an English-only rule—unless certain criteria are met.¹⁸⁰ The regulations also prohibit discrimination based on English proficiency and accents,¹⁸¹ prohibit employers from inquiring into the immigration status of employees or applicants unless the inquiry is necessary to comply with federal law,¹⁸² prohibit height and weight requirements,¹⁸³ and prohibit segregation or recruitment applicants based on national origin.¹⁸⁴

6.6.1 English-only work rules

In America generally, employers may require that employees speak only English in the workplace, unless that requirement discriminates on the basis of national origin by having an unjustified adverse impact. California is different. The FEHA, without requiring any proof of an adverse impact, makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to adopt or enforce a policy that prohibits the use of any language in the workplace unless the employer notifies employees of the policy to employees and justifies it by showing a “business necessity.”
“Business necessity” exists only if the policy serves an “overriding legitimate business purpose” and is needed for the safe and efficient operation of the business, and there is no available alternative.185

FEHC regulations on national origin discrimination declare it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to adopt a policy that creates an “English only” rule, unless (1) the rule is job-related and consistent with “business necessity,” (2) the rule is narrowly tailored, and (3) employees get effective notice of when and where the rule applies and what consequences result from a violation. The regulations would also provide that an English-only policy would not be valid simply because it promotes business convenience or reflects customer preference. Further, the regulations would presume that English-only rules violate the FEHA unless the employer can prove “business necessity.”186

FEHC regulations permit language restriction policies—including English-only policies—only under the very narrow circumstances already set forth in the FEHA: the language restriction must justified by “business necessity,” the language restriction must be narrowly tailored, and the employer must have told employees about how and when the language restriction applies and what happens to employees who violate it. The regulations define “business necessity” narrowly as a situation where the restriction is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business, the restriction effectively fulfills the business purpose it is supposed to serve, and there is no alternative practice to the restriction that would accomplish the business purpose equally well with a lesser discriminatory impact. The regulations state that a language restriction is not justified simply because the restriction promotes business convenience or reflects customer or co-worker preference. In any event, English-only restrictions cannot apply to non-work time (such as breaks, lunch, unpaid employer-sponsored events).

Discrimination against an employee’s accent may also be national origin discrimination, unless the accent interferes materially with the ability to perform the job in question. Requiring English proficiency may also be discriminatory, absent “business necessity.” The regulations allow employers to ask applicants or employees about their ability to speak, read, write, or understand any language (including non-English languages), but inquiries must be justified by a business necessity.187

The new regulations also clarify that the FEHA forbids height and weight requirements that create a disparate impact on the basis of national origin, unless, of course, the requirements are job-related and advance a business necessity.188 Even then, the challenged requirement could be unlawful if the requirement’s purpose could be more effectively achieved with less discriminatory measures. It is also unlawful for employers to seek, request, or refer applicants or employees based on national origin to assigned positions, facilities, or geographical areas of employment based on national origin, unless the employers have a “permissible defense” such as job relatedness or a bona fide occupational qualification.189

The regulations apply to undocumented applicants and employees just as they would with any other applicant. Any inquiry into an applicant or employee’s immigration status is unlawful unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the inquiry was needed to comply with federal immigration law.190 The use of derogatory language or slurs based on national origin, and threatening to contact the immigration authorities about an individual’s immigration status, also remain unlawful.191
6.6.2 Protections for specially licensed individuals

The prohibition against discrimination because of “national origin” also prohibits discrimination against an individual for possessing a special California driver’s license who can prove identity and residency and other qualifications for a driver’s license but who “is unable to submit satisfactory proof that the applicant’s presence in the United States is authorized under federal law.” This provision allows those who are not legally in the country to obtain a driver’s license if they can provide valid proof of identity and California residency.

And, in the same vein, employers must not require applicants or employees to present a driver’s license, unless the law requires the license or permits the employer’s requirement. Further, failing to apply the requirement uniformly or for a legitimate business purpose may amount to discrimination because of national origin.

But any action an employer takes to comply with any federal requirement or prohibition would not be a violation. And the U.S. Constitution preempts state laws that directly conflict with federal law, so that it could be difficult to predict whether a court would find a violation where an employer has discriminated against a special licensed immigrant who is not authorized to work in the United States.

6.6.3 Other protections for inadequately documented workers

California, seeking to protect immigrants, is a national leader in resisting federal immigration agencies, and in actively discouraging employers from cooperating with those agencies. California in this context has not limited itself to traditional concepts of national origin discrimination. California has enacted many other immigrant-protection laws, discussed elsewhere. (See § 5.17.)

6.7 Equal Pay

For many years, the Labor Code forbade California employers to pay an unequal wage for equal work on the basis of sex and made violating employers liable for double damages to employees who suffered that form of pay discrimination, and also subject to criminal liability.

In 2015 the Legislature went further, making employer obligations substantially more onerous and giving California one of the nation’s more aggressive equal pay laws.

Differences from federal law. Federal law addresses gender-based pay discrimination. Title VII forbids pay discrimination because of any protected status, and the federal Equal Pay Act gives women a right to equal pay for equal work. California’s peculiar version of the Equal Pay Act has expanded employer obligations well beyond federal law as to any pay differentials observed among employees of different genders, races, and ethnicities:

- Employees can be compared even if they do not work at the same establishment. This means that the pay of an employee may be compared to the pay of other employees who work hundreds of miles apart.

- Employees can be compared even if they do not hold the “same” or “substantially equal” jobs. Plaintiffs need only show that the employees are engaged in “substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions.”
Employers, in defending pay differentials, can cite only certain factors and must apply them reasonably, and the factors, when viewed together, must explain the entire pay differential.

California thus has dramatically lowered the bar for equal pay suits, permitting plaintiffs to compare themselves with persons working at any location for the same employer, and in any similar—and not necessarily the same—job. While Title VII does not require a showing of “equal work” within the same establishment (as the federal Equal Pay Act does), Title VII does require a showing of discriminatory intent or a specific practice or policy with a discriminatory impact—a showing that California does not require.

California requires equal pay defendants to affirmatively demonstrate that any pay differences are based on one or more of a limited number of factors. The permitted reasons for differences in pay are

- a seniority system,
- a merit system,
- a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, and
- a bona fide factor other than sex such as education, experience, and training. Employers may rely on such a factor only if the employer proves the factor is not based on or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation, is job related with respect to the position in question, and is consistent with a “business necessity” (i.e., the factor relied upon effectively fulfills the business purpose it is supposed to serve). Moreover, this defense will not apply if the plaintiff shows that an alternative business practice would serve the same business purpose without producing the pay differential.

California, unlike federal law, has removed statutory exemptions that applied where work was performed “at different geographic locations” and “on different shifts or at different times of day.” Nonetheless, employers may still justify pay differences based on geographic location, shift, or hours differentials, as a bona fide factor other than sex.

Expansion beyond gender. In 2016, the Legislature doubled down on the Equal Pay Act, extending California’s pay-equity provisions beyond gender differentials to differentials among employees of different races or ethnicities.

Ban on use of prior salary as sole basis to defend pay disparity. The 2015 amendment provided that employers must not use prior salary as the “sole” basis to justify a pay disparity. In 2018 the Legislature tightened this restriction, providing that prior salary cannot be used to justify any disparity in compensation. While employers still may cite rightfully obtained prior salary information, employers cannot rely on differences in prior pay to justify ongoing pay differences between substantially equal employees.

Anti-secrecy provision. The Equal Pay Act, repeating law also found elsewhere, forbids employers to prohibit employees from disclosing or discussing their own wages or the wages of others, or from aiding or encouraging other employees to exercise their rights under the law. These anti-pay secrecy requirements echo similar prohibitions emanating from the National Labor Relations Act, the California Labor Code, and an Executive Order that applies to federal contractors.
Methods of enforcement. The DLSE can enforce the Equal Pay Act, and employees can sue directly in court—within two years from the date of the violation (or three if the violation was “willful”)—to recover the balance of wages, interest, liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. Employees also may file complaints with the DLSE alleging employer violations of the prohibitions on discrimination, retaliation, and restricting employee wage-information discussions. The Equal Pay Act law provides an additional private right of action—with a one-year statute of limitations—for employees claiming they have been discharged, discriminated, or retaliated against for engaging in any conduct protected by the statute. These employees may seek reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and benefits, interest, and “appropriate equitable relief.”

Recordkeeping requirements. The Equal Pay Act has extended—from two years to three—an employer’s obligation to maintain records of wages and pay rates, job classifications, and other terms of employment.

Ban on inquiries about applicant’s prior salary. In 2017 California joined several other U.S. jurisdictions, including San Francisco, in forbidding employer inquiries into applicants’ “salary history information.” The new law—Labor Code section 432.3—forbids employers to seek information about an applicant’s “compensation and benefits.”

Under Section 432.3, employers must not ask about salary history information and must not rely on it in deciding whether to offer a job or how much to pay. Nonetheless, the law also states that employers may consider this information in setting salary if an applicant volunteers that information. That said, because California precludes employers from relying on prior salary to justify any gender, ethnicity, or race-based disparity in pay, employers should proceed with caution in utilizing prior salary.

Required pay scale disclosure. The 2017 legislation made California the nation’s first jurisdiction to require that employers provide applicants with pay scales: “An employer, upon reasonable request, shall provide the pay scale for a position to an applicant applying for employment.” This seemingly simple provision generates important compliance issues, as the key terms—“applicant,” ”pay scale,” and “reasonable request”—are undefined. In 2018 the Legislature enacted clarifying amendments to state: an “applicant” is someone seeking employment with the employer—not someone already employed by the employer; the “pay scale” the employer must provide is a salary or hourly wage range; and a “reasonable request” is made after the applicant has completed an initial interview. First, the amendments made clear that the law only applies to external applicants for a position. The pay scale need not be provided to internal applicants seeking a promotion or lateral move. Next, amendments clarified that “pay scale” means the salary or hourly wage range and does not include bonuses or equity ranges. Finally, the 2018 amendments clarified that the pay scale need not be provided until the applicant has completed the initial interview and then only upon request.

Further clarifications. Legislation effective in 2019 provided as follows. First, prior salary cannot be used to justify a wage differential, whether on its own or in combination with a lawful factor. Second, prior salary is a permissible factor to consider in a pay decision for a current employees, such as in awarding a bonus, so long as any wage differential from the decision is justified by a specified permissible factor, such as a merit system. Third, the ban on asking about prior salary does not forbid the employer to ask the applicant about “salary expectations” for the position sought.
6.8 Pant Suits

In America generally, grooming and dress codes that differentiate between men and women are not unlawful as sex discrimination, as these employer requirements do not affect employment opportunities. California is different. The FEHA makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to permit an employee to wear pants on account of the employee’s gender. Thus, California employers can ban pants for all employees, but must not ban pants for men only or for women only. Exceptions exist for requiring employees “in a particular occupation to wear a uniform” and for requiring an employee to wear a costume while portraying a specific character or playing a dramatic role.\textsuperscript{212}

6.9 Gender, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression

California’s prohibition against sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of “gender,” a term that means not only biological sex but also “gender identity and gender expression.”\textsuperscript{213} “Gender expression” includes “gender related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.”\textsuperscript{214}

The statutory language aims to protect persons whose vocal pitch, facial hair, personality, hairstyle, mannerisms, clothing, or demeanor is associated with a particular gender. The statute would forbid employment discrimination, for example, on the basis that a male employee appeared effeminate or on the basis that a female employee appeared masculine. Nonetheless, employers may continue to impose “reasonable workplace appearance, grooming, and dress standards not precluded by other provisions of state or federal law, provided that an employer shall allow an employee to appear or dress consistently with the employee’s gender identity or gender expression.”\textsuperscript{215}

Regulations provide additional protections for gender identity and transgender employees in the workplace. The regulations add a definition of “transitioning,”\textsuperscript{216} and prohibited discrimination against individuals undergoing gender transition.\textsuperscript{217} The regulations also require employers to provide equal access to facilities such as bathrooms, regardless of the employee’s gender identity, and to provide gender-neutral signage for single-occupancy facilities.\textsuperscript{218}

The regulations further prohibit employers from inquiring about sex, gender identity, or gender expression as a condition of employment,\textsuperscript{219} and forbid dress standards that conflict with an employee’s gender identity or expression, unless the employer can establish a business necessity.\textsuperscript{220} The regulations also require employers to abide by the employee’s preferred name and gender identity, unless the employer otherwise must, by law, utilize the employee’s legal name and the sex assigned at birth.\textsuperscript{221}

6.10 Religious Accommodation

While the FEHA definition of “religion” may in some respects be narrower than its federal counterpart,\textsuperscript{222} the scope of the California duty to accommodate religious practices is clearly broader than the corresponding federal duty.
6.10.1 Express coverage of specified religious practices

Federal law protects religious workplace expression only in general terms. California differs, by expressly defining “religion” to encompass “all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice, including religious dress and grooming practices.” “Religious belief or observance” includes “observance of a Sabbath or other religious holy day or days, reasonable time necessary for travel prior and subsequent to a religious observance, and religious dress practice and religious grooming practice.” “Religious dress practice” includes “the wearing or carrying of religious clothing, head or face coverings, jewelry, artifacts, and any other item that is part of the observance” of an individual’s religious creed. “Religious grooming practice” includes “all forms of head, facial, and body hair that are part of the observance” of the individual’s religious creed.

6.10.2 Disallowance of segregation as a religious accommodation

Judicial interpretations of federal law have permitted employees to accommodate religious objections to the employer’s personal appearance standards by having the religiously objecting employee—while retaining pay and benefits—work in a secluded area of the workplace. California categorically rejects that approach: “An accommodation of an individual’s religious dress practice or religious grooming practice is not reasonable if the accommodation requires segregation of the individual from other employees or the public.”

6.10.3 Adoption of higher standard employers must meet to show undue hardship

Federal law permits employers to refuse to provide a religious accommodation for an employee if the accommodation would work an “undue hardship,” which the U.S. Supreme Court has defined very broadly to mean anything more than a de minimis cost.

California is different. Lawyers once debated whether California courts should follow analogous federal law or should instead follow the FEHC interpretative regulations, which, without recognizing any de minimis standard, defined “undue hardship” in terms of such factors as the size of the establishment, the size of budgets, the overall size of the employer, the nature and cost of the accommodation, and the availability of reasonable alternatives. The Legislature has mooted that debate with a statute that makes California’s approach clearly more onerous than the federal approach. California now clearly requires employers that raise the “undue hardship” defense to a claim of religious accommodation to meet the same tough standard that applies in cases of disability accommodations. From a practical perspective, the interactive process that employers use to address disability accommodations should also guide considerations of religious accommodations.

California provides a vague exemption from its religious accommodation requirements where the employee’s proposed accommodation “would result in a violation” of any “law prohibiting discrimination or protecting civil rights.”

6.11 Special Rules for Retaliation

Under both federal and California law, employers may be liable for retaliating against an employee for engaging in protected activity, even where the conduct the employee opposes turns out not to be unlawful. But California diverges from federal law in several key respects.
6.11.1 Broad definition of protected activity

Under federal law, a plaintiff alleging retaliation must show that she engaged in protected activity, which means that she participated in a discrimination charge or lawsuit or at least overtly opposed what she reasonably thought was unlawful discrimination.\(^{231}\) California is different. Here the employee’s opposition need not be overt. A plaintiff disagreeing with an employer directive she believes to be discriminatory need not express that belief; all she must prove is that the employer knew she thought the directive was discriminatory. Thus, the California Supreme Court permitted a female manager to proceed on a retaliation claim in which her “opposition” activity was simply resisting a male manager’s order to fire a female cosmetics sales clerk for not being pretty enough.\(^{232}\) By the Supreme Court’s view, the plaintiff had engaged in protected activity even though she did not report or protest the offensive order to fire the sales clerk, but rather simply said she needed more “justification.” It was enough that she reasonably believed that the order to fire the clerk was discriminatory and that the employer, “in light of all the circumstances,” was aware of that belief.

California courts do seem to recognize that the plaintiff’s oppositional activity must have been in good faith; the law does not protect the making of knowingly false charges.\(^{233}\) Nor does the FEHA protect either lying or withholding information during an employer’s internal investigation of a discrimination claim.\(^{234}\) As of 2016, California expanded the scope of protected employee activity to include an employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation with respect to either religious accommodation or disability accommodation.\(^{235}\)

6.11.2 Broad definition of adverse employment action

The California Supreme Court acknowledges that an adverse employment action “must materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to be actionable” under the FEHA,\(^{236}\) but broadly defines adverse employment action for purposes or retaliation to include “the entire spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to adversely and materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity for advancement in his or her career.” The Supreme Court has thus permitted a retaliation plaintiff to establish an adverse employment action by citing a wide variety of intermediate personnel management decisions, such as (1) unwarranted negative performance evaluations, (2) a refusal to allow the plaintiff to respond to allegedly unwarranted criticism, (3) unwarranted criticism voiced by a manager in the presence of the plaintiff’s associates, (4) a “humiliating” public reprobation by a manager, and (5) a manager’s solicitation of negative feedback from the plaintiff’s staff.\(^{237}\) By this approach, the “totality of the circumstances” could show an adverse employment action against the plaintiff even if she never suffered a formal job detriment.

6.11.3 Broad application of the continuing violation doctrine

Under federal law, the continuing violation doctrine, properly understood, applies only to harassment cases and does not apply to discrete personnel management decisions.\(^{238}\) But California is different. The California Supreme Court, criticizing federal law, has rejected an employer’s contention that certain retaliatory acts preceding the limitations period were time-barred. The Supreme Court concluded that limiting employees to evidence of discrete acts within the limitations period would undermine the goals of encouraging informal resolution of disputes and avoiding prematurely filed lawsuits. Under the Supreme Court’s broad view of the continuing violation doctrine, an employer can be liable for acts that preceded the limitations period if they are sufficiently linked to unlawful acts that occurred within that period. And under this approach, the statute of limitations begins to run only when the
continuing course of conduct comes to an end (such as by the employer’s cessation or by the employee’s resignation), or when the employee is on notice that further efforts to end the unlawful conduct will be in vain.239

6.11.4 Personal liability for retaliation

For many years, California courts deviated from analogous federal law to impose personal liability on individual supervisors who retaliated against employees for opposing unlawful harassment or discrimination.240 A California supervisor considering an employment decision on behalf of the employer that could be characterized as retaliatory thus had to consider the prospect of personal liability. It was highly doubtful that the Legislature ever intended to create such a conflict of interest for the individual supervisor. Magnifying the aberrant nature of this doctrine of personal liability for retaliatory employment decisions was the judicial recognition that supervisors are not personally liable for employment decisions that turn out to be discriminatory or against public policy.241 A hypothetical absurd result of the California doctrine was that a single wrongful dismissal could result in no personal liability for the decision-maker with respect to claims for sex and race discrimination and a claim for wrongful discharge, but personal liability for the individual decision-maker with respect to a claim for retaliation.

California courts nonetheless insisted on this absurd result by relying on a literal reading of a statutory provision.242 Finally, in 2008, the California Supreme Court ended the nonsense (albeit only by a close vote of 4-3) by ruling that nonemployer individuals cannot be held personally liable for retaliation, just as they cannot be held personally liable for discriminatory actions.243

6.11.5 Broader class of plaintiffs

Ordinarily only employees and job applicants can bring retaliation claims, against their employer or prospective employer. Thus it was that a trial court granted summary judgment against a physician partner who claimed that her medical group removed her as a regional director because she had opposed sexual harassment of female employees. The Court of Appeal, however, reversed, concluding that it would further the purpose of the FEHA—to eliminate employment discrimination—to allow a retaliation claim by the doctor, a non-employee, against the physician group, an employer, where the alleged retaliation was in response to her reporting employment discrimination.244

6.11.6 Lower causation standard

Under federal Title VII, a retaliation plaintiff must prove that the “protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” In other words, the plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have occurred but for the employer’s retaliatory motive.245 But California is different. Under the FEHA, plaintiffs need only show that an unlawful retaliatory intent was a “substantial motivating factor” in the employer’s adverse action.246

6.12 Special Rules for No-nepotism Policies

Employers in America generally may forbid the hiring of anyone who is a relative of any existing employee. This policy does not discriminate against anyone on a protected basis. But California is different, because it prohibits discrimination based on marital status and interprets that prohibition in a peculiar way. The DFEH maintains that an employer cannot base an employment decision on whether an individual’s spouse is employed by the
employer unless (1) there are “business reasons of supervision, safety, security or morale” to “refuse to place one spouse under the direct supervision of the other spouse,” or (2) “the work involves potential conflicts of interest or other hazards greater for married couples than for other persons,” such that “business reasons of supervision, security or morale” warrant a refusal to have both spouses in “the same department, division or facility.”

6.13 Difficulty in Obtaining Defendant’s Attorney Fees and Even Costs

Under the federal law that most states follow, a discrimination plaintiff who loses a claim is liable for the defendant’s attorney fees if the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even if not maintained in subjective bad faith. Applying this standard, California courts have denied attorney fees to prevailing defendants in FEHA cases, even when the plaintiff has rejected the defendant’s more favorable offer of judgment. Legislation effective in 2019 clarifies the legislative intent to deny both attorney fees and costs to FEHA defendants—even if they make an offer of judgment and win, and even if the plaintiff wins but fails to beat the offer—unless the lawsuit was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

And even those prevailing California defendants who can show that a plaintiff’s FEHA claim was frivolous may face still further obstacles to the recovery of attorney fees. First, the Court of Appeal has held that awarding attorney fees to a prevailing defendant was an abuse of discretion absent proof regarding the plaintiff’s ability to pay for them: “The trial court should also make findings as to the plaintiff’s ability to pay attorney fees, and how large the award should be in light of the plaintiff’s financial situation.” Second, in a FEHA decision that affirmed summary judgment for the two defendants—the plaintiff’s employer and her supervisor—the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision to award only $1.00 in attorney fees to the prevailing individual defendant, even though the suit against her was “frivolous and vexatious.” The Court of Appeal upheld the decision to give only a nominal fee award, because any fee award would benefit the corporate employer, which had paid for the individual’s defense, and because the suit against the employer itself, while lacking merit, was not frivolous.

In a more welcome development, a Court of Appeal decision upheld an order requiring the plaintiff to pay a prevailing FEHA defendant $100,000 in attorney’s fees, where (1) the trial court made express oral findings when it ruled on defendant’s motion, (2) the trial court properly considered plaintiff’s financial condition, and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the action was “unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious.”

Under federal and California law, the prevailing party in a lawsuit generally is entitled to recover its costs of suit (filing fees, court reporter fees, etc.). But California has instituted a new double standard that favors FEHA plaintiffs. The California Supreme Court held that prevailing defendants in FEHA cases are not automatically entitled to their costs of suit. Rather, FEHA defendants seeking costs as prevailing parties must show not only that they prevailed but that the action was objectively without foundation when brought, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after the lack of foundation had become clear. The same double standard has extended to awards of expert witness fees in FEHA cases, even where the defendant has made an offer of judgment that was more generous than what the plaintiff achieved in a verdict, and thus ordinarily would be entitled to recover its expert witness fees (see § 5.16.)

6.14 No Meaningful Duty to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

A Title VII plaintiff must, before suing, exhaust administrative remedies by filing a personally verified charge with the EEOC, which can investigate and conciliate and possibly avoid litigation.
California, meanwhile, has systematically removed exhaustion requirements to the point that they have become a mere ministerial formality. First, employment discrimination complainants can bypass any administrative process simply by filing a form with the DFEH to “elect court action” and obtain an immediate right to sue. Second, California complainants need not even sign the administrative paperwork; the complainant’s attorney may sign instead. Third, the complainant’s attorney need not even bother with a physical signature; the signature can be electronic. And although the attorney is supposed to give notice of the administrative complaint to the employer, the attorney’s failure to do so will not bar a lawsuit. So it is that California employers often learn of an employee’s claim of discrimination only once a lawsuit is served.

California also favors complainants when it comes to late administrative filings. Federal law excuses a late administrative filing only under special circumstances, such as where the employer has misled an employee or has concealed facts that the employee needed in order to assert the employee’s rights; there is no tolling of the filing deadline simply because the employee has pursued an internal grievance. California is different. The California Supreme Court has held that the deadline for filing an administrative complaint of discrimination under the FEHA is tolled while the claimant voluntarily pursues an internal administrative remedy with the employer. To tilt the playing field even further to the complainant’s advantage, DFEH regulations provide that “where there is doubt about whether the statute of limitations has run,” the complaint will be accepted and timeliness “investigated and analyzed” during the investigation. As a result, it is in the discretion of the DFEH investigator to determine timeliness.

6.15 Use of the Unfair Competition Law to Sue for Discrimination

In America generally, laws designed to prevent unfair competition and antitrust violations do not enable employees to sue employers for employment discrimination. California is different. The Court of Appeal has held that the California Unfair Competition Law (which has a four-year statute of limitations) enables an employee to sue an employer for age discrimination, the reasoning being that an employer who engages in that discriminatory practice has obtained an unfair competitive advantage over other employers. Employees who sue under this statute, though, are typically limited in remedy to injunctive relief.

6.16 Disregard of Federal Evidentiary Doctrines

6.16.1 Rejection of the “stray remarks” rule

In America generally, courts rule as a matter of law (either on summary judgment or in a motion for judgment as a matter of law) against discrimination plaintiffs who rely on “stray remarks”—remarks made remote in time or otherwise disconnected from the challenged employment decision, remarks not made by anyone who made or influenced the decision, or remarks not directed to the plaintiff. But California is different. The Court of Appeal, in reversing a summary judgment for the employer in an age discrimination case, broadly repudiated the “so-called ‘stray remarks’ rule.” The Court of Appeal reasoned that the “stray remarks” rule would impermissibly permit trial judges to weigh evidence in ruling on motions for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff should have been able to thwart summary judgment with his assertions that co-workers (who had no apparent connection with the challenged employment decision) had called him “slow,” “fuzzy,” “sluggish,” and “lethargic.” In 2010, the California Supreme Court affirmed this reasoning.
6.16.2 Rejection of the “same actor rule”

In America generally, courts have followed the “same actor rule”: Where the same actor both hired and fired the same discrimination plaintiff, within a short period of time, an inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive in the firing. California courts also once followed this rule, in line with the general principle that interpretations of the FEHA should follow interpretations of Title VII where the two statutes share the same basic purpose.

Yet a Court of Appeal decision, upholding a jury verdict of race and gender discrimination, has disputed the “same actor rule,” stating: “Evidence that the same actor conferred an employment benefit on an employee before discharging that employee is simply evidence and should be treated like any other piece of proof. … Placing it in a special category as a ‘rule’ or ‘presumption’ or stating it creates a ‘strong inference’ attaches undue influence to same actor evidence and threatens to undermine the right to a jury trial by improperly easing the burden on employers in summary judgment and postverdict motions.” Although the Supreme Court agreed to review the case, the parties then settled the matter, leaving in doubt the status of the “same actor rule” for purposes of FEHA cases.

6.16.3 Requiring admissibility of “me too” evidence

Discrimination plaintiffs often seek to introduce evidence that other employees—who are not themselves plaintiffs—also suffered discrimination at the hands of the defendant employer. Federal and state courts generally treat “me too” evidence on a case-by-case basis, weighing the evidence’s probative value against its potential to create undue prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. The United States Supreme Court, in 2008, confirmed that there is no rule necessarily requiring trial courts either to admit or to exclude such “me too” evidence.

But in California it’s different. In 2011, a Court of Appeal decision overruled a trial court’s exclusion of “me too” evidence. The trial court had held that evidence of sexual harassment, to be admissible, must have occurred in the plaintiff’s presence, during her employment. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that evidence of sexual harassment toward nonparty female employees—outside the plaintiff’s presence and without her contemporaneous knowledge—should have been admitted, to show the defendant’s discriminatory mental state.

A 2018 Court of Appeal decision further illustrates California’s leniency about admitting evidence relating to sexual harassment. The jury rendered a verdict for the employer, but the Court of Appeal reversed and ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial court had erred on certain evidentiary issues. The Court of Appeal held that

- the plaintiff should have been permitted to testify about details of sexual electronic messages she had received from the alleged harasser even though she had since lost the messages,
- the trial court should have admitted “me too” testimony from four co-workers, all also allegedly harassed by the alleged harasser, who could present evidence going to his gender bias, and
- the trial court erred in admitting evidence that plaintiff had published on social media her abdominal tattoo, as displaying it was “sexual conduct” that not with the alleged harasser and therefore, was rendered inadmissible by the Evidence Code to show the plaintiff’s consent to allegedly unwelcome sexual conduct.
Me too evidence does have limits, even in California, where courts have limited the extent of such evidence to facts showing discrimination sufficiently similar to what the plaintiff allegedly suffered. Thus, one plaintiff, who alleged Asian and Japanese ancestry, permissibly was denied the chance to show that his Arab employer discriminated against all non-Arabs. The plaintiff could present evidence that other employees of East Asian or alleged Asian and Japanese ancestry, permissibly was denied the chance to show that his Arab employer discriminated against all non-Arabs. The plaintiff could present evidence that other employees of East Asian or Japanese descent had experienced similar discrimination, but not that the employer had discriminated against non-Arabs generally.

2. Gov't Code § 12926(c) (unlawful to "discriminate against any person [on any of the protected bases] in the selection, termination, training, or other terms or treatment of that person in any apprenticeship training program, any other training program leading to employment, an unpaid internship, or another limited duration program to provide unpaid work experience for that person").
3. See Gov't Code § 12960(d).
4. See Gov't Code §§ 12965(b), 12960(d).
7. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009). Note, though, that in dictum the Supreme Court said that oppositional activity may consist of standing pat and refusing to implement an unlawful order to discriminate. Extending protection for oppositional activity that far would not differ materially from the California standard.
8. McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88 (2008) (plaintiff's voluntary pursuit of internal administrative remedy will toll running of statute of limitations on FEHA claim, even if plaintiff voluntarily abandons the internal proceeding).
10. See § 6.10.
11. Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203 (2013) (plaintiff who proves a protected status was a substantial motivating factor for an adverse employment action can thereby obtain declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs, although the employer who proves it would have reached the same decision even absent that motivating factor can avoid further relief in the form of reinstatement, back pay, front pay, and noneconomic damages). The Harris result, while pro-plaintiff, did improve on the standard jury instruction,CACI 2500, which would have made employers liable for adverse employment actions whenever a protected status or activity was a motivating reason/factor, where a "motivating factor" as "something that moves the will and induces action even though other matters may have contributed to the taking of the action"). The Court of Appeal has held, rather harshly, that an employer had waived the Harris defense (not yet announced) when it failed to plead it in an answer. Alamo v. Practice Management Information Corp., 219 Cal. App. 4th 466, 470 (2013) (defendant "not entitled to an instruction on the mixed-motive or same-decision defense because it failed to plead that defense or any other affirmative defense alleging that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretalatory reason for its discharge decision in its answer"). On the brighter side, the Court of Appeal has extended the Harris reasoning to a claim for tortious discharge in violation of public policy, where the public policy asserted is the FEHA. Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 245 Cal. App. 4th 1302, 1322-23 (2016) (affirming trial decision to give Harris jury instruction).
12. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (under the federal ADEA, plaintiff alleging that adverse action was "because of" his age must "establish that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse action"). Title VII has a different standard, because its own "because of" language was amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)(B)(ii). The California Supreme Court in Harris crafted, via creative judicial interpretation, a result that closely resembles the legislative compromise that Congress crafted in the 1991 Title VII amendments.
13. Gov't Code § 12926(o) ("Race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, age, sexual orientation, or military and veteran status includes a perception that the person has any of those characteristics or that the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any of those characteristics.").
14. Lab. Code §§ 1101, 1102 (under section 1101, employers must not make regulations or policies "[f]or forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating in politics, becoming a political candidate, or [c]ontrolling or directing ... the political activities or affiliations of employees"; under section 1102, employers must not "coerce or influence" employees "to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of political action or political activity").
15. Gov't Code § 12940(a) (employers shall not "refuse to hire or employ" a person, or prevent them from participating in a "training program leading to employment," based on the persons "marital status").
16. Gov't Code § 12940(a) (employers shall not "refuse to hire or employ" a person, or prevent them from participating in a "training program leading to employment," based on the persons "sexual orientation"); Gov't Code § 12926(s) ("Sexual orientation means heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality.").
17. 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11030(d) (defining "sex stereotype" as "an assumption about a person's appearance or behavior, gender roles, gender expression, or gender identity, or about an individual's ability or inability to perform certain kinds of work based on a myth, social expectation, or generalization about the individual's sex").
18. Gov't Code §§ 12920, 12921, 12926(r)(2), 12930(i), 12931, 12940(a)-(d), 12944(a)(c), 12949, 12955, 12955.8, 12956.1(b)(1), and 12956.2; see also 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11030 (a), (b), (e). The remainder of this, section 6, and section 9 below contain a more thorough discussion.
19. Gov't Code §12926(r)(1)(A) & (B); see also §12940(j)(4)(C). California's Fair Employment and Housing Act defines "sex" to include "[p]regnancy or medical conditions related to pregnancy" and "[c]hildbirth or medical conditions related to childbirth").
Gov’t Code § 12926(r)(1)(C) (protected status of “sex” includes “[b]reastfeeding or medical conditions related to breastfeeding”).

Gov’t Code §§ 12926(q); see also id. §§ 12940(a) & (l). The statute defines all these terms broadly: “[r]eligious creed,” “religion,” “religious observance,” “religious belief,” and “creed” include “all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice, including religious dress and grooming practices”; “[r]eligious dress practice” includes “the wearing or carrying of religious clothing, head or face coverings, jewelry, artifacts, and any other item that is part of the observance by an individual observing a religious creed”; and “[r]eligious grooming practice” includes “all forms of head, facial, and body hair that are part of an individual observing a religious creed.”

Gov’t Code §§ 12926(i)(2)(A), (B) (“genetic characteristics” can be either genes or chromosomes or inherited characteristics, if they are not presently associated with a symptom of disease or disorder but are known to cause or be statistically associated with the risk of causing a disease or disorder in an individual or that individual’s offspring). But employers can discriminate on the basis of a medical condition if the employee, “because of the … medical condition, is unable to perform the employee’s essential duties even with reasonable accommodations, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger the employee’s health or safety or the health or safety of others even with reasonable accommodations.” Id. § 12940(a)(2).

Gov’t Code §§ 11135, 12920, 12921, 12926(g), 12930(i), 12931, 12940(a)-(d), 12944(a) & (c), 12955, 12955.8, 12956.1(b)(1), and 12993. California defines “genetic information” to mean, as to any individual, information about “(A) the individual’s genetic tests; (B) The genetic tests of family members of the individual; (C) The manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of the individual.” Gov’t Code § 12926(g)(1). This definition includes “any request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical research that includes genetic services, by an individual or any family member of the individual.” Id. § 12926(g)(2). “Genetic information” does not, however, include information about an individual’s sex or age. Id. § 12926(g)(3).

Gov’t Code § 12940(a) (employers shall not “refuse to hire or employ” persons, or prevent them from participating in a “training program leading to employment,” based on their “military and veteran status”); see also Military & Veterans Code § 394 (employers must not discriminate against—or prejudice or injure”—a member of the military or naval forces of the state or of the United States”).

Health & Safety Code § 120980(f) (“the results of an HIV test … shall not be used in any instance for the determination of … suitability for employment”).

See § 6.6.2.

Lab. Code § 230.5 qualifying crimes include: vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, felony child abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or a death, assault resulting in the death of a child under eight years of age, felony domestic violence, felony physical abuse of an elder or dependent adult, felony stalking, solicitation for murder, a “serious felony,” hit-and-run causing death or injury, felony driving under the influence causing injury, and sexual assault.

Lab. Code § 1102.5 (employers must not implement rules, policies, or regulations that prevent employees from disclosing violations of state or federal law, and must not retaliate against employees for making such disclosures).

Lab. Code § 6310 (employers must not discriminate because of reporting or complying with investigations of health and safety violations).

Lab. Code § 98.6(a) (providing remedies for employees discriminated against for claiming or reporting a violation under the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner).

Lab. Code § 132a (providing remedies for employees discriminated against for claiming or reporting a workers’ compensation violation or workplace injury). For a more thorough discussion, see § 17.8.

AB 1509, 2016 bill amending Lab. Code §§ 98.6, 1102.5, 6310.


AB 897, 2016 bill amending Gov’t Code §§ 12940 (l), (m).

AB 488, 2016 bill amending Gov’t Code §§ 12926, 12926.05.

2 Cal. Code Regs § 11065(i).

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) & (2) (defining “disability” and “major life activities”).


2 Cal. Code Regs. § 11065(d). California’s broadened definition of “disability” came about through enactment of Assembly Bill 2222, effective 2001. The California Supreme Court, however, has opined that California always defined disability broadly, without regard to whether a limitation on a major life activity imposed a “substantial” limitation.

Gov’t Code § 12926.1(c); 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11065(d) (adding autism spectrum, blindness, deafness, cerebral palsy, obsessive compulsive disorder, organic brain syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, and schizophrenia).

Gov’t Code § 12926(i) (mental condition), (m) (physical condition).


2 Cal. Code Regs § 11065(l).

2 Cal. Code Regs § 11065(l).

2 Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1052 (1993) (“weight may qualify as a protected “handicap” or “disability” within the meaning of the FEHA if medical evidence demonstrates that it results from a physiological condition affecting one or more of the basic bodily systems and limits a major life activity.”).

Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, 18 Cal. App. 5th 908 (2017) (reversing a summary judgment for an employer that, in challenging the plaintiff’s assertion that her obesity qualified as a disability, failed to present scientific or expert evidence that the obesity lacked a physiological cause).

Gov’t Code § 12926(o).


See Gov’t Code § 12940(d), (e).
Gov't Code § 12940(a). See also 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11067(b) (inability of employee or applicant to perform the job is a defense that the employer must prove).


67 Id. at 271-73 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (citing 2 Cal. Code Regs § 7293.8(b)) (further arguing that the California Legislature had acquiesced in this agency interpretation by leaving it undisturbed when the Legislature amended the FEHA). *Green has been followed consistently since,* E.g., *Castro–Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express, Inc.*, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 120, 127 (2016); *Wallace v. County of Stanislaus*, 245 Cal. App. 4th 109, 137-38 (2016).

68 Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(d) provides: “Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.” While California led the way, 33 other states (and the District of Columbia) have now enacted similar laws. *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (2005).

69 The Compassionate Use Act has identified each as an example of a condition treated with medicinal marijuana. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(b)(1)(A).

70 Health & Safety Code § 11362.785 (emphasis added).


72 *Id.* at 933-37 (Kennard, J. dissenting).


75 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11069.

76 Gov't Code § 12940(n). See, e.g., DFEH v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., FEHC Dec. Case No. 10-05-P (Oct. 19, 2010) (finding employer’s repeated delays in requiring the plaintiff to submit to exam by employer’s doctor and failure to respond to numerous inquiries by plaintiff, while plaintiff was on unpaid leave of absence, violates § 12940(n)).

77 *Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California*, 157 Cal. App. 4th 413, 424-25 (2007) (employer ignoredarthritic employee’s requests for a transfer that would shorten a long commute; FEHA allows independent cause of action for employees whose employers fail to engage in the interactive process; this provision does not require proof of the elements required by the ADA; federal ADA cases that hold that employers are not liable for refusal to engage in an interactive process are therefore inapposite). But see *Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.*, 166 Cal. App. 4th 952, 979-81 (2008) (California courts should follow federal rule that employer is liable for failing to engage in
good-faith interactive process only if a reasonable accommodation was available). Scotch v. Art Institute of California, 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 994-95 (2009), reconciled Wysinger and Nadaf-Rahrov to hold that an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that was available when the interactive process should have occurred.

Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4th 952, 965-66, 971 (2008) (reviving disability discrimination claim of employee dismissed when her physician said she could not perform “work of any kind,” because that information pertained to the current position and not all vacant jobs potentially available in the foreseeable future; substantial physical restrictions did not self-evidently prevent plaintiff from performing vacant desk jobs for which she was otherwise qualified; discovery commissioner erred in limiting request to stores in just two cities, even if plaintiff was not entitled to nationwide discovery); Prilliman v. United Airlines, 53 Cal. App. 4th 935, 950-51 (1997) (“employer who knows of the disability of an employee has an affirmative duty to make known to the employee other suitable job opportunities with the employer and to determine whether the employee is interested in, and qualified for, those positions, if the employer can do so without undue hardship”).

2 Cal. Code Regs § 11068(c).


Gov’t Code § 12940(l)(4).

Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express, Inc., 2 Cal. App. 5th 1028, 1037 (2016). The Court of Appeal modified its decision to withdraw the holding, while continuing to suggest that the FEHA may reasonably be interpreted to require accommodation based on an employee’s association with a physically disabled person.

See, e.g., Larimer v. IBM Corp., 370 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2004).

2 Cal. Code Regs § 11065(p).

Id. §§ 11065, 11069.

Id. §§ 11065, 11069.

Id. § 11068(b).

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(3) (in ADA cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a reasonable accommodation, compensatory and punitive damages “may not be awarded under this section where the covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the disability who has informed the covered entity that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual with an equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the business”).


Gov’t Code § 12941.

See Gov’t Code § 12941. The statute, effective 2000, overruled Marks v. Loral Corp., 57 Cal. App. 4th 30 (1997), a decision holding that a reduction in force based on salary considerations would not be discriminatory even if it disproportionately affected older workers.


29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).

See generally LINDEMANN & KADUE, WORKPLACE HARASSMENT LAW (2012).


Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(4)(A).

Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1).

Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1) (unlawful to harass “an employee, an applicant, an unpaid intern or volunteer, or a person providing services pursuant to a contract”). By a 2016 amendment, any individual employed under “a special license pursuant to Section 1191 or 1191.5 of the Labor Code in a nonprofit sheltered workshop, day program, or rehabilitation facility” may sue for harassment or discrimination under the FEHA. Gov’t Code § 12926.05.

Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(3).

See Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1); State Dep’t of Health Services v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 4th 1026 (2003) (employer with harassing supervisor cannot assert Ellerth/Faragher defense, but can escape liability for damages plaintiff could have avoided by reporting the harassment more promptly if (1) employer took reasonable steps to prevent and correct workplace harassment and (2) plaintiff unreasonably failed to use preventive and corrective measures employer provided).

See § 6.5.5.

Gov’t Code § 12940(j).

Miller v. Department of Corrections, 36 Cal. 4th 446 (2005).

Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1), (k), See Turman v. Turning Point of California, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 4th 53 (2010) (employer must take immediate, appropriate corrective action in response to harassment complaints, even when harassment is “inherently part of the job”).

Gov’t Code § 12950(b). For discussion of the California-imposed duty to prevent and correct harassment, see § 6.5.3.

2 Cal. Code Regs §§ 11023(b), (c).

Gov’t Code § 12950.1.

2 Cal. Code Regs §§ 11019(b), 11034(f)(1).


Id. at 75.

47 Cal. 4th 686 (2009).

Gov't Code § 12940(k).

Gov't Code § 12940(i).


Id. at 475.


SB 1343, amending Gov't Code §§ 12950 and 12950.1. The DFEH must make available a one-hour and a two-hour online training course that employers can use and must make the training videos, existing informational posters, fact sheets, and online training courses available in multiple languages.

Gov't Code § 12950.1(a).

Gov't Code §§ 12950, 12950.1(a), (b), (c).

Gov't Code § 12950.1.

Gov't Code § 12950.1(h)(1).

Gov't Code § 12950.1(h)(1).

DFEH accepts complaints from employees that their employers have not complied with the law requiring that sexual harassment prevention training be provided. Such complaints filed after January 1, 2020 will be reviewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, which may include the availability of DFEH’s online training courses or the availability of qualified trainers. If DFEH finds that the law has been violated, then it will work with employers to obtain compliance with the law. See https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2018/12/SB_1343_FAQs.pdf (visited Feb. 14, 2019).


Id. § 1 1024(a)(1), (3).

See also Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.

Gov't Code § 12940(k).

Gov't Code §§ 12950, 12950.1(a), (b).

Gov't Code § 12950.1.

Gov't Code § 12950.1(h)(1).

Gov't Code § 12950.1(h)(1).

Gov’t Code § 12950.3. (The DFEH can seek an order requiring an employer comply with these requirements.)

Gov’t Code § 12950.2 (“practical guidance on how to enable bystanders to recognize potentially problematic behavior and to motivate bystanders to take action when they observe problematic behaviors”).

Gov't Code § 12950.1(b), (h)(2).


Lab. Code § 1700.50 et seq. Talent agencies must retain, for three years, records showing that those educational materials were provided.


See also Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 1309 (2015) (reversing judgment for massage therapist alleging sexual harassment at work; “there cannot be a valid claim for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment if, as here, the jury finds that the sexual harassment that occurred was not sufficiently severe or pervasive as to result in liability”).

DFEH v. Lyddan Law Group, LLP. FEHC Dec. No. 10-04-P (Oct. 19, 2010) (respondent had no written anti-harassment policy or employee handbook, conducted no harassment prevention training, and did not independently investigate employee’s complaints; FEHC imposed injunctive relief). See also 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11023(a)(3) (“Department may independently seek non-monetary preventative remedies for a violation of Government Code section 12940(k) whether or not the Department prevails on an underlying claim of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation”).

E.g., Mendoza v. W. Med. Ctr. Santa Ana, 222 Cal. App. 4th 1334, 1344-45 (2014) (plaintiff’s expert witness noted “numerous shortcomings in the investigation” into the plaintiff’s complaint of harassment; “lack of a rigorous investigation by defendants is evidence suggesting that defendants did not value the discovery of the truth so much as a way to clean up the mess” uncovered by the plaintiff’s complaint; “more thorough investigation might have disclosed additional character and credibility evidence for defendants to consider before making their decision”). See also Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 243, 278-83 (inadequate investigation can evidence pretext).


Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(3). The California Legislature overruled Carriseles v. Department of Corrections, 21 Cal. 4th 1132 (1999), in which the California Supreme Court had recognized that the FEHA does not apply to actions between co-workers in the absence of a supervisory relationship.


Id. at 1038-39.

Id.

Id. at 1044.

Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013) (upholding Seventh Circuit decision that had affirmed summary judgment for the employer; the employer is vicariously liable for harassment perpetrated by its employee only when the employer empowered the harasser to take “tangible employment actions against the victim,” such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits).

Gov’t Code § 12926(t). California’s definition of “supervisor,” which has no Title VII counterpart, is “any individual having the authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
the responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend that action, if, in connection with the foregoing, the exercise of that authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.” Id. This language mirrors the definition of “supervisor” appearing in the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).

The U.S. Supreme Court in Vance declined to follow the NLRA definition of “supervisor”: “[T]he NLRA may in some instances define ‘supervisor’ more broadly … . But those differences reflect the NLRA’s unique purpose, which is to preserve the balance of power between labor and management … . That purpose is inapposite in the context of Title VII, which focuses on eradicating discrimination. An employee may have a sufficient degree of authority over subordinates such that … the employee should not participate with lower level employees in the same collective-bargaining unit (because, for example, a higher level employee will pursue his own interests at the expense of lower level employees’ interests), but that authority is not necessarily sufficient to merit heightened liability for the purposes of Title VII.” 133 S. Ct. at 2445 n.7. Query whether a California court would adopt this reasoning to limit the definition of supervisor under the FEHA, or, instead, choose to justify vicarious employer liability by relying mechanically on the FEHA’s literal statutory language.

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152 Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1).
153 Civ. Code § 1708.5.
154 See § 5.11.2 (Ralph Civil Rights Act, Tom Bane Civil Rights Act).
155 Civ. Code § 1708.7.
156 Civ. Code § 51.9.
162 36 Cal. 4th 446 (2005).
163 Id. at 451.
164 Id. at 464.
165 Id. at 469.
166 Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(4)(C) (“Sexually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.”).
168 Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP, 222 Cal. App. 4th 1228 (2014) (heterosexual male suffered sexual harassment when his co-workers’ workplace verbal attacks on his heterosexual identity—calling him “queer,” “faggot,” “homo,” and “gay porn star”—were used to harass him, regardless of whether the attacks against him were motivated by sexual desire).
169 SB 820, adding Code Civ. Proc. § 1001. The statutory language suggests that a violation of Section 1001 would support a cause of action for civil damages. Id. § 1001(b).
170 Id. § 1001(e).
171 Id. § 1001(c).
172 AB 3109, adding Civil Code § 1670.11.
173 SB 1300, adding Gov’t Code § 12964.5(a).
174 Gov’t Code § 12964.5(c).
175 SB 1300, adding Gov’t Code § 12923.
176 Brooks held that a single incident of misconduct was insufficient to support a claim of a sexually hostile environment where the harasser approached a co-worker as she was taking a call and put his hand on her stomach, commented on its softness, boxed her in as he stood her chair, and forced his hand underneath her sweater and bra to fondle her break, and approached her a second time as if he would fondle her again.
179 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11027.1(b).
180 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028.
181 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(b), (c).
182 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(f).
183 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(k).
184 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(l).
185 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(b).
186 Gov’t Code § 12951(b).
188 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(d).
189 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(k).
190 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(t).
191 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11028(i).
192 Gov’t Code § 12926(v) (expanding definition of “national origin” to include those who, notwithstanding their inability to provide their lawful presence in the United States, have obtained a driver’s license under Motor Vehicle Code section 12801.9, which permits undocumented immigrants to obtain a special driver’s license).
193 Labor Code section 1102.5 prevents employers from retaliating against an employee for reporting “a violation of or noncompliance with a ... federal rule or regulation.”
The Supremacy Clause in Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution establishes the Constitution, the federal statutes, and the treaties of the United States as “the supreme law of the land.”

Lab. Code § 1197.5.
Lab. Code § 1199.5.

Lab. Code § 1197.5(a): “An employer shall not pay any of its employees at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex for substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions, except where the employer demonstrates [a specified defense].”


This clarification came from the senator who introduced the Fair Pay Act legislation. Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson wrote the President pro Tempore of the Senate a letter printed in the California Senate Daily Journal on May 26, 2015: “[T]he amendments to this bill that strike ‘work is performed at different geographic locations’ and ‘work is performed on different shifts or at different times of day’ should not be construed as the Legislature’s intent to make those factors unavailable to an employer responding to an equal pay complaint. Rather, the employer may claim a ‘bona fide factor,’ that may be specifically described by the employer as work that is performed at different geographic locations or work that is performed on different shifts or at different times of day, so long as the employer can prove that the factor is consistent with business necessity, as specified in the bill.”

Lab. Code § 1197.5(b): “An employer shall not pay any of its employees at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of another race or ethnicity for substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions, except where the employer demonstrates [a specified defense].”


Lab. Code § 1197.5(a)(4) & Lab. Code § 1197.5(b)(4) (“Prior salary shall not justify any disparity in compensation. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to mean that an employer may not make a compensation decision based on a current employee’s existing salary, so long as any wage differential resulting from that compensation decision is justified by one or more of the factors listed in this subdivision.”).


AB 168, codified in Lab. Code § 432.3.
Lab. Code § 432.3(b).
Lab. Code § 432.3(h), (g) (“voluntarily and without prompting”).
Lab. Code § 11034(i).
Lab. Code § 11034(i)(4).
Id. § 11034(e).
Id. § 11034(i).
Id. § 11034(g).
Id. § 11034(h).


Gov’t Code § 12940(h)(1).
Gov’t Code § 12926(q).
Gov’t Code § 12940(h)(2).


Gov’t Code § 12940(h)(1) (citing Gov’t Code § 12926(i)).
Gov’t Code § 12940(h)(3).


Federal law may go further than indicated in text. In Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009), the Supreme Court held that a witness during a sexual-harassment investigation engaged in protected oppositional activity by telling the company investigator that the alleged harasser had harassed her. In holding that oppositional activity is not limited to activity that the plaintiff initiates, the Court stated in dictum that oppositional activity can even include passive activity such as standing pat and refusing to implement an unlawful order to discriminate.

Joan v. City of Los Angeles, 202 Cal. App. 4th 1207, 1226 (2012) (“an employer may discipline or terminate an employee for making false charges, even where the subject matter of those charges is an allegation of sexual harassment”).


Gov’t Code § 12940(h)(4) (unlawful to “retaliate or otherwise discriminate against a person for requesting accommodation under this subdivision [regarding religious accommodation], regardless of whether the request was granted”); § 12940(m)(2) (unlawful to “retaliate or otherwise discriminate against a person for requesting accommodation under this subdivision [regarding disability accommodation], regardless of whether the request was granted”). This amendment was in response to Rope v. Auto-Chlor Sys. of Washington, Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 635 (2013), which held that a mere request for a disability accommodation is not itself oppositional activity and thus is not protected from retaliation.

Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1052 (2005).

Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th at 1139-40.


Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1058 (2005). See also Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank, 168 Cal. App. 4th 714 (2008) (reversing summary judgment against claim of sexual-orientation harassment, where plaintiff alleged co-worker made homophobic verbal attacks on her, then ceased verbal attacks and began engaging in other conduct to impede plaintiff’s ability to do her job; rejecting defendant’s argument that the later conduct was different and unrelated in nature to the prior conduct; plaintiff raised triable issues as to whether later conduct constituted continuing FEHA violation); Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal. App. 4th 1390, 1404 (2015) (continuing violation theory did not apply because time-barred acts of retaliation had already reached a threshold level of “permanence”; they had culminated in a suspension at which point the plaintiff knew that future efforts to end the unlawful conduct would have been futile).


Gov’t Code § 12940(h) (unlawful for “any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part”) (emphasis added).


2 Cal. Code Regs § 11057.


Mangano v. Verty, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 4th 944 (2008) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion for attorney fees even though plaintiff’s rejection of Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer made defendant the prevailing party; section 998 does not trump Christiansburg standard; defendant still must show the plaintiff’s case was frivolous).

SB 1300, 2018 bill amending Gov’t Code § 12965(b) (“In civil actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party, including the department, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness fees,”). See also Villanueva v. City of Colton, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1202 (2008) (trial court must consider non-prevailing party’s ability to pay before assessing attorney fees under FEHA, but where plaintiff offered no evidence that might warrant a reduced fee award, trial court did not abuse discretion in awarding attorney fees to defendant).


Id. at 115 (prevailing defendant should not be awarded costs and fees unless “the action was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”).


Ricks v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1523 (2012) (reversing summary judgment granted to employer because Ricks had failed to file a verified FEHA complaint; the complaint that his attorney filed through DFEH’s online automated system, though unsigned, was sufficient).

Wasti v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 4th 667 (2006) (Gov’t Code section 12962, which requires the complainant’s attorney to serve the DFEH complaint on the respondent-employer within 60 days, does not create jurisdictional prerequisite to FEHA suit; rather, notice is required only when the DFEH is to investigate, not when plaintiff requests the immediate right to sue).

McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88 (2008) (voluntary pursuit of internal administrative remedy before filing FEHA complaint will toll running of statute of limitations on FEHA claim; nothing in FEHA stands as a bar to the usual rule that limitations periods are tolled while a party pursues an alternate remedy; tolling may apply even if the plaintiff voluntarily abandons the internal proceeding).

2 Cal. Code Regs § 10007(e)(2).


Alch v. Superior Court (Time Warner Entertainment), 122 Cal. App. 4th 339 (2004) (trial court lacked authority to award backpay damages on an age discrimination theory under the UCL; prevailing plaintiffs generally limited to equitable remedies such as injunctive relief and restitution).


Harvey v. Sybase, Inc., 161 Cal. App. 4th 1547, 1563 (2008), rev. granted. The Supreme Court initially agreed to decide whether a FEHA plaintiff must “present stronger evidence of bias if the person responsible for the termination had previously treated the plaintiff favorably?” But then the Supreme Court dismissed review. The ultimate result is that the Harvey decision was depublished and cannot be cited as authority.

See also Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 243, 272, 273 (2009) (“no California case or statute has created a same actor presumption”; same-actor evidence should not have “some undue importance attached to it, for that could threaten to undermine the right to a jury trial by improperly easing the burden on employers in summary judgment”).


Id. at 92.


Evid. Code § 1106(a), (b):
(a) In any civil action alleging conduct which constitutes sexual harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery, opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the plaintiff’s sexual conduct, or any of that evidence, is not admissible by the defendant in order to prove consent by the plaintiff or the absence of injury to the plaintiff, unless the injury alleged by the plaintiff is in the nature of loss of consortium.

(b) Subdivision (a) does not apply to evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual conduct with the alleged perpetrator.

Hatai v. Department of Transp., 214 Cal. App. 4th 1287, 1297-98 (2013) (upholding decision to admit evidence that supervisor discriminated against employees who were of the same national origin and race as plaintiff, but to exclude evidence that supervisor discriminated against employees of protected classes to which plaintiff did not belong). Another Court of Appeal decision has previously taken a favorable view of “me too” evidence. Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation, 173 Cal. App. 4th 740 (2009) (reversing summary judgment for employer in pregnancy discrimination case because of “me too” evidence of other women hired for being pregnant, as this evidence, the court opined, went to the employer’s motive, for purposes of casting doubt on an employer’s stated reason for an adverse employment action).
7. Wage and Hour Laws

Federal wage and hour law stems from a 1938 federal statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act—enforced by the Wage Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor. California has a far more extensive regulation of wages and working conditions, which reflects several sources: the IWC wage orders, the Labor Code, judicial decisions, and DLSE interpretations.

The FLSA does not preempt state law. Accordingly, an employer who is subject to both federal and California wage and hour law must comply with whichever law is the more onerous. And the more onerous version is almost always the California version. Thus, the California Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the “recognized principle that state law may provide employees greater protection than the FLSA.”

For example, California wage and hour law, unlike federal law,

- imposes a high and ever-increasing minimum wage (see § 7.2),
- requires that the minimum wage be paid separately for each hour of work, without regard to wage averaging (see § 7.2),
- treats any time under the control of the employer as hours worked (§ 7.3),
- requires payment for travel time by nonexempt employees even if it occurs beyond normal working hours (see § 7.3),
- requires reporting-for-duty pay (§ 7.3),
- requires overtime premium pay in many situations beyond the federal standard of work in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, including time and one-half for work in excess of eight hours a day and on the seventh consecutive day in a workweek, and doubletime for work in excess of 12 hours a day and work in excess of eight hours and on the seventh consecutive day in a workweek (see § 7.4),
- forbids use of the fluctuating-workweek method to compute the regular rate for salaried nonexempt workers (see § 7.4),
- requires employers to pay wages upon termination of employment, or incur large penalties (§ 7.5),
- imposes salary and duty criteria, for various exemptions, more onerous than those imposed by federal law (see § 7.6),
- requires that wage and hour exemptions be narrowly construed, as opposed to have them receive simply a fair reading (see § 7.6),
- requires meal, rest, and recovery breaks (see §§ 7.8, 7.9)
- requires an extra hour of pay for each daily failure to provide a meal break (§ 7.10),
• requires an extra hour of pay for each daily failure to provide a rest or recovery break (§ 7.10),
• requires employers to provide employees with suitable seats wherever the nature of the work reasonably permits seating (see 7.11),
• requires employers to pay for any uniforms and equipment that they mandate (see § 7.12),
• requires employers to pay for routine employee business expenses (see § 7.13),
• imposes special reporting requirements for piece-rate pay (see § 7.14)
• creates special requirements for commission payments (see § 7.15),
• creates special rules for bonus payments (see § 7.16),
• disallows tip credits (see § 7.17),
• treats earned vacation pay as a form of deferred wage (see § 7.18),
• restricts some employers’ ability to schedule and staff employees as they chose (see §§ 7.21, 7.22), and
• imposes potentially massive civil penalties for violations of wage and hour statutes (see § 7.24).

Moreover, California often eschews the guidance that federal labor law provides on analogous issues. The DLSE has stated: “we cannot use the analysis employed by the federal courts in establishing the obligations of California employers under the unique provisions of the California Industrial Welfare Commission wage orders.”

The California Supreme Court has made similar pronouncements—dismissive of federal law whenever the court deems California law more employee-friendly (see § 7.3.5).

To make matters still worse for employers, California courts decree that the California Labor Code, unlike the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, is to be "liberally construed" to protect employees. (See § 7.5.) This rule of construction does not mean that “plaintiff always wins”; it just seems that way. The California Supreme Court did once say this: “A mandate to construe a statute liberally in light of its underlying remedial purpose does not mean that courts can impose on the statute a construction not reasonably supported by the statutory language.” Of course, that was not an employment case.

7.1 Requirements Imposed by IWC Wage Orders

7.1.1 Overview of wage orders

The Industrial Welfare Commission has issued 17 “wage orders” to cover 12 broadly described industries and five occupations. Although the IWC no longer operates, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement continues to enforce the wage orders.

The wage orders address monetary compensation and working conditions, covering such items as minimum wage, reporting-time pay, overtime premium pay, doubletime premium pay, certain payroll deductions, employer-
required uniforms and equipment, meal periods, and rest breaks. These requirements affect all employees who are not expressly exempted, and exemptions are interpreted narrowly. The wage orders impose further requirements, as to both exempt and nonexempt employees, with respect to such matters as change rooms and resting facilities, seats, temperature, and elevators. Many rules are identical from one wage order to the next.

In promulgating the wage orders, IWC has engaged in a quasi-legislative capacity; a wage order thus deserves “the same dignity” as a statute and is considered “presumptively valid.”

Every employer subject to a wage order must post the order in a conspicuous place seen by employees during work hours. (Multiple occupational orders may apply to an employer not covered by an industry order.) For a copy of the wage orders, see www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/WageOrderIndustries.htm. Printed versions of the industry wage orders, for workplace posting, can ordered from http://www.dir.ca.gov/wp.asp.

7.1.2 Summary of major wage order provisions

While each wage order is distinct, the wage orders address essentially the same subject matters, in essentially the same order, with often similar if not identical language. Here is a summary of the major recurring provisions.

§ 3 Hours and Days of Work: Employers must pay daily overtime, weekly overtime, seventh-day overtime, doubletime for daily hours more than 12, and double time for daily hours more than eight on the seventh consecutive workday. As to any alternative workweek schedule the employer establishes (subject to detailed regulatory requirements), the employer must maintain a regular hourly rate, accommodate employees’ religious observances and conflicting schedules, and refrain from coercing employees to vote for or against a proposed alternative workweek. And the employer must honor an employee’s right not to work more than 72 hours per week.

§ 4 Minimum Wage: California employers must pay the minimum wage, which, for a larger employer, has been $12.00 since January 1, 2019. The federal minimum wage, meanwhile, has remained at $7.25 since July 2009.

§ 5 Reporting Time Pay: Employers must pay reporting-time pay to employees who must “report for work” and who are not provided with at least one-half the usual or scheduled work. Employers must also pay employees for at least two hours of work if they are called back to work without being provided with at least two hours of work. Reporting-time pay is not due if operations have ceased because of threats to employees or property, because civil authorities have recommended closure, because public utilities have failed, or because of other causes beyond the employer’s control.

§ 6 Licenses for Disabled Workers: Certain sub-minimum wages apply for licensed disabled workers.

§ 7 Records: Employers must record each employee’s full name, home address, occupation, social security number, birthdate (if under 18), must record when each work period begins and ends, and must record each meal period (although the employer need not record meal periods during which operations cease and need not record authorized rest periods). Employer must provide clocks in “all major work areas” or within a “reasonable distance.” The employer must also record split-shift intervals, total daily hours worked, wages paid, other compensation furnished each payroll period, total hours worked each payroll period, applicable rates of pay, etc. Employers must furnish itemized statements of all deductions, inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid.
the name of the employee or identifying number, the name of the employer, etc. Employers must make all required records available for inspection by the employee on reasonable request. And employers must provide clocks in “all major work areas or within reasonable distance thereto.”

§ 8 Cash Shortage and Breakage: Employers must not deduct from wages for any cash shortage, breakage, or loss of equipment that was not caused by the employee’s dishonest or willful act or by gross negligence.

§ 9 Uniforms and Equipment: Employers must provide and maintain any required employee uniform, a uniform being “apparel and accessories of distinctive design or color.” Employers must provide and maintain any required tools or equipment, except for hand tools and equipment customarily required by the craft that are used by employees who earn at least twice the minimum wage. While employers may require reasonable deposits for employer-provided uniforms and equipment and written agreements for deductions for loss of unreturned items, employers must not deduct for “normal wear and tear.”

§ 10 Meals and Lodging: Employers can take certain credits against minimum wage for employer-provided meals and lodging, and charge certain amounts of rent for required living at employer-provided lodging.

§ 11 Meal Periods: Employers must not make an employee work for a period of more than five hours without a 30-minute off-duty meal period, and must provide a “suitable place” for employees to eat if they are to eat on the premises. Exceptions: mutual-consent waivers if the workshift does not exceed six hours, and permissible “on duty” meal periods by mutual written agreement if the nature of the employee’s work prevents relief from all duty.

§ 12 Rest Periods: Employers must authorize and permit 10-minute rest periods (which still count as working time) near the middle of each work period of four hours “or major fraction thereof” (more than two hours). Exception: Employers need not authorize a rest period for daily work time that is less than three and one-half hours.

§ 13 Change Rooms and Resting Facilities: Employers must provide suitable places to safekeep outer clothing during working hours and work clothing during nonworking hours, and must provide (separate from toilet rooms) clean space to change clothing “in reasonable privacy and comfort” and suitable facilities to rest during work hours.

§ 14 Seats: Employers must provide “suitable seats” when the nature of the work “reasonably permits.” If the nature of the work does not reasonably permit the use of a seat, the employer still must make a suitable seat available nearby for use when employees are not engaged in active duties, so long as a seat would not interfere with the performance of those duties.

§ 15 Temperature: Employers must maintain temperature for “reasonable comfort” “in each work area,” must remove “excessive heat or humidity” created by work, and must maintain the temperature in toilet, resting, and change rooms at or above 68 degrees.

§ 16 Elevators: Employers must provide adequate elevators or escalators when employees work four or more floors above ground level.
§ 17 Exemptions: The DLSE can—on a showing of “undue hardship” to the employer and no material effect on employees—waive the requirements of Sections 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

§ 18 Filing Reports: Referring to employer duties imposed by Labor Code section 1174(a).

§ 19 Inspection: Referring to employer duties imposed by Labor Code section 1174.

§ 20 Penalties: Violations of the wage order trigger criminal misdemeanor penalties (as described in Labor Code section 1199) as well as civil penalties in the amount of $50 per pay period for each underpaid employee for an initial violation and $100 per pay period for each underpaid employee for each further violation.

§ 22 Posting of Order: Employers must keep the wage order posted in an area where it may be easily read during the workday. Where that is not practical, employers must make a copy of the order available on request.

7.2 Minimum Wages

7.2.1 State-wide minimum wage

California, with more than a dozen other states, imposes a higher minimum wage than does federal law. The California minimum wage for larger employers has been $12.00 since January 1, 2019. The federal minimum wage, by contrast, has remained at $7.25 since July 2009.

By 2016 legislation, the California minimum wage will rise annually until it reaches $15 in 2022, after which it will rise further in accordance with inflation.7 The following chart states the minimum wage for larger employers (those with more than 25 employees). For smaller employers, the schedule has each wage hike come one year later.

January 1, 2019 – $12.00

January 1, 2020 – $13.00

January 1, 2021 – $14.00

January 1, 2022 – $15.00

For years after 2022, the Department of Finance will calculate a yearly minimum wage increase at either 3.5% or the increase in the U.S. Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (U.S. CPI-W), whichever is lesser. The minimum wage will stay the same if that index is negative.

The Governor can pause wage hikes based on economic conditions, up to two times.

California heaps significant penalties on employers that fail to pay minimum wage. First, the underpaid employee is entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of the unpaid wages, plus interest thereon,8 unless the employer shows that it had reasonable grounds, in good faith, to believe that its actions complied.9 Second, the Labor Code imposes civil penalties of $100 per employee per pay period for a first, intentional, violation, and $250 per employee per pay period for repeated violations, on “[a]ny employer or other person acting either individually or as an officer, agent, or employee of another person” who fails to pay the minimum wage.10
Third, the Labor Code imposes criminal penalties on “[e]very employer or other person acting either individually or as an officer, agent, or employee of another person” who “causes to be paid to any employee a wage less than the minimum fixed by” a wage order.  

#### 7.2.2 The peculiar “pay separately for each hour” doctrine

In America generally, employers subject to the FLSA satisfy their duty to pay the minimum wage by paying an average hourly wage that meets the minimum, even if the employer does not separately compensate each hour of work within a workweek. And the FLSA also permits employers to pay employees a piece or commission rate, without specially compensating employees for non-productive working time, so long as their average hourly wage meets the minimum.

California is different. The DLSE interprets California law to require that employees be paid the minimum wage separately for each hour deemed to be time worked, regardless of what the employees earn on average. Courts have endorsed this California-specific approach. The Court of Appeal has held that drivers, paid on the basis of mileage and at certain hourly rates for certain tasks, must be paid additionally for each rest break: “a piece-rate compensation formula that does not compensate separately for rest periods does not comply with California minimum wage law.” The Court of Appeal has reached a similar conclusion as to nonexempt commissioned sales employees, holding that they, too, must be paid separately for their rest breaks.

**Development of a peculiar doctrine.** This California peculiarity received its judicial baptism in 2005, with an appellate decision reasoning that because Labor Code provisions reveal “a clear legislative intent to protect the minimum wage rights of California employees to a great extent than federally,” California employers must provide “full payment of wages for all hours worked.”

California courts then extended this “pay separately for every hour worked” concept to piece-rate workers. The Court of Appeal held that employers must separately pay employees the minimum wage for each hour worked—including waiting time and other time during which the employee cannot earn a piece rate. Under this interpretation of the California minimum wage, an employer cannot average the piece-rate earnings over the total hours worked, even if the employer guarantees that employees will earn the equivalent of minimum wage for all hours worked.

A federal court in California applied California’s peculiar “pay separately for every hour worked” principle to employees paid on a commission basis. In early 2017, the Court of Appeal followed suit, holding that the requirement to separately pay for rest breaks applies to employees paid on commission.

The “pay separately for every hour worked” doctrine has even extended, in the context of piece-rate work, to require an employer to pay separately for rest breaks, on the rationale that rest breaks are counted as hours worked and are paid as such for workers earning an hourly wage, but are not separately paid for in the piece-rate context (see § 7.14).

A 2018 Court of Appeal decision, *Certified Tire & Service Centers Wage and Hour Cases*, endorsed a creative variable hourly based compensation system that approximated the wages paid under a traditional commission or piece-rate plan. Automotive technicians earned an hourly wage, exceeding the minimum wage, for all hours worked. A technician’s hourly rate could be higher, based on a formula that rewarded work billed to the customer.
Billed dollars charged to a customer went into a formula that produced “production dollars,” which were divided by the hours worked during the pay period to determine a “base hourly rate.” If the base hourly rate exceeded the guaranteed minimum hourly rate, then the technician would be paid the base hourly rate for all time worked during the pay period. If the base hourly rate were lower, then the guaranteed minimum hourly rate would apply for all such time worked.

The plaintiffs challenged this pay method because it required employees to perform work that could not generate production dollars (e.g., tire rotations, oil changes, cleaning, attending meetings) and thus could not increase the base hourly wage. The plaintiffs argued that these non-productive activities were uncompensated.

Certified Tire rejected this argument, because the pay plan was an hourly based compensation system, not an activity-based compensation system: “Although the hourly rate differs from pay period to pay period because technicians have the opportunity to increase their guaranteed minimum hourly rate based on the generation of production dollars, the technicians are always paid on an hourly basis for all hours worked at a rate above minimum wage regardless of their productivity, and regardless of the type of activity in which they were engaged during those hours.”

The eminent good sense of this decision notwithstanding, the California Supreme Court granted review. Its own ruling is expected in 2019 or 2020.

### 7.2.3 Local “living wage” ordinances

The national movement favoring a $15 minimum wage has won resounding approval in California, not only at the state level but in many municipalities, which have adopted various forms of minimum wages, either for companies generally or for those companies that have contracted with the local government.\(^9\)

**Application beyond city limits.** Some ordinances can apply beyond the city limits. A Court of Appeal affirmed the application of the Hayward, California city ordinance to employees who lived or worked outside the city limits. The ordinance’s failure to specify how it would apply in situations where contractors performed work outside of the municipality did not render it unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeal also permitted employees, as intended third-party beneficiaries of their employer’s contract with the city, to sue to enforce their employer’s contractual promise to comply with Hayward’s living wage.\(^10\)

**San Francisco minimum wage.** San Francisco has stretched the wage and hour envelope as much as any other California city, and the area of the minimum wage is no exception. Voters, by enacting Proposition J, made the minimum wage $14 as of July 2017. Proposition J made the minimum wage $15 by July 2018 and, in the years thereafter, will hike the minimum wage to further levels as determined by annual changes in the cost of living. The minimum wage will rise to $15.59 in July 2019.\(^11\)

Other municipalities have enacted similar measures. In Southern California minimum-wage ordinances have been enacted in Long Beach, Los Angeles, Malibu, Pasadena, San Diego, Santa Monica, and West Hollywood. In Northern California minimum-wage ordinances have been enacted in Berkeley, El Cerrito, Emeryville, Mountain View, Oakland, Palo Alto, Richmond, Sacramento, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Clara, and Sunnyvale. Here are a few examples:
Berkeley. The minimum wage rose to $15 in October 2018.\textsuperscript{24}

Emeryville. As of July 2017, Emeryville took the crown for the highest general minimum wage in California: For large employers the minimum wage will rise from $15.69 to an estimated $16.00 by July 2019.

City and County of Los Angeles. The minimum wage rose to $12 in July 2017, with further annual raises each July, scheduled to bring the minimum wage to $15.00 by 2020. Since July 2018 the minimum wage for employers with 26 or more employees has been $13.25 and it will rise to $14.25 by July 2019.\textsuperscript{25} In the City of Los Angeles, the minimum wage for hotel employees is determined annually based on a consumer price index. In July 2018 the hotel workers’ minimum wage rose to $16.10.\textsuperscript{26}

Oakland. Under Measure FF, passed in 2014, the minimum wage rises with cost-of-living increases. The minimum wage since January 1 2019, has been $13.80.

Palo Alto. Under a 2016 ordinance, Palo Alto raised the minimum wage to $13.50 in January 2018 and the minimum wage has been $15.00 since January 1, 2019.

Richmond. The minimum wage has been $15.00 since January 1, 2019.

San Diego. The minimum wage has been $12.00 since January 1, 2019.

San Jose. The minimum wage has been $15.00 since January 1, 2019.

Santa Monica. The Santa Monica ordinance tracks the minimum wage requirements of its neighbor Los Angeles, including a carve-out for hotel employees. The minimum wage is $14.25 and will rise to $15.00 by 2020.

7.3 Pay For Hours Worked

7.3.1 Statutory right to recover contractual pay

Federal statutes do not require employers to live by contracts to pay wages that exceed the minimum wage. California is different. California employees can sue under the Labor Code to recover wages required by either statute or contract.\textsuperscript{27}

7.3.2 California counts as hours worked any time subject to the employer’s control

The “hours worked” concept is central to both federal and California law. The California concept, however, is broader, and can require employers to pay employees where federal law does not.

Federal law considers time worked if the time is spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit, as opposed to the employee’s benefit. California is different. First, California defines “hours worked” as “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.”\textsuperscript{28} California law thus applies a broader definition of “hours worked” than the FLSA does. Second, while the federal Portal to Portal Act specifies that employers need not pay for “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities … [the] employee is employed to perform,” or for “activities … preliminary to or postliminary to [the] principal activity
or activities,” California law applies a broader standard, entitling the plaintiffs in one case to claim pay “for the time they spent subject to defendants’ control between signing in and beginning work shifts and between the end of their work shifts and when signing out.” Nonetheless, California law does require, as under federal law, that the employer knew or should have known of the time alleged to be hours worked.

7.3.3 Reporting time pay and split shift pay

Reporting time. Nonexempt employees sometimes report for work, only to find that the expected work is not available. When that happens, the employer must pay for at least one-half the scheduled work (with the pay to be no less than two hours nor more than four hours). Nonexempt employees also sometimes report for work a second time within the same workday to find less than two hours of work to perform on the second reporting. When that happens, the employer must pay two hours “at the employees’ regular rate of pay, which shall not be less than the minimum wage.”

The Court of Appeal has rejected a plaintiff’s claim that, as to a 45-second termination meeting he was summoned to attend, he should have received four hours of pay instead of the two hours of pay that he did receive. The Court of Appeal reasoned that on the day in question the plaintiff was scheduled for a meeting of unspecified length and so was not entitled to anything more than the two-hour minimum.

The Court of Appeal has also clarified that because reporting-time pay is due only when the employee has work for less than one-half the scheduled shift, an employer can schedule short meetings and pay only for the length of the meeting. The example the Court of Appeal gave was a meeting scheduled for one and one-half hours, but lasting only one hour. In that case, no reporting-pay would be due, the Court of Appeal said, because the employer furnished work for more than one-half the scheduled time.

The traditional meaning of “report for work” is to show up at the workplace at the appointed time, ready to work. That certainly was the phrase’s meaning when the relevant Wage Order language was enacted, in 1947. But in 2019 an activist Court of Appeal decision held that employees “report for work” if, while subject to an on-call schedule, they comply with an employer requirement to telephone two hours before the shift to see if work is available that day. The majority opinion—expressing solicitude for the plight of workers whose on-call schedules “significantly limit” their ability to “earn income, pursue an education, care for dependent family members, and enjoy recreation time”—held that employees “report for work,” and thereby are eligible for reporting pay if they then receive no work, simply by calling the employer to report their availability; they need not in these circumstances be at the workplace to “report for work.” A well-reasoned dissenting opinion bemoaned this latest instance of California judicial activism: “[O]ur fundamental task in interpreting Wage Orders is ascertaining the drafters’ intent, not drawing up interpretations that promote the Court’s view of good policy. … It is our Legislature’s responsibility to enact any necessary legislation to address any hardship to employees who are required to call the employer to discover if they must report for work.”

Split shifts. Some nonexempt employees have a work schedule interrupted by nonpaid, nonworking hours (other than meal breaks), with a designated beginning and quitting time. The DLSE takes the position that a bona fide meal break does not exceed one hour, and that interruptions exceeding one hour may give rise to a split shift. California employer must pay split-shift employees “one hour’s pay at the minimum wage … in addition to the minimum wage for that workday.”
The commonsensical interpretation of this provision is that split-shift employees, if they get paid more than the minimum wage, are entitled to any difference between what they actually earned and what they would have earned had they received the minimum wage for their entire shift plus an extra hour. The Court of Appeal has adopted this interpretation, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a split-shift employee is automatically entitled to an extra hour of wages paid at the rate of the minimum wage.

7.3.4 Travel time

**Commuting.** Under the FLSA, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers need not pay for the time an employee spends traveling to and from work, so long as the travel itself is not integral to the work performed. California is different: travel time is compensable if the employee is subject to the control of the employer, even if the employee is not working. Under this doctrine, even commuting time in California is compensable if the employer requires its employees to travel to work on its buses. The Ninth Circuit has highlighted the difference between federal and California law, with the Ninth Circuit holding that where employees were required to use company vehicles for commuting purposes, the commute was not compensable under the federal Employment Commuter Flexibility Act, but was compensable under California law, which requires that employees be paid for all time during which they are subject to the employer’s control. A 2018 Court of Appeal decision recognized that, even in California, time spent traveling in an employer-provided vehicle, even one loaded with equipment and tools, is not compensable if using that vehicle is “optional and voluntary.”

**Overnight travel.** Under federal law, hours worked do not include non-working travel time spent beyond normal working hours. California is different, treating as hours worked any compulsory travel time, because it is time subject to the control of the employer, regardless of whether the employee actually works during that time.

7.3.5 On-call time

Federal law applies two factors in assessing whether “on call” time is entitled to compensation: (1) the degree to which the on-call employee is free to engage in personal activities and (2) the agreements between the parties. In California it’s different. The California DLSE deems irrelevant any agreement between the parties as to whether on-call time is compensable. Instead, the essential test for compensability is simply whether the employer imposed restrictions on the on-call employee’s ability to serve personal purposes so as to render the employee subject to the employer’s control. Employers can minimize the impact of on-call compensability by paying for on-call time at some wage (e.g., the minimum wage) that is lower than the normal wage.

**Sleeping time.** The Court of Appeal has held that ship-board employees who worked 14 consecutive shifts of 12-hour days (followed by 14 days off), and who were otherwise on call, were entitled to pay for all their on-call hours, because of the requirement that they sleep aboard ship and remain within no more than 45 minutes of the ship at all times. The Court of Appeal rejected federal authority that would consider agreements between the parties governing pay for on-call work, because California law depends on the employer’s control, without regard to agreements.

One sensible Court of Appeal decision held that if an employee is on a 24-hour shift, then an employer can deduct up to eight hours as uncompensable sleep time, so long (1) as the sleep is uninterrupted, (2) the employer provides the on-call employee a comfortable place to sleep, and (3) the employee has agreed in writing that this period would not be compensated.
But then the California Supreme Court took this decision for review, and in 2015 issued a sweeping decision that highlights how peculiar California employment law can be. The Supreme Court held that on-site, on-call construction site security guards were entitled to pay for all their on-call time, including their sleeping time, even though federal regulations regarding resident employees would permit the employer and employee to make reasonable agreements about the amount of uncompensated free time, and to exclude eight hours of sleep time from a 24-hour shift. More generally, the Supreme Court emphasized generally the differences between federal law and more employee-friendly California law, proclaiming that California courts should not incorporate a federal standard on compensable time absent convincing evidence that California authorities intended to incorporate the federal standard.

7.3.6 Security procedures

Under the FLSA, time that employees spend undergoing post-shift security screenings is not compensable. The Supreme Court so held in 2014, reasoning that this screening activity for warehouse employees was not “integral and indispensable to the principal activities that an employee is employed to perform,” and thus was exempted from FLSA requirements by the Portal to Portal Act of 1947.

California, however, has no analogous exemption, and makes time compensable wherever an employee is under the employer’s control. One federal district court certified a class of retail workers who sought pay for the time they spent cooperating in routine bag checks upon departing the store. The case settled for $5 million.

A California employer has prevailed against a similar, however, where employees could avoid a post-shift bag check simply by deciding not to bring a bag to work. This issue is now before the California Supreme Court.

7.4 Computing Wages Owed

7.4.1 Employer duty to record hours

California employers must record (in addition to name, address and other personal information) voluminous data as to each employee. The items that employers must record include gross wages earned, net wages earned, total hours worked, the number of any piece-rate units earned, any applicable piece rate, inclusive dates of pay periods, all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each rate, the time each work period and meal period began and ended, and all deductions made. California employers must not prohibit employees from maintaining their own personal record of the hours they have worked or the piece-rate units they have earned.

7.4.2 Workweek calculation

For purposes of computing weekly overtime pay, employers must count the hours worked within each workweek. Employers often designate the workweek as beginning at midnight on Sunday, though the workweek can begin at any time the employer designates (or at different times for different groups of employees). Time worked within the designated week counts toward weekly overtime. An employer following this accounting should not have its workweek method challenged. But California courts have found “artificial” workweek designations unlawful if those designations aim to avoid overtime obligations. One Court of Appeal decision held that employees who worked 14-day shifts from Tuesday to Tuesday on boats could recover seventh day overtime compensation on both the
seventh and 14th days of each consecutive 14-day work period, even though the employer’s designated workweek began on Monday at 12:01 a.m. and ended on Sunday at midnight.\textsuperscript{57}

\subsection*{7.4.3 The de minimis doctrine}

Federal courts applying the FLSA have recognized that some work time off the clock is too short, too sporadic, or too difficult to record to be compensable.\textsuperscript{58} This time is considered \textit{de minimis} (too trivial to care about). \textit{De minimis} is a doctrine rather than an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead.\textsuperscript{59} Exemplifying the doctrine in action are rulings that the time spent to undergo certain bag checks while exiting a retail store was \textit{de minimis} and thus not compensable.\textsuperscript{60}

But does the judicially created \textit{de minimis} doctrine, applied in cases interpreting federal law, also apply in California? Although the DLSE and the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the \textit{de minimis} doctrine applies under California law,\textsuperscript{61} the California Supreme Court, in \textit{Troester v. Starbucks Corp.},\textsuperscript{62} concluded otherwise. The case came to the Supreme Court on a referral from the Ninth Circuit, which certified this question that the Supreme Court agreed to review: “Does the federal Fair Labor Standards Act’s \textit{de minimis} doctrine, as stated in \textit{Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.}, 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946) and \textit{Lindow v. United States}, 738 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 1984), apply to claims for unpaid wages under the California Labor Code sections 510, 1194, and 1197?”\textsuperscript{63}

\textit{Troester} is another classic example of a California court deciding that California public policy somehow differs from analogous federal policy, with the result that the California result will be more onerous on the employer. \textit{Troester} first held that California statutes and regulations have not adopted the federal \textit{de minimis} doctrine. \textit{Troester} emphasized that courts “liberally construe the Labor Code and wage orders to favor the protection of employees,” and that the California Supreme Court has “recognized the divergence between IWC wage orders and federal law, generally finding state law more protective than federal law.”\textsuperscript{64}

Moreover, \textit{Troester} held that although the \textit{de minimis} doctrine exists as a general background principle, it would not apply on the facts at hand, where the employer required the employee to work off the clock several minutes per shift. \textit{Troester} specifically declined to “decide whether there are circumstances where compensable time is so minute or irregular that it is unreasonable to expect the time to be recorded.”\textsuperscript{65} Meanwhile, \textit{Troester} was generally skeptical of applying the \textit{de minimis} doctrine: “one of the main impetuses behind the … doctrine in wage cases is ‘the practical administrative difficulty of recording small amounts of time for payroll purposes.’ … But employers are in a better position than employees to devise alternatives that would permit the tracking of small amounts of regularly occurring worktime. … [T]echnological advances may help with tracking small amounts of time. … [W]e decline to adopt a rule that would require the employee to bear the entire burden of any difficulty in recording regularly occurring worktime.”\textsuperscript{66}

\subsection*{7.4.4 “Rounding”}

Both federal law and state law (as interpreted by the DLSE) permit employers to compute employee work time by using a rounding method, “provided that it is used in such a manner that it will not result, over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees properly for all the time they have actually worked.”\textsuperscript{67} A California trial court, however, held that rounding was unlawful and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, on a rationale that California law does not authorize paying on the basis of anything other than strict time reporting. The Court of
Appeal then corrected this mistake, holding that California law should follow federal law in this instance. The California Supreme Court, meanwhile, has yet to address whether rounding is permissible.

A 2018 Court of Appeal decision rejected a challenge to a healthcare employer’s practice of rounding time to the nearest quarter-hour. The rounding system was neutral on its face and, in practice, overcompensated employees as a whole. The plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue as to the validity of the system by citing that they and a bare majority of employees at a single hospital suffered a net loss of compensable time during a discrete period.

The Ninth Circuit likewise has followed a common-sense approach to evaluating an employer’s practice of rounding to the nearest quarter-hour, recently affirming summary judgment for an employer whose rounding practice complied with both the FLSA and California wage and hour laws and was neutral in design and in outcome.

Because the permissibility of a rounding practice can thus depend on retrospective analyses of numerical outcomes, the practice may sometimes be legally precarious. In any event, a “rounding” practice should not be confused with an “exception reporting” practice that gives employees a “grace period” to clock in a few minutes before or after the scheduled shift, while simultaneously forbidding any work outside the scheduled shift (subject to expressly authorized exceptions, and subject to the employee indicating the scheduled hours or some expressly different amount of hours were worked each day and week). Under this system, the electronically recorded time would not be the measure of hours worked but rather would serve as a method to confirm attendance. California courts have not (yet) rejected this federally approved practice, which works well only with respect to fixed schedules from which deviations are rare.

### 7.4.5 Overtime premium pay

In America generally, employers must pay nonexempt employees at an overtime premium rate (1.5 times the regular hourly rate) only to the extent that they work over 40 hours per week. California is different. Most wage orders provide that nonexempt employees also earn daily overtime—premium pay for work over eight hours a day, and for the first eight hours of work on a seventh consecutive workday in a workweek. There is also a premium pay rate of double the regular rate for work performed over 12 hours a day and over eight hours on the seventh consecutive workday in a workweek. These special premiums apply even where the working time does not exceed 40 hours a week.

A 2011 decision recognized that California employers could mitigate some of the harshness of these requirements by a mutual agreement with employees to pay a fixed salary that covers all hours worked, including overtime, but in 2012 the California Legislature eliminated this option, forbidding employers to use such agreements.

**Salaried nonexempt employees: fluctuating workweek method not permitted.** California law differs from federal law on how to calculate overtime pay for salaried nonexempt employees. Federal law permits use the “fluctuating workweek” method, which recognizes the economic reality that the weekly salary covers all hours worked that week, so that only the overtime “premium” is due for overtime hours. California, by contrast, requires the use of the “fixed workweek” method, which irrebuttably presumes that the weekly salary is paid only for a 40-hour workweek (at most). Under this method, both overtime premium and base salary are due for each overtime...
hour worked. As shown below, the “fixed workweek” method results in greater liability where employers have misclassified salaried nonexempt employees as exempt.

Under the federal “fluctuating workweek” method, the regular rate for a given week for a nonexempt salaried employee is the weekly salary divided by the total number of hours worked that week. Consider an employee paid $800 per week who works 50 hours one week: the regular rate for that week would be $16 per hour ($800 divided by 50), and the overtime premium rate would be $24. The amount of premium pay due for that week would be ten hours of overtime times $8 per hour, or $80, because for the ten overtime hours the employee has already been paid the regular rate of $16, and would be entitled to only an additional $8 per hour (0.5 times the regular rate).

In California the regular rate would be higher. For the same nonexempt salaried employee, working the same hours, the regular rate would be $800 divided by only 40 hours (not the 50 hours actually worked). The regular rate would thus be $20, making the premium rate $30. In addition, because the fixed workweek method presumes that a salary covers only the first 40 hours of work, the employee would be entitled to extra pay in the amount of ten hours multiplied by the entire premium rate of $30, not just the extra $10 per hour.

The federal and California methods thus diverge at two junctures: (1) how to calculate the regular rate of pay, and (2) what multiplier to apply to the amount due. As to the regular rate, the federal fluctuating-workweek method divides weekly salary by all hours worked in a week, while the California fixed-workweek method divides weekly salary by only 40 hours. As to the multiplier, the fluctuating workweek multiplies the regular rate by 0.5, while the fixed-workweek multiplies the regular rate by 1.5.

Thus, the employee who has $80 of weekly premium pay elsewhere in America could have $300 in California:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weekly salary</th>
<th>Weekly hours</th>
<th>Regular rate</th>
<th>Multiplier</th>
<th>OT hours</th>
<th>OT pay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fluctuating Workweek</strong></td>
<td>$800.00</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>$16.00</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$80.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Workweek</strong></td>
<td>$800.00</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>$20.00</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$300.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.5.1 Payment during employment

The Labor Code aims to “ensure that employees receive their full wages at specified intervals while employed, as well as when they are fired or quit,” and this protection applies not only to hourly employees but even to highly paid executives and salespeople. Labor Code sections 204, 204b, and 205 set forth detailed requirements for establishing regular paydays. Section 207 requires that employers post a notice identifying when and where wages are paid. Nonexempt employees must be paid at least semimonthly and must be paid no later than seven days after the close of the pay period. A failure to pay wages due in a pay period incurs penalties of $100 or $200 per employee per pay period plus 25% of the unpaid wage.

The Court of Appeal has held that this worker-protection legislation entitles all employees—even highly paid executives making very large salaries under a written employment agreement—to sue for wages under the Labor Code and to recover attorney fees for a successful wage claim.

7.5.2 Method and place of payment

The payment of wages must be in a form redeemable in cash on demand, without discount, at an established place of business within California.

Labor Code sections 208 and 209 require that an employer pay final wages due at the place of employment (when the employee is fired) or the employer's offices (when the employee quits), and to make the final paychecks of striking workers available on the next regular payday.

Payment by direct deposit. Employers generally may satisfy their obligation to pay wages by making direct deposits to the employee’s account in a California bank, with the employee's voluntary written authorization.

Payment by debit card. The DLSE has opined that California employers can meet their duty to pay wages in cash or by negotiable instruments through the means of an electronic debit card, so long as the employee has agreed in writing to this method of payment and so long as the employee can use the card without fee for the first transaction in each pay period, to permit immediate free access to the entirety of the wages.

7.5.3 Payment upon termination of employment

What are the “wages” that must be paid upon termination? Does a failure to pay an employee the extra hour of pay the employee is entitled to for a meal-break or rest-break violation give rise to a Section 203 penalty for failing to pay timely termination wages? The correct answer is No, because the one hour of pay is a remedy for a violation, and not an earned wage. The Court of Appeal recognized this point in a 2016 decision. The Supreme Court has since upset reliance on that sensible result by granting review of the question in another case. The Supreme Court is expected to rule in 2019.

Timing of payment. Many states permit employers to pay final wages in the regular payroll cycle. California is different. California employers must pay a discharged employee in full on the day of discharge. An employee who quits must be paid not later than 72 hours of the notice of resignation, or earlier, at the time of quitting, if the employee has given at least 72 hours of notice.
The California Supreme Court has decided that an employer owed waiting-time penalties to an employee who had not resigned, but rather had retired. At issue was whether Labor Code sections 202 and 203, which authorize a suit by an employee who “quits” employment, likewise authorize a suit by an employee who has retired. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, reasoning that retirees fall into the broader category of employees who have “quit” employment within the meaning of the general prompt payment rule of Sections 202(a) and 203.95

Payment by direct deposit. California law once “deemed terminated” the employee’s authorization of direct deposit if the employee was fired or quit. The Legislature amended that annoying provision, however, to permit employers to may make the final payment of wages by regularly authorized direct deposit.96

When is the day of discharge? Because of the severe waiting-time penalties imposed (see § 7.5.4 below), it is important for an employer to establish clearly the day of discharge. The day of discharge is not necessarily the last day on which work is performed. In cases of suspected employee misconduct, many California employers suspend an employee without pay pending further investigation or deliberation on the decision whether to discharge the employee. This approach enables an employer to have the final paycheck ready on the day of discharge. If, however, the employer reaches its final decision to discharge, and releases the employee from employment, before the day the employer delivers the final paycheck, the employer would risk waiting-time penalties.

When are temporary employees discharged? A “temporary employee” might be called to work for a fixed-term assignment, and then wait a few days before taking the next assignment. Is there a “discharge”—requiring immediate payment of all earned wages—every time a temporary assignment ends? In a case involving an individual hired for a one-day modeling job and then not promptly paid for her services, the Court of Appeal relied on the plain meaning of the statutory term “discharge” to hold that an employee whose temporary assignment simply runs its course has not been “discharged” and, therefore, cannot recover waiting-time penalties for lack of an immediate payment; rather, final payment can occur at some mutually agreed time or other reasonable time.97 The California Supreme Court then swept this pro-employer ruling off the books and held that the employer’s obligation to pay all earned wages upon termination of employment is not limited to a situation where an employee is released from an ongoing employment relationship, but also applies upon completion of the specific job assignment or time duration for which the employee was hired.98

The California Legislature then provided some complications with 2008 legislation that addresses timely payment of temporary service employees. This law generally permits weekly payments for these employees, “regardless of when the assignment ends,” subject to certain exceptions pertaining to daily work assignments, labor disputes, and other special situations.99

Payment of vacation pay upon termination. The wages that the employer must pay a departing employee include all accrued, unused vacation pay. Vacation pay due at the time of termination must be calculated at the final rate of pay on the basis of daily accrual, even if accrual of vacation pay ordinarily has been calculated on an annual, monthly, or weekly basis.100 (See § 7.18.)

7.5.4 Waiting-time penalties

Willful failure to pay wages due upon termination can result, under Section 203 of the Labor Code, in a “waiting time” penalty equal to the employee’s daily rate of pay for up to 30 working days.101
belief that no wages are owed is a defense to waiting-time penalties, but ignorance of the law is insufficient. (See § 13.3.)

Although the waiting-time penalty provision most obviously applies to a failure to make timely payment for work done during a final pay period, the DLSE has applied the penalty in circumstances where the final paycheck fails to address unpaid wages that have been earned at any time during the employment.

Absent some constitutional challenge, the amount of waiting-time penalty imposed on a California employer does not depend on the amount of the underpayment. Thus, an employer who has underpaid an employee by a grand total of $1, and who does not discover the underpayment until more than 30 working days after the employee has quit, could owe the employee waiting-time penalties, measured by 30 working days, or six weeks, of wages. A 2018 Court of Appeal decision held that the trial court lacks discretion to reduce the amount of waiting-time penalties. A court can effectively reduce the amount of penalty, however, if it determines that part of the delay in payment resulted from inadvertent clerical error and thus was not willful.

To make matters worse for employers, the statute of limitations for claiming waiting-time penalties is three years, not the one-year limitations period generally applying to penalty claims. One Court of Appeal decision held that a claim just for penalties (where the employer had paid the underlying wages due) should be subject to the one-year statute of limitations, but the California Supreme Court, in 2010, held that a three-year period applies.

Softening the blow somewhat, the same California Supreme Court decision held that waiting-time penalties are not recoverable as restitution under California’s Unfair Competition Law, in that those penalties “would not restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest.” Accordingly, plaintiffs may not simply add a UCL claim to extend the statute of limitations period to four years for waiting-time penalties.

The Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS has opined on the tax treatment of this California peculiarity, stating that Section 203 penalties are not wages for purposes of employment tax. Accordingly, according to this opinion, an employer paying Section 203 penalties need not withhold taxes for the terminated employee or pay employer-side payroll taxes.

7.6 “White Collar” Exemptions from Wage Requirements

Section 1(A) of most of the wage orders states that Sections 3 through 12 of the wage orders do not apply to employees covered by the administrative, professional, or executive exemptions. Section 1(C) indicates that the same is true for outside salespeople. The California administrative, professional, and executive exemptions resemble the corresponding federal exemptions, but an employer generally will find it harder under California law than under federal law to establish that an employee is exempt.

For one thing, federal wage and hour law is not inherently pro-plaintiff, while California wage and hour law is. In a 2018 U.S. Supreme Court case, the Court considered whether service advisors at an auto dealership qualified under the FLSA for an overtime exemption that applies to salespeople primarily engaged in servicing automobiles. The Ninth Circuit, finding the statutory language ambiguous, ruled for the plaintiff under a “principle that exemptions to the FLSA should be construed narrowly.” The Supreme Court “reject[ed] this principle as a useful guidepost for interpreting the FLSA. … The narrow-construction principle relies on the flawed premise that
the FLSA pursues its remedial purpose at all costs. … But the FLSA … exemptions are as much a part of the FLSA’s purpose as the overtime-pay requirement. … We thus have no license to give the exemption anything but a fair reading.”\(^{112}\) California, meanwhile, is radically different. It supreme court proclaims that wage and hour exemptions are “narrowly construe[d] … against the employer.”\(^ {113} \)

7.6.1 Salary requirement

Under both federal and state law, an employee must be salaried to qualify as an administrative, professional, or executive employee. Thus, with some specific exceptions (e.g., computer professionals, physicians), all hourly paid employees are nonexempt, regardless of their duties or their level of pay.

Minimum salary. For exemptions requiring a salary basis, the salary paid must meet a certain numerical minimum. Under federal law, the salary basis is met so long as the weekly salary is at least $455 (equating to an annual salary of $23,660). The U.S. DOL, during the Obama Administration, issued a final regulation, to take effect December 1, 2016, that would have dramatically narrowed the FLSA’s executive, administrative, and professional exemptions by raising the minimum annual salary to $47,476. But in November 2016 a federal district court in Texas placed a nationwide injunction on the new regulation.

Wherever the federal law may ultimately fix the minimum salary, California will be different. To qualify as salaried exempt, a California employee must earn a salary that is at least twice the monthly minimum wage for full-time (40 hours per week) employment.\(^ {114} \) So because California’s minimum wage is on the move, the minimum pay needed to meet the salary basis moves accordingly. For employers with more than 25 employees, the minimum weekly salary for an exempt California employee as of 2019 is $960 (twice the minimum wage of $12 and equivalent to an annual salary of $49,920).

Vacation deductions for partial-day personal absences? In interpreting the salary requirement, federal regulators have permitted employers some flexibility in charging an employee’s PTO bank for partial-day absences from work. But the DLSE argued that California vacation pay, being “vested,” cannot be deducted for partial-day absences without destroying the salary basis. A 2005 Court of Appeal decision rejected this theory, holding that California employers may require the use of accrued vacation for partial-day absences without causing otherwise exempt employees to become nonexempt under the salary basis test.\(^ {115} \) A 2009 DLSE opinion letter agreed with this position, opining that deductions from accrued sick-leave and vacation balances generally do not destroy an employee’s salary basis.\(^ {116} \)

Because the 2005 case involved a leave policy that effected deductions from an employee’s PTO bank only for partial-day absences of at least four hours, some employers made PTO adjustments for partial-day absences only when they were four hours or more. In 2014, however, the Court of Appeal held that deductions from accrued vacation time is permissible in California regardless of the length of the exempt employee’s partial-day absence.\(^ {117} \)

7.6.2 Executive exemption

A California exempt executive must (1) be primarily engaged in managing a department or subdivision of it, (2) supervise at least two other individuals, (3) have the authority to hire or fire other employees, or effectively recommend the same, (4) customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment in the
performance of job duties (i.e., have the authority to make an independent choice free from immediate supervision with respect to matters of significance), and (5) be “primarily engaged” in exempt duties.\textsuperscript{118}

Executive activities may include interviewing, selecting, and training employees, setting and adjusting pay rates and work hours, directing the work of subordinates, evaluating employee efficiency and productivity, resolving employee complaints, disciplining employees, planning the work, determining techniques to use, deciding types of material, supplies and machinery to use, purchasing same, and engaging in work directly and closely related to those activities, or properly viewed as a means to carry them out.

Nonexempt tasks include performing the same kind of work as subordinates, performing production or service work that is not part of the supervisory function, making sales or replenishing stock, performing routine clerical duties, checking or inspecting goods in a production operation, and performing maintenance work.

\textbf{No appreciation for multi-tasking.} Federal law, in determining whether an employee is executive exempt, recognizes that concurrent performance of exempt and nonexempt work can count as exempt for purposes of the executive exemption. For example, federal regulations interpreting the FLSA state: “An assistant manager can supervise employees and serve customers at the same time without losing the exemption.”\textsuperscript{119} California is different. The Court of Appeal has held that an activity must be categorized as either exempt or nonexempt, based on the employee’s purpose for engaging in such activity.\textsuperscript{120}

\textbf{No sole-charge exemption.} Federal law formerly provided for a “sole-charge exception” for executives at separate establishments, which allowed employers to treat the manager of an establishment as exempt irrespective of the primary duty test, so long as there were at least two full-time employees or their equivalents under the manager’s supervision at the location.\textsuperscript{121} California has never recognized this exception.

\textbf{7.6.3 Professional exemption}

A California exempt professional must (1) either (a) be licensed or certified by California and primarily engaged in law, medicine, dentistry, optometry, architecture, engineering, teaching, or accounting, or (b) be primarily engaged in an occupation commonly recognized as a learned or artistic profession requiring knowledge of an advanced type customarily acquired by prolonged academic study, or (c) be engaged in original and creative work dependent primarily on invention, imagination, or artistic talent, or (d) be engaged in work that is predominantly intellectual and varied in character, and (2) customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment in the performance of those activities.\textsuperscript{122}

Under the narrow limits of California’s professional exemption, pharmacists and registered nurses, who are exempt professionals under federal law and in many states, cannot qualify as exempt professionals in California.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{7.6.4 Administrative exemption}

A California exempt administrative employee must be primarily engaged in (1) customarily and regularly exercising discretion and independent judgment\textsuperscript{124} in the performance of intellectual work (office or non-manual work of substantial importance directly related to management policies or the general business operation of the employer or its customers; not production or sales work), or (2) directly assisting an exempt executive or administrator, with only general supervision, or work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training,
experience, or knowledge; or execute special assignments. Exempt administrative employee activities include servicing the business by, for example, advising management on policy determinations, planning, negotiating, representing the company, purchasing, and business research, and also by engaging in work that is directly and closely related to those activities, or properly viewed as a means of carrying them out.

In *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange*, a California appellate court considering whether insurance claims adjusters were administrative employees. *Bell* construed the wage orders to add a “role” test to the traditional “duties” test: *Bell* would not even reach the issue of whether the job satisfies the duties test unless the employee serves in an “administrative capacity.” *Bell* distinguished administrative work from “production” work, the latter being work needed to create whatever product or service the business sells, as opposed to administrative work necessary to support the production. *Bell* held that work of insurance claims adjusters was inherently production work, rendering them ineligible for the administrative exemption.

But the FLSA regulations provide that an administratively exempt employee can provide administrative support to the employer or the employer’s customers. Thus, *Bell* conceded “that the administrative / production worker dichotomy is a somewhat gross distinction that may not be dispositive in many cases. ... For example, some businesses, such as management consulting firms, may provide services that clearly pertain to business administration, even though they are activities that the businesses exist to produce and market.”

*Bell* placed California law at odds with analogous federal law. Federal decisions have refused to apply *Bell*’s reasoning in FLSA insurance adjuster cases, and the 2004 FLSA regulation amendments clarify that insurance adjusters can be covered by the administrative exemption “whether they work for an insurance company or another type of company.” Several federal decisions have concluded that insurance adjusters are exempt under the FLSA. A further indication that *Bell* had limited effect was a 2007 Ninth Circuit decision, which held that insurance adjusters, as a rule, qualify for the administrative exemption, and which criticized *Bell* for its overbroad construction of the meaning of “production work.”

California peculiarity reasserted itself, however, in 2007, when the Court of Appeal decided *Harris v. Superior Court (Liberty Mutual)*. Despite the opportunity to move away from *Bell* and towards the federal view of the administrative exemption, *Harris* went the other way, taking an even narrower view than *Bell* concerning what jobs qualify as “administrative.” The Court of Appeal concluded that “only work performed at the level of policy or general operations [emphasis in original] can qualify as ‘directly related to management policies or general business operations’,” and that “work that merely carries out the particular, day-to-day operations of the business is production, not administrative, work.” *Harris* thus departed significantly from traditional analysis of the administrative exemption, rejecting many federal decisions that interpret the administrative / production dichotomy much differently.

A strong dissent in *Harris* challenged the majority’s conclusions. The California Supreme Court granted review of *Harris* in 2007, and finally issued its decision in 2011.

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court distinguished *Bell* as involving a stipulation that the plaintiffs’ work there was “routine and unimportant” and as relying on the 1998 version of a wage order, which was superseded by a 2001 version that incorporates relevant aspects of federal regulations. The Supreme Court explained that modern-day, post-industrial, service-oriented businesses may not follow the administrative/production worker dichotomy, and that
courts should not strain to apply the dichotomy where it does not fit. Thus, while the dichotomy might still have use as an analytical tool, the Court of Appeal erred in applying the administrative / production worker dichotomy as a dispositive test.

### 7.6.5 The quantitative requirement for “white collar” exemptions

In America generally, a “white collar” exemption applies where an employee must, as a “primary duty,” perform exempt tasks and, in doing so, regularly and customarily exercise discretion and independent judgment. In interpreting “primary duty,” the U.S. Department of Labor does not treat the amount of time spent as the sole test. The DOL recognizes that an employee might be an exempt executive without spending most of working time in managerial duties.

California is different. In an analogous situation involving the exemption for outside salespeople, the California Supreme Court ruled that the test for exempt versus nonexempt duties is a “purely quantitative approach,” gauging whether “more than one-half” of an employee’s time is spent on exempt duties. In so holding, the California court declined to follow the DOL’s regulation that “reclassifies intrinsically nonexempt sales work as exempt based on the fact that it is incidental to sales.”

The quantitative test applies for other exemptions as well, including the executive exemption.

### 7.7 Other Exemptions

#### 7.7.1 Alternative workweek schedule

To accommodate employers and employees who want flexible hours, certain California wage orders permit “four-day workweek” arrangements, whereby nonexempt employees can work four ten-hour days without creating liability for daily overtime. These arrangements require specified secret-ballot election procedures, to be held within readily identifiable work units (such as a division, department, job classification, shift, or facility). The results of the election must be reported within 30 days to:

Division of Labor Statistics and Research  
Attn: Alternative Workweek Election Results  
Department of Industrial Relations  
P.O. Box 420603  
San Francisco, CA 94142-0603

Also permissible, subject to the foregoing procedures, is an alternative workweek including 12-hour workdays in which employees work ten hours at regular pay and the extra hours at overtime pay.

Labor Code section 511 provides that an employer may adopt an AWS only if two-thirds of the affected employees approve the AWS in a secret vote. Specific AWS requirements appear in the applicable wage orders. Wage Order 1, for the manufacturing industry, permits adoption of an AWS only upon satisfying these requirements: (1) the employer proposes an AWS in writing, (2) two-thirds of the affected employees vote to adopt the proposed AWS, in a secret ballot conducted during regular working hours at the work site, (3) the employer has made a written disclosure regarding the effects of the proposed arrangement on wages, hours, and benefits, and has held at least one meeting at least 14 days before the vote, (4) the results of the election have...
been timely reported to the Division of Labor Statistics and Research, (5) employees have not been required to work the new hours for at least 30 days after election results were announced, and (6) the employer has not coerced any employee’s vote.

California courts have read the AWS requirements strictly, with disastrous consequences for employers who have failed to meet requirements that sometimes exalt form over substance. Employers adopting an AWS must follow the specific rules in the applicable wage order or face liability for unpaid overtime. The Court of Appeal delivered this lesson in a 2018 decision. A production machine operator, manufacturing plastic bags worked 12-hour shifts that paid the regular rate for the first 10 hours of work and then an overtime rate for the next two hours. He sued for unpaid daily overtime wages for the time worked after eight hours. Four different time periods were involved, but the Court of Appeal held that as to each the employer or its predecessor had failed to meet a requirement, such as a written disclosure, a pre-vote meeting, a vote, a 30-day waiting period, or a report to the state. It was no defense the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant’s predecessor had failed to comply with AWS requirements, because the defendant bore the burden of proof as to all periods of compliance.148

7.7.2 Computer professionals

California exempts from overtime pay requirements computer professionals who are primarily engaged (1) in work that is intellectual or creative requiring the exercise of discretion and independent judgment and (2) in duties that consist of (a) applying systems analysis techniques and procedures (e.g., determining hardware, software, or system functional specifications), or (b) designing, developing, documenting, analyzing, creating, testing, or modifying computer systems or programs, or (c) documenting, testing, creating, or modifying the design of software or hardware, or (d) duties associated with being highly skilled in the theoretical and practical application of highly specialized information to computer systems analysis, programming, and software engineering.

An employer seeking to establish the computer professional exemption must meet all of the foregoing requirements plus a compensation requirement. By a 2007 amendment, an employer met that requirement, effective January 1, 2008, by paying $36 an hour or the annualized full-time salary equivalent. That rate is subject to annual increases in accordance with the California Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers.149 Effective January 1, 2019, the relevant hourly rate is $45.41, and the minimum annual salary is $94,603.25.

7.7.3 Specified medical employees

California is peculiar in not recognizing a professional exemption for registered nurses (RNs) engaged in the practice of nursing, i.e., engaged primarily in patient care. California permits an exemption only for “advanced practice nurses” (APNs), such as certified nurse midwives, certified nurse anesthetists, and certified nurse practitioners.150 The distinction between RNs and APNs is that the latter undergo months or years of specialized education and training, must be state-licensed, and perform duties that otherwise only physicians could perform.

7.7.4 Outside salespersons

Under federal law, an employee qualifies as overtime exempt as an outside salesperson by regularly engaging outside the workplace in selling services or the use of facilities if the nonsales activities do not exceed 20% of the time worked.151 Sales activity includes work incidental to or in conjunction with outside sales, including incidental
deliveries and collections. The time devoted to various duties is important, but not necessarily controlling. A routeman who calls on customers and takes orders for products delivered from stock, and who receives compensation commensurate with a volume of products sold, is employed for the purpose of making sales.\(^{152}\) Thus, the federal exemption focuses on the employee’s “primary function,” not on how much work time is spent selling, and the 20 percent cap on nonexempt (i.e., nonsales) work does not apply to nonsales activities that are “incidental” to outside sales, including deliveries.

California is different. While California has a statutory overtime exemption for outside salespeople,\(^ {153}\) its wage orders define the term narrowly, as an adult “who customary and regularly works more than half the working time away from the employer’s place of business selling tangible or intangible items or obtaining orders of contracts for products, services or use of facilities.”\(^ {154}\) This definition does not mention the primary function for which the person is employed and focuses, quantitatively, on whether “more than half the working time” is devoted to “selling ... or obtaining orders or contracts.” Moreover, the California definition does not reclassify intrinsically nonsales work as exempt based on the fact that it is incidental to sales.

In its 1999 Ramirez v. Yosemite Water decision, the California Supreme Court held that California’s exemption for outside salespersons—by not tracking the language of the federal exemption and by using its own definition of “outside salespersons”—intends to depart from federal law, to “provide, at least in some cases, greater protection for employees.”\(^ {155}\) At issue was whether a routeman delivering bottled water was exempt from overtime as an outside salesperson. While remanding the case for further proceedings, Ramirez strongly implied that the plaintiff could be nonexempt under California law even if he was exempt under federal law.

Ramirez left unresolved several questions:

- What does it mean to “customarily and regularly” spend more than one-half of the work time on outside sales? FLSA regulations define “customarily and regularly” as “more than occasionally but less than constantly.” If an employee has a habit of often spending two or three days working away from the employer’s place of business, but spends the overall majority of all work time at the employer’s place of business, would that qualify as “customarily and regularly” spending more than one-half the work time outside?

- How does one attribute time that the employee spends before a sales visit preparing to make the visits, or the time spent after the visit to complete paper work on the sale? Ramirez mentions that the employer argued it would be absurd to exclude those tasks from the “outside sales” calculation, but did not explain how those duties should be analyzed under the exemption.

- What constitutes “away from the employer’s place of business”? Clearly delivering water to a customer’s home would qualify, but what if the employee is in a job making customer contact by telephone? Is any time selling outside the employee’s designated “office” considered time “away from the employer’s place of business”?

- How does an employer enforce reasonable expectations that its employees spend most of their time outside selling? Where the employer encourages selling, but allows the employees to make sales any way they want without tracking their movements, what is the employer’s reasonable expectation as to “outside sales” activity?
Sick pay implications. See § 7.7.5 below.

### 7.7.5 Commissioned sales employees

**The federal exemption.** A commissioned salesperson in a “retail or service establishment” is exempt from overtime requirements if the salesperson is paid more than 1.5 times the federal minimum wage and earns pay mostly in the form of commissions on goods or services. Federal minimum wage payments are satisfied by a total of pay (whether in commissions, base salary, advances, or some combination) that, when divided by hours worked during the pay period, meet the minimum wage.

**The California version.** The California requirements for the exemption are (1) total compensation exceeding 1.5 times the California minimum wage and (2) at least 50% of total pay from commissions.\(^{156}\) (For discussion of what California considers a true commission, see § 7.15.1.) This exemption applies to overtime pay but still obliges California employers to pay the minimum wage to commissioned sales employees and to provide meal periods and rest breaks.

Many employers reconcile commissions and pay them on a monthly basis. California courts have acknowledged that employers can pay a commission in anticipation of its being earned.\(^{157}\) But in 2014 the California Supreme Court complicated the basis for the commissioned-employee exemption by stating that it is not proper for an employer to attribute commissions paid in one pay period to other pay periods to make up any shortfall in meeting the pay requirements of the exemption.\(^{158}\)

**Sick pay implications.** In 2016, the DLSE issued an opinion letter regarding California’s Healthy Workplace Healthy Families Act of 2014. The opinion letter asserts that the term “exempt,” as used in Labor Code section 246(k), refers only to those employees who satisfy both the salary and duties tests of the professional, executive, or administrative exemptions. Thus, according to the DLSE, the term “exempt” does not include those employees who are exempt from overtime under the outside sales exemption or the commissioned employee exemption. Therefore, for purposes of sick pay, California employers should look to Labor Code sections 246(k)(1) or (2)—which articulate the two methods used to calculate sick pay for nonexempt employees—when determining how to calculate sick time for commissioned employees, even if they qualify as exempt from overtime as either an outside salesperson or a commissioned employee.

### 7.7.6 Collective bargaining agreements

Union-friendly California has created exemptions for employees who are subject to certain collective bargaining agreements. (Certain special union-related exemptions also exist with respect to meal-break requirements. See § 7.9.) California’s general overtime-pay requirements do not apply to workers whose employment is governed by a “valid collective bargaining agreement” that “provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay … of not less than 30 percent more that the state minimum wage.”\(^{159}\) A 2014 Court of Appeal decision clarifies that for purposes of this exemption the governing definition of “overtime” is provided by the CBA, not the Labor Code.\(^{160}\)

### 7.7.7 Truck drivers transporting goods in interstate commerce

Commercial truck drivers who operate large trucks to transport goods in interstate commerce are generally exempt from California overtime law, just as they are under federal law.\(^{161}\)
7.7.8 RLA preemption

California’s pesky “minimum wage paid separately for each hour worked” doctrine is preempted by collective bargaining agreements entered into under the Railway Labor Act, which also applies to airlines. The Court of Appeal thus upheld a summary judgment against airline attendants alleging that the airline’s practice of paying, pursuant to a CBA, $1.60 an hour for their time waiting for an airline to be readied for flight was an unlawful failure to pay the minimum wage. The Court of Appeal held that “the IWC order [mandating a minimum wage] was preempted by the RLA and that enforcement of the IWC order would burden interstate commerce.”

7.7.9 Agricultural workers

The federal FLSA exempts “agricultural work” from the overtime rules, but here, as so often elsewhere, California is outstanding in the wage and hour field. Wage Order 14 entitles agricultural employees to daily overtime for hours worked in excess of ten hours in a day. And, under 2016 legislation, gradual annual changes—beginning in 2019 and culminating in 2025—will give all agricultural workers the same daily overtime and daily doubletime entitlements that apply to non-agricultural workers. For larger employers, as of 2019, daily and overtime premium pay starts after 9.5 hours per day and 55 hours per week.

This chart summarizes the phase-in process for agricultural overtime pay requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective date</th>
<th>26+ employees</th>
<th>2 * Reg. Rate</th>
<th>&lt; 26 employees</th>
<th>1.5 * Reg. Rate</th>
<th>2 * Reg. Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/1/19</td>
<td>&gt; 9.5 hrs/day, &gt; 55 hrs/week</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1/1/22</td>
<td>&gt; 9.5 hrs/day, &gt; 55 hrs/week</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/20</td>
<td>&gt; 9 hrs/day or &gt; 50 hrs/week</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1/1/23</td>
<td>&gt; 9 hrs/day or &gt; 50 hrs/week</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/21</td>
<td>&gt; 8.5 hrs/day, or &gt; 45 hrs/week</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1/1/24</td>
<td>&gt; 8.5 hrs/day, or &gt; 45 hrs/week</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/22</td>
<td>&gt; 8 hrs/day or &gt; 40 hrs/week</td>
<td>&gt; 12 hrs/day</td>
<td>1/1/25</td>
<td>&gt; 8 hrs/day or &gt; 40 hrs/week</td>
<td>&gt; 12 hrs/day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wage Order 14, meanwhile, continues to define agricultural employees as workers engaged in:

- the preparation, care, and treatment of farm land, pipeline, or ditches,
- the sowing and planting of any agricultural (generally, farm) or horticultural (generally, garden, orchard, or nursery) commodity,
- the care of any agricultural or horticultural commodity,
the harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodity,

- the assembly and storage of any agricultural or horticultural commodity,

- the raising, feeding and management of livestock, fur bearing animals, poultry, fish, mollusks, and insects,

- the harvesting of fish for commercial sale as defined by Fish and Game Code section 45, or

- the conservation, improvement, or maintenance of a farm and its tools and equipment.

7.8 Meal Periods

Section 11 of most wage orders states: “No employer shall employ any person for a work period of more than five (5) hours without a meal period of not less than thirty (30) minutes.” An off-duty meal period may be unpaid, but unless the employee is relieved of all duty during the 30-minute meal period, the entire period counts as time worked.

Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512 also address meal periods. Section 226.7 forbids an employer to require an employee to work during any meal or rest period that is mandated by an IWC order. Section 512 requires that employees “provide[]” 30-minute meal periods for employees working more than five hours (one meal period) or working more than ten hours (two meal periods). (As to the meaning of “provide,” a word that does not appear in the wage orders, see § 7.8.5.)

Section 11 applies only to nonexempt workers. A literal interpretation of Section 512, however, could extend a general meal-period entitlement to all employees, exempt as well as nonexempt. The DLSE has noted this point in opining that exempt employees as well as nonexempt employees are entitled to meal periods.

7.8.1 Record-keeping requirement

Section 7 of the wage orders requires that the employer keep accurate information with respect to each required meal period.

7.8.2 On-duty meal periods

On-duty meal periods are permitted only if (1) the nature of the work prevents the employee from being relieved of all duty during the meal period, (2) the employer and employee have agreed in writing to the on-duty meal period, and (3) the agreement states that the employee may revoke the agreement, in writing, at any time. The DLSE has opined that the nature of the work permits on-duty meal periods only in very limited circumstances, such as where the employer’s operations make it virtually impossible to provide the employee with an off-duty meal period.

To limit the utility of the on-duty meal period still further, Court of Appeal decisions have indicated that the employer must determine an employee’s “nature of the work” under the circumstances pertaining to each assignment, instead of choosing, more efficiently, to have a blanket policy by which employees sign an on-duty meal period agreement in advance of particular assignments.
7.8.3 Waiver of meal periods

Employers must not condition permission to work on waiver of a meal period.

**Waiver of first meal period.** If the employee works no more than six hours in a day, then the employee’s duty to provide a meal period may be waived by “mutual consent” of employer and employee. The consent can be written or oral. The Court of Appeal has held that an employer can rely on a collective bargaining agreement as a means for employees to waive their first meal period for shifts that do not exceed six hours. No “magic words” are needed for the CBA to meet the requirement that a statutory right must be waived in clear and unmistakable language.

**Waiver of second meal period.** An employee who works more than ten hours in a day, and who is thus entitled to two 30-minute meal periods, may choose to waive the employer’s duty to provide a second meal period, if the employee has not waived the first meal period. The waiver of the second meal period must be in a writing signed by both employer and employee and applies only for a shift in which the employee works 12 or fewer hours.

A special meal period waiver provision in Wage Order No. 5, section 11(D), permits “employees in the health care industry” to waive one of their two meal periods, regardless of whether the employee works more than 12 hours. But in 2015 the Court of Appeal ruled that Section 11(D) waivers are invalid, on a rationale that the IWC, in issuing the Wage Order, was powerless to deviate from Labor Code section 512, which allows employees to waive second meal periods only if the shift does not exceed 12 hours. After the Supreme Court agreed to review this surprising result, the Legislature repudiated the Court of Appeal’s decision, and declared that Section 11(D) waivers have always been valid, since 2000. The California Supreme Court, instead of simply acknowledging this legislative declaration, remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to decide whether the legislation merely restated existing law or changed it, and, if there was a change, whether the change should apply retroactively. On remand, the Court of Appeal recognized that Section 11(D) validly authorizes waivers of second meal periods in the health industry.

7.8.4 Timing of meal periods

The California Supreme Court ruled, in its 2012 *Brinker Restaurant v. Superior Court* decision, that an employer timely provides meal breaks so long as the first meal period is provided no later than the end of the fifth hour of work (for work shifts exceeding five hours) and so long as the second meal period (for work shifts exceeding ten hours) is provided no later than the end of the tenth hour of work.

No **de minimis** rule as to untimely meal periods. There is no **de minimis** exception to the timing requirement for a meal period. A 2018 Court of Appeal decision rejected an employer’s argument that it lawfully provided meal periods that began “slightly” after the end of the fifth hour of work. The basis for applying the **de minimis** doctrine was absent, the Court of Appeal reasoned, because “there is no indication of a practical administrative difficulty recording small amounts of time for payroll purposes” and thus rejected the **de minimis** claim.

7.8.5 Meaning of “provide”

California employers must not employ an employee for a work period exceeding five hours “without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes.” In this context, what does “provide” mean?
No duty to ensure break is taken. The Court of Appeal once held that employers must ensure that employees actually take their meal breaks, as did the DLSE. The California Supreme Court finally addressed this issue in *Brinker*, holding that California employers must “provide” a meal period only in the sense that they must relieve the employees of duty; the employer need not police the break or otherwise ensure that the employee refrain from working during the break. If the employer knows or should know that the employee has decided to work during the meal period, then the employer's obligation is to pay for the working time, not to pay the hour of premium pay that would be due for a meal-period violation.

Ability to round meal periods? One Court of Appeal decision indicated that a rounding policy might apply to meal periods. The decision reasoned that the *See's Candy* rounding standard (see § 7.4.4) should extend to meal periods and therefore a trial court need only consider how often a policy results in rounding up and rounding down recorded work time, not the number of meal period violations that are assessed or avoided. But note that this decision may have more to do with rounding of overall time rather than providing compliant meal periods, and should be cited in the context of meal periods only with extreme care.

7.8.6 Meal periods on premises

Under federal law, employers need not pay employees for time spent during any “bona fide” meal period—a period in which the employee is completely relieved of duty for the purpose of eating. The employer need not permit the employee to leave the premises during a meal period, if the employee is otherwise completely freed from duties during the period. California is different.

California courts have followed a DLSE interpretation that employees who must remain on the employer’s premises during meal periods have not been freed from duty, and thus must be paid for that time even if the employees were free to use the on-premises time in whatever way they saw fit. In 2012, the California Supreme Court in *Brinker* generally endorsed the DLSE’s interpretation.

But meal periods accompanied by a requirement to stay on the premises can be lawful, under the right circumstances. A 2018 Ninth Circuit decision held that employees eating discounted meals on premises were not under the employer’s control and were still relieved of all duties during the meal period. The Ninth Circuit thus upheld a special program that gave employees the option to buy discounted meals so long as they followed a rule to eat the meal on premises (to prevent employees from abusing their privileges by buying discounted meals for others). The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that restricting the employees’ movement during the meal period made it an “on duty” meal period, which would be inconsistent with the requirement to provide off-duty meal periods.

7.8.7 No federal Motor Carrier preemption

Employers of truck drivers had hoped that California meal and rest requirements were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, but those hopes were dashed in 2014, when the Court of Appeal held that the FAAAA does not preempt California’s meal- and rest-break requirements.

Meanwhile, in December 2018, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) declared that its hours-of-service regulations preempt California rules for meal periods and rest breaks for employees covered by those regulations. The FMCSA’s declaration is currently under legal challenge, keeping the law in this area unsettled.
7.8.8 Statutory exemptions from meal period requirements

Collective bargaining agreements. Union-friendly California has created some meal-period exemptions for certain employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. The meal-period requirements do not apply to certain construction workers, commercial truck drivers, security officers, and gas or electrical utility workers if (1) their employment is governed by a “valid collective bargaining agreement” that expressly provides for such things as meal periods and final and binding arbitration of meal-period disputes and (2) their regular wage is 30% more than the state minimum wage.\(^ {194} \)

Certain truck drivers transporting commercial feed. Truck drivers transporting commercial livestock feed to “remote, rural areas” may take a meal period after the sixth hour if their regular rate of pay is at least one and a half times the state minimum wage and the driver is subject to overtime pay. Drivers must still be provided a second meal period at the tenth hour.\(^ {195} \)

7.8.9 Civil penalties for unprovided rest breaks

Failure to provide a required meal period incurs liability for an extra hour of pay per day (see § 7.10) and also can trigger Section 558 of the Labor Code, which creates a civil penalty of $50 per employee per pay period for an initial violation, and $100 per employee per pay period for further violations.\(^ {196} \)

7.9 Rest and Recovery Breaks

Section 12 of most wage orders states: “Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods, which insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work period.”\(^ {197} \) A rest break must be paid: “Authorized rest period time shall be counted as hours worked for which there shall be no deduction from wages.”\(^ {198} \) Section 12 applies only to nonexempt workers. Failure to provide a required rest break makes the employer liable for an extra hour of pay for each day in which a required rest break is not authorized and permitted.

Labor Code section 226.7 forbids an employer to require an employee to work during a prescribed rest break.\(^ {199} \)

7.9.1 Amount and timing of rest breaks

The wage orders entitled employees to 10 minutes of “net rest time” for every four hours worked or “major fraction thereof,” with the rest break to be available near the middle of the work period, insofar as is practicable.\(^ {200} \) Under DLSE interpretations, employers must authorize and permit a first rest break if the daily work time is at least three and one-half hours and a second rest break if the work time has extended beyond six hours.\(^ {201} \) The California Supreme Court, in its 2012 \textit{Brinker} decision, endorsed this interpretation, and added the observation that employers must authorize and permit a third rest break for work in excess of 10 hours.\(^ {202} \) The wage order’s reference to “net rest time” indicates that employees might be entitled to additional rest time if they need to spend minutes walking to and from a designated rest area.\(^ {203} \)
7.9.2 Meaning of authorize and permit

An employer can be liable for failing to provide rest breaks if the employer has encouraged employees to skip rest breaks by failing to notify employees that breaks are available, where the employer is aware that employees are not taking breaks.\(^\text{204}\)

7.9.3 Record keeping

Employers need not record the rest breaks they authorize.\(^\text{205}\)

7.9.4 Rest areas required

Employers must provide a rest area, separate from toilet rooms, where the employee may choose to take the rest break,\(^\text{206}\) and must also allow employees to leave the work premises during rest breaks (see § 7.9.8 below).

7.9.5 Calculation of rest break time

The DLSE has opined that employees must be permitted to take their ten minutes of rest in an uninterrupted block (e.g., one ten-minute break, not two five-minute breaks)\(^\text{207}\) and that the “net rest time” language prohibits an employer from counting as rest time any time that the employee must take to move from one work position to another, or to a rest area.\(^\text{208}\)

7.9.6 Toilet breaks excluded

The DLSE interprets the wage orders to forbid an employer to count any separate use of toilet facilities as a rest break.

7.9.7 Rest break time counted as hours worked

The time spent on a rest break counts as working time.

7.9.8 “On duty” rest breaks not permitted

Because rest breaks count as time worked, one would think that an employee who takes a break while remaining on premises, available for emergencies, would still be receiving a valid rest break, so long as work demands do not actually interrupt the break. Yet in 2016 the California Supreme Court upset long-standing employer expectations on this issue in Augustus v. ABM Securities Inc. A Los Angeles trial judge ruled, in 2012, that security guards who must carry their pagers while on break were thereby denied their rest breaks, regardless of whether they were ever paged. The result was a judgment against the security company in an amount exceeding $100 million. In 2015, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, holding that on-call rest breaks are still valid rest breaks, unless the employer actually interrupts the break by calling the employee to duty during the break. The Court of Appeal noted that the standard was whether the employer had breached its duty “not to require an employee to work during a meal or rest or recovery period.”\(^\text{209}\) Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that the employer, in merely requiring the security guards to be on call during breaks, did not breach this duty, because the guards could pursue personal activities during the breaks: “remaining available to work is not the same as actually working.”\(^\text{210}\)
The California Supreme Court then agreed to review the case, to address these issues: (1) Do Labor Code section 226.7 and Wage Order No. 4 require that employees be relieved of all duties during rest breaks? (2) Are security guards who remain on call during rest breaks performing work during that time? The Supreme Court then issued its answers, in December 2016. The result was an unexpected opinion that disrupted the sensible outcome reached by the Court of Appeal. Augustus adopted a simplistic, radical interpretation of the rest-break requirement that disregards contrary long-standing Labor Code interpretations by the DLSE.

The simplistic view adopted in Augustus is that a “rest period” must be “a period of rest,” which to the high court means a period wholly free of any work duty. Augustus thus overturned long-settled employer expectations by announcing that rest breaks, like meal periods, must be completely “duty free”: an employee on a rest break who must be “at the ready, tethered by time and policy to particular locations or communications devices,” has not been afforded the statutorily required rest break. Under this radical view, as the dissenting opinion suggests, merely requiring an employee on break to stay on premises, or to carry a radio in the case of an emergency, may make the rest break non-compliant, even if the employee on break is never interrupted.

In 2017 the DLSE, responding to Augustus, revised its response to a frequently asked question about rest breaks, stating that now employers may not require employees to remain on site during their rest breaks:

Q. Can my employer require that I stay on the work premises during my rest period?

A. No, your employer cannot impose any restraints not inherent in the rest period requirement itself. In Augustus v. ABM Security Services … the California Supreme Court held that the rest period requirement “obligates employers to permit-and authorizes employees to take-off-duty rest periods. That is, during rest periods employers must relieve employees of all duties and relinquish control over how employees spend their time.” … As a practical matter, however, if an employee is provided a ten minute rest period, the employee can only travel five minutes from a work post before heading back to return in time.

7.9.9 No federal Motor Carrier Act preemption

Employers of truck drivers had hoped that California meal- and rest-break requirements were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, but those hopes were dashed in 2014. (See § 7.8.7).

Meanwhile, in December 2018, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) declared that its hours-of-service regulations preempt California rules for meal periods and rest breaks for employees covered by those regulations. The FMCSA’s declaration is currently under legal challenge, keeping the law in this area unsettled.

7.9.10 Recovery breaks

As of 2014, California employers must afford employees a “recovery period,” to “prevent heat illness.” Employers must not require employees to work during a recovery period that is “mandated pursuant to an applicable statute, or applicable regulation, standard, or order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board, or the Division or Occupational Safety and Health.” The recovery period counts as hours worked.
7.9.11 Exemption for safety-sensitive positions at petroleum facilities

Workers who hold “safety-sensitive positions,” at petroleum facilities are exempted from rest-break rules. A “safety-sensitive position” is a position whose duties reasonably include responding to emergencies in the facility and carrying communication devices. The exemption applies only to workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement and subject to Wage Order No. 1. If such a worker’s rest period is interrupted to respond to an emergency, then the employer must pay the worker one hour of pay.

7.9.12 Civil penalties for unprovided rest breaks

Failure to provide a required rest break incurs liability for an extra hour of pay per day (see § 7.10) and also can trigger Section 558 of the Labor Code, which creates a civil penalty of $50 per employee per pay period for an initial violation, and $100 per employee per pay period for further violations.

7.10 The “One Additional Hour of Pay”

A California employer that “fails to provide an employee a meal or rest or recovery period in accordance with a state law” must “pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest or recovery period is not provided.” The Court of Appeal has held that an employer that fails to provide both a meal period and a rest period must pay up to two premium hourly payments per work day.

The foregoing does not apply to an employee who is exempt from meal or rest or recovery period requirements “pursuant to other state laws.”

7.10.1 Pay is characterized as a “wage” for purposes of limitations period

The extra hour of pay—a fixed amount due regardless of how long work intrudes into the meal or rest break—resembles a penalty in that the payment does not correspond to the amount of break time denied. As discussed below, “penalty” is the characterization that employer-defendants have preferred. And in fact 22 of the 24 Court of Appeal justices who considered the issue agreed with the employers’ view that the extra hour of pay is indeed a penalty, as did the DLSE in a Precedent Decision.

In 2007, however, the California Supreme Court, in Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, erased all of that pro-employer authority by ruling, unanimously, that the extra hour of pay is what the plaintiffs always said it is: a “premium wage.” Murphy justified its result with repeated references to the California rule that “statutes governing conditions of employment are to be construed broadly in favor of protecting employees,” even though the relevant provision, a statute of limitations, appeared not in the Labor Code but in the Code of Civil Procedure.

7.10.2 Potential implications of treating meal payments as wages

Murphy’s decision to characterize the extra hour of pay as a wage implicated several issues:

- The statute of limitations for a wage claim is three years (for violation of a statutory obligation to pay wages) instead of the one-year statute that applies to a penalty claim. Murphy held that the limitations period for a meal-pay claim is now at least three years.
• Tax withholding and employer taxes are required on a payment of wages. Does the extra hour of pay amount to wages for tax purposes? (The IRS has suggested that the answer is yes.)

• Attorney fees are recoverable for a wage claim. Would a claim for the extra hour of pay entitle the prevailing party to attorney fees? California does have a Labor Code provision authorizing the award of attorney fees in a case claiming unpaid wages, but the California Supreme Court, in a case where the employer won and sought attorney fees, held that a claim for meal pay is not a claim for wages and that therefore the employer could not recover its attorney fees. (See § 5.12.)

• Prejudgment interest is recoverable on a wage claim. Is the extra hour of pay subject to prejudgment interest?

• There are penalties for failing to pay wages on termination of employment. Is the extra hour of pay a wage that must be paid by the time employment terminates?

• Restitution for unpaid wages would be available under California’s Unfair Competition Law, with its four-year statute of limitations. Is the extra hour of pay subject to recovery as restitution?

• Additional civil penalties might apply under PAGA (the bounty-hunter statute (see § 5.15)). Is the extra hour of pay itself a civil penalty or does PAGA create a civil penalty on top of the extra hour of pay? (Some plaintiffs, as if to prove the axiom that “no good deed goes unpunished,” have sought PAGA penalties as to each meal premium an employer has paid, on a theory that the payments reflected employer admissions that a meal period had been unlawfully denied. At least one court, however, has rejected this theory, realizing that the extra hour of pay functions as a “civil penalty” such that PAGA would not create an additional civil penalty.)

7.10.3 Further issues involving the “one additional hour of pay”

How should employers calculate the extra hour of pay? Although the Labor Code specifies a particular way to measure the extra hour of pay—the “regular rate of compensation”—plaintiffs have argued that the proper measure is the “regular rate” used for overtime-pay purposes. The “regular rate” often will be higher than the usual hourly wage (as, for example, when an employee works some hours subject to a shift premium). At other times the “regular rate” will be lower than the usual hourly wage (as, for example, when an employee gets a “controlled standby” wage that is set at a low rate). We believe the usual hourly wage is the right measure, as the Legislature deliberately chose not to adopt the “regular rate” term of art but instead specified the “regular rate of compensation.” Nonetheless, in May 2018 a federal district court disagreed, holding that the extra hour of pay must be calculated the same way the employer calculates the regular rate for overtime purposes.

Is the pay included in the regular rate? Is the extra hour of pay owed for meal-period and rest-break violations something that employers must include within the regular rate for purposes of computing overtime pay? We think not, as the premium wage paid for overtime work is itself not an item to include within the regular rate. The DLSE seems to agree.

Must the pay be recorded in wage statements? Is the extra hour of pay something that employers must record in the required wage-itemization statement (see § 16.3)? One might think not, as the extra hour of pay is not truly
wages “earned” and does not represent “hours worked,” and thus logically does not fall within a category of the items that the wage statement must include. Yet recall that, in California, logic and reason can yield to the imperative that “statutes governing conditions of employment are to be construed broadly in favor of protecting employees.” Accordingly, prudent employers will continue to record the extra hour of pay in wage itemization statements, in a clearly labeled separate category.

7.11 Suitable Seats

Most California wage orders require employers to provide employees “with suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats.” The relevant provision is in two parts: Section 14(a) and Section 14(b). Subsection (a) requires that seats be provided when the nature of the work permits. Subsection 14(b) requires that seats be placed nearby for use when the employees “are not engaged in the active duties of their employment.”

The wage order does not authorize any monetary remedy, but the Labor Code forbids employment of employees under conditions prohibited by a wage order and enables employees who experience Labor Code violations to seek PAGA penalties of $100 or $200 per employee, per pay period (see §§ 5.15, 7.24). Plaintiffs’ lawyers have invoked this obscure seating rule in class and representative actions against retailers, banks, hotels, and other employers whose employees often must work while standing.

7.11.1 Early decisions

Until 2009, no published decision had addressed a seating claim. In 2005, in Hamilton v. San Francisco Hilton, a trial court rejected the seating claim of a guest service agent who challenged a hotel’s requirement to stand at the front desk. The trial court granted the hotel summary judgment because (1) standing and continual mobility throughout the front office area were essential functions of the job and (2) seated employees could not safely use a computer, fit their knees and legs confined in the workspace, or open a cash drawer. Further, the hotel could reasonably decide that guest service agents should stand to serve guests—a business judgment about image and brand that a court should not “second guess.”

In 2009, however, a federal district judge in San Francisco breathed new life into seating claims, ruling that a store cashier could pursue such a claim. And then, in 2010, two California appellate courts both recognized the viability of seating claims. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit further enlivened seating claims by holding that employees need not request a seat to trigger their employer’s duty to provide one.

But other aspects of the employer’s duty to provide a seat remained unsettled.

7.11.2 The California Supreme Court’s pro-employee decision in Kilby

In December 2013, the Ninth Circuit, hearing consolidated appeals, asked the California Supreme Court to resolve these issues of first impression:

1. Does the phrase “nature of the work” refer to an individual task performed during the workday, or does “nature of the work” require a holistic look at the entire range of duties? And if the holistic approach applies, then should courts consider the entire range of duties if the employee spends more than one-half of the time on tasks that reasonably allow the use of a seat?
2. In deciding whether the nature of the work “reasonably permits” the use of a seat, should courts consider the employer’s business judgment, the physical layout of the workplace, and the employee’s physical characteristics?

3. Must the employee prove what a “suitable seat” would be?

The Supreme Court exercised its discretionary authority to take these questions under submission.\(^{243}\)

In 2016 the Supreme Court, in *Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy*, gave its answers.\(^{244}\) *First*, the Supreme Court rejected both the employers’ argument that the entire job must be considered holistically and the plaintiffs’ argument that the job must be considered task by task. *Kilby* held instead that the proper focus is on the tasks performed at a given location. The trier of fact is to “consider whether it is feasible for an employee to perform each set of location-specific tasks while seated.”\(^{245}\)

Second, *Kilby* ruled that while the employer’s business judgment is a factor to consider in determining whether the nature of the work reasonably permits sitting, the employer’s business judgment is not controlling. The physical layout of a workplace is also relevant. The employee’s physical characteristics were not relevant in the case presented, which did not raise any issue about possibly needed reasonable accommodations for particular workers.\(^{246}\)

Third, *Kilby* held that the employer, not the employee, bears the burden of proof as to whether any particular seat is suitable.\(^{247}\)

*Kilby* also reached out to make a pro-employee decision on an issue not before it. *Kilby* held that if other job duties take the employee to a location where he must work while standing, he would be entitled to a seat, under Section 14(B), during “lulls in operation.”\(^{248}\)

*Kilby* encourages more seating claims. Meanwhile, California employers can re-evaluate every location that requires standing to see if the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats at that location. The evaluation might involve an ergonomic study to determine the feasibility of adding seats. This development also highlights the importance of describing any standing requirement in the relevant job description.

7.12 Deductions and Having Employees Pay for Costs of Business

California employers must themselves incur all the costs incurred in the normal operation of business, without requiring employees to act as insurers against ordinary business losses. California courts thus have invalidated many wage deductions taken to cover business losses that have resulted from factors beyond the employee’s control or from simple employee carelessness.\(^{249}\) The DLSE also has taken this position.\(^{250}\)

**7.12.1 Employers cannot use wage deductions to cover business expenses**

_**Wage order upheld by California Supreme Court.**_ Section 8 of most wage orders reads: “No employer shall make any deduction from the wage or require any reimbursement from an employee for any cash shortage, breakage, or loss of equipment, unless it can be shown that the shortage, breakage, or loss is caused by a dishonest or willful act, or by the gross negligence of the employee.” The Supreme Court upheld this provision in *Kerr’s Catering Service v. Department of Industrial Relations*,\(^{251}\) deciding that employer cannot make payroll deductions that would make employees financially responsible for business losses that did not result from the
employees’ gross negligence or willful misconduct. The employees at issue sold food from lunch trucks. They earned wages plus a commission based on their sales, with the commission reduced by any cash shortages. Kerr’s Catering upheld the wage order on the rationale that the concept of protecting employees from wage deductions already existed in various Labor Code provisions: Section 221 forbids an employer to collect back from an employee wages already paid, and Sections 400-410 limit employers’ rights to seek cash bonds from employees.

**Rule against business-expense deductions applied to exempt employees.** The DLSE has opined that the Labor Code itself, rather than just Section 8 of the wage orders, bars the deductions expressly barred by Section 8. That DLSE interpretation would mean that the anti-deduction rules protect *exempt* employees as well as the *nonexempt* employees protected by the wage orders.252

**Development of general concept.** The concept discovered in *Kerr’s Catering*—that California employers must not make employees insurers for general business losses—has been extended to other contexts, making certain commission and bonus plans suspect under California law (see §§ 7.15, 7.16).

### 7.12.2 Payment for uniforms

California employers who require employees to wear uniforms must pay for the uniforms and their maintenance.253 A uniform is any distinctively designed or colored wearing apparel or accessory, although items of unspecified design that are usual and generally usable in the occupation (e.g., white shirts, dark pants, black shoes and belts) are not considered to be part of a uniform.254 In one case, a retailer settled a DLSE enforcement action in which the DLSE contended that a dress code requiring the wearing of a blue shirt and tan or khaki pants constituted a uniform requirement.255

Section 9(C) of most wage orders states that employer-provided uniforms must be returned by the employee upon completion of the job. The employer may require a reasonable deposit as security for the return. With prior written authorization by the employee, the employer may deduct from the employee’s last check the cost of the uniforms, but must not deduct for normal wear and tear.

### 7.12.3 Payment for tools or equipment

Section 9(B) of most wage orders provides that employers who require tools or equipment to perform a job must provide and maintain them, although employees who are paid at least twice the minimum wage may be required to provide and maintain hand tools and equipment customarily required in their trade or craft. Section 9(C) provides that with tools and equipment, as with uniforms, employers may require a reasonable deposit and may, with prior written authorization, make deductions for items not returned by employees.

### 7.12.4 Cost of medical examinations

California employers must not deduct from a paycheck the cost of a medical examination for the employee.256
7.12.5 Debt repayment (employee loans)

Any payroll deduction used to satisfy a debt that the employee owes the employer is valid only if approved in writing by the employee. Any deduction of a “balloon” payment from a final paycheck is unlawful unless it is authorized in writing at the time of termination.\(^{257}\)

7.12.6 Barriers to employer recovery of wage overpayments

One California appellate court decision has even held that an employer must not make payroll deductions in order to recoup mistakenly made overpayments of salary. The court reasoned that any such deduction would violate attachment and garnishment statutes.\(^ {258}\)

The DLSE has opined that an employer making regular, predictable, and expected overpayments (such as where the employer pays a set amount on the assumption that employees have worked a given number of hours, without yet checking on the exact number of hours worked) can recover those overpayments through deductions in the next paycheck, but only if the employer has prior written authorization to make those deductions and only if the employee still receives, after the deductions, not less than the minimum wage. Further, even with that authorization, according to the DLSE, there can be no deduction from the final paycheck.\(^ {259}\)

7.12.7 Other forbidden deductions

**General Labor Code prohibition.** California employers generally must not deduct from employee paychecks except as authorized by law or with the employee’s written consent.\(^{260}\)

**Tips.** California employers must not deduct tips or gratuities from wages. For discussion of this and other peculiar rules on tips, see § 7.17.

7.13 Indemnification of Employee Expenses

Under Labor Code section 2802, California employers must indemnify employees for money that they necessarily expend or lose in direct consequence of discharging their duties or as a result of following their employer’s direction.\(^{261}\) An employee who successfully sues the employer for indemnification is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.\(^ {262}\) A prevailing employee also would be entitled to interest on an award, at the rate applicable in civil actions, from the date on which the employee incurred the necessary expenditure or loss.

Although in effect since 1937, Section 2802 traditionally was simply a means to obtain employer “indemnification” only in the narrow sense of the word: “to reimburse (another) for a loss suffered because of a third party’s act or default.”\(^ {263}\) Examples of these cases are noted below (see § 7.13.1, 7.13.2). More recently, however, employees have invoked Section 2802 to seek indemnification for other kinds of employee expenses (see § 7.13.3).

7.13.1 Indemnification for payment of attorney fees

California employers must indemnify employees for the attorney fees they incur in defending suits filed by a third party for liability arising out of the employees’ employment. For example, an employee who successfully defended an action for co-worker sexual harassment was entitled to indemnification from the employer for fees and costs incurred in defending the action.\(^ {264}\)
7.13.2 Indemnification for value of stolen tools

An employer who requires employees to leave the employee’s personal tools on the employer’s premises must indemnify an employee for tools that are stolen from the premises.265

7.13.3 Indemnification for routine business expenses?

Although judicial decisions interpreting Section 2802 typically have addressed circumstances in which an employee seeks indemnification for lost or damaged tools or equipment, or for the legal expenses incurred to defend a lawsuit arising out of the employee’s job duties, the DLSE has interpreted Section 2802 to apply more broadly, to require employers to cover routine employee business expenses. For example, the DLSE opines that Section 2802 requires employers to indemnify employees for such expenses as auto expenses (for other than commuting), client entertainment, and cell phone charges.266

A 2005 appellate decision, Gattuso v. Harte-Hank Shoppers, Inc., endorsed the DLSE’s extension of Section 2802 to car mileage expenses.267 The California Supreme Court reviewed this case, and issued its own decision in 2007.268 The high court’s decision assumed, without officially deciding, that Section 2802 does indeed require employers to indemnify employees for their ordinary business expenses.269

At issue in Gattuso was whether the employer could satisfy a duty to indemnify necessary expenses by increasing the employee’s overall pay, as opposed to paying for expenses as they were incurred and claimed on expense reports. Gattuso held that an employer can choose among various alternative methods to pay employee mileage expenses, including (1) tracking the actual costs to the employee for necessary fuel, insurance, depreciation, and service, and paying that amount, (2) paying the employee a lump sum payment each month so long as the lump sum actually covers all necessary mileage expenses, (3) paying a per-mile rate, such as the IRS mileage rate, or (4) increasing the employee’s commission rate, with the extra commissions being devoted to cover employee expenses.270

This employer victory was partial only. First, Gattuso held that because Labor Code section 2804 prohibits employers and employees from waiving the right to indemnity, employees will always be entitled to payment for all necessary expenses, meaning that the employer who provides a fixed expense allowance or an enhanced commission rate must ensure that payments actually cover all necessary expenses.271 Second, Gattuso held that the employer must provide some method or formula to identify the amount of the combined employee compensation payment that is intended to provide expense reimbursement. Gattuso also stated that, going forward, employers must identify the portion of wages allocated to expenses on itemized wage statements.272

Gattuso effectively derailed proposed DLSE regulations, which would have prohibited employers from indemnifying travel expenses by paying higher base salaries or commission rates as a matter of contract. The DLSE regulations also would have required employers to reimburse employees for all expenses necessarily incurred while traveling on business, and would treat as presumptively reasonable the vehicle mileage reimbursement rate set forth in IRS publication 463 (Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expense) and the lump sum per diem rate set forth in IRS publication 1542.273

Another decision has held what Gattuso implies—that California employers must indeed indemnify employee for their reasonable, necessary business expenses. In that case FedEx delivery drivers, arguing that they were
employees, not independent contractors, sued FedEx under Section 2802 for reimbursement of work-related expenses. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding that the drivers were employees for purposes of Section 2802 and that FedEx had failed to indemnify the drivers fully for their business expenses.

**Duty to solicit requests for reimbursement?** A federal district court has held that employers can be liable for business expenses even when the employee has failed to submit required expense reports. The court reasoned that the law focuses not on whether an employee requests reimbursement of expenses but rather on whether the employer either knows or has reason to know that the employee has incurred a reimbursable expense. If the employer has that actual or constructive knowledge, then it must exercise due diligence to ensure that the employee is paid.

**Cell-phone expense reimbursement.** The Court of Appeal has held that an employer that required its customer service managers to use their personal cell phones for business must reimburse the managers for a reasonable percentage of their cell phone bills. The trial court had denied certification of a proposed class of 1,500 managers, reasoning that a class trial was unmanageable in light of individualized issues as to whether particular class members paid their own phone bills and whether they had service plans that provided for unlimited minutes. In either case, the trial court ruled, the employer’s practice of requiring personal cell-phone use might not have caused an employee to incur any actual expense.

The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the denial of class certification, because it disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of Section 2802. The Court of Appeal held that Section 2802 always requires reimbursement when an employee relieves the employer of a business expense, regardless of whether the employee actually incurred an extra expense in doing so: “Otherwise, the employer would receive a windfall because it would be passing its operating expenses onto the employee. Thus, to be in compliance with section 2802, the employer must pay some reasonable percentage of the employee’s cell phone bill.” The Court of Appeal left for another day the enormous practical difficulties involved in calculating individual damages. Nor did the Court of Appeal address other issues (such as tax issues and issues of the regular rate of pay) that would arise if employers respond to the Court of Appeal’s ruling by over-paying employees for their actual expenses.

### 7.14 Payment by Piece Rate

Legislation effective in 2016 dealt a blow to piece-rate employers already reeling from hostile judicial decisions. This legislation codified the judge-made “pay separately for every hour worked” doctrine as to piece-rate wages, and requires that employers must:

- Pay piece-rate employees for rest and recovery breaks (and all periods of “other nonproductive time”) separately from, and in addition to, their piece-rate pay. The new law specifies a formula for calculating the required pay rate for rest breaks.

- Provide piece-rate employees with wage statements that include the pay period, the total hours of compensable rest and recovery breaks, the rate of pay for those breaks, and the gross wages paid for those breaks during the pay period.
List, for the pay period, the total hours of other non-productive time, the pay rate for that time, and the gross wages paid, if the employer does not pay a base hourly rate for all hours worked (in addition to piece-rate wages).²²⁹

DLSE guidance. The DLSE has issued a Fact Sheet and Frequently Asked Questions regarding the piece-rate law. Among the highlights:

- **Employers may not realize they have “piece rate” employees.** The DLSE suggests that the piece-rate law applies to employers that pay employees only partly on a piece-rate basis. For example, an employer may pay piece rates on certain days of the week and pay hourly wages on other days. The DLSE’s wage-rate calculation examples indicate that during a week where an employee performs piece-rate work on some days but not others, the employer must (1) include earnings from days in which no piece-rate work was performed in calculating the average hourly wage for the week, and (2) pay the average hourly wage for all rest breaks during the week, even if the employee performed no piece work on a given day. This guidance arguably deviates from the intent of the statute, because on days where the employee performs no piece-rate work, there should be no need to have rest breaks paid at a higher hourly rate.

- **Commissions are (mostly) not “piece rates.”** The DLSE Fact Sheet offers some comfort to employers by clarifying that the new law does not apply to commissioned employees. But the DLSE warns that some payments labelled as “commissions” may actually be piece rates, such as where the employee receiving “commissions” is not principally involved in selling the product or service or where the payment is not calculated as a percentage of the product or service sold.

- **Another “regular rate” trap for the unwary.** The DLSE Fact Sheet creates a potential pitfall on how to calculate the “total compensation” for the workweek. The DLSE advises that all “remuneration” included in calculating the regular rate of pay for purposes of overtime premium pay (e.g., the value of meals, lodging, and other non-monetary remuneration) should also be included in determining the total compensation and average hourly rest-break rate for piece-rate employees. The DLSE thus added a further layer of complication for employers that had hoped to look only to the total hourly and piece rate pay in determining the average hourly rest break rate. Employers may, however, exclude payments that are not included in the regular rate of pay, such as vacation payments, gifts, and travel expenses.

- **Rest period time need not be separately tracked.** Providing some relief to employers from the potential burdens of the new law, the DLSE advises that employers need not separately track actual rest break time taken by piece-rate employees. Instead, employers must pay for all compensable (legally required) rest breaks at the specified rate, and record these minutes on the wage statement. The employer need not record the actual number of minutes employees take for rest breaks or report those minutes on wage statements.

### 7.15 Payment of Commissions

Employees earn commissions in accordance with the level of products or services that they sell. Employees who earn more than 1.5 times the minimum wage and whose total pay consists mostly of commissions are exempt from California overtime requirements. (See § 7.7.5.) Nonexempt employees on commission must receive, through a draw against commissions or otherwise, at least the minimum wage for each pay period. And the Court of Appeal has held that these employees must also be paid separately, at the minimum wage, for the time spent on rest breaks.²³⁰
7.15.1 What payments qualify as commissions?

To qualify as receiving “commission” wages, the employee must be involved principally in sales activities (not on product creation or rendering service), and the compensation must depend on the level of sales. The DLSE has defined commissions narrowly, as pay based on a percentage of the sale, and argues that pay based on the number of units is really a piece rate, not a commission rate. But the Court of Appeal has rejected this narrow interpretation in the context of a pay plan for car salespersons. At issue was a Labor Code provision stating that commissions for employees of licensed vehicle dealers consist of “compensation paid to any person for services rendered in the sale of such employer’s property or services and based proportionately upon the amount or value thereof.” The Court of Appeal concluded that fixed payments of $150 for each car sold or leased qualified as payments that would count towards determining whether a car salesperson made most of her pay from commissions and thus qualified as exempt from overtime requirements. The Court of Appeal reasoned that a uniform payment for each vehicle sold was “proportionate—a one-to-one proportion. The pay will rise and fall in direct proportion to the number of vehicles sold.”

The Court of Appeal has also recognized that payments reflecting a percentage of the adjusted gross profit on the sale of a product or service can qualify as commissions. The employees at issue placed candidates with client companies and, once the candidate was successfully placed, received a percentage of the adjusted gross profit from the placement, as determined by a formula that included the employer’s costs and expenses. The Court of Appeal, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that this formula was too “complex” to qualify as a commission, reasoned that the payments “were sufficiently related to the price of services sold to constitute commissions for purposes of the commissioned employees exemption.”

7.15.2 When are commissions earned?

Commissions earned within a pay period must be paid for that pay period, and commissions generally are earned upon the completion of a sale. Nonetheless, the DLSE has recognized that an employer may set reasonable conditions that must occur before a commission is considered “earned.” One opinion letter states: “Commissions are due and payable after the reasonable conditions precedent of the employment agreement have been met. If commissions cannot be calculated until after an event has happened then the commissions are not ‘earned’ within the meaning of Section 204 until the happening of that event so long as the event is reasonably tied to the calculation.”

The Court of Appeal has stated that preconditions to earning the commission must be “clearly expressed,” must “relate to the sale,” and “cannot merely serve as a basis to shift the employer’s cost of doing business to the employee.”

7.15.3 Advances and chargebacks

Employers may advance commissions on a sale and then charge back the advance if the sale does not go through. Thus, if the employer advances an employee a commission for selling a magazine subscription, then the advance can be “charged back” against future commissions (cancelling out commissions generated in future sales) if the purchaser cancels the subscription within one month. The employer’s position is strongest if the employee has authorized the chargeback arrangement in writing and if the arrangement ensures that the employee will always be paid the lawful minimum.
Advances paid against commissions to be earned may be recovered at termination of employment only if there is a specific written agreement to that effect and, for nonexempt employees, only to the extent that the recovery does not invade the minimum wage or any overtime premium pay.

The Court of Appeal struck down a chargeback arrangement in *Hudgins v. Neiman Marcus*. In that case, a retailer addressed the problem of rescinded sales in certain sections of the store by imposing on all sales commissions in each section a pro rata deduction for “unidentified returns” (items returned that could not be tracked to a particular sales associate). *Neiman Marcus* concluded that this unidentified-returns policy effected a “forfeiture of commissions individually earned,” on the rationale that “[a]s to those items of merchandise the customer decides to keep, the sales associate has clearly earned his or her commission at the moment that the sales documents are completed and the customer takes possession of the purchased items.” The policy was unlawful under California law, *Neiman Marcus* concluded, because it effectively required sales associates to “repay a portion of commissions” on “completed sales” to compensate the employer for commissions paid on sales that other employees did not complete—amounts that would otherwise be a business loss that “the conscientious sales associate has done nothing to cause.”

*Neiman Marcus* contrasted this practice with “identified returns, [where] the sale is reversed and the individual sales associate is required to return the commission because his or her sale was rescinded.” While *Neiman Marcus* did not decide whether an “identified returns” policy would necessarily be lawful, the DLSE has interpreted *Neiman Marcus* as allowing a chargeback of commissions paid to an employee for identified returns.

### 7.15.4 Written contracts required for commission agreements

Employers contracting for services within California and contemplating payment in the form of commissions must put the commission agreement in writing and describe how commissions are computed and paid. Further, employers must give a signed copy of that agreement to each commissioned employee, and obtain a signed receipt from the employee.

The statute defines “commission” for these purposes as “compensation paid to any person for services rendered in the sale of such employer’s property or services and based proportionately upon the amount or value thereof.” But the following forms of pay do not qualify as “commissions”: (1) short-term productivity bonuses such as those paid to retail clerks; (2) temporary, variable incentive payments that increase, but do not decrease, payment under the written contract, and (3) bonus and profit-sharing plans, unless the employer offered to pay a fixed percentage of sales or profits as pay for work performed.

### 7.16 Bonuses

A bonus is money paid in addition to ordinary salary or wages. The Labor Code does not expressly address bonuses. Courts treat a bonus as a form of wages. Entitlement to a bonus is a matter of contract law, as modified by California statutory law. Courts consider an offer of a bonus as a binding unilateral contract that the employee accepts by beginning performance under the bonus plan.

Unless a bonus plan expressly provides otherwise, California bonuses are often treated as earned pro rata and payable, as wages, upon termination. Further, if the reason an employee has not earned a bonus is that the employer has dismissed the employee without cause, then a California court likely would hold that the employee
is entitled to a pro rata share of the bonus, on the theory that the employer is at fault for preventing the performance needed to earn the bonus.\footnote{300}

But if a written bonus plan clearly requires the employee to remain employed until a certain date, then an employer can deny the entire bonus if an employee, before that date, voluntarily resigns or is dismissed for good cause.\footnote{301}

### 7.16.1 Bonuses affected by the employer’s workers’ compensation experience

Some employers base bonuses in part on how successfully the company has avoided workers’ compensation costs. California Labor Code section 3751, however, forbids an employer to deduct from employee earnings, either directly or indirectly, “to cover the whole or any part of the cost” of workers’ compensation.\footnote{302} A 2003 California appellate court decision (\textit{Ralphs I}) interpreted Section 3751 to mean that workers’ compensation costs must be ignored in the calculation of a profit-based bonus plan.\footnote{303} This ruling, had it remained in effect, would have invalidated countless traditional profit-based bonus plans, including those for CEOs.

But then, in 2007, the California Supreme Court overruled \textit{Ralphs I} in a decision (\textit{Ralphs II}) involving the same employer and the same bonus plan.\footnote{304} \textit{Ralphs II} holds that traditional bonus systems based on net profits are lawful, even if net profits necessarily reflect workers’ compensation costs together with other business losses. \textit{Ralphs II} distinguished (a) a profit-based bonus plan from (b) a bonus or commission plan that first promises a payment and then reduces the promised payment to adjust for business losses. The latter plan, \textit{Ralphs II} explained, would unlawfully charge employees for the company’s cost of doing business.\footnote{305} A profit-based plan, by contrast, does “not create an expectation or entitlement in a specified wage, then take deductions or contributions from that wage to reimburse [the employer] for its business costs.” Rather, each employee receives, in addition to a guaranteed wage paid regardless of profit, a promised supplemental incentive compensation based on a profit to be calculated for a relevant period of operation. The bonus plan thus does not recapture or deduct from what the employer had originally promised,\footnote{306} but rather rewards employees’ “cooperative and collective contributions” by giving them a portion of profits that the employer “would otherwise be entitled to retain itself.”\footnote{307}

Notwithstanding the “reason and common sense” \textit{Ralphs II} thus invoked, it drew the support of just four of the seven justices. The three dissenters protested that the Labor Code must be read liberally in the employee’s favor: “Section 3751 prohibits the pass-through of workers' compensation costs in the broadest possible terms.”\footnote{308} The dissenters insisted: “What [the employer] cannot do in constructing its formula is include factors the Legislature has decided should play no role in the calculation of employment compensation. Workers’ compensation is such a factor.”\footnote{309}

Profit-based bonuses in California have thus squeaked by, so far, by a 4-3 majority of the Supreme Court.

### 7.16.2 Bonuses affected by cash and merchandise shortages

Where bonuses depend on net profits, which depend in turn on such items as theft and cash shortages, plaintiffs have claimed that the bonus calculation amounts to a deduction in violation of Section 8 of the wage orders. \textit{Ralphs I} distinguished between nonexempt employees (covered by Section 8) and exempt employees (not covered by Section 8).\footnote{310} As to exempt employees, \textit{Ralphs I} held that California employers lawfully may calculate bonuses using a formula that includes deductions for cash and merchandise shortages, because that calculation appropriately encourages exempt employees to manage the business to increase revenue while minimizing
expenses. With regard to nonexempt employees, however, *Ralph I* held that the employer’s profit-based bonus calculation would unlawfully require them to bear the costs of management.

The California Supreme Court’s *Ralphs II* decision, which overruled *Ralphs I* with respect to its interpretation of Labor Code section 3751, also overruled *Ralphs I* with respect to its view that employers must not deduct cash and merchandise shortages in calculating profits for purposes of a profits-based bonus for nonexempt employees. But *Ralphs II* was a hotly contested, 4-3 decision, and the three dissenting justices, while arguing that the employer unlawfully considered workers’ compensation costs in its profits-based bonus plan, suggested that they would also find unlawful the “deduction of cash and merchandise shortages.”

### 7.16.3 Longevity bonuses involving restricted company stock

The California Supreme Court, in *Schachter v. Citigroup*, upheld a voluntary employee incentive compensation plan that permitted employees to take shares of restricted company stock at a reduced price in lieu of receiving a portion of annual cash compensation. The plan provided that the stock did not vest unless the employee was still employed on a specified date, and that the employee would forfeit the stock—and the portion of cash compensation that had been paid in the form of the restricted stock—if the employee quit or was dismissed for cause before the vesting date. An employee who took restricted stock and then quit before the vesting date sued to challenge the forfeiture provisions. The employee argued that the forfeiture violated Labor Code requirements that employees be paid all earned, unpaid wages upon termination or resignation, and a Labor Code provision that prohibits agreements that purport to circumvent those requirements. *Schachter* rejected the employee’s challenge because, according to the terms of the incentive plan, there were no earned, unpaid wages remaining unpaid upon termination of employment. That is, the plan provided a longevity bonus, which was never earned because the employee quit before the relevant date.

Even in granting the employer a victory, however, *Schachter* found it necessary to opine that bonuses, commissions, and other incentive compensation may have to be paid where the worker does not quit but is fired: “If the employee is discharged before completion of all of the terms of the bonus agreement, and there is not valid cause, based on conduct of the employee, for the discharge, the employee may be entitled to recover at least a pro-rata share of the promised bonus.” For this proposition *Schachter* cited no law but rather a DLSE Manual provision and a DLSE opinion letter. *Schachter’s* dictum did not address how the Supreme Court would interpret a longevity bonus plan that expressly requires continued employment to a given date, regardless of the reasons for the termination of employment, but the *Schachter’s* language strongly implies that a California employer could not deny the bonus if the employer has dismissed the employee without cause.

### 7.16.4 Retroactive bonus overtime pay

Employers must pay overtime premium pay on non-discretionary bonuses paid to nonexempt employees.

**The federal method.** Employers can adopt any “reasonable and equitable method of allocation” of the bonus to the relevant workweeks, such as assuming that employees earned an equal amount of bonus each hour of the relevant period and determining the resultant hourly increase by dividing the total bonus by the number of hours worked during the period for which the bonus is paid. “The additional compensation due for the overtime workweeks in the period may then be computed by multiplying the total number of statutory overtime hours
worked in each such workweek during the period by one-half this hourly increase,” in recognition of the fact that the employee already has received the straight-time portion of the bonus.

**Peculiar California method for “flat sum” bonuses.** For years, the DLSE, while recognizing that the federal method is proper to calculate overtime premium pay on a formula bonus, such as a production bonus, took a peculiar approach to a “flat sum” bonus, such as a payment of $300 for working through the end of a season. As to a “flat sum” bonus, the DLSE opined that the employer must calculate the regular rate by dividing the amount of the bonus by the straight-time hours worked, and then multiply that rate by 1.5 (for overtime) or 2.0 (for doubletime) to calculate the amount of overtime pay or doubletime pay. The DLSE insisted that this peculiar arithmetic was needed to avoid a dilution of the bonus regular rate that, in the DLSE’s imagination, would somehow encourage employers to assign more overtime hours to bonus-earners. There was no particular law behind the DLSE’s position, as opposed to a policy preference that overtime work must be discouraged whenever possible. Thus, while federal law would determine a regular bonus rate on a “flat sum” bonus by dividing the bonus by all hours worked and then multiplying the number of overtime hours by 0.5 times the regular rate to determine the amount of bonus overtime pay, California would more than triple the amount of bonus overtime pay, by requiring employers to divide the bonus by only the straight-time hours worked and then multiply the number of overtime hours by 1.5 times the regular bonus rate.

In 2016, the Court of Appeal, in *Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp.*, rejected the DLSE’s notion, holding that California law follows federal law as to calculating “flat sum” bonuses. The employer in *Alvarado* calculated weekly bonus overtime pay. The employer’s method essentially divided the $15 weekly bonus by all weekly hours worked (both straight-time and overtime) to yield a bonus regular rate, and then multiplied one-half that amount by the number of weekly overtime hours to produce the weekly bonus overtime pay. The plaintiff claimed that this method of compliance with the federal method failed to pay overtime premium pay due under Labor Code sections 510 and 1194. The employer prevailed on summary judgment. The trial court found no legal basis for the plaintiff’s proposed formula, because federal law did not conflict with the employer’s method, and because the plaintiff was relying on notions of California public policy lifted from a dictum in the DLSE Enforcement Manual that lacks any legally binding effect.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s sensible result, recognizing that California employers may use the federal method to calculate the overtime pay due on bonuses. But then the California Supreme Court intervened, to take review of the case.

In March 2018, the Supreme Court in *Alvarado* reversed. Exalting mechanical logic over practical reality, *Alvarado* endorsed the DLSE’s approach and thus required that the “flat sum” bonus be divided by just straight-time hours (not all hours) and that the resulting regular bonus rate be multiplied by the number of overtime hours and by 1.5, not 0.5. *Alvarado* rejected an approach that would divide the bonus by all hours worked, because that approach would result in “progressively decreasing regular rate of pay as the number of overtime hours increases, thus undermining the state’s policy of discouraging overtime work.” This strictly logical approach blinks practical reality. Consider a worker earning the $15 bonus during a 50-hour week. By *Alvarado*’s reasoning, the federal method (dividing $15 by all 50 hours worked—yielding a bonus regular rate of $0.30, multiplied by 0.50 and 10 overtime hours to generate $1.50 in weekly bonus overtime pay) somehow would encourage the employer to create more overtime hours than if the employer used the DLSE method (dividing $15 by just the 40 hours of straight time—yielding a regular bonus rate of $0.375, multiplied by 1.50 and 10 overtime hours to generate $5.625 in weekly bonus overtime pay). *Alvarado* cited no evidence—in the form of an empirical study or
otherwise—to support its speculation about an employer’s incentive to create overtime in this scenario. Nor had the DLSE provided any such evidence when it invented its peculiar “flat sum” bonus rule in the first place. Would an employer really create more overtime—paying time and one-half for each such hour—in order to dilute the bonus regular rate by a few cents? This practical consideration was something Alvarado’s theoretical musing did not begin to contemplate.

In a remarkable concurring opinion, four of the seven Supreme Court justices acknowledged that the “spare language” of statutory law could have left employers “somewhat uncertain about how to proceed,” and that the DLSE manual was not an “authoritative construction by a state agency.” The four concurring justices further acknowledged that employers who “fully intended to comply with state overtime laws” “may now be faced with substantial penalties”—an “unfortunate” state of affairs that “conceivably could have been avoided had an interpretative regulation of this subject been promulgated through formal APA rulemaking.” The concurring justices nonetheless agreed that Alvarado’s new interpretation should apply retroactively, even if, “[r]egrettably,” “more was not done to help employers meet their statutory responsibilities.”

7.17 Tips

In America generally, employers may use a “tip credit” by which they can count the amount of tips that customers leave for employees toward payment of the employee’s minimum wage: federal law and many state laws permit an employer to pay a tipped employee a sub-minimum base wage as low as one-half the minimum wage, provided that the amount of tips brings the actual wage up to the minimum wage.

California is different. Employers of California service employees encounter a triple whammy. First, the state minimum wage is considerably higher than the federal minimum wage (see § 7.2). Second, the tip credit permitted by federal law is forbidden under California law: every gratuity becomes the sole property of the employee to whom it is paid, regardless of the base rate of pay, which means that the employee must receive at least the minimum hourly wage without regard to how many tips the employee receives. Third, certain limitations apply to any “tip pooling” scheme. For example, tips from the pool must not go to any “agent” of the employer.

As to tips paid by credit card, California employers must pay the employee the full amount of the gratuity indicated by the customer on the credit card slip, without deducting for any processing fees, and must pay the gratuity to the employee no later than the next regular payday following the date the patron authorized the credit card payment.

The California Supreme Court has held that there is not a private right of action for employees to challenge a violation of the Labor Code section that prohibits employers from taking any tip that a patron pays to or leaves for an employee.

7.18 Vacation Pay

California differs from most states by treating accrued vacation as a form of wages. More specifically, by virtue of a California Supreme Court interpretation of Labor Code section 227.3,

- earned vacation must not be forfeited,
- unused vacation pay must be paid on termination of employment, at the final rate of pay,
• vacation pay is deemed to be earned daily,
• “use it or lose it” policies are unenforceable, and
• “paid time off” is treated as vacation.

The Section 227.3 vacation rules apply “[u]nless otherwise provided by a collective bargaining agreement.” The Court of Appeal has interpreted this exemption narrowly, holding that Section 227.3 rules apply even to union-represented employees unless their CBA “clearly and unmistakably waives” Section 227.3 rights.330

7.18.1 Accrued vacation pay is a form of wages

An employer need not provide any paid vacation at all. But if the employer does so, California treats vacation pay as wages earned on a daily basis and not subject to any forfeiture and requires that all earned, unused vacation be paid upon termination of employment at the final rate of pay, regardless of when the vacation was earned or whether the employee had become eligible to use the vacation.331 The basis for this peculiar doctrine is a California statute, Labor Code section 227.3, which provides that “all vested vacation shall be paid” to terminating employees “as wages at [their] final rate” and that no employer policy shall provide for “forfeiture of vested vacation time upon termination.”332 Because the right to be paid for the amount of vacation time offered by an employer constitutes deferred wages for services rendered, the employee is entitled to receive pay, at the time of termination, for the pro rata share earned during the time that the employee rendered services to the employer.

Section 227.3 also empowers the Labor Commissioner to “apply the principles of equity and fairness” “in the resolution of any dispute with regard to vested vacation time.” Pursuant to this broad, vague mandate, the DLSE has promulgated interpretations that employers may find arbitrary and capricious.

7.18.2 Impermissible “use it or lose it” policies and permissible caps

Many employers provide that paid vacation time, if not used within a given time (such as a calendar year), is forfeited. You must “use it or lose it.” Not so in California. Because California law deems vacation pay to be a form of wages that vests daily, it is not subject to forfeiture. Accordingly, “use it or lose it” vacation policies are not enforceable in California.333

Nonetheless, employers can approximate the result of a “use it or lost it” policy by implementing a “no further accrual” policy. That policy permissibly may provide that once employees accrue a particular number of vacation days (an accumulation “cap”), they no longer continue to earn vacation until they take vacation to reduce the accumulated number of unused vacation days below the cap.334 The DLSE has opined, however, that the level of the cap must be reasonable. The DLSE has withdrawn an opinion letter that arbitrarily required the cap to be 1.75 times the annual vacation accrual rate.335

7.18.3 Problems with denying vacation pay to short-term employees

Vacation pay is deemed to have been earned from the first day of employment if the vacation pay plan provides that an employee has earned a given amount of vacation pay (e.g., two weeks) upon completion of the first six months or one year of employment. Thus, if California employers want to avoid paying accrued vacation pay to terminating short-term employees, they must clearly provide that no vacation is earned for some specific initial period of time.336 If an employer also wants to permit an employee to take vacation immediately after that initial
period, then it can arrange for the employee to take the vacation pay in the form of an advance against wages to be earned in the future, pursuant to a written agreement. But the DLSE has opined that California employers must not deduct from a final paycheck to recover for advanced, unearned vacation.  

7.18.4 “Personal time off” policies

Some employers have combined vacation and sick leave to create an overall benefit typically called “personal time off.” This arrangement has administrative advantages, but enhances employer liability under California law because California will treat PTO as simply vacation by another name unless use of the PTO is conditioned upon a specific event, such as illness, an anniversary date, or a holiday. Moreover, employers with a PTO policy should ensure that the policy complies with the requirements of the California Paid Sick Leave Law (see § 2.14). A PTO arrangement also has “kin care” implications (see § 2.11).

7.18.5 Sabbaticals

Some employers provide long-term employees with a sabbatical: a paid leave to promote retention and increase productivity upon the employees’ return to work. An employer thus might entitle employees to an eight-week paid leave—in addition to regular vacation—once they complete seven years of service. The DLSE acknowledges that a true sabbatical is not subject to the anti-forfeiture rules that protect regular vacation. But the DLSE insists that a “sabbatical” is really just extra vacation unless the leave (a) is awarded in addition to earned vacation, (b) occurs only after lengthy employment (such as seven years), (c) is granted for an extended period longer than the normal vacation, and (d) is provided only to high level managers and advanced professionals.

One Court of Appeal decision, *Paton v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.*, rejected the DLSE’s arbitrary view that true sabbaticals are offered only to high-level or professional employees, but *Paton* generally adopted the DLSE’s approach and declined to define a clear set of rules on which employers could rely to ensure that the sabbaticals they grant will not be mistaken for vacation.

The trial court in *Paton* had granted summary judgment to an employer sued by former salaried employees who claimed that the employer’s failure to pay them for unused sabbatical leaves amounted to an unlawful forfeiture of vested vacation pay. The leaves—available for eight weeks once an employee reached seven years of employment—were in addition to regular vacation. *Paton* distinguished regular vacation—deferred compensation typically earned in proportion to the length of employment—with a true sabbatical, which *Paton* defined as a leave designed to “provide incentive for experienced employees to continue with and improve their service to the employer.” *Paton* reversed the summary judgment for the employer, reasoning that because the employer imposed no condition on how employees used their sabbaticals, a reasonable jury could find that the sabbatical was really just extra vacation for long-term employees.

*Paton* declined to apply a definitive test that would distinguish a sabbatical from a regular vacation. Rather, *Paton* announced a four-factor test to determine if a particular form of unconditional leave qualifies as a true sabbatical: (1) whether the leave is granted infrequently (e.g., every seven years), (2) whether the length of the leave is adequate to achieve the employer’s purpose (an unconditional leave should be longer than regular vacation), (3) whether (as always must be the case) the sabbatical is granted in addition to the average vacation given in the relevant labor market, and (4) whether the employee is expected to return to work once the leave ends.
7.18.6 ERISA preemption

Some employers have sought to avoid California vacation law by funding vacation pay through an ERISA plan.\(^{345}\)

7.18.7 Claims for vacation pay do not accrue until termination

The DLSE, in an unusually pro-employer opinion letter, once decided that the time for an employee to claim vacation pay begins to accrue when the vacation pay is earned. Employers that had used improper “use it or lose it” vacation plans could at least limit their liability to long-term employees by disregarding vacation pay earned beyond the statutory limitations period. But the Court of Appeal then held that a claim for unused vested vacation pay accrues only upon termination of employment, not before, regardless of when the vacation pay was earned.\(^{346}\) An employee suing for unpaid vacation pay at the end of employment thus can rely on vacation earned at any time during the employment.

7.18.8 Employers can pay vacation benefits at lower rates during employment.

The vacation pay statute requires that an employer pay an employee, upon termination, “all vested vacation … as wages at his final rate in accordance with such contract of employment or employer policy respecting eligibility or time served.”\(^{347}\) The Court of Appeal has recognized that this provision does not require employers to pay vacation at the employee’s regular rate during employment. The Court of Appeal thus affirmed the dismissal of a claim by employees complaining that they received vacation pay during their employment in flat sums of $500 or so per week instead of receiving their (higher) regular rate of weekly pay.\(^{348}\)

7.18.9 Transition to “no vacation” or “unlimited vacation” policies?

The onerous nature of California vacation law has inspired some employers to discontinue traditional vacation policies. One potential option is an “unlimited time off” policy. The law in this area is still developing, but some observations surely apply. In an at-will, non-union work environment, an employer may, with adequate notice, unilaterally change the terms and conditions of employment, including any vacation plan. The notice should provide employees with adequate time to adjust. For example, one method of transition might permit employees to use their accrued vacation before a new policy takes effect. Any accrued, unused vacation pay that an employee does not use before the new policy begins would still belong to the employee. The employer would have to pay off that balance at some point, such as the time of the policy change or when employment ends, at the latest. An employer that chooses not to pay out unused vacation pay could let employees use the time during other time off, including leaves of absence. Allowing the time to remain in the “bank” during the remainder of the employee’s employment, however, could require the employer to pay the accrued vacation time at the final rate of pay, which usually would exceed the rate in effect when the paid vacation was earned.

Considerations for an “unlimited time off” policy differ based on whether the employees in question are exempt or nonexempt. An “unlimited time off” policy for exempt employees should be carefully crafted to avoid suspicion that it is a “subterfuge” to hide an unlawful “use it or lose it” policy. For this reason, it is best to avoid any specific limit on the total amount of time off an employee may take. But an “unlimited time off” policy for exempt employees could include safeguards, such as (1) requiring manager approval for significant lengths of time off, (2) imposing a business-needs requirement to ensure that employees remain available during critical periods, and (3) specifying
that time off taken for leaves of absences or for sabbaticals would be excluded from the definition of “unlimited
time off,” and thus, would not be paid.

“Unlimited time off” policies for nonexempt employees, meanwhile, would be difficult to manage, if not wholly
impracticable. Nonexempt employee job duties by their nature generally require supervision, and thus are
incompatible with a time-off policy that would allow the nonexempt employee discretion to manage the time
needed to accomplish work goals. Likewise, while exempt employees get paid the same amount regardless of the
number of hours worked, nonexempt employees generally get paid on an hourly basis, for time worked that the
employer must record; that task seems at odds with an unlimited time-off policy. Some employers may find it
easier to manage to create a policy that would pay nonexempt employees when they work, while enabling them to
take unpaid time off within limits.

7.19 Personal Liability for Wage and Hour Violations

Some California plaintiffs seeking repaid wages have sued corporate officials personally. The California Supreme
Court limited that practice in 2005, by holding, in Reynolds v. Bement, that corporate officers, directors, and
shareholders cannot be personally liable for unpaid overtime wages as an “employer,” even if they exercised
control over the payment of wages. Reynolds also rejected a theory that the individual defendants were jointly
liable for directing or participating in tortious conduct: a “simple failure to comply with statutory overtime
requirements” does not qualify as tortious, the court explained. Finally, Reynolds held that the individual
defendants could not be liable for “conspiring” with their corporate employer to withhold wages, because
corporate agents acting on the corporation’s behalf are not considered to be co-conspirators.

At the same time, however, Reynolds encouraged plaintiffs’ counsel not to despair, by speculating as to
circumstances where personal liability for unpaid wages could still be possible. First, the Labor Commissioner can
continue to use the broad definition of “employer” found in the wage orders to seek financial recovery from
individuals in administrative hearings. Second, in cases of thinly capitalized corporations that have played fast
and loose with the corporate form, the “alter ego” doctrine can make controlling individuals liable for unpaid
wages. Third, huge civil penalties ($100 per underpaid employee per pay period) could be sought by aggrieved
employees, under PAGA, against “any person acting on behalf of an employer who violates, or causes to be
violated,” a statute or wage order regarding wages.

During 2015, in legislation called “A Fair Day’s Pay Act,” California added Labor Code section 558.1 to enhance
the Labor Commissioner’s enforcement authority to recover civil penalties. Under Section 558.1, any employer,
and any “other person acting on behalf of an employer,” may be held liable for violations of the directives
appearing in the Wage Orders and in various provisions of the Labor Code. The Legislature defines “other person
acting on behalf of an employer” as “a natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the
employer.” The “managing agent” definition mirrors the definition found in California’s punitive damages statute.
Under that statute and case law, “managing agents” are all employees who exercise substantial independent
authority and judgment in their corporate decision-making such that their decisions ultimately determine corporate
policy.

A 2017 Court of Appeal decision argued for the individual liability of a company’s president, sole shareholder, and
director, both as a joint employer and as an alter ego. The decision considered a suit by restaurant employees
against their former employer, Koji’s, for unpaid wages, inadequate wage statements, and failure to provide meal
and rest breaks. Koji’s went out of business, but the employees also sued Arthur Parent, Koji’s president, sole shareholder, and director. The trial court, after a bench trial, rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that Parent was a joint employer. The trial court was concerned that if Parent were held liable because of his control as sole shareholder and president of Koji’s, then all owners of closely held corporations would suffer the same fate. But the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Parent could be individually liable as a joint employer because he was the “big boss” who hired and fired managers and laid off the employees.\textsuperscript{355}

The Court of Appeal also held that personal liability could be possible on an “alter ego” theory, emphasizing that the theory applies not only when a sham corporate entity is formed to commit a misdeed, but also when the corporate form is used to circumvent a statute or to accomplish some other wrongful purpose.\textsuperscript{356}

In a 2018 decision, the Court of Appeal held that individuals can be held personally liable for civil penalties under the Labor Code. Two restaurant employees brought wage and hour claims against their corporate employer and also against Paolo Pedrazzani—the corporation’s owner, president, secretary, and director. The employees invoked PAGA to seek civil penalties under Labor Code sections 558 and 1197.1, which authorize the recovery of civil penalties against the employer “or other person acting on behalf of an employer” who violates or causes a violation of those statutes. After a bench trial, the trial court issued civil penalties against Pedrazzani individually as an “other person” who caused violations of the overtime and minimum wage statutes. The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that Pedrazzani could be personally liable for civil penalties—even in the absence of a viable “alter ego” theory—because Sections 558 and 1197.1 authorize the Labor Commissioner to recover civil penalties, and because PAGA authorized plaintiffs to recover those penalties in the Labor Commissioner’s place: “California … has decided that both the employer and any ‘other person’ who causes a violation of the overtime pay or minimum wage laws are subject to specified civil penalties.” The Court of Appeal concluded that if a party other than the employer committed or caused to be committed violations of the overtime and minimum wage laws, then that party is personally liable for “certain civil penalties regardless of the identity or business structure of the employer.”\textsuperscript{357}

7.20 Broadened Definition of Employer?

7.20.1 Joint employers

In 2010, the California Supreme Court held that the wage orders endorse a broad definition of “employer” that extends beyond the definition of “employer” ordinarily used in interpreting federal statutes (i.e., the common law definition). The California wage order’s definition of employer extends to anyone who (1) exercises control over wages, hours, working conditions, (2) suffers or permits a worker to work, or (3) engages a worker to work, thereby creating a common law relationship.\textsuperscript{358} The Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier recognition, however, that a definition of employer does not impose liability on individual corporate agents who were acting within the scope of their agency, even if this result effectively would leave workers without a remedy where their primary employer has gone bankrupt. In the case before it, the Supreme Court recognized that merchants who purchased produce from a grower were not the “employers” of the grower’s agricultural workers absent any evidence that those merchants exercised control over the workers’ wages and hours.

In 2012, the Court of Appeal, in \textit{Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza}, further promoted a broad notion of employment liability. At issue was whether a pizza franchisor could be held liable for torts and FEHA violations perpetrated against a teenage pizza store employee by the manager of a pizza store franchisee.\textsuperscript{359} The Court of Appeal held
that liability for the franchisor was possible, on the basis of a franchise contract that gave the franchisor extensive
control over the pizza store franchise’s local operations, and on the basis of extra-contractual evidence
suggesting that the franchisor exercised extensive local management control over the franchisee in areas
including employee conduct and discipline. In 2014, the California Supreme Court reversed, albeit by a 4-3 vote,
holding that uniform marketing and operational plans do not automatically make the franchisor liable for the
actions of the franchisee’s supervisors. Rather, to be considered an employer, the franchisor would have to retain
or assume a “general right of control” over the business.360

But the Court of Appeal has continued efforts to expand the scope of employer liability. In 2014, the same Court
of Appeal justice who wrote *Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza* wrote a similarly expansive decision in *Castaneda v. Ensign Group, Inc.*361 A nursing assistant, seeking unpaid minimum and overtime wages earned at a rehabilitation
care center, sued Ensign Group, a holding company that owned the care center. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Ensign because Ensign did not manage the care center. But the Court of Appeal reversed, holding
that a parent corporation could be liable for a wholly owned subsidiary’s wage and hour violations, even if the
parent corporation did not directly hire, fire, or supervise the employees in question. The Court of Appeal opined
that where the parent corporation exercised structural and managerial control over the subsidiary, and thus could
have ensured that the subsidiary’s practices complied with California labor law, a potential basis of liability is “the
owner’s failure to perform the duty of seeing to it that the prohibited condition does not exist.”362 The Court of
Appeal cited, as evidence of managerial control, that Ensign required care center employees to follow Ensign
“core values,” to use Ensign “forms and templates in the course of doing their jobs,” and to use particular
computer and billing and operational systems.

“Client employers.” As of 2015, the Legislature created special liability for “client employers” that use the
services of a labor contractor. A client employer now shares with its labor contractors (such as payrolling,
temporary staffing, and employee leasing agencies) “all civil legal responsibility and civil liability for all workers
supplied by that labor contractor,” in connection with the payment of wages and the securing of workers’
compensation coverage.363 Thus, if a client employer’s labor contractor fails to pay all wages or fails to procure
sufficient workers’ compensation coverage for the contractor’s own employees, then the client employer can also
be liable for these failures. The new law defines “wages” expansively, by reference to Labor Code section 200, to
include incentive compensation, bonuses, and vacation pay. Client employers also now have non-delegable
responsibilities for worksite occupational health and safety. Of course, a client employer can still seek contractual
indemnity against labor contractors that create liability for the client employer. The law also excludes exempt
employees from its provisions.

Even in the absence of this statute, plaintiffs have argued for a broader definition of employer with respect to
claims based on the IWC wage orders, which define employment more broadly than does the common law.364

**Federal joint employer standard.** It remains to be seen whether California’s expansion of employment
concepts—and thus employer liability—will follow the ambitious lead taken by federal agencies during the Obama
Administration. The NLRB, in 2015, radically expanded potential joint-employer liability in *Browning-Ferris
Industries of California*, which announced a new standard to determine whether multiple entities are “joint
employers” of a single workforce for purposes of collective bargaining.365 Under *Browning-Ferris*, the NLRB would
inquire whether there was a common-law employment relationship with the employees in question (including the
“right to control” the employees). If such a common-law employment relationship were found, the NLRB would
see whether the putative joint employer possessed enough control over the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to permit “meaningful collective bargaining.”

Under *Browning-Ferris*, joint employer status would longer require “direct and immediate” control over working conditions. Indirect control and even the reserved right to control working conditions would now suffice to establish joint employer status if two or more entities “share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.” The essential terms and conditions of employment include hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, direction, “dictating the number of workers to be supplied,” scheduling, seniority, overtime, assigning work, and “determining the manner and method of work performance.” And this list is illustrative, not exhaustive. *Browning-Ferris* would have affected many types of employers, including organizations that regularly use contractors—such as cleaning or janitorial services, maintenance services, caterers, or management companies—to staff and operate the business.

In late 2018, however, a D.C. Circuit decision invalidated *Browning-Ferris* and remanded the case for further NLRB proceedings. The D.C. Circuit found that *Browning-Ferris* failed to adequately distinguish between indirect control over employment terms and influence or control over “routine” matters related to the formation and maintenance of contractor arrangements. The D.C. Circuit identified cost-plus billing, cost containment measures, providing an “advance description of tasks,” setting basic parameters of performance, and developing contractor “objectives” and “expectations” as examples of actions that—although perhaps indirectly controlling or influencing a putative contractor’s employees—are not pertinent to joint employment. The D.C. Circuit returned the case to the NLRB to “erect some legal scaffolding that keeps the inquiry within traditional common law bounds.”

Meanwhile, the Trump NLRB has proposed a rule that would supplant *Browning-Ferris*. The proposed rule would make clear that an employer will be considered a joint employer of a separate company’s employees only where that employer possesses and exercises “substantial direct and immediate control” over the essential terms and conditions of employment (such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and direction) of the second company’s employees. And even where an employer exercises direct control over another employer’s workers, it would not be held to be a joint employer if such control is “limited and routine.”

**Payroll companies.** The Court of Appeal did stem the tide toward expanding notions of joint employment in *Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC.*, where a plaintiff suing for unpaid wages, wrongful termination, and inadequate wage statements sued her employer’s payroll company on a theory that it was her joint employer. The Court of Appeal, relying on prior authority, rejected all the plaintiff’s claims that contended the payroll company was her joint employer, in that the payroll company did not control her wages or working conditions. The Supreme Court took review of the decision but not on the issue of joint employment. The Supreme Court instead reviewed the Court of Appeal’s decision to let the lawsuit proceed against the payroll company on other issues of liability (contract, negligent representation, and professional negligence), and in a 2019 decision determined that theories were not viable.

**ABC test not extended to joint employer question.** The Supreme Court, in the context of whether a worker hired by a company is its employee or independent contractor, has adopted an “ABC test” that heavily weights the result toward employee status. (See § 19.6.) So far the Court of Appeal has rebuffed efforts by plaintiffs to use the ABC test to determine whether a defendant is the plaintiff’s joint employer.
7.20.2 Other liability imposed for another employer’s Labor Code violations

Customers of delinquent port drayage motor carriers. Legislation effective in 2019 requires the DLSE to post a list on its website of port drayage motor carriers with any unsatisfied judgment or assessment or any “order, decision, or award” finding illegal conduct as to various wage and hour issues, specifically including independent contractor misclassification and derivative claims. The new law also extends joint and several liability to the customers of these drayage motor carriers for their future wage violations of the same nature.372

Direct construction contractors. Urgency legislation enacted in 2018 clarifies Labor Code section 218.7, which created joint liability for construction contractors and subcontractors. The new legislation repeals the express provision that relieved direct contractors for liability for anything other than unpaid wages and fringe or other benefit payments or contributions owed.373

Temporary employment agencies. The Court of Appeal in 2018 held that a staffing agency with its own compliant policy on meal periods was not obligated to police the meal periods of its employees who were working on a client employer’s premises, and that the staffing company was not vicariously liable for the client employer’s own violations.374 In another 2018 decision, the Court of Appeal held that workers who settled their wage and hour suit against a staffing company could not then sue the client employer on identical claims, because the client employer and the staffing company were in privity with one another for purposes of the wage and hour claim, and the client company was an agent of the staffing company with respect to the staffing company’s payment of wages to its employees who worked at the client company.375

7.21 Restrictions on Scheduling

7.21.1 One day’s rest every seven days

California generally entitles employees to a day of rest every seven days, except where the hours of work do not exceed 30 hours in one week or six hours in one day.376 This statutory requirement was in place, without litigious contention, since 1937. But then the PAGA statute, in 2004, created the opportunity for plaintiffs’ counsel to seek civil penalties for a wide variety of Labor Code violations. Thus it was that former Nordstrom employees, invoking PAGA, sued the department store company for having employers work on a seventh day, without the employees’ written consent. This paternalistic theory of employer liability would hurt employees who, for their own reasons—wanting more money, satisfying personal scheduling preferences—want to work on the seventh day. A federal district court dismissed their claim. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit wrestled with the following questions concerning how to interpret the relevant Labor Code provisions: First, what are the seven days: the employer’s regular workweek, or any group of consecutive seven days? Second, does the exemption from the day-in-rest requirement apply when an employee works less than six hours in any one day of the seven days, or does the exemption apply only when an employee works less than six hours in each day during the seven days? Third, when the statute prohibits an employer to “cause” employees to miss a day of rest, does “cause” mean force, coerce, pressure, schedule, encourage, reward, permit, or something else?

In 2017, the California Supreme Court answered the three questions, in Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc. First, as to the question of “which seven days?,” Mendoza determined that employees are entitled to at least one day of rest.
during each workweek, and not during a rolling period of any seven consecutive days.\textsuperscript{377} Second, as to the exemption for employees working shifts of six hours or less, \textit{Mendoza} held that the exemption applies only to those employees who never exceed six hours of work on any day of the workweek.\textsuperscript{378} Third, as to what it means for an employer to “cause” to work a seventh day, \textit{Mendoza} held that an employer may not induce an employee to forgo a protected day of rest, but the employer may permit or allow the employee to do so.\textsuperscript{379}

\textbf{7.21.2 Retail scheduling.}

Retail employers throughout America generally have the discretion to schedule their workforces in accordance with their own business needs, without regard for employee preferences. That is not so in San Francisco. In 2014 its Board of Supervisors enacted two first-of-a-kind ordinances, commonly referred to as the “Retail Workers’ Bill of Rights.” These ordinances impose obligations on “Formula Retail Establishments”\textsuperscript{380} with 20 or more employees in San Francisco.

Before employment begins, Formula Retail employers must provide a good-faith written estimate of the employee’s expected minimum number of scheduled shifts per month, and the days and hours of those shifts. But this estimate is not a contractually binding promise.

Formula Retail employers also must provide employees with their schedules two weeks in advance, including any on-call shifts, and must provide advance notice of any changes to the employees’ biweekly schedule (not including employee-requested sick leave, time off, shift trades, or additional shifts). If changes are made to the employee’s schedule with less than seven days’ notice but more than 24 hours’ notice, then the Formula Retail employer must pay one hour of pay, at the employee’s regular hourly pay, for each shift change. If changes are made with less than 24 hours’ notice, then the Formula Retail employer must pay between two and four hours of “predictability pay,” depending on the duration of the shift. “Predictability pay”—owed in addition to any regular pay—is for employees working a shift in these circumstances:

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Advance Notice} & \textbf{Length of Shift} & \textbf{Predictability Pay Owed} \\
\hline
< 7 days but 24 hours or more & Any length & 1 hour \\
\hline
Less than 24 hours & 4 hours or less & 2 hours \\
\hline
Less than 24 hours & More than 4 hours & 4 hours \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Further, Formula Retail Employers must provide equal treatment to part-time employees regarding (1) starting hourly wage, (2) access to employer-provided paid and unpaid time off (which is prorated for part-time workers), and (3) eligibility for promotions, subject to certain qualifications.\textsuperscript{381}
7.22 Worker Retention and Staffing Requirements

7.22.1 Grocery worker retention

Los Angeles and other California cities (such as Santa Monica, San Francisco, and Gardena) have “worker retention” ordinances that require purchasers of major supermarkets to retain certain members of the pre-existing workforce for at least 90 days, subject only to the employer’s right to fire a worker for cause. Other ordinances of this general kind similarly protect service workers in the event that one city contractor replaces another. In 2008 the California Grocers Association obtained an injunction against enforcement of the Los Angeles grocery worker retention ordinance and in 2009, the Court of Appeal, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the injunction, ruling that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the California Retail Food Code and is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act.

But then the California Supreme Court held otherwise, reversing the Court of Appeal to rule that the worker-retention ordinance was not preempted by the California Retail Food Code or the National Labor Relations Act and that the Retail Food Code did not violate equal protection. The United States Supreme Court declined to hear the California Grocers Association’s request to review the case.

The Legislature has followed the municipalities’ lead. As of 2016, a “successor grocery store employer” must retain the current grocery workers for 90 days after the “change in control” of a grocery store. At the end of the 90 days, the new employer must prepare a written performance review for each worker and “consider offering” continued employment if the worker has performed satisfactorily.

7.22.2 Employee staffing

Employers throughout America generally have the discretion to staff their workforces in accordance with their own business needs, without regard for current workforce preferences. That is not so in San Francisco, San Jose, or Emeryville.

San Francisco. Formula Retail employers, before hiring new employees or using contractors or a temporary services or staffing agency to perform work in a Formula Retail Establishment, must first offer the additional work to existing part-time employees if (1) the part-time employee is qualified to do the additional work, as reasonably determined by the employer, and (2) the additional work is similar to work the employee has performed for the employer. Further, if no single part-time employee is available to work the entirety of the additional hours or shifts, then the employer must allow an existing part-time employee to work a portion of that time so long as (1) the total number of consecutive hours that the employee can work is at least four hours, and (2) the remainder of the shifts that the employee cannot work is not less than four hours. The Formula Retail employer need offer only the number of hours needed for the part-time employee to reach 35 hours of work in a week.

The Formula Retail employer must deliver a written offer of the additional hours, or post the offer in a conspicuous location in the workplace where employee notices customarily appear. The part-time employees must be provided 72 hours to accept the additional hours, after which the employer may hire new employees or use contractors to work the additional hours.
If a Formula Retail Establishment changes ownership, then the new Formula Retail employer ("successor employer") must retain for 90 days those employees of the old Formula Retail employer ("incumbent employer") who worked for at least six months prior to the change of ownership (other than supervisory, managerial, or confidential employees). The successor employer must retain each eligible employee under the same terms of employment with respect to job classification, compensation, and number of work hours that governed the employee and the incumbent employer. During the 90-day period, an eligible employee is immune from discharge without cause.

The incumbent and successor employers must also maintain, for each eligible employee, a retention list that includes the employee’s name, contact information, date of hire, rate of pay, average number of weekly hours during the six months preceding the change in control, and occupational classification. The two employers must also post certain notices, and the successor employer must make employment offers to workers on the retention list based on seniority or pursuant to an existing collective bargaining agreement.

**San Jose.** Under San Jose’s voter-approved Ballot Measure E, the “Opportunity to Work Ordinance,” covered employers must offer part-time nonexempt employees additional work hours before hiring any new or temporary employees. The City of San Jose has provided preliminary guidance on the enforcement of the measure on the city website.

The ordinance covers San Jose employers that employ more than 35 nonexempt employees and are subject to San Jose’s business tax. For chain businesses and franchisees, the ordinance counts all employees, including both full and part-time employees, regardless of whether they work in San Jose. An “employee” is anyone over whom a company exercises direct or indirect control as to wages, hours, or working conditions.

A covered employer must offer incumbent employees (if they have the skill and experience to perform) extra hours of work before the employer uses temporary employees or hires new employees. Employers need not provide the additional hours if doing so would create entitlement to overtime or other premium wages.

Employers must also post notice of the rights created by the ordinance, must use a “transparent and non-discriminatory process” to distribute hours among existing employees, must retain records for new hires that show the employer’s efforts to first offer the additional work to existing part-time employees for a four year period, and must preserve, for four years, employees work schedules and any other records required to demonstrate compliance with the ordinance.

San Jose can address violations by issuing fines of up to $50 per violation and by seeking civil penalties in court. The ordinance also authorizes private actions: a person not offered work under the ordinance can sue for lost wages, penalties, and attorney fees.

The ordinance’s employee-friendly retaliation provision creates a rebuttable presumption that retaliation has occurred whenever employees claim that they have suffered an adverse employment action within 90 days of complaining about a violation of the ordinance.

The ordinance exempts scheduling provisions contained within a collective bargaining agreement, if the CBA explicitly waives the ordinance in clear and unambiguous terms. Additionally, San Jose can exempt businesses
from complying with the ordinance where the business works in good faith to comply and where compliance would be impracticable, impossible, or futile.404

Emeryville. The union-backed Fair Workweek Ordinance, effective in 2017, covers all retail and food service businesses with more than 55 employees worldwide.405 The only exception is for unionized employees.

Businesses must post work schedules 14 days in advance.406 Any new hours not so scheduled can be declined by the employee.407 Employers must pay extra wages for making schedule changes between one and 14 days before the shift.408

Employers cannot hire for new positions unless they have first offered the new schedules to existing employees.409 The additional hours can be divided among several existing employees as long as the employer doesn’t discriminate among employees when dividing hours.410 Employers also can’t divide up hours to avoid the benefits required under the Affordable Care Act.411

Employers must give employees at least 72 hours to accept the offer of additional work.412 If the time of additional hours needed will last less than two weeks, then the employer must give the employee at least 24 hours to accept the hours.413 The offer and the acceptance of hours must be communicated in writing, with records to be retained for at least three years.414

Employers must provide good-faith estimates of work schedules.415 Employees can request changes to the schedule before commencing work.416 Employers must respond to employees’ requests in writing regarding schedule changes that are approved or rejected.417 New employees must be immediately given their first two weeks of scheduled work upon hire.418

The only exceptions to Emeryville scheduling requirements are for circumstances when the employees or the place of business is threatened, when public utilities fail, or when there is an act of nature such as a natural disaster or civil unrest.419 Employee-to-employee changes are also exempt, but the employer cannot help to facilitate shift-swapping.420

Emeryville would penalize employers that allow fewer than 11 hours rest between shifts.421 Employees who work these shifts must agree to do so in writing, and employers must pay them 1.5 times the regular rate for any hours worked with fewer than 11 hours of time off between shifts.422

Employers must post notice of employee’s rights under the ordinance.423 They must also provide notice to new employees upon hire.424 Employers must not retaliate against employees for exercising their rights under the ordinance.425

Penalties apply to employers that fail to notify employees of their rights, that fail to provide a work schedule in a timely manner, that fail to provide predictability pay for changes with less than 24 hours’ notice, that fail to offer existing employees work before hiring, that fail to maintain adequate payroll records for three years, and that fail to give the City access to payroll records.426 Employees may also file lawsuits.427
7.23 Does California Law Affect Out-of-State Employees?

7.23.1 Out-of-state residents who temporarily work in California

In paying employees, employers traditionally apply the wage and hour laws of the state where the employee resides or performs the most work, even when an employee occasionally works elsewhere. In California, however, this practice can be problematic.

_Sullivan v. Oracle_. In this 2011 decision, the California Supreme Court held that non-California residents who work in California for a California-based employer were subject to California daily overtime laws if they performed their California work for whole days. Oracle also held that California’s UCL applies to this work.

Although Oracle explicitly limited its decision to the circumstances of that case, the decision raises ongoing questions about its broader implications:

- whether Oracle applies to partial days of work performed within California by non-California residents,
- whether other wage and hour provisions, not just California’s daily overtime provision, apply to nonresident employees who work in California, and
- whether Oracle’s rationale extends to employees who work daily overtime in California for employers who are not based in California.

The airline cases. Federal district courts in California have differed as to whether and how California wage and hour law should apply to airline employees who fly in and out of California airports.

In 2017, a federal judge in San Francisco permitted Virgin America flight attendants to proceed on a claim for California minimum wage, overtime pay, and meal and rest pay. The judge rejected the employer’s argument that California law does not apply to flight attendants’ work outside the state. California law applied, the judge concluded, because the class members resided in California and because the employer, with a California headquarters, had “deep ties” to the state.

The same month, another California federal judge applied a multi-factor test to reject the claims of Delta Air Lines flight attendants who claimed inadequate wage statements and untimely periodic payment of wages. This judge rejected the argument that even _de minimis_ work within California automatically triggers its wage and hour protections. The judge emphasized that Delta, unlike Virgin, is not headquartered in California, that Delta flight attendants worked only limited times in California, and that the plaintiffs had disavowed the relevancy of their California residency. The judge held that these factors, coupled with the nature of the jobs (requiring flight attendants to be in federal airspace and multiple jurisdictions during the course of a single pay period or even a single day) meant that California law did not apply.

The judge in Delta was following the reasoning of yet another California federal judge, who months earlier had made a similar ruling, on similar facts, to reject claims made by pilots employed by United Airlines.

Issues raised in the airline cases are now pending before the California Supreme Court, upon referral from the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court is expected to rule during 2019. (See Preface above.)
7.23.2 Using the UCL to pursue FLSA claims for work done outside of California

Sullivan v. Oracle also ruled on the plaintiffs’ ambitious claim that they could use California’s UCL to pursue FLSA violations that occurred outside of California. On this issue the California Supreme Court ruled for the employer, concluding that the UCL applies only to work performed within California.

7.24 Civil Penalties

7.24.1 Civil penalties collectible by the Labor Commissioner

Failure to comply with wage orders triggers a civil penalty of $50 for each underpaid employee for each pay period of underpayment for any initial violation, and $100 for each underpaid employee for each pay period of underpayment for each further violation. Special penalties (which the California Supreme Court has called an extra hour of premium pay) apply to violations of meal-period and rest-break requirements. Violations of the Labor Code also can trigger civil penalties.

Civil penalties, whether created by a wage order or by the Labor Code, can be recovered by the Labor Commissioner. Under California’s peculiar PAGA statute (explained immediately below), civil penalties can also be recovered in private lawsuits by an aggrieved employee who is acting as a private attorney general.

7.24.2 Private recovery of civil penalties for Labor Code violations

Various Labor Code provisions historically have subjected employers to enormous civil penalties. The California Legislature believed, however, that the civil penalties potentially available against scofflaw employers were too small, and were too rarely sought. This belief led to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). PAGA amended certain Labor Code provisions (such as Sections 210, 225.5, and 1197.1) to double the existing per-employee, per-pay-period civil penalties from $50 for a first violation and $100 for further violations to $100 for a first violation and $200 for further violations, and created new penalties as well (see below). More generally, PAGA created a new civil penalty for each Labor Code violation except those for which a civil penalty already was specifically provided. PAGA penalties can also apply to Wage Order violations, by virtue of a Labor Code section that incorporates Wage Order provisions within the Labor Code.

Charted below are some commonly applicable Labor Code provisions, together with common Wage Order provisions, and the associated civil penalties.

“LC 210” refers to civil penalties imposed by Section 210 for certain wage payment violations—$100 per employee for the first violation, $200 per employee for each later violation or for willful or intentional violation, plus 25% of the amount unlawfully withheld.

“LC 225.5” refers to civil penalties imposed by Section 225.5 for certain additional wage payment violations—$100 per employee for first violation, $200 per employee for each later violation or for willful or intentional violation, plus 25% of the amount unlawfully withheld.

“LC 558” refers to civil penalties imposed by Section 558 for violations of certain Labor Code provisions and Wage Order provisions regulating hours and days of work: $50 per “underpaid employee” per each pay period of underpayment for the first violation (in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages), and $100 per
underpaid employee per each pay period for each further violation (in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages). 441

“LC 1197.1” refers to civil penalties imposed under Section 1197.1 for failure to pay minimum wage—$100 per underpaid employee per pay period for the first intentional violation and $250 per underpaid employee per pay period (regardless of intent) for each further occurrence of the “same specific offense.” These penalties are “in addition to an amount sufficient [for an employee] to recover underpaid wages and liquidated damages pursuant to Section 1194.2.” 442

“LC 2699” refers to the prospect that PAGA has created a new penalty for violation of the provision in question, in the amount of $100 per employee per pay period for the first violation and $200 per employee per pay period for each further violation. 443

We group Labor Code provisions, for ease of reference, into these categories:

- provisions forbidding certain conditions of employment (§ 7.24.3 below),
- provisions forbidding certain employer inquiries or surveillance (§ 7.24.4 below)
- provisions governing hiring employees (§ 7.24.5 below),
- provisions governing paying wages during employment (§ 7.24.6 below),
- provisions governing paying wages at termination of employment (§ 7.24.7 below),
- provisions governing paying benefits to employees (§ 7.24.8 below),
- provisions governing indemnification of employees (§ 7.24.9 below),
- provisions governing required employer disclosures (§ 7.24.10 below),
- provisions governing scheduling employees (§ 7.24.11 below),
- provisions governing accommodating employees (§ 7.24.12 below),
- provisions governing respecting protected activities of employees (§ 7.24.13 below),
- provisions governing safety conditions of employees (§ 7.24.14 below),
- provisions governing labor organizations (§ 7.24.15 below),
- provisions governing minor status of employees (§ 7.24.16 below), and
- miscellaneous provisions (§ 7.24.17 below).
### 7.24.3 Impermissible conditions of employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Civil Penalty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>226.8</td>
<td><strong>Willful Misclassification as Independent Contractor.</strong> Employers must not willfully misclassify workers as independent contractors or impose deductions or charges on such employees that would be unlawful to impose on employees.</td>
<td>$5,000 to $25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407</td>
<td><strong>Illegal Consideration to Secure Employment.</strong> Employers must not condition employment on investment in or purchase of stock in business.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432.2</td>
<td><strong>Polygraph and Similar Tests.</strong> Employers must not require applicants or employees to take polygraph, lie detector, or similar tests or examinations as a condition of employment. Any “request” that employees take the test must be accompanied by written notice of this code section.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432.3</td>
<td><strong>Salary History Inquiries Forbidden.</strong> Employers must not inquire into salary history, and, in deciding whether to offer employment, may not rely on salary history. Salary history disclosed voluntarily and without prompting may be relied upon in setting salary but cannot itself justify any disparity in pay.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432.5</td>
<td><strong>Forcing Written Agreement to Illegal Terms of Employment.</strong> Employers must not require applicants or employees to agree to any term or condition of employment that the employer knows to be unlawful.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td><strong>No Coercion to Patronize Employer.</strong> Employers must not require employees to patronize the employer or other person in purchases of things of value, such as equipment or supplies. Employers must not charge employees to submit employment applications.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1051</td>
<td><strong>Employee Photos and Fingerprints.</strong> An employer commits a misdemeanor if the employer requires employees or applicants to be fingerprinted or photographed if the employer intends to give the fingerprints or photos to a third person, to the possible detriment of the employee or applicant, or the employer fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent such a violation.</td>
<td>LC 1054: treble damages; LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2870-2872</td>
<td><strong>Employee Inventions.</strong> Employers must not require or enforce contract provisions that assign rights in employee inventions if developed entirely on employee’s own time, without using employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret information. <strong>Exception:</strong> inventions that either (a) at time of conception or reduction to practice, relate to employer’s business or employer’s actual or demonstrably anticipated research or development, or (2) result from work by employee for employer. Any employment agreement requiring employees to assign invention rights to the employer must include written notice that agreement does not apply to any invention that would qualify under this section.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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7.24.4 Impermissible employer inquiries or surveillance

<table>
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<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Civil Penalty</th>
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<tr>
<td>432.7</td>
<td><strong>No Inquiries Regarding Arrest That Does Not Lead to Conviction or That Occurred When the Applicant was a Juvenile.</strong> Employers must not ask employees or applicants about arrests or detentions that have not led to conviction. Employers must not ask about or use information about participation in diversion programs. Employers must not ask about a conviction that has been judicially dismissed or ordered sealed pursuant to law. Employers must not seek, or use as a factor in determining any condition of employment, information regarding participation in diversion programs or arrests or detentions, unless the arrest led to conviction. And employers must not ask applicants about arrests or detentions that occurred when the individual was a juvenile, and must not seek—or use as a factor in determining any condition of employment—information regarding arrests or detentions that occurred when the individual was a juvenile. Employers may ask employees/applicants about arrests pending trial, but must not rely on it for any adverse employment decision unless it results in a conviction. <strong>Exceptions:</strong> an employer is not prohibited from asking an applicant about the information above if: (1) the employer is required by law to obtain information regarding conviction of an applicant, (2) the applicant would be required to possess or use a firearm in the course of employment, (3) an individual who has been convicted of a crime is prohibited by law from holding the position sought, regardless of whether that conviction was expunged, judicially ordered sealed, statutorily eradicated, or judicially dismissed following probation, and (4) the employer is prohibited by law from hiring an applicant who has been convicted of a crime. In addition, health care employers defined in Section 1250 of the H&amp;S Code may ask certain applicants about arrests under any section specified in Penal Code § 290 and H&amp;S Code § 11590. Health care employers may also inquire into arrests and detentions that occurred when the applicant was a juvenile when the information concerns a matter before the juvenile court in which the applicant has been found to have committed a felony or misdemeanor that occurred within five years preceding the job application. Health care employers must provide applicants with a list describing specific offenses under Penal Code § 290 and H&amp;S Code § 11590 for which disclosure is sought. Health care employers may not uncover sealed records by the juvenile court.</td>
<td>Actual damages or $200; treble damages or $500; costs and reasonable attorney fees.</td>
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<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Civil Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>432.8</td>
<td><strong>No Inquiries Regarding Marijuana Arrests Over Two Years Old.</strong> Employers must not ask employees or applicants to disclose misdemeanor marijuana arrests or convictions that are over two years old, or consider those arrests or convictions in making employment decisions.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>435</td>
<td><strong>No Audio or Video Recording in Private Areas.</strong> Employers must not record by audiotape or videotape any activity in locker rooms, restrooms, or any other area where employees change clothes.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1171.5</td>
<td><strong>Inquiries re: Immigration Status.</strong> In employment proceeding, no inquiry is permitted into a person’s immigration status, unless the inquiry is necessary to comply with federal immigration law.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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### 7.24.5 Hiring

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<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Civil Penalty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>432.3</td>
<td><strong>Salary Inquiries.</strong> Employers in hiring must not seek or rely on an applicant’s prior compensation and benefits. Employers must, on reasonable request, provide the applicant with “the pay scale” for the position applied for. Employers may consider, in setting a salary, prior salary information the applicant discloses voluntarily and without prompting, but prior salary cannot itself justify a pay disparity.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>970</td>
<td><strong>Misrepresentation of Employment Conditions to Induce Employee Move.</strong> Employers must not induce employees to move from one location to another by misrepresenting the kind, character, length of work, housing conditions surrounding work, or existence or non-existence of labor disputes.</td>
<td>LC 970: double damages; LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>973</td>
<td><strong>Notice of Strike in Employment Advertisements.</strong> Employers must include notice in any job advertisement of any strike, lockout, or trade dispute. The ad must also identify the person placing the ad and anyone he represents in placing the ad.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>976</td>
<td><strong>No Willful Misleading Regarding Compensation or Commissions.</strong> Employers must not willfully mislead or falsely represent an employee or applicant regarding compensation or commissions that may be earned.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1021</td>
<td><strong>Hiring Unlicensed Workers by One Without State Contractor’s License.</strong> Employer incurs a civil penalty if they lacks a valid contractor’s license and employ a worker to perform services for which such a license is required.</td>
<td>$200 per employee per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Civil Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>1021.5</td>
<td><strong>Hiring Unlicensed Independent Contractor by One Holding State Contractor’s License.</strong> Employers who hold valid contractor's license incur civil penalties by hiring as an independent contractor, for services requiring a license, someone who cannot establish independent contractor status or who lacks a license.</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2810.3</td>
<td><strong>Client Liability for Entering Into a Contract for Labor or Services if There are Insufficient Funds to Comply with Laws or Regulations.</strong> Client employers must not contract for labor or services with a construction, farm labor, garment, janitorial, security guard, or warehouse contractor, if the client employer knows or should know that the contract does not include enough money for the contractor to comply with labor laws or regulations. Otherwise the client employer must share with the labor contractor civil liability for all workers supplied by the labor contractor for the payment of wages, and the failure to obtain valid workers’ compensation coverage. A client employer that is a household goods carrier permitted by the Public Utilities Commission is excluded from liability.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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### 7.24.6 Paying wages (pre-termination)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
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<tr>
<td>203.1</td>
<td><strong>Bad Check.</strong> If an employer’s final paycheck bounces, then the employee can recover penalties of up to 30 days of continuing wages and fringe benefits. (The title of this section refers to the building and construction industries, but the language of the statutory provision is not so limited.)</td>
<td>203.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td><strong>Paydays.</strong> Employers must pay nonexempt employees at least semi-monthly on designated paydays, paying, for work done between 1st and 15th, no later than 26th, and paying, for work done between 16th and end of month, no later than 10th of next month. Employers must pay all overtime wages no later than payday for next regular payroll period. (Under Section 204(c), employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement with different pay arrangements are subject to the CBA.) For earning periods other than between the 1st and 15th of the month and 16th and last day of the month, employers must pay wages within seven calendar days of the end of the period. Employers may make monthly payments to salaried executive, administrative, and professional employees by 26th if entire month’s salary, including unearned portion, is then paid.</td>
<td>LC 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>204b</td>
<td><strong>Weekly Paid Employees.</strong> Employers must pay weekly paid employees by the next weekly payday for work done in a week on or before a payday, and by seven days after the next weekly payday for work done in a week after the payday for that week.</td>
<td>LC 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204.2</td>
<td><strong>Nonexempt Salaried Executive, Administrative, Professional Employees.</strong> Salaries earned for labor performed in excess of 40 hours in calendar week are due by 26th day of next calendar month, unless employees are covered by a CBA that provides different pay arrangements.</td>
<td>LC 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204.3</td>
<td><strong>Comp Time Off.</strong> Employers can provide comp time off in lieu of overtime pay to nonexempt employees at same rate employee would have earned overtime pay if (1) written agreement is in place before work is performed, (2) employee has not accrued comp time &gt; 240 hours, (3) employee written to request comp time in lieu of overtime, and (4) employee is scheduled to work no less than 40 hours in a workweek. Any comp time must be paid at employee’s rate of pay at time of payment. At termination, comp time must be paid at higher of (i) current pay rate or (ii) average pay rate over prior three years. Employees shall be permitted to use comp time within “reasonable time” of request to use it, if it does not unduly interrupt operations. Reasonable time is determined by (A) normal work schedule, (B) anticipated peak workloads based on past experience, (C) emergency requirements for staff and services, and (D) availability of qualified substitute staff. Upon request, employers shall pay overtime pay in cash in lieu of comp time off for any comp time that has accrued for at least two pay periods.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td><strong>Payments Where There Is a Dispute.</strong> Employers must timely pay all wages conceded to be due. Employers who dispute portion of employees claim must pay undisputed portion. If Labor Commissioner finds employee claim valid, then employer must pay balance within ten days of notice of finding, or risk treble damages for willful failure to pay.</td>
<td>LC 2699 (except where treble damages apply?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206.5</td>
<td><strong>Release of Unpaid Wages Void.</strong> Employers must “not require the execution of a release of a claim or right on account of wages due, or to become due, or made as an advance on wages to be earned, unless payment of those wages has been made.” Any release so executed is void. By a 2008 amendment, “execution of a release” includes requiring an employee, as a condition of being paid, to execute a statement of the hours … worked during a pay period which the employer knows to be false.”</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td><strong>Notice of Paydays.</strong> Employers must post notices of regular time and place of payment.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td><strong>Payment at Separation.</strong> Employers must pay discharged employees at place of discharge. Employer must pay quitting employee at office of employer in county where employee worked.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td><strong>Payment of Striking Employees.</strong> Employer must pay striking employee all unpaid wages on the next regular payday, and must return all employee deposits, money, or other guaranty.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212(a)</td>
<td><strong>Payment by Check or Cash.</strong> Employers must pay wages in negotiable instruments (checks) or cash, and maintain sufficient funds to cover the check for at least 30 days. Coupons redeemable in goods or services are not legal payment.</td>
<td>LC 225.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213(d)</td>
<td><strong>Direct Deposit.</strong> Employers may deposit wages in a bank account of the employee’s choice with voluntary authorization, including timely termination wages.</td>
<td>LC 2699?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td><strong>Falsely Denying Wages Due.</strong> Employers commit misdemeanor if they willfully refuse to pay, after demand is made, wages due that they have the ability to pay, or if they falsely deny the amount or validity of a wage demand, with an intent to secure a discount, or with the intent to harass or delay or defraud.</td>
<td>LC 225.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td><strong>No Contracting Around These Rules.</strong> Employers must not circumvent wage rules by private agreement.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td><strong>No Kickbacks.</strong> Employers must not collect or receive from employees any part of wages paid by employer to employee.</td>
<td>LC 225.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td><strong>Withholding Prohibited.</strong> Employers must not withhold any portion of agreed-upon wages unless authorized by law (such as taxes) or by employee (See sec. 224).</td>
<td>LC 225.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222.5</td>
<td><strong>Withholding for Medical/Physical Exams Prohibited.</strong> Employers must pay for any required medical examination.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td><strong>No Secret Payment Below Scale.</strong> Employers must not secretly pay lower wage while purporting to pay wages required by statute or contract.</td>
<td>LC 225.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240-243</td>
<td><strong>Failing to Pay Wages Adjudged Due Under Sections 200-234.</strong> Employers who fail to timely pay wages adjudged to be due are subject to bond requirements and injunctions. Sanctions increase for multiple violations within 10-year period.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>Limits on Wage Assignments. No wage assignment is valid unless it meets specific requirements of Section 300, including signed written statement specifying transaction for which assignment occurs, spousal consent, notarization, maximum 50% of wages assigned. An assignment is revocable at any time.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>351</td>
<td>Ownership of Gratuities (tip pooling). Employers must not take any portion of gratuities left for employees. No deductions allowed for cost to process tips left on credit card. Credit card tips must be paid next regular payday.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>353</td>
<td>Record of Gratuities. Employers must record gratuities received either from employees or indirectly by wage deductions.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>356</td>
<td>Not Contracting Around Gratuity Laws. Employers must not attempt to circumvent the gratuity laws with private agreements.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510</td>
<td>Daily, Weekly, Seventh-Day Overtime. Employers must pay nonexempt employees 1.5 times the regular rate for &gt; eight hours per workday, 40 hours per workweek, or eight hours on seventh consecutive day of work in workweek. Employers must pay double time for work &gt; 12 hours in workday or eight hours on seventh consecutive workday. Employers must pay for all time, including travel time, spent from first place where employers require employee’s presence. Employers need not pay overtime rates to employees if CBA covers wages, hours of work, and working conditions, provides premium rate for overtime, and imposes regular wage of at least 1.3 times the minimum wage.</td>
<td>LC 558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>511</td>
<td>Alternative Workweek. Employers may adopt four-day ten-hour regular workweek without paying daily overtime after eight, if two-thirds of employees so choose in secret ballot election subject to strict specific procedures. Any work over 40 hours in week, or over regularly scheduled hours in an alternative workday up to 12 hours, must be paid at 1.5 times the employee’s regular rate. Hours over 12 in a workday and after eight hours on a day that the employee is not normally scheduled to work must be paid at double time. Employers must make reasonable effort to accommodate those who cannot work more than eight hours per day. <strong>Exception:</strong> Where CBA covers wages, hours of work, and working conditions, and provides premium wage rates for overtime and a regular hourly rate of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.</td>
<td>LC 558</td>
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### 7.24.7 Termination of employment

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<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td><strong>Payment of Wages Upon Discharge.</strong> Employers must pay immediately upon discharge all wages due (including salary, hourly wage, overtime, accrued vacation, benefits).</td>
<td>LC 203: &quot;waiting time&quot; penalty, up to 30 working days</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>201.3</td>
<td><strong>Temporary service employees.</strong> Employers may pay weekly, “regardless of when the assignment ends,” with certain specified exceptions: employers must pay daily to nonexempt, non-clerical employees assigned to work on a day-to-day basis and to employees working for a client engaged in a trade dispute; employees must pay temporary employees on the day of discharge; and employees who quit must be paid in accordance with Labor Code section 202.</td>
<td>LC 203</td>
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<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td><strong>Payment of Wages Upon Resignation.</strong> Payment is due on last day of work where employee resigns with &gt; 72 hours of notice. To extent employees fail to give 72 hours’ notice, employers must pay final wages within 72 hours of the quit. Employers may pay by mail if employee so requests, providing an address.</td>
<td>LC 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227.3</td>
<td><strong>Vacation Payment at Termination.</strong> Absent an exception that applies for employees subject to certain collective bargaining agreements, employers must pay separating employees all unused vested vacation time, as wages.</td>
<td>LC 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2926-2927</td>
<td><strong>Employer Must Pay All Wages Earned Through Termination.</strong> Employer must pay employees all wages earned through the time of dismissal or resignation.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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### 7.24.8 Paying benefits

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<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td><strong>Failure to Make Benefits Payments.</strong> Employers must not fail to remit to the appropriate state agency withholdings from an employee's wages that were made pursuant to state, local, or federal law. Employers must not willfully fail to make benefits payments under terms of health or welfare fund, pension fund or vacation plan, other employee benefit plan, negotiated industrial promotion fund, or CBA.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233</td>
<td><strong>Kin Care Leave.</strong> Employers who have a sick leave policy must permit employees to use one-half of annual sick leave accrual to attend to employees’ sick children, parents, spouses, domestic partners, sick children of domestic partners, grandparents, grandchildren, and siblings.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2800.2</td>
<td><strong>Notification of Cal-COBRA and COBRA.</strong> Employers must give Cal-COBRA notices (which can include notice to former employee spouses and former spouses).</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>2803.4</td>
<td><strong>Medical Eligibility Not an Exception to ERISA Health Benefits.</strong> Employers must not reduce or deny ERISA health plan benefits because of Medi-Cal or Medicaid eligibility.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2803.5</td>
<td><strong>Compliance With Laws Regarding Health Coverage for Children of Employees.</strong> All employers must comply with laws regarding health benefits for employees’ children.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2806</td>
<td><strong>15 Days’ Notice to Cancel Health Benefits.</strong> Employers must give 15 days' notice of plans to discontinue offer of non-ERISA health benefits.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2807</td>
<td><strong>HIPP Notice.</strong> Employers must give employees standardized written description of California Health Insurance Premium Program.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2808</td>
<td><strong>Explanation of Benefits.</strong> Employers must explain all health coverages they offer. Employers must give notice to terminated employees of all continuation, disability extension, and conversion coverage options under any employer-sponsored coverage for which the employee may remain eligible after employment.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2809</td>
<td><strong>Explanation of Employer-Managed Deferred Compensation Plan.</strong> Employers who offer employer-managed deferred compensation plans must notify employees in writing of financial risks, and must (by itself or through plan manager) provide quarterly reports of financial condition of employer and financial performance.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2810.5</td>
<td><strong>Paid Sick Days.</strong> California employees are entitled to paid sick days for prescribed purposes, accrued at a rate of no less than one hour for every 30 hours worked. Employers can use accrued sick days beginning on the 90th day of employment. Employers may limit use of paid sick days to 24 hours or three days per year. Employers must comply with notice, posting, and recordkeeping requirements. <strong>Exemptions:</strong> Employees whose employment is governed by a CBA that provides for the payment of wages, hours of work, working conditions, and premium overtime (with a regular hourly rate of not less than 1.3 times the minimum wage), paid sick or similar leave, and final and binding arbitration of disputes regarding the paid sick days provision. Also exempt are construction employees covered by CBAs with specific provisions, in-home supportive service providers, and certain air carrier and flight personnel.</td>
<td>LC 2810.5</td>
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### 7.24.9 Indemnification

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<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>231</td>
<td><strong>Employer Must Pay for Driver’s License Physical.</strong> Employers that require driver’s license of employees must pay cost of any required physical examination, except where examination was taken before employee applied for employment.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td><strong>Payment for Bonds or Photos.</strong> If employer requires a photograph or bond of an employee, then employer must bear the cost.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>402-403</td>
<td><strong>Employer Acceptance of Cash Bonds.</strong> Employers must not require cash bonds unless employee/applicant is entrusted with property of equal value or employer regularly advances goods to employee. All cash bonds require written agreement, deposit in bank account, and withdrawal only by signature of both employer and employee/applicant. When employee/applicant returns the money or property and fulfills agreement, employer must immediately return the bond money, with interest.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td><strong>Use of Property Put Up as Bond.</strong> Employer must not use employee property for any purpose other than liquidating accounts. Employer must hold property in trust and not mingle it with other property. No contract shall abrogate this section.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406</td>
<td><strong>All Property Is a Bond.</strong> Any property employee/applicant puts up as part of employment contract is deemed to be put up as a bond, regardless of wording of contract.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2800</td>
<td><strong>Indemnification.</strong> Employers must indemnify employees for any loss caused by the employer’s “want of ordinary care.”</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2802</td>
<td><strong>Indemnification for Necessary Expenditures.</strong> Employers must indemnify employees for necessary expenditures or losses incurred by employees in direct consequence of discharge of duties, or of obedience to employer directions, even though unlawful, unless employee, when obeying directions, thought them unlawful.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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## Required employer disclosures

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<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
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<tr>
<td>226(a)</td>
<td><strong>Itemized Wage Statements.</strong> Employers must provide with each wage payment an itemized statement showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee, except for exempt employees paid solely by salary, (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if employee is paid on piece-rate basis, (4) all deductions, provided, that all deductions made on written orders of employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) inclusive dates of period for which the employee is paid, (7) name of the employee and either the last four digits of the employee’s social security number or an employee identification number other than the employee’s social security number, (8) the name and address of legal entity that is the employer, and (9) all hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the number of hours worked at each rate. The employer must maintain a copy of the statement and the record of deductions for at least three years at the place of employment or at a central location within California, although a copy can take the form of a computer-generated record that shows all the information required. Temporary services employers must record the rate of pay and total hours worked for each temporary services assignment.</td>
<td><strong>LC 226.3:</strong> $250 per employee in initial citation, $1,000 for later citations;  <strong>LC 226(e):</strong> greater of “actual damages” or $50 per employee for initial pay period for knowing, intentional violation, and $100 for each further violation in a later pay period, to cap of $4,000 per employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>226(b) &amp; (c)</td>
<td><strong>Request to Review Payroll Records.</strong> Employers required to keep Section 226(a) data must give current and former employees the right to inspect or receive a copy of the records pertaining to their employment, upon reasonable request. Employers may take reasonable steps to ensure the employees’ identities. Employers who provide copies may charge employees the actual cost of reproduction. Employers who receive a request to inspect or copy records must comply within 21 calendar days of the request.</td>
<td><strong>LC 226(f):</strong> $750, to employee or to DLSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227.5</td>
<td><strong>Annual Benefits Statement.</strong> Employers must give annual statements, upon written request, to employees covered by employer-funded health or welfare funds, pension funds, vacation plans, or other employee benefits plans.</td>
<td><strong>LC 2699</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432</td>
<td><strong>Copies of Documents Signed by Employee.</strong> Employers must provide, on request, a copy of any document that an employee or applicant has signed to obtain or hold employment.</td>
<td><strong>LC 2699</strong></td>
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<td>LC §</td>
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<td>1174</td>
<td><strong>Employer Obligations to Provide Information to IWC and DLSE.</strong> Employers must comply with all IWC information requests, must allow IWC or DLSE free access to sites to investigate and inspect employment records, must record names and addresses of all employees and the ages of all minors, and must keep at a central California location, or at establishments where employees work, payroll records (for not less than three years) showing daily hours worked and wages paid.</td>
<td>LC 1174.5: $500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1198.5</td>
<td><strong>Employee Right to Inspect Personnel Records.</strong> Employers must—upon written request and at reasonable intervals and times—provide a copy and make available for inspection the personnel records that relate to a current or former employee’s performance or to any grievance concerning the employee. The employer must comply within 30 calendar days of receiving a written request, unless the employer and employee, or the employee’s representative, agree to a date up to 35 calendar days after the employer receives a written request. Employers need not make records available when the employee is required to render service to the employer, if the requester is the employee. As to current employees, employers must make personnel records available where the employee reports to work or at another location agreeable to the requester, with no loss to the employee if he or she is the requester. As to former employees, employers must make personnel records available where it stores the records, unless the parties agree in writing to a different location. Employers must maintain a copy of personnel records for at least three years after employment. <strong>Exceptions:</strong> Employers need not disclose (1) records relating to investigation of possible crime, (2) letters of reference, and (3) records that were (A) obtained before employment, (B) prepared by identifiable examination committee members, or (C) obtained for a promotional examination.</td>
<td>LC 1198.5(k): $750 to employee or to DLSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1408</td>
<td><strong>California WARN.</strong> Employers who own or operate any facility employing 75+ employees within the last 12 months must give 60-day written notice of any mass layoff (50+ employees within 30 days), relocation (moving &gt; 100 miles), or termination of business at that facility. <strong>Exception:</strong> where physical calamity or act of war is the reason for the mass layoff, relocation, or termination.</td>
<td>$500 for each day of violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2751</td>
<td><strong>Contract of employment for commissions.</strong> California employers paying commissions must put the commission arrangement in a written contract and give the employee a signed copy.</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
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<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>2810</td>
<td><strong>Retention of contractors.</strong> A California business that retains certain contractors can be liable to the contractor’s employees for Labor Code violations if the business knew or should have known that the relevant agreement did not include enough money to permit the contractor to satisfy all applicable federal, state, and local labor laws.</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2810.5</td>
<td><strong>“Wage Theft” Act notice.</strong> California employers must notify employees, at the time of hire, of (1) the rates of pay and the basis thereof (e.g., hourly, salary, commission, etc.), including any applicable overtime rates, (2) allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including meal or lodging allowances, (3) the regular designated payday, (4) the employer’s name (including any dba name) and its address and telephone number, (5) the name, address, and telephone number of the employer’s worker’s compensation insurance carrier, (6) the employee’s rights to accrue and use sick leave, to request and use accrued paid sick leave, to be free of retaliation for using or requesting accrued paid sick leave, and to file a complaint against an employer who retaliates, and (7) any other information the Labor Commissioner deems “material and necessary.</td>
<td>n/a as to notice statutes LC 2699(g)(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2930</td>
<td><strong>Shopping Investigator.</strong> Employers who base discipline or dismissal on shopper’s report by outside agency must give employee, before imposing discipline or dismissal and before concluding an interview that might result in discipline or dismissal, a copy of the report.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3550</td>
<td><strong>Workers’ Compensation Posting.</strong> Employers must post, where it may be easily read by employees during the workday, a notice with the information specified in this section.</td>
<td>LC 6431: up to $12,471 per violation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3551</td>
<td><strong>Workers’ Compensation Notice to New Hires.</strong> Employers must give new hires, by end of first pay period, information contained in the workers’ compensation posting, provided in English and Spanish.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3553</td>
<td><strong>Workers’ Compensation Notice to Employee Victims of Crime.</strong> Employers must tell workplace crime victims they are eligible for workers’ compensation for resulting injuries, including psychiatric injuries. This notice must be either personal or by first-class mail, within one working day of the workplace crime, or within one working day of when employer reasonably should have known of crime.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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## 7.24.11 Scheduling

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<tr>
<td>226.7</td>
<td><strong>Meal/Rest/Recovery Periods.</strong> Employers must not require employees to work during any meal or rest or recovery period mandated by state law and must pay employees “one additional hour of pay at the ... regular rate ... for each workday that the meal or rest or recovery period is not provided.” A mandated rest or recovery period counts as hours worked for which there can be no deduction from wages. That is, recovery and rest breaks must be compensated as hours worked. <strong>Exception:</strong> exempt employees.</td>
<td>LC 226.7(c) (one hour of pay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512</td>
<td><strong>Mandatory Meal Period.</strong> Employers must provide a 30-minute meal period if employee works more than five hours, though parties can waive meal period where total work period does not exceed six hours. Employers must provide second meal period if employee works more than ten hours, though parties can waive second meal period by written agreement where total work period does not exceed 12 hours and where the first meal period was not waived.</td>
<td>LC 226.7(c) LC 558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>551, 552</td>
<td><strong>One Day of Rest in Seven.</strong> Employers must not cause employees to work more than six of seven days. Days of rest may be accumulated throughout the month if all rest days are given in the month. <strong>Exceptions:</strong> (Sections 554, 556): emergencies, work to protect life or property from loss, certain railroad-related work, certain agricultural work, employees who work less than six hours daily or 30 hours weekly.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>850-854</td>
<td><strong>Pharmacy Workers.</strong> Employees who sell drugs or medicine at retail or who compound physician’s prescriptions must not work more than an average of nine hours per day, or for more than 108 hours in any two consecutive weeks or for more than 12 days in any two consecutive weeks. Except on Sundays and holidays, and a meal period (not more than one hour), the hours of work permitted per day by this chapter shall be consecutive. <strong>Exceptions:</strong> hospitals employing one person to compound prescriptions; “emergencies” that involve accident, death, sickness or epidemic.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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### 7.24.12 Accommodating employees

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<tr>
<td>230(a)</td>
<td><strong>Jury Duty Leave.</strong> Employers must not discharge or discriminate against employees for taking time off for jury service, after the employee gives reasonable notice that the employee is required to serve, and must permit employees on such leave to use otherwise available vacation, personal leave, or compensatory time off, unless otherwise provided by a CBA. The entitlement of any employee under this section shall not be diminished by any CBA.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230(b)</td>
<td><strong>Witness Duty Leave.</strong> Employers must not discharge or discriminate or retaliate against employees for taking time off to testify under subpoena or other court order, and must permit employees on such leave to use otherwise available vacation, personal leave, or compensatory time off, unless otherwise provided by CBA No employee entitlement under this section shall be diminished by any CBA.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230(c)</td>
<td><strong>Domestic Violence/Sexual Assault/Stalking Leave.</strong> Employers must not discharge or discriminate or retaliate against victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking for taking time off from work to seek relief to help ensure health, safety, or welfare of victim or victim’s child, and must permit employees on such leave to use otherwise available vacation, personal leave, or compensatory time off, unless otherwise provided by CBA. Where possible, employees must give reasonable advance notice. Employers must not take action on basis of unscheduled absence if employee completes certification as set forth in Section 230(d)(2)(A)-(C). Employers must engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodations for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking who request an accommodation for safety while at work. Employers must maintain confidentiality of employees who request leave, to extent required by law. No employee entitlement under this section shall be diminished by any CBA.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>LC §</td>
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<tr>
<td>230.1</td>
<td><strong>Additional Rights for Victims of Domestic Violence / Sexual Assault/Stalking.</strong> Employers with 25+ employees must not discharge or discriminate or retaliate against victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking for taking time off from work to (1) seek medical attention for injuries caused by domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, (2) obtain services from domestic violence shelter, program, or rape crisis center as a result of domestic violence or sexual assault, (3) obtain psychological counseling related to an experience of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, (4) participate in safety planning and take other actions to increase safety from future domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, and must permit employees on such leave to use otherwise available vacation, personal leave, or compensatory time off, unless otherwise provided by CBA. Although employees must give reasonable advance notice where possible, employers must not take action on basis of unscheduled absence if employee completes certification as set forth in Section 230(d)(2)(A)-(C). Employers must maintain confidentiality of employees who request leave, to the extent required by law. No employee entitlement under this section shall be diminished by any CBA. This section does not create employee rights to unpaid leave exceeding that permitted by the federal Family and Medical Leave Act.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2</td>
<td><strong>Crime Victim Leave.</strong> Employers must permit a crime victim, and a crime victim’s immediate family member, registered domestic partner, or child of registered domestic partner, to leave work to attend judicial proceedings related to the crime, and must permit employees on the leave to use otherwise available vacation, personal leave, or compensatory time off. Employers must keep the reason for this leave confidential. Employers must not discriminate against employees for taking the leave.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.3</td>
<td><strong>Volunteer Leave.</strong> Employer must not discharge or discriminate against employees for taking time off to perform emergency duty as a volunteer firefighter, a reserve peace officer, or emergency rescue personnel (which includes an officer, employee, or member of a disaster medical response team sponsored by the state). <strong>Exception:</strong> employers that are public safety agencies or providers of emergency medical services, where employer determines the employee’s absence hinder public safety or emergency medical services.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>LC §</td>
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<tr>
<td>230.4</td>
<td><strong>Training Leave for Fire, Law Enforcement, and Emergency Rescue Personnel.</strong> Employers with 50+ employees must provide leaves (two weeks per calendar year) for fire, law enforcement, or emergency personnel training. An employee who works for an employer with at least 50 employees, who is discharged, threatened with discharge, demoted, suspended, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because the employee has taken time off for training leave, is entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by the acts of the employer.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.5</td>
<td><strong>Victim of Specified Offenses Leave.</strong> Employers must not discharge or discriminate or retaliate against victims of specified offenses for taking time off from work to appear in court to be heard at any proceeding in which a right of the victim is at issue. Specified offenses include vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, felony child abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or a death, assault resulting in the death of a child under eight years of age, felony domestic violence, felony physical abuse of an elder or dependent adult, felony stalking, solicitation for murder, “serious felony,” hit-and-run causing death or injury, felony driving under the influence causing injury, and sexual assault. The employee must give reasonable advance notice, unless not feasible.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.7</td>
<td><strong>School Discipline Leave for Parents.</strong> Employers must not discriminate against parents or guardians who take time off for school appearance under Education Code § 48900.1 (child suspended), upon reasonable notice of the appearance.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>LC §</td>
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<tr>
<td>230.8</td>
<td><strong>School Activities Leave.</strong> Employers must not discriminate against parents, guardians, or grandparents with custody of K-12 children, for attending licensed child day care facility, for taking off up to 40 hours each year, not exceeding eight hours per calendar month, to participate in activities of school or licensed child day care facility of employee’s children, upon reasonable notice of absence, and must permit use of existing vacation, personal leave, or compensatory time off for this absence (unless it is vacation period that all eligible employees take at same time every year), unless otherwise provided by CBA entered into before January 1, 1995, and in effect on that date. If both parents work for same employer, only the first to ask is entitled to leave. No CBA may diminish an entitlement under this section. The Legislature has expanded “parent” to include a parent, guardian, stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent of, or a person who stands in loco parentis to, a child. “Child care provider or school emergency” includes a request that the child be picked up from school or child care, behavioral/discipline problems, closure or unexpected unavailability of the school (excluding planned holidays), or a natural disaster.</td>
<td>treble lost wages &amp; work benefits for willful refusal to rehire, promote, or restore employee eligible for rehire or promotion +LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233</td>
<td><strong>Kin Care Leave.</strong> Employers who have a sick leave policy must permit employees to use one-half of annual sick leave accrual to attend to employees’ sick children, parents, spouses, domestic partners, and sick child of domestic partners.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1025</td>
<td><strong>Accommodation of Employee Attending Drug or Alcohol Rehab.</strong> Employers with 25+ employees must accommodate those who voluntarily enter drug or alcohol rehabilitation, if accommodation does not impose “undue hardship” on employer, though employers can deny employment to those whose current use of alcohol or drugs renders them unable to perform job duties, or to perform them in manner that would not endanger health or safety of individual or others.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1027</td>
<td><strong>Accrued Sick Time for Rehabilitation.</strong> Employers must allow employees to use their accrued sick leave while attending an alcohol or drug rehabilitation program.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030-1031</td>
<td><strong>Lactation Accommodation.</strong> Employers must provide break time for employees to express milk for their babies, concurrent with otherwise allowable break time, where possible. The private location provided must not be a toilet stall or other bathroom station, and must be close to the employee’s workstation, if employee lacks own office with locking door.</td>
<td>LC 1033 ($100 penalty per violation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>1041-1044</td>
<td><strong>Literacy Accommodation.</strong> Employers with 25+ employees must reasonably accommodate employees with personal literacy problems who seek assistance, absent unreasonable hardship. Employer must provide information about literacy programs, but need not give paid leave for literacy training. Employers must take reasonable steps to ensure employee privacy regarding literacy problems. Employer must not discharge employee for revealing illiteracy if job performance is satisfactory.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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### 7.24.13 Respecting protected activities

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<tr>
<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>98.6</td>
<td><strong>Lawful Off-Duty Conduct.</strong> Employers must not discharge or in any manner discriminate, retaliate, or take any adverse action against any employee or applicant for engaging in conduct protected by Section 96(k) (lawful off-premises conduct occurring during nonworking hours).</td>
<td>98.6(b)(3) ($10,000, awardable to employee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98.6</td>
<td><strong>Exercising Labor Code Rights.</strong> Employers must not discriminate, retaliate, or take any adverse action against employees or applicants for exercising rights under the Labor Code, including bona fide claims with the Labor Commissioner.</td>
<td>98.6(b)(3) ($10,000, awardable to employee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132a</td>
<td><strong>Workers’ Compensation Claims.</strong> Employers must not discriminate against workers who file workers’ compensation claims or indicate intent to do so.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td><strong>Disclosure of Wages.</strong> Employers must not (a) require that employees refrain from disclosing their wages, (b) require employees to sign waiver of this right, or (c) discharge, discipline, or otherwise discriminate against employees who disclose their wages.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232.5</td>
<td><strong>Disclosure of Working Conditions.</strong> Employers must not (a) require that employees refrain from disclosing information about employer’s working conditions, (b) require employees to waive that right, or (c) discharge, discipline, or otherwise discriminate against employees who disclose information about employer’s working conditions. This section does not permit disclosure of proprietary information, trade secrets, or other legally privileged information.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>234</td>
<td><strong>Kin Care Absences.</strong> Employers must not count kin-care absences as absences that may lead to discipline, discharge, demotion, or suspension.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>244(a)</td>
<td><strong>No Need To Exhaust Administrative Remedies.</strong> Employees can pursue lawsuits without first exhausting administrative remedies, unless there is an express statutory requirement of exhaustion.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244(b)</td>
<td><strong>Ban on retaliatory reporting of suspected citizenship or immigration status.</strong> An employer commits an “adverse action” if it reports to a government agency the suspected citizenship or immigration status of an employee, former employee, or prospective employee, or of that individual’s family member, because the individual has exercised rights under the Labor, Government, or Civil Codes.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246.5</td>
<td><strong>Use of paid sick leave.</strong> Employees may use paid sick leave for the employee's or a family member’s health condition, including preventive care, and for the employee’s time off in connection with sexual violence or stalking, and employers must not retaliate against an employee for those authorized uses of paid sick leave.</td>
<td>LC 248.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>921-922</td>
<td><strong>Employee Rights to Organize.</strong> Employers must not attempt to influence or interfere with workers’ rights to join or support a union. Employers must not force employees to agree not to join a union.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>923</td>
<td><strong>Selection of Bargaining Representative or With Concerted Activities.</strong> Public policy gives employees the right to be free of interference, restraint, or coercion in designating representatives or in “other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1024.6</td>
<td><strong>Employee Updating Personal Information.</strong> Employers must not discharge or in any manner discriminate, retaliate, or take any adverse action against an employee because the employee has updated or attempted to update the employee’s personal information, based on a lawful change of name, social security number, or federal employment authorization document.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1025</td>
<td><strong>Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation.</strong> Employers regularly employing 25 or more employees shall reasonably accommodate any employee who wishes to voluntarily enter and participate in an alcohol or drug rehabilitation program, provided that this reasonable accommodation does not impose an undue hardship on the employer.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1101</td>
<td><strong>Employee Political Affiliations.</strong> Employers must not restrict employees from participating in politics or running for political office. Employers must not control or direct political activities or affiliations of employees.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>1102</td>
<td><strong>No Influence or Coercion in Political Activities.</strong> Employers must not use threat of discharge or other adverse employment action to influence or coerce employees regarding a political action or political activity.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1102.5</td>
<td><strong>Whistleblower Protection.</strong> Employers must not adopt or enforce rules against providing information to (a) state or federal agencies, (b) a person with authority over the employee, or (c) another employee who has authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or against providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee providing the information has reasonable cause to believe the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties. And employers must not retaliate against an employee for engaging in these activities, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe the information discloses violation of state or federal statute or noncompliance with a regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties. Employers must also not retaliate against an employee because the employee is a family member of a person who has, or is perceived to have, engaged in any acts protected by this section.</td>
<td>LC 1102.5(f) civil penalty (for an employer that is a corporation or LLC) up to $10,000 per violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6310</td>
<td><strong>No Discrimination vs. Safety Whistleblowers.</strong> Employers must not discharge or discriminate against employees who bring safety complaints either to employer or to administrative agency, or employee’s representative (i.e., union), who start or participate in proceedings to enforce safety rights, or who participate in an occupational health and safety committee pursuant to an IIPP under Section 6401.7. Employers also must not retaliate against an employee because the employee is a family member of a person who has—or is perceived to have—engaged in bringing safety complaints.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6311</td>
<td><strong>No Discipline for Refusal to Work in Violation of Safety Laws Where Violation Would Create Hazard.</strong> Employers must not discharge, lay off, or fail to pay employees who refuse to work because of violation of safety or health law, where violation would create real and apparent hazard to any employee.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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</table>
7.24.14  **Safety conditions**

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<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
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<tr>
<td>2260</td>
<td><strong>Sanitary Facilities.</strong> All employers must comply with sanitary facilities standards adopted by the Occupational Safety &amp; Health Standards Board.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2350</td>
<td><strong>Workplace Free from Effluvia and With Sufficient Toilets.</strong> Employers must provide a clean workplace free of foul smelling vapors, and must provide sufficient number of bathrooms; If there are five or more employees who are not all of the same gender, sufficient gender-designated bathrooms must be provided.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2351</td>
<td><strong>Proper Ventilation.</strong> Every factory or workshop operator must ventilate every workplace to prevent injury to employee health by injurious vapors, gases, dust, or other impurities generated by the work.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2353</td>
<td><strong>Fans.</strong> Employers must use properly fitted exhaust fans or blowers with pipes and hoods to prevent dust, filaments, or injurious gases from escaping into the atmosphere of any room where employees work.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<tr>
<td>2440</td>
<td><strong>First Aid.</strong> All employers must comply with standards for medical services and first aid adopted by Occupational Safety &amp; Health Standards Board.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2441</td>
<td><strong>Free, Fresh, and Pure Drinking Water.</strong> Employers must provide fresh, free, and pure drinking water for employees, at reasonable and convenient times and places.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<tr>
<td>2650-2667</td>
<td><strong>Industrial Homework.</strong> No industrial homework is permitted in various industries, including manufacture of food items, garments, toys and dolls, tobacco, drugs and poisons, bandages and other sanitary goods, explosives, fireworks. Licenses are required for other industrial homework.</td>
<td>LC 2699; LC 2658.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6314</td>
<td><strong>Workplace Inspections by Division of Occupational Safety and Health.</strong> Employers must give DOSH free access to employer premises to inspect and gather information (including statistics and physical materials), and to speak privately with employees regarding safety issues. Employers must post and comply with any order to preserve accident site or related physical materials.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>6318</td>
<td><strong>Posting Citations, Orders, Actions Related to OSHA Violations.</strong> Employers must post, at or near each place of violation and for three working days or until condition is abated, any DOSH citation or order. Employers also must post notice regarding abatement of violation.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6325</td>
<td><strong>Removal of Notices Prohibiting Entry to Hazardous Area.</strong> No unauthorized person shall remove a DOSH notice preventing entry into an area DOSH has identified as an imminent hazard to employees until the hazard has been determined to be abated.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6326</td>
<td><strong>Entry / Use of Hazardous Area.</strong> After notice has been posted pursuant to Section 6325, it is unlawful for anyone to enter area or use or operate equipment or device before it is made safe (except for purpose of abating safety issue), or to deface, destroy, or remove the notice without the division’s authority.</td>
<td>LC 2699; LC 6326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6328</td>
<td><strong>Postings.</strong> Employers must post safety notices in both English and Spanish. For postings, see <a href="http://www.dir.ca.gov/wpnodb.html">http://www.dir.ca.gov/wpnodb.html</a>.</td>
<td>n/a; see LC 2699(g)(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6386</td>
<td><strong>Laboratory Employers and Hazardous Substances.</strong> Laboratory employers must ensure that labels regarding hazardous substances are not removed or defaced, and must maintain any material safety data sheets received with shipments of hazardous substances and ensure they are readily available to laboratory employees.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6398</td>
<td><strong>Notice to Employees Who Work with Hazardous Substances.</strong> Employers must (a) timely make available Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) to employees, collective bargaining representatives, or employees’ physicians, (b) furnish MSDS information, either in writing or through training, to employees exposed to hazardous substance, and (c) inform employees of rights to this information.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<tr>
<td>6399</td>
<td><strong>Employers Must Obtain Updated MSDS from Manufacturers on Request from Employee, Union, Physician.</strong> Employer must request MSDS from manufacturer within seven days of request by employee, union rep, or employee’s physician, if employer (a) has not requested MSDS on the substance within prior 12 months and does not have MSDS on the substance, or (b) has not requested update to MSDS from manufacturer within past six months. Employers who do not receive response from manufacturer within 25 days of request must send copy of request to director with note that no response has been received.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>6399.7</td>
<td><strong>No Discrimination Against Whistleblowers.</strong> Employers must not discharge or</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>discriminate against employees for filing complaints or instituting proceeding</td>
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<td>relating to hazardous substances.</td>
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<td>6400</td>
<td><strong>Safe and Healthful Environment Required.</strong> Employers, including joint</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>employers, must furnish safe and healthful employment.</td>
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<td>6401,</td>
<td><strong>Employers Must Provide and Maintain Safety Devices.</strong> Employers must supply</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<tr>
<td>6403,</td>
<td>safety devices and safeguards, and processes reasonably adequate to</td>
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<tr>
<td>6406</td>
<td>render employment safe and healthful. Employer must do everything reasonably</td>
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<td>necessary to protect employee safety and health. Employers must not (a)</td>
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<td>remove or damage any safety device or warning furnished for use in employment,</td>
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<td>(b) interfere with the use thereof, or (c) interfere with process adopted</td>
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<td>for employee protection, or (d) fail or neglect to do every other thing</td>
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<td>reasonably necessary to protect the life, safety, and health of employees.</td>
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<td>6401.7</td>
<td><strong>Injury Illness Prevention Program Required.</strong> Employers must maintain</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>effective injury prevention programs, timely correct unsafe and unhealthy</td>
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<td>conditions and practices, comply with employee training obligations, and record</td>
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<td>steps taken to implement their IIPPs.</td>
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<td>6402</td>
<td><strong>No Employees in Unsafe Places.</strong> Employers must not require or permit</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>employees to go or be anywhere that is not safe and healthful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6404</td>
<td><strong>All Workplaces Must Be Safe and Healthful.</strong> Employers must not occupy or</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>maintain any place of employment that is not safe and healthful.</td>
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<td>6404.5</td>
<td><strong>Smoking Restrictions.</strong> Employers generally must prohibit smoking in all</td>
<td>LC 6404.5</td>
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<td>enclosed workplace spaces. <strong>Exceptions:</strong> (1) 20% of guestroom accommodations</td>
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<td>in lodging establishments, (2) retail or wholesale tobacco shops and private</td>
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<td>smokers' lounges, (3) cabs of motortrucks, (4) theatrical production sites,</td>
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<td>if smoking is an integral part of the theatrical story, (5) medical research</td>
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<td>or treatment sites, if smoking is integral to research and treatment, (6)</td>
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<td>patient smoking areas in long-term health care facilities. Penalties are $100</td>
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<td>for a first violation, $200 for a second violation within one year, and $500</td>
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<td>for each further violation within one year.</td>
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<td>6407</td>
<td><strong>Compliance Mandatory.</strong> Employers must comply with occupational safety/</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
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<td>health standards, with H&amp;S Code § 25910 (relating to spraying of asbestos),</td>
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<td>and with all rules, regulations, and orders that apply to its own conduct.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC §</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>6408</td>
<td><strong>Obligation to Provide Information and Access.</strong> Employers must give</td>
<td><strong>LC 6431</strong> (up to $12,471 per violation)</td>
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<td>employees information in various ways, as prescribed by regulations: (a)</td>
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<td>post information about employee rights and obligations under occupational</td>
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<td>safety and health laws, (b) post each citation issued under § 6317, at or</td>
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<td>near place where violation occurred, (c) tell employees or their</td>
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<td>representatives they can observe monitoring or measuring of employee</td>
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<td>exposure to hazards conducted pursuant to [OSHA] standards promulgated</td>
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<td>under § 142.3, (d) allow access by employees or their representatives to</td>
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<td>accurate records of exposures to potentially toxic materials or harmful</td>
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<td>physical agents, (e) notify any employee exposed to toxic materials or</td>
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<td>harmful physical agents in concentrations or at levels exceeding those</td>
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<td>prescribed by an applicable standard, order, or special order, and inform</td>
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<td>employee of corrective action being taken.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6409</td>
<td><strong>Filing Physician’s Report on Industrial Injury or Illness.</strong> Every</td>
<td><strong>LC 6413.5</strong> $50 - $200 for pattern of or willful</td>
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<td>physician as defined in Section 3209.3 who tends to an injured employee</td>
<td>violations)</td>
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<td>must file electronically a complete report with the Division of Workers’</td>
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<td>Compensation and the employer, or, if insured, with the employer’s insurer,</td>
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<td>within five days of the initial examination.</td>
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<td>6409.1</td>
<td><strong>Obligations to File Reports on Industrial Injury or Illness.</strong> Employers</td>
<td><strong>LC 6413.5, plus LC 6409.1(b)—$5,000+ for failure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>must report to the Department of Industrial Relations—or, if insured, to</td>
<td><strong>to report serious illness, injury or death</strong></td>
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<td>the insurer—any injury or illness that results in time lost beyond the</td>
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<td>day of the incident, or which requires medical treatment beyond first aid,</td>
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<td>and must file amended report if employee dies as result of illness/injury.</td>
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<td>For serious illness, injury, or death, employers must report immediately</td>
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<td>to DOSH by telephone or email.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6410</td>
<td><strong>Recordkeeping Requirements.</strong> Reports required by 6409 and 6409.1 must</td>
<td><strong>LC 6431</strong>: up to $12,741 per violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>be maintained.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6411</td>
<td><strong>Completing Forms from the Division.</strong> Employers receiving forms with</td>
<td><strong>LC 2699</strong></td>
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<td>directions from Division of Labor Statistics &amp; Research must complete them</td>
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<td>correctly, and give a good reason for any failure to answer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7156</td>
<td><strong>No Obstruction of Safety.</strong> Employers must not—in employing or direct-</td>
<td><strong>LC 2699</strong></td>
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<td>ing work building construction, repairing, painting, or cleaning of any</td>
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<td></td>
<td>house, building, or structure—(a) knowingly or negligently furnish or</td>
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<td></td>
<td>erect improper scaffolding, slings, ladders, or other mechanical contriv-</td>
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<td>ances, (b) hinder or obstruct any DOSH official trying to inspect that</td>
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<td></td>
<td>equipment, or (c) deface or remove any official notice that equipment has</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>been declared unsafe.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Safety Devices on Windows

Employers must not employ or direct anyone to perform window-washing services without requisite safety devices on buildings over three stories high, absent exception. Any person employing, directing, or permitting another to perform labor on windows without safety devices as provided for in Sections 7326 and 7327 is guilty of a misdemeanor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7328-7329</td>
<td><strong>Safety Devices on Windows.</strong> Employers must not employ or direct anyone to perform window-washing services without requisite safety devices on buildings over three stories high, absent exception. Any person employing, directing, or permitting another to perform labor on windows without safety devices as provided for in Sections 7326 and 7327 is guilty of a misdemeanor.</td>
<td>LC 2699; LC 7328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Misrepresentation of Labor Engaged in Production, Manufacture, or Sale of Products

Employers must not misrepresent the kind, nature, and character of labor employed, the extent of labor employed, the number or kind of persons employed, that a particular kind of laborers is employed when in fact another kind is employed. Employers thus not misrepresent that union labor is used when it is not, or that an item is “made in America” when it was made elsewhere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1011</td>
<td><strong>Misrepresentation of Labor Engaged in Production, Manufacture, or Sale of Products.</strong> Employers must not misrepresent the kind, nature, and character of labor employed, the extent of labor employed, the number or kind of persons employed, that a particular kind of laborers is employed when in fact another kind is employed. Employers thus not misrepresent that union labor is used when it is not, or that an item is “made in America” when it was made elsewhere.</td>
<td>LC 2699; LC 1011 (misdemeanor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1012</td>
<td><strong>Misrepresentation of Union Labor Employed.</strong> Employers must not willfully misrepresent or falsely state that union labor was employed in the manufacture, production, or sale of articles or performance of services.</td>
<td>LC 2699; LC 1012 (misdemeanor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1015</td>
<td><strong>Forgery of Union Label or Trademark.</strong> Employers must not willfully forge a union label or other mark, with intent to sell items to which unauthorized label is attached.</td>
<td>LC 2699; LC 1015 (misdemeanor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1016</td>
<td><strong>Unauthorized Use of Union Label or Trademark.</strong> Employers must not willfully use union label, trademark, insignia, seal, device or form of advertisement without authorization.</td>
<td>LC 2699; LC 1016 (misdemeanor)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Employer-dominated Employee Groups

Employers are liable for organizing employee groups that are employer-financed or dominated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1122</td>
<td><strong>Employer-dominated Employee Groups.</strong> Employers are liable for organizing employee groups that are employer-financed or dominated.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### No Professional Strikebreakers

Employers must not willingly or knowingly hire or use professional strikebreakers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1130-1136.2</td>
<td><strong>No Professional Strikebreakers.</strong> Employers must not willingly or knowingly hire or use professional strikebreakers.</td>
<td>LC 2699; LC 1136 (misdemeanor)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 7.24.16 Status of minors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td><strong>Files on Minors.</strong> Employers of minors must keep on file all relevant permits and certificates to work or to employ such minors. The files shall be open at all times to the inspection of the school attendance and probation officers, the State Board of Education, and the officers of the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1302</td>
<td><strong>Employers Must Permit Inspections of Files on Minors.</strong> Employers must allow attendance supervisor or probation officer to enter workplace to inspect work permits regarding minors.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1311.5</td>
<td><strong>Child Protection Act of 2014.</strong> Employers must not discriminate, discharge, or threaten any adverse action against any individual for filing a claim for Labor Code violations that arose while the individual was a minor. The statute of limitations for Labor Code claims are tolled until the aggrieved individual attains the age of majority.</td>
<td>$25,000-50,000 for each class “A” violation, as defined in LC 1288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1391</td>
<td><strong>Work Hours for Minors 16-17 Years Old.</strong> Minors 16-17 years old must not work more than eight hours within 24 hours, more than 48 hours within one week, or before 5 a.m. or after 10 p.m. on any day preceding a schoolday, except that they can work during the evening preceding a nonschoolday until 12:30 a.m. of the nonschoolday. When school is in session, minors 16-17 years old must not work more than four hours in a schoolday unless are employed in “personal attendant” occupation, school-approved work experience, or cooperative vocational education program, or have a work permit.</td>
<td>Misdemeanor; fines up to $10,000 for willful violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1391.1</td>
<td><strong>Minors Work Between 10 p.m.-12:30 a.m.</strong> Minors 16-18 years old enrolled in work experience or cooperative vocational education programs may work after 10 p.m. but not later than 12:30 a.m. if not detrimental to health, education, or welfare of minor and with approval of parent and work experience coordinator, but work between 10 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. is subject to minimum wage paid to adults.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1391.2</td>
<td><strong>Minors Who Have High School Equivalency Can Be Employed As Adults.</strong> For minors under 18 who have completed high school equivalency can be employed on same terms as adults, if paid in manner equivalent to adults.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 7.24.17 Miscellaneous

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC §</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1050, 1052</td>
<td><strong>No Misrepresentations to Prevent Reemployment.</strong> Employers commit a misdemeanor if they make misrepresentations to prevent a former employee from obtaining new job, or if they fail to take all reasonable steps to prevent such a violation.</td>
<td>LC 1054: treble damages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1061</td>
<td><strong>Employment of Displaced Janitors.</strong> Successor service contractors must hire janitor-employees who worked for former service contractor for at least four months, and retain them 60 days absent substantiated cause not to do so (based on performance or conduct). Contractors must state this requirement in all initial bid packages, and must make written job offers in primary language or other language in which the offeree is literate. The same wages and benefits are not required. The offer shall state time it will remain open (not &lt; ten days). If fewer employees are needed, then seniority within job classification shall be basis for layoffs. Contractors must also identify employees not retained and reason therefore, to place them on preferential hiring list. Contractors must give each retained employee a written performance evaluation at end of 60 days. If the evaluation is satisfactory, then the contractors must offer continued employment, which may be at will.</td>
<td>LC 2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703</td>
<td><strong>Talent services contracts.</strong> Contracts between an artist and a talent service must contain certain provisions (e.g., description of services to be performed, duration of the contract) to protect the artist.</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703.4</td>
<td><strong>Prohibited acts by talent services agencies.</strong> Agencies must not make unsupported advertisements or representations about auditions or other employment opportunities for artists, must not charge an artist for an audition or employment opportunity, must not charge artists other than certain specified fees, and must not own, operate, or have a financial interest in a talent listing service.</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.25 Criminal Penalties

As we’ve occasionally indicated above, Labor Code provisions often, if not typically, provide for misdemeanor penalties (fines and imprisonment) for any willful violation.\(^4^{44}\) Criminal penalties can apply even for neglecting to comply with certain provisions of the Labor Code or with any order or ruling of the Industrial Welfare Commission.\(^4^{45}\)

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2 Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 592 (2000); see generally Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal. 4th 785, 795 (1999) (“IWC’s wage orders, although at times patterned after federal regulations, also sometimes provide greater protection than is provided under federal law in the Fair Labor Standards Act”); see, e.g., Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1535 n.10 (2008) (noting DLSE’s refusal to defer to federal authority analyzing whether on-call time is “hours worked” because, under California law ‘the existence of an “agreement” regarding the understanding of the parties (as to the compensation policy) is of no importance. The ultimate consideration in applying the California law is determining the extent of the “control” exercised.’).

3 DLSE Opinion Letter 1994.02.03-3 at 2 (contrasting federal and California definitions of “hours worked” and noting that California has not enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act).


7 Lab. Code § 1182.12.

8 Lab. Code § 1194.2(a).

9 Lab. Code § 1194.2(b).

10 Lab. Code § 1197.1(a).

11 Lab. Code § 1199(b).

12 See DLSE Enforcement and Policies Manual § 47.7 (2002); DLSE Opinion Letter 2002.01.29.


15 Vaquero v. Stoneledge Furniture, LLC, 9 Cal. App. 5th 98, 110 (2017) (“We agree with Bluford that Wage Order No. 7 requires employers to separately compensate employees for rest periods if an employer’s compensation plan does not already include a minimum hourly wage for such time.”). All of the federal courts that have considered this issue of California law have reached a similar conclusion and have held employers must separately compensate employees paid by the piece for nonproductive work hours.

16 Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 314, 323 (2005) (California protects “the minimum wage rights of California employees to a great extent than federally”; utility pole workers thus could seek the minimum wage for all hours worked, including nonproductive time such as travel time in company vehicles and time spent completing paperwork).

17 For federal court cases following Armenta, see Quezada v. Con-Way Freight, Inc., 2012 WL 2847609, at *2, 6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012) (employer must pay directly for “all hours worked” and thus could not rely on payments per mile driven, plus an hourly wage for plant work; employer must also pay separately for vehicle inspections, paperwork completion, etc.); Cardenas v. McLane Food Servs., Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1249-53 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (employer must pay truck drivers for pre- and post-shift inspections, as time was included in the hourly rate); Ontiveros v. Zamora, 2009 WL 425962 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2009) (employer cannot just pay mechanics for the number of repairs completed, but must also pay them for hours worked while not performing repairs).

18 Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal. App. 4th 36 (2013) (automotive service technicians paid a “piece-rate” basis for repair work must also be paid a separate hourly minimum wage for time they spent during their workshifts waiting for vehicles to repair or performing other nonrepair tasks directed by their employer).

19 Balasanyan v. Nordstrom, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing FLSA minimum wage claim while permitting California minimum wage claim to continue, because, under California law, “employees must be directly compensated at least minimum wage for all time spent on activities that do not allow them to directly earn wages”; thus store salesperson paid with commissions, with guarantee of being paid, on average, at least the minimum wage, was still separately owed the California minimum wage for non-sales activities such as stocking merchandise).


22 See Lab. Code § 1205(c) (authorizing jurisdictions to impose labor standards through “exercise of local police powers or spending powers”).


27 See Lab. Code § 218.5(a) (“In any action brought for the nonpayment of wages, fringe benefits, or health and welfare or pension fund contributions, the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party if any party to the action requests attorney’s fees and costs upon the initiation of the action.”); DLSE Opinion Letter 2002.01.29 at 10-11 (arguing that Labor Code sections 221-223 provide “a statutory basis ‘for the enforcement of non-overtime contract based wage claims’; ‘California law explicitly prohibits employers from paying employees less than the wages required under any statute or … contract …’.”).

28 Lab Code Regs § 11160(2)(J).

29 Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 588 (2000) (federal labor law differs substantially from state law with respect to concept of hours worked); Troester v. Starbucks Corp., 5 Cal. 5th 829, 837-42 (2019) (same); Wage Order No. 4, in section 2(K), highlights the distinction between federal and California law on this point, defining “hours worked” to include “all the time the employee is suffered or
permitted to work, whether or not required to do so, and also “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer,” while stating that within the health care industry the term “hours worked” means simply “the time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work for the employer, whether or not required to do so, as interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.”


31 Jong v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 391 (2014) (upholding summary judgment against a nonexempt pharmacy manager’s claim for unpaid off-the-clock work, where the manager was aware of Kaiser’s timekeeping rules and policy of paying for all hours worked and presented no evidence that Kaiser management knew or should have known of his unreported overtime hours).

32 IWC Wage Orders § 5(A) (exceptions apply for Acts of God and other cause beyond the employer's control).

33 IWC Wage Orders § 5(B) (exceptions apply for Acts of God and other cause beyond the employer’s control).


37 Id., slip op. at 1 (Egerton, J., dissenting).


39 IWC Wage Orders § 4(C) (an exception applies for employees residing at the place of employment). “Split shift” means a work schedule that the employer has interrupted with non-paid non-working periods, other than “bona fide rest or meal periods.” Wage Orders § 2(Q).

40 See, e.g., Galvez v. Federal Express Inc., 2011 WL1599625, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (“The plain language of the split shift regulation reflects an intent to ensure that an employee who works a split shift must be compensated highly enough so that he or she receives more than the minimum wage for the time actually worked plus one hour.”).


42 Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 584 (2000) (employer that requires employees to travel to work site on its buses must compensate them for time spent traveling on buses and for time spent waiting for buses after employee has arrived at designated waiting site at designated time; time subject to control of employer is hours worked under definition provided in California wage order). Cf. Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal. App. 4th 263 (2006) (where employer provided employees with parking a mile distant from the work site and provided shuttle that employees were permitted but not required to take between parking lot and work site, employer need not compensate employees for time spent on shuttle).

43 Rutti v. Lojack Corp., 596 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2010).

44 Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Tel. Co., No. C084350, — Cal. App. 5th — (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2018) (“[B]ecause the plaintiffs here were not required to use the company vehicle to commute to work, they were not under the control of the employer. Further, simply transporting tools and equipment during commute time is not compensable work where no effort or extra time is required to effectuate the transport.”) (emphasis in original).

45 DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual § 46.3 (2002) (California does not distinguish between compulsory travel during “normal” working hours and compulsory travel outside “normal” hours, because these “distinctions, and treatment of some of this time as noncompensable, are purely creatures of the federal regulations, and are inconsistent with state law”).

46 See, e.g., Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[t]he two predominant factors in determining whether an employee’s on-call waiting time is compensable overtime are (1) the degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal activities; and (2) the agreements between the parties”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally 29 C.F.R. § 785.14-17 (examples on whether, under the FLSA, an employee is required to be engaged or is engaged to wait).

47 Seymore v. Metson Marine, Inc., 194 Cal. App. 4th 361, 365 (2011) (but the parties could agree to exclude from compensation eight hours of sleep time in each 24-hour period).


49 Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, 60 Cal. 4th 833 (2015).

50 Id. at 843 (“we decline to import any federal standard, which expressly eliminates substantial protections to employees, by implication”; “where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”) (citations omitted).


53 Frlekin v. Apple Inc., 2015 WL 6681424 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2015) (granting summary judgment against Apple store employees seeking pay for time spent waiting for their bags to be searched before they left the store after clocking out, where the searches were peripheral to job duties and could be avoided if the employees chose not to bring bags to work). Frlekin relied on Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal. App. 4th 263 (2006), where employees riding a company shuttle to work lost their claim for shuttle-time pay because the they had been permitted, but not required, to ride the shuttle between the company parking lot and their work site).


55 Lab. Code § 226(a); Wage Orders § 7.

56 Lab. Code § 1174(d).

57 Seymore v. Metson Marine, Inc., 194 Cal. App. 4th 361, 365 (2011) (“We agree with plaintiffs that it is not permissible for Metson to artificially designate the workweek in such a way as to circumvent the statutory requirement to pay overtime rates for the seventh consecutive day worked in a workweek.”)

58 See, e.g., Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1984) (approximately 7-8 minutes spent each day, before the shift started, reading log book and exchanging information was de minimis because it was irregular and difficult to monitor).

59 Corbin v. Time Warner, 821 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2016).
Lab. Code § 201.3(b) provides in part:

It is a crime for a California employer to willfully refuse to pay wages after demand is made or to falsely dispute the demand in order to coerce an agreement to compromise or delay payment. Lab. Code § 216.

70 Corbin v. Time Warner Entertainment-Advance Newhouse Partnership, 821 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2016).

71 See 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(c) (employees working on fixed schedules).

72 Wage Orders § 3.


74 Lab. Code § 515(d)(2) (“Payment of a fixed salary to a nonexempt employee shall be deemed to provide compensation only for the employee’s regular, nonovertime hours, notwithstanding any private agreement to the contrary.”).


77 It is a crime for a California employer to willfully refuse to pay wages after demand is made or to falsely dispute the demand in order to coerce an agreement to compromise or delay payment. Lab. Code § 216.


80 Lab. Code § 204.

81 Lab. Code § 206.5.


85 Lab. Code § 204.


88 Lab. Code § 212.

89 Lab. Code § 213(d).


91 Ling v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1261 (2016) (“The fact that the remedy is measured by an employee’s hourly wage does not transmute the remedy into a wage as that term is used in § 203.”)


93 Lab. Code § 201.


95 McLean v. State of California, 1 Cal. 5th 615, 624 (2016).

96 Id. (“If an employer discharges an employee or the employee quits, the employer may pay the wages earned and unpaid at the time the employee is discharged or quits by making a deposit authorized pursuant to this subdivision, provided that the employer complies with the provisions of this article relating to the payment of wages upon termination or quitting of employment.”).


98 Smith v. Superior Court (L’Oreal USA), 39 Cal. 4th 77 (2006).

99 Lab. Code § 201.3(b) provides in part:

(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) to (5), inclusive, if an employee of a temporary services employer is assigned to work for a client, that employee’s wages are due and payable no less frequently than weekly, regardless of when the assignment ends, and wages for work performed during any calendar week shall be due and payable not later than the regular payday of the
following calendar week. A temporary services employer shall be deemed to have timely paid wages upon completion of an assignment if wages are paid in compliance with this subdivision.

(2) If an employee of a temporary services employer is assigned to work for a client on a day-to-day basis, that employee’s wages are due and payable at the end of each day, regardless of when the assignment ends, if each of the following occurs: (A) The employee reports to or assembles at the office of the temporary services employer or other location. (B) The employee is dispatched to a client’s worksite each day and returns to or reports to the office of the temporary services employer or other location upon completion of the assignment. (C) The employee’s work is not executive, administrative, or professional, as defined in the wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission, and is not clerical.

(3) If an employee of a temporary services employer is assigned to work for a client engaged in a trade dispute, that employee’s wages are due and payable at the end of each day, regardless of when the assignment ends.

(4) If an employee of a temporary services employer is assigned to work for a client and is discharged by the temporary services employer or employing employer, wages are due and payable as provided in Section 201.

(5) If an employee of a temporary services employer is assigned to work for a client and quits his or her employment with the temporary services employer, wages are due and payable as provided in Section 202.

100 Lab. Code § 227.3.
104 Although no California appellate authority seems to have addressed the constitutionality of imposing a penalty of thirty days’ wages for a relatively minor underpayment of wages, courts have recognized that a “penalty prescribed [can be] so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.” United States v. Citrin, 972 F.2d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 1992).
106 Nishiki v. Danko Meredith, APC, 25 Cal. App. 5th 993 (2018) (as to initial delay in payment the employer’s failure to pay termination wages was not willful, because an inadvertent clerical error resulted in the wrong amount being shown on the paycheck; but delay in sending a corrected check was willful and warranted waiting-time penalties).
109 Id. at 1401 (internal citations omitted).
110 Office of Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum 201522004, February 10, 2015 (https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/201522004.pdf). The Chief Counsel’s advice memo, provided to field or service center employees, is not something that a taxpayer can cite as precedent.
112 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
114 Lab. Code § 515(a).
115 Conley v. PG&E Co., 131 Cal. App. 4th 260, 271 (2005) (“[N]othing in California law … precludes an employers from following the federal rule that permits them to require the use of vacation leave for partial-day absences without causing otherwise exempt employees to become nonexempt under the salary basis test.”).
117 Rhea v. General Atomic, 227 Cal. App. 4th 1560, 1575-76 (2014) (“We conclude that regardless of whether the absence is at least four hours or a shorter duration, a requirement that exempt employees use Annual Leave time for a partial day absence does not violate California law.”).
118 See IWC Wage Orders § 1(A)(1).
119 29 C.F.R. § 541.106(b).
120 Heyen v. Safeway Inc., 216 Cal. App. 4th 795, 827 & n.8 (2013) (rejecting argument that trier of fact should account for simultaneously performing exempt and nonexempt tasks, such as actively managing store while also checking and bagging customer grocery purchases; noting that California Legislature has not elected to follow the federal regulation).
121 See id 29 C.F.R. § 541.113.
122 See IWC Wage Orders § 1(A)(3).
123 “[P]harmacists employed to engage in the practice of pharmacy, and registered nurses employed to engage in the practice of nursing, shall not be considered exempt professional employees, nor shall they be considered exempt … unless they individually meet the criteria established for exemption as executive or administrative employees.” IWC Wage Orders § 1(A)(3)(f).
124 An employee who merely applies knowledge in following prescribed procedures or in determining which procedure to follow does not exercise “discretion and independent judgment,” but rather is simply applying skill and knowledge. “Discretion and independent judgment” consists of comparing and evaluating possible courses of conduct, and making a decision after considering the various possibilities.
125 See IWC Wage Orders § 1(A)(2).
127 Id. at 812.

C.F.R. §§ 541.2(a), 541.205(a).

Bell, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 826.

E.g., Miller v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 481 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007) (criticizing Bell’s interpretation of the administrative/professional dichotomy and finding insurance adjusters categorically to qualify as exempt employees).

C.F.R. § 541.203(a). See also former C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(5) (identifying insurance adjusters within the universe of employees often covered by the administrative exemption). The current regulations still require an adjuster to meet the duties test to qualify as exempt, which requires the adjuster to perform such activities as “interviewing insureds, witnesses and physicians; inspecting property damage; reviewing factual information to prepare damages estimates; evaluating and making recommendations regarding coverage of claims; determining liability and total value of a claim; negotiating settlements; and making recommendations regarding litigation.”


Miller v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 481 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007).

481 F.3d at 1124, 1132.


Id. at 177.

But see Combs v. Skyriver Communications, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 4th 1242 (2008) (upholding trial court finding that manager of capacity planning and director of network operations was exempt as administrative employee, focusing on “salary” and “duties” tests set forth in IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001 rather than administrative/production worker dichotomy set forth in Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 87 Cal. App. 4th 805 (2001), where plaintiff primarily engaged in work “directly related to management policies or general business operations” that involved customary and regular exercise of discretion and independent judgment).


Harris v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 170 (2011).

C.F.R. § 541.1(a).

29 C.F.R. § 541.103.


20 Cal. 4th at 852.

Batze v. Safeway, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 5th 440, 444-45 (2017) (affirming trial court’s ruling for employer that first and second assistant managers spent more than one-half of their workweek in managerial tasks and that they met all the other qualifications to be exempt from overtime rules).

Mitchell v. Yoplait, 122 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 8 (App. Div. 2004) (upholding, as authorized by Lab. Code § 511(b), alternative workweek schedule by which employees in relevant work unit voted for three twelve-hour shifts and one six-hour shift a week, by which only the last two hours in each twelve-hour shift were considered overtime entitled to time-and-one-half wages, with no overtime premium pay being due for the ninth and tenth hours of work on the twelve-hour shifts).

50.6.1(4).

See generally Wage Order No. 9 (Transportation Industry) § 3(L) (overtime provisions do not apply to employees whose hours of service are regulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation or by Title 13 of the California Code of Regulations, regulating hours of drivers).

See, e.g., Godfrey v. Oakland Port Servs. Corp. 167
Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc. 167
Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC 167
Rodriguez v. Taco Bell Corp. 167
E.g., Bono v. Enterprises, Inc. v. Bradshaw 167
Gerard v. Orange Coast Mem. Med. Ctr. 167
Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. 167
Lubin v. Wackenhut Corp. 167
Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court 167

29 C.F.R. § 785.19(b). 167
29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). 167

The California Supreme Court joined the overwhelming weight of federal court decisional authority on this point of California law. 167


SB 327, amending Lab. Code § 516 (stating “the healthcare employee meal period waiver provisions ... were valid and enforceable on and after October 1, 2000, and continue to be valid and enforceable”). 167

No. 225205 (Aug. 17, 2016) (remanding case with directions to vacate its decision and to reconsider the cause in light of the enactment of Statutes 2015, chapter 505 (Sen. Bill No. 327 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.)). 167

Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center, 9 Cal. App. 5th 1204, 1207 (2017). 167

Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012). 167


Lab. Code § 512(a). 167

Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 4th 949, 963 (2005) (“employers have an ‘affirmative obligation to ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty’”) (citing DLSE Opinion Letter 2002.01.28, at 1). 167

DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual § 45.2.1 (2002) (“It is the employer’s burden to compel the worker to cease work during the meal period.”). 167

Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012). 167

The California Supreme Court joined the overwhelming weight of federal court decisional authority on this point of California law. E.g., Brown v. Federal Express Corp., 249 F.R.D. 580, 585 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (Fischer, J.) (denying class certification and rejecting argument that employers must ensure that employees take breaks); Gabriella v. Wells Fargo Financial, Inc., 2008 WL 3200190 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2008) (denying motion for class certification while applying standard that employers need only make break periods available to its employees); Perez v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 253 F.R.D. 508, 514 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (granting motion for summary judgment in part, denying plaintiffs motion for class certification while applying the “make available” standard); Salazar v. Avis Budget Group, 251 F.R.D. 529 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (denying motion for class certification because class members could not show they were forced to miss breaks); Kenny v. Supercuts, 252 F.R.D. 641, 645 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (same). 167

Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC, 29 Cal. App. 5th 1068 (2018) (rejecting argument that rounding policy could not apply to meal period punches; trial court need only consider how often policy results in rounding up and down; rejecting argument that plaintiff often got short meal periods and was discouraged from taking them, where signed attestations of meal period compliance accompanied every timesheet reflecting late or short meal periods). 167

29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). 167
29 C.F.R. § 785.19(b). 167

E.g., Bono v. Enterprises, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 32 Cal. App. 4th 968, 971, 975-77 (1995) (affirming judgment denying employer’s request for injunctive relief against DLSE enforcement position that employers must pay employee for their meal time if the employer requires the employee to remain on employer premises during lunch; “When an employer directs, commands or restrains an employee from leaving the work place during his or her lunch hour and thus prevents the employee from using the time effectively for his or her own purposes, that employee remains subject to the employer’s control [and] that employee must be paid.”). 167

Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1036 (2012) (“the DLSE argues ... the wage order’s meal period requirement is satisfied if the employee (1) has at least 30 minutes uninterrupted, (2) is free to leave the premises, and (3) is relieved of all duty for the entire period [citing DLSE Opinion Letter Nos. 1988.01.05, 1996.07.12]. We agree with this DLSE interpretation of the wage order.”). 167

Rodriguez v. Taco Bell Corp., 896 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2018). 167

Godfrey v. Oakland Port Servs. Corp., 230 Cal. App. 4th 1267 (2014) (rejecting defendant’s argument that California law was preempted by FAAAA, which provides that states may not enact laws “related to ... service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property”) (citing People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 772, 778 (2014) (rejecting presumption against federal preemption traditional state regulation over wages and hours, and holding that FAAAA does not affect UCL claim, not involving meal and rest breaks, by truck drivers claiming that they are employees misclassified as independent contractors). See also Dilts v. Penske
Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.  
Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc.  
Hartwig v. Orchard Commercial, Inc. 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/FAQ_RestPeriods.htm  
Augustus v. ABM Security Servs., Inc.  
United Parcel Serv. Wage & Hour Cases,  
Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.  
Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court

Lab. Code § 226.7(e). (f). A valid CBA qualifies for that exemption if it “expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of employees, and expressly provides for meal periods for those employees, final and binding arbitration of disputes concerning application of its meal period provisions, premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked, and a regular hourly rate of pay of not less than 50% (or more than the state minimum wage rate).” Lab. Code § 512(e)(2). See generally Araquistain v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 229 Cal. App. 4th 227, 236 (2014) (affirming summary judgment against meal-pay claim of unionized gas company employee; the CBA exemption applies because the CBA provides for a “meal period” even though during that period the employee was not necessarily relieved of all work duties). Araquistain decided that a CBA expressly provided for meal periods by permitting employees to eat their meals during work hours. “This conclusion comports with the clear intent of the Legislature to afford additional flexibility with regard to the terms of employment of employees in certain occupations, so long as their interests are protected through a collective bargaining agreement.” Id. at 237-38.

AB 2610, 2018 bill adding Lab. Code § 512(b)(2) (“[A] commercial driver employed by a motor carrier transporting nutrients and byproducts from a commercial feed manufacturer subject to Section 15051 of the Food and Agricultural Code to a customer located in a remote rural location may commence a meal period after six hours of work, if the regular rate of pay of the driver is no less than one and one-half times the state minimum wage and the driver receives overtime compensation in accordance with Section 510.”).


IWC Wage Orders § 12(A).  
IWC Wage Orders § 12(B).  
Lab. Code § 226.7(a).  
IWC Wage Orders § 12(A).  
DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual § 45.3.1 (2002) (any time exceeding two hours is a “major fraction”).

Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1028-32 (2012).  
DLSE Opinion Letters 1995.06.02 & 2002.02.22.  

IWC Wage Orders § 7(A)(3).  
IWC Wage Orders § 13(B) (“Suitable resting facilities shall be provided in an area separate from the toilet rooms and shall be available to employees during work hours.”).

See DLSE Opinion Letter 1986.01.03.  

No. S224853 (Cal. April 29, 2015). The Supreme Court agreed to decide these issues: (1) Do Labor Code section 226.7, and Wage Order No. 4 require that employees be relieved of all duties during rest breaks? (2) Are security guards who remain on call during rest breaks performing work during that time under the analysis of Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc., 60 Cal. 4th 833 (2015)?


49 U.S.C. § 31141(c).  
Lab. Code § 226.7(a).  
Lab. Code § 226.7(b).  
Lab. Code § 226.7(d).

AB 2605, 2018 bill adding Lab. Code § 226.75. This urgency bill took effect immediately upon Governor Brown’s signing of the bill into law on September 20, 2018. The law will sunset January 1, 2021. AB 2605 was a direct response to Augustus v. ABM Security Services.


Lab. Code § 226.7(c). See IWC Wage Orders § 11(B) (meal periods), § 12(B) (rest periods). See also Lab. Code § 558(a) (civil penalty for violating IWC wage order).


Lab. Code § 226.7(e).


Hartwig v. Orchard Commercial, Inc. (June 17, 2005), effectively overruled by the California Supreme Court’s Murphy’s decision, discussed in text. The Labor Commissioner on occasion has designated an Order, Decision or Award as a Precedent Decision. See Gov’t Code § 11425.60. The Hartwig decision was the first to receive that special status. The Hartwig opinion fully reviewed the wage v. penalty issue and concluded that the additional hour of pay is indeed a penalty. The Murphy decision, however, makes Hartwig a dead letter. And now the Labor Commissioner has concluded that it is inappropriate to designate ODAs as precedent decisions. See https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/precedentialdecisions.pdf (March 7, 2008 Memorandum of Robert Roginson, Chief Counsel) (visited Feb. 19, 2019).

In an advice memorandum released May 29, 2015 (which “may not be used or cited as precedent”), the IRS Office of Chief Counsel indicated that while Section 203 (“waiting time”) penalties are not taxable as wages, Section 226.7 payments may be: “[As to] ... meal and rest period payments made under California Labor Code Section 226.7[,] ... if an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period or rest period in accordance with State requirements, the employer must pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each day that the meal or rest period is not provided. Because the meal and rest period payments are essentially additional compensation for the employee performing additional services during the period when the meal and rest periods should have been provided, it appears those payments would be wages for federal employment tax purposes.” IRS Memorandum No. 201522004 at 6.

Lab. Code § 218.5.


Lab. Code § 203.

Bus. & Prof. Code §17200.

Lab. Code § 203.


DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual § 49.1.3 (2002) (extra hour of pay for a meal-period or rest-break violation is in the nature of legally required premium pay and thus is not included in computing the regular rate of pay).


Wage Orders § 14 (‘(A) All working employees shall be provided with suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats. (B) When employees are not engaged in the active duties of their employment and the nature of the work requires standing, an adequate number of suitable seats shall be placed in reasonable proximity to the work area and employees shall be permitted to use such seats when it does not interfere with the performance of their duties.’).

Lab. Code § 1198.

No. 04-431310 (S.F. Sup. Ct. 2005).


Green v. Bank of America NA, No. 11-56365 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2013) (reversing order dismissing the complaint for failing to allege that the plaintiff had requested a seat).

Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 739 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2013).

The California Supreme Court did accept such a referral in Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal. 4th 1191, 1206 (2011), and issued an opinion adverse to employers. See § 7.13.1.


Id. at 17-18.

Id. at 21-23.

Id. at 24.

Id. at 19.

E.g., Hudgins v. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 1109 (1995) (unidentifiable returns of merchandise not attributed to sales made by particular employee could not be deducted from commissions); Quillian v. Lion Oil Co., 96 Cal. App. 3d 156 (1979) (unlawful to determine bonus payments by deducting amount of cash shortages for sales). See also Sciborski v. Pacific Bell Directory, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1152 (2012) (unlawful to unilaterally declare commission was unearned and use self-help to deduct funds from wages already paid; although employers and employees may agree on certain conditions to a sales commission being earned, permitting an employer to recoup advances if the conditions are not satisfied, those conditions must be clearly expressed, generally in writing, and must relate to the sale and cannot merely serve as a basis to shift the employer’s cost of doing business to the employee).

DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual § 10.1.3 (2002). As the DLSE has stated in an opinion letter: “[Labor Code provisions] announce the long-standing policy of the State of California in regard to an employer’s obligation to pay all costs his employee expends or loses in carrying out the duties of the employment. ... As is clear from the [Labor Code], under the California law, an employer may not ‘pass through’ the normal costs of operating a business to the employee he hires. Debiting an employee’s earned wages to cover a normal operating expense of the employer is not allowed in California.” DLSE Opinion Letter 2000.08.01 at 4.

57 Cal. 2d 319 (1962).

Lab. Code § 224 (arguably suggesting that any valid deduction must be authorized by state or federal law or expressly authorized in writing by the employee, or in a collective bargaining agreement, to cover health or pension plan payments). Two cases indirectly support this view: Hudgins v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 1109 (1995) (suggesting without deciding that Labor Code itself bars deductions for innocently caused business losses); Quillian v. Lion Oil Co., 96 Cal. App. 3d 156 (1979) (applying anti-deduction rule to gas station store manager without addressing whether manager was exempt, on apparent assumption that Labor Code provisions discussed in Kerr’s Catering directly bar deductions for business losses, rather than simply authorize the IWC to issue wage orders against those deductions).

IWC Wage Orders § 9.

IWC Wage Orders § 9; DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual § 45.5.5 (2002).
This relatively new statute has survived a constitutional challenge. Lab. Code § 226.2. DLSE Opinion Letter 1999.09.22–1 at 3. Otherwise, the employer must “pursue a civil action to recover any unpaid debt from the employee.” Id.


E.g., Jacobus v. Krambo, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1096 (2000) (employee entitled to reimbursement from employer of expenses incurred by employee in successful defense against sex harassment allegations). See also Devereaux v. Latham & Watkins, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1571 (1995) (expenses incurred by employee in connection with her depositions in two actions brought by third parties against her employer); Grissom v. Vons Companies, 1 Cal. App. 4th 52 (1991) (employer must reimburse employee expenses incurred in defending third party lawsuit arising out of on-the-job auto accident, if retaining separate counsel was necessary because employer had failed to timely provide competent counsel free of any conflict of interest); Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 50 Cal. App. 3d 449 (1975) (expenses incurred by employee in defending lawsuit filed as a result of employee’s job-related services). The duty to reimburse for legal expenses does not apply when the employee rejects his employer’s offer of free, competent, conflict-free counsel and chooses to hire his own lawyer. Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC, 219 Cal. App. 4th 337, 348-49 (2013) (“dispositive question here is whether the fees and costs Carter incurred for the attorneys he chose were ‘necessary’ when his employer had arranged, through its insurer, to provide Carter with a different attorney at no cost to him”).

This relatively new statute has survived a constitutional challenge. Nisei Farmers League v. California Labor & Workforce Development Agency, No. F075102, — Cal. App. 4th — (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2019) (Section 226.2 is not facially unconstitutional as the language of the statute is sufficiently clear to provide adequate notice of the conduct the statute prohibits or requires).

Vaquero v. Stoneledge Furniture, LLC, 9 Cal. App. 5th 98, 110 (2017) (“We agree with Bluford that Wage Order No. 7 requires employers to separately compensate employees for rest periods if an employer’s compensation plan does not already include a minimum hourly wage for such time. … All of the federal courts that have considered this issue of California law have reached a similar conclusion and have held employers must separately compensate employees paid by the piece for nonproductive work hours.”).


Lab. Code § 226.2.

This relatively new statute has survived a constitutional challenge. Nisei Farmers League v. California Labor & Workforce Development Agency, No. F075102, — Cal. App. 4th — (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2019) (Section 226.2 is not facially unconstitutional as the language of the statute is sufficiently clear to provide adequate notice of the conduct the statute prohibits or requires).

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Lab. Code § 226.2.
A different result might obtain if the employer requires the employee to remain employed after the bonus calculation date is not entitled to receive it.

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A different result might obtain if the employer requires the employee to remain employed after the bonus calculation date is not entitled to receive it.
Labor Code section 351 provides: “Unless otherwise provided by a collective bargaining agreement, whenever a contract of employment
specifies sabbatical project (other than rest and recreation).”

employer purpose: the court would “have little trouble concluding” that a leave program is a sabbatical if the leave “is granted for a

vested vacation time, shall apply the principles of equity and fairness.”

vacation shall be paid to him as wages at his final rate in accordance with such contract of employment or employer policy respecting

eligibility or time served; provided, however, that an employment contract or employer policy shall not provide for forfeiture of vested

statutory language as shown in legislative history).

state statute does not necessarily create a private cause of action; instead, a right to sue must be conferred by Legislature in either

applicable to the statutory language); Id. at 1521.

400. at 1574. at 1574.

the accrual period) are unfair and will not be enforced by the Division. (See the detailed discussions of these issues at O.L. 1991.01.07

December 22, 2005, withdrawal of the opposing opinion—DLESE Opinion Letter 1993.05.17, at 2 (“a worker must have at least nine

employment contract or employer policy shall not provide for forfeiture of vested

The Labor Commissioner or a designated representative, in the resolution of any dispute with regard to

protection being waived or, at a minimum, the statute itself”).


Lab. Code § 351.50(a).

See 29 C.F.R. § 531(a).

“Every gratuity is hereby declared to be the sole property of the employee or employees to whom it was paid, given, or


deductions to recoup prior overpayments violated attachment and garnishment laws)).


deductions to recoup prior overpayments violated attachment and garnishment laws)).

The November 22, 2005, withdrawal of the opposing opinion—DLESE Opinion Letter 1993.05.17, at 2 (“a worker must have at least nine

months after the accrual of the vacation within which to take the vacation before a cap is effective”)—is noted at

www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/OpinionLetters-Withdrawn.htm (visited Feb. 9, 2019). See also DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations

Manual § 15.1.4.1 (vacation policies providing “that all vacation must be taken in the year it is earned (or in a very limited period following

and 1993.08.18).”).

The question presented on review is: “What is the proper method for calculating the rate of overtime pay when an employee receives both an hourly wage and a flat

sum bonus?”

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Id. The Court of Appeal explained that the overall critical inquiry was the true purpose of the program, and that it was not necessarily dispositive that employees were expected to return from leave, that the leave exceeded "normal" vacation, that the leave was offered only every five or seven years, that the leave was designed to be competitive with other companies, and that other employees assumed the absent employee’s duties during the leave. Id. at 1523-24.

Id. at 1522.

See, e.g., California Hospital Ass'n v. Henning, 770 F.2d 856, modified, 783 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1985); Milan v. Restaurant Enterprises Group, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 477 (1993). See also Bell v. H.F. Cox, Inc., 209 Cal. App. 4th 62, 73 (2012) (reversing summary judgment against claim of unlawfully denied termination vacation pay: employer could not win on defense of ERISA preemption on its motion for summary judgment, because plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact that the vacation benefits plan was funded from employer’s general assets and not—as ERISA would require—from a separate trust).


Lab. Code § 227.3.

Bell v. H.F. Cox, Inc., 209 Cal. App. 4th 62, 75 (2012) (affirming summary judgment for the employer: Section 227.3 applies only to termination payout, and does NOT require that vacation be paid at the employee’s regular rate of pay during employment; “Neither Labor Code Section 227.3 nor any other authority cited by plaintiffs supports the proposition that, apart from the situation where an employee is terminated with unused vacation time, a vacation benefits policy must provide for payment of vacation time at an employee’s regular rate of pay.”).


Id. at 1087-88, 1090. See also Bradstreet v. Wong, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1440 (2008) (where now-bankrupt corporations failed to pay earned wages, the corporate shareholders, officers, and managing agents are not personally liable for unpaid wages absent any indication that they were corporate alter egos; absent finding that employees performed labor for individuals rather than for the benefit of corporate employers, or that corporate agents appropriated corporate funds that otherwise would have paid wages, an order requiring those individuals to pay wages would not be “restitutionary,” as it would not replace any money or property that individuals took directly from employees). Bradstreet was abrogated by Martinez v. Coombs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 50 n.12 (2010), to the extent Bradstreet followed Reynolds v. Bement as to the definition of “employer.”

A later Court of Appeal case, Jones v. Gregory, 137 Cal. App. 4th 798 (2006), strongly questioned the proposition that the Labor Commissioner has any more authority than a private litigant does to pursue a claim for unpaid wages against individuals in addition to the traditional employer. Id. at 805-08. This decision was abrogated by the California Supreme Court in Martinez v. Coombs, 39 Cal. 4th 35, 50 n.12 (2010).

Reynolds, 36 Cal. 4th at 1088-89.


Lab. Code § 558.1(b).

Turman v. Superior Court (Koji’s Japan Inc.), 17 Cal. App. 5th 969, 986 (2017). The Court of Appeal also suggested that California’s definition of employer under the Wage Order can be as broad as the FLSA’s definition, for purposes of imposing personal liability. Id. at 987 (there are “similar factors applicable to determining federal joint employer liability, notwithstanding the separate definitions of the term employer under state and federal law”). Meanwhile, the trial court also had “failed to address whether Parent might be a joint employer under the definitions of the term ‘employer’ applicable to plaintiffs’ claims under the unfair competition law, the tip misappropriation statute, and PAGA.” Id. at 974.

Id. at 980-81.


Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 60 Cal. 4th 474 (2014).


Id. at 1020.

Lab. Code § 2810.3.

See, e.g., Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (Lee), 230 Cal. App. 4th 718 (2014) (in determining whether workers classified as independent contractors were really employees, plaintiff could use the IWC definition of employer as construed in Martinez v. Coombs, 49 Cal. 4th 35 (2010) instead of the common law test for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors that was discussed in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989)), rev. granted, No. S22732 (Cal. Jan. 28, 2015).


5 Cal. App. 5th 154 (2016), rev. granted, No. S239841 (Cal. Feb. 15, 2016) (agreeing to decide: “Does the aggrieved employee in a lawsuit based on unpaid overtime have viable claims against the outside vendor that performed payroll services under a contract with the employer?”).

Futrell v. Payday California, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 4th 1419, 1432 (2010) (affirming summary judgment for payroll company sued as plaintiff’s joint employer with respect to wage and wage-statement claims; payroll company did not control wages or conditions of employment by virtue of performing the “ministerial tasks of calculating pay and tax withholding, and by also issuing paychecks, drawn on its own bank account”).

Goonewardene, 5 Cal. App. 5th at 166-71.


California Grocers Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 4th 177 (2011).


Lab. Code § 2506(d).

Under the Formula Retail Employee Rights Ordinances, an employer is any person who owns or operates a Formula Retail Establishment with 20 or more employees in San Francisco. This count includes corporate officers or executives who, directly or indirectly, exercise control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of any individual. The count also includes workers who perform at least two hours of work per week within San Francisco who are scheduled for an on-call shift for at least two hours, but who are not required to report to work, even if the bulk of their work takes place somewhere else. A business’s number of employees is calculated by using the average number of people employed by the business per week during the previous year. As a result, temporary or seasonal employees count towards the total to the extent that their employment affects the weekly average number of employees.

A Formula Retail employer need not offer a part-time employee any shift for which the employer would have to pay the part-time employee daily or weekly overtime rates for any part of the shift.


See San Jose 2016 Ballot Measure E (“Measure E”), adding Chapter 4.101 to the San Jose Municipal Code.


San Jose Municipal Code § 4.101.090(A), (B).

Id. § 4.101.030(C); see also San Jose Municipal Code § 4.100.030.


Id. § 4.101.040(A).

Id. § 4.101.050(B).

Id. at § 4.101.050(B).

San Jose Municipal Code § 4.101.050(B); see also San Jose Municipal Code Section 4.100.090.

San Jose Municipal Code § 4.101.050(B).

Id.; see also San Jose Municipal Code § 4.100.070.

San Jose Municipal Code § 4.101.110; see also San Jose Municipal Code § 4.100.050.

Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal. 4th 1191, 1206 (2011). The nonexempt employees at issue in Sullivan were Colorado and Arizona residents who, as Instructors, trained customers in California to use Oracle software. Oracle arose in an unusual procedural posture. The Ninth Circuit, hearing an appeal from a federal district court, certified three questions of California law for the California Supreme Court to decide: First, does the California Labor Code apply to overtime work performed in California for a California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case, such that overtime pay is required for work in excess of eight hours per day or in excess of forty hours per week? Second, does Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 apply to the overtime work described in question one? Third, does § 17200 apply to overtime work performed outside California for a California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case if the employer failed to comply with the overtime provisions of the FLSA?” Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 557 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2009).


Oman v. Delta Air Lines, No. 3:15-cv-00131 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2017) (Judge Orrick) (rejecting claims that employer failed to provide adequate itemized wage statements required by Labor Code section 226 and to pay all wages earned on a periodic basis as required by Labor Code section 204, as California law did not apply).


Oracle, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207-08.

Under Labor Code section 98(a), the Labor Commissioner can hold a hearing to determine civil penalties due under Section 558 against any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer, including an individual liable under Section 558.1.

Under Labor Code section 558(a), the Labor Commissioner can hold a hearing to determine civil penalties due under Section 558 against any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer, including an individual liable under Section 558.1.

E.g., Lab. Code §§ 1199, 1199.5 (violations of Lab. Code §§ 1171-1205); Lab. Code § 1197.2 (misdemeanor for employer who willfully fails to pay and has the ability to pay a final court judgment or Labor Commissioner order for all wages due to an employee who, within 90 days of the date that the judgment was entered or the order became final, has quit or been discharged); Lab. Code § 226.6 (misdemeanor fine or imprisonment—in addition to any other penalty provided by law—for employer that knowingly and intentionally violates the provisions of Section 226 or aids in violating any provision of Section 226).

E.g., Lab. Code § 1189(c); Lab. Code § 1175 (violation of Labor Code § 1174).
8. Employee Benefits

8.1 Domestic Partners

California helped lead the national trend toward recognizing unmarried domestic partners as the equivalent of married couples for various purposes. Domestic partners in California—two adults who have chosen to share one another’s lives in an intimate, committed relationship of mutual care—may file a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the Secretary of State. Heterosexual couples may register if one partner is over age 62. Homosexual couples may register if both partners are at least age 18. California has allowed domestic partners to register with the state and has granted registered partners workplace rights with respect to unemployment insurance (where one partner quit a job to relocate because of the employment of the other partner) and kin care leave, allowing employees to use some of their paid sick leave to care for an ill domestic partner.

The California Supreme Court has held that registered domestic partners can sue for marital status discrimination under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (for discrimination in public accommodations), and there is no reason to suppose that California courts would not similarly hold that domestic partners can sue for marital status discrimination in the context of an employment discrimination lawsuit.

8.1.1 Same rights and responsibilities as spouses

Under the Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, registered domestic partners have virtually all the rights and responsibilities afforded to married spouses. California employers must give domestic partners the same legal treatment as spouses in most areas of state law. One probable effect is that the California Family Rights Act, which grants leave to an employee to care for a sick spouse, also requires leave for an employee to care for a sick registered domestic partner.

8.1.2 Insurance benefits

Employers must offer dependent care coverage for domestic partners under the same terms and conditions as spousal coverage, with the insurance premium for this coverage exempt from taxable wages under state law. The Insurance Equality Act provides that California group health insurance policies shall be deemed to provide coverage for registered domestic partners that is equal to the coverage provided to a spouse of an employee, insured, or policyholder.

Every health care service plan contract and every health insurance policy that is marketed, sold, or issued to a California resident must extend identical coverage to same sex and opposite sex spouses and domestic partners. Further, it can be a crime in California to discriminate between the coverage for (a) heterosexual spouses or domestic partners and (b) partners in same-sex relationships. California also mandates equality in health coverage for same sex and opposite sex couples (whether domestic partners or spouses) for every group health care service plan contract (HMO) and every group health insurance policy that is marketed, issued, or delivered to a California resident.

In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Windsor, struck down Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional. Windsor requires that same-sex marriages be recognized for all federal purposes, as long as the marriage was valid in the jurisdiction where it was entered into.
In 2015, in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, the U.S. Supreme Court again addressed same-sex marriage, and required full equality between same-sex and opposite-sex spouses under federal and state law.\(^{10}\) This decision clarified that health benefits provided to same-sex spouses are no longer taxable to the employee under either federal or state law. But note that *Obergefell* does not apply to unmarried same-sex partners who are in a domestic partnership or civil union. In other words, nothing in *Obergefell* changed the domestic partner coverage requirements for insured health plans in California.

After *Windsor* and *Obergefell*, same-sex domestic partnerships remain legal and unchanged. Therefore, a same-sex domestic partnership is still a legal option in addition to a same-sex marriage. As a result, fully insured benefits are still subject to California insurance laws and employers must continue to recognize same-sex domestic partnerships.

### 8.2 Required Coverage

**Autism and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Coverage.** Every health care service contract and health insurance policy must cover medical services related to autism.\(^{11}\) This means providing coverage for behavioral health treatment, including applied behavioral analysis.\(^{12}\) Health care service plans and health insurers must maintain an adequate network of qualified autism providers, and the law imposes specific requirements on autism service providers with respect to treatment plans they prescribe. This law, originally set to sunset in 2017, has been extended indefinitely.\(^{13}\)

**Maternity Services Coverage.** Every group and individual health insurance policy must cover maternity services, which include such things as prenatal care, ambulatory care maternity services, involuntary complications of pregnancy, neonatal care, and inpatient hospital maternity care (including labor and delivery and postpartum care). This definition is subject to change when the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act defines the scope of benefits to be provided under its own maternity benefit requirement. There are exceptions for specialized health insurance, Medicare supplement insurance, CHAMPUS-supplement insurance, or TRI-CARE supplement insurance, or to hospital indemnity, accident-only, or specified disease insurance.\(^{14}\)

**Group Coverage Maintained During Pregnancy Leave.** As discussed above (§ 2.1), California employers must maintain and pay for coverage for eligible employees who take pregnancy disability leave under a group health plan, throughout the leave (up to four months over a 12-month period), at the level and under the conditions coverage would have existed had the employee continued in continuous employment during the leave.\(^{15}\)

### 8.3 Cal-COBRA

The federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA)\(^{16}\) generally requires an employer of 20 or more employees who offers a group healthcare plan to offer the option of continuing healthcare coverage for up to 18 months if coverage is lost or reduced. Members of the employee’s family must also be given the opportunity to continue their coverage.

California law operates with respect to employers too small to be covered by federal COBRA and with respect to periods following the federal COBRA period.\(^{17}\) Under Cal-COBRA, employers of 2-19 employees must offer 36 months (not just 18) of continuation coverage.\(^{18}\) Cal-COBRA provides an extension for those who have exhausted their 18 months on federal COBRA (or 29 months for disabled individuals) for a total extension that cannot exceed
36 months. This special Cal-COBRA extension applies to insured plans where the employer’s master policy is issued in California. If the group master policy is not issued in California, then the employer must employ 51% or more of its employees in California and have its principal place of business in California.

The legislation directly regulates only the health care service plan or insurer, and not employers as such. But presumably an employer will find it more expensive to purchase group coverage as the provider knows that it has a 36-month continuation coverage tail as well as mandatory conversion coverage obligations. In addition, many insurers require the employer to notify them of a Cal-COBRA qualifying event.

California has a Health Insurance Premium Program (HIPP), by which the state will pay the insurance premiums of qualifying individuals under COBRA, Cal-COBRA, or OBRA (the extension of COBRA for up to 29 months for disabled individuals). California employers of 20 or more employees must give a HIPP notice to terminating employees.

California employers must give a notice of rights to convert group medical coverage into an individual coverage, within 15 days of the termination of group coverage. Termination doesn’t occur until the end of any continuation period (e.g. COBRA, extensions, OBRA).

8.4 Mandatory Employer-Funded Health Care

8.4.1 Health care security laws

Employers generally are free to decide whether to provide health care to employees (subject to financial penalties under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act for certain employers who do not provide a minimum level of health insurance coverage to full-time employees). In California, it’s different, or at least it is in San Francisco. The San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance requires employers engaging in business in the City of San Francisco that have on average at least 20 employees during a quarter to make “health care expenditures” for their employees who work in San Francisco or to make payments directly to the City.

The Ninth Circuit has upheld the San Francisco ordinance against a challenge that ERISA preempts the ordinance.

8.5 Explanation Of Benefits

8.5.1 Discontinuation of medical coverage

Before discontinuing medical, surgical, or hospital coverage, California employers must give all covered employees at least 15 days advance written notice. This notice requirement does not, however, apply to welfare plans that are subject to ERISA.

8.5.2 Notice of available medical benefits

California employers must explain to employees, in at least outline form, the benefits provided under employer-sponsored health coverage, including the identity of the provider organization(s), and must give terminated employees notification of all continuation, disability extension, and conversion options under any employer-sponsored coverage for which the employee may remain eligible after employment terminates.
8.5.3 Disclosures for deferred compensation plans

California employers who offer employer-managed deferred compensation plans must provide each employee, before the employee’s enrollment in the plan, written notice of the reasonably foreseeable financial risks concerning participation in the plan, together with historical information to date as to the performance of plan investments and documents showing the employers’ financial condition through at least the immediately preceding year. Employers that directly manage investments of such a plan must also provide quarterly reports for each plan investment fund and the actual performance of the employee’s investment.”

1 Fam. Code § 297(b)(4)(A). Further, a person under age 18 who otherwise meets the requirements for a domestic partnership may also register upon obtaining a court order and parental consent. Fam. Code § 297.1.
3 Lab. Code §§ 233, 245.5(c).
5 Fam. Code § 297.5(a) (“Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses.”).
7 Ins. Code § 10121.7(f).
12 Id.
13 California Assembly Bill No. 796 (2016 Regular Session).
15 Gov’t Code § 12945(a)(2). Employers may recover from employees the premium paid to maintain their coverage during a leave to the extent that (1) employees fail to return to work after the pregnancy disability leave and (2) the failure to return from leave is for a reason other than either (a) taking leave under the California Family Rights Act or (b) the continuation, recurrence, or onset of a condition that entitles the employee to a pregnancy disability leave or other circumstances beyond the employee’s control.
17 Health & Safety Code § 1366.20 et seq.; Ins. Code § 10128.50 et seq. (California Continuation Benefits Replacement Act, or “Cal-COBRA”).
18 Health & Safety Code §§ 1366.21(e), 166.27(a)(1); Ins. Code §§ 10128.50(b), 10128.57(a)(1).
20 Lab. Code § 2807.
23 Golden State Restaurant Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 648-61 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3487 (2009).
24 Lab. Code § 2806.
26 Lab. Code § 2809.
9. Special Posting, Distribution, and Notice Requirements

9.1 Posting Requirements

All California employers must meet workplace posting obligations. For an overview, see [www.dir.ca.gov/wpnodb.html](http://www.dir.ca.gov/wpnodb.html). In addition to the information required by federal law, California employers must post the

- the Labor Commissioner template poster, or the employer’s own poster, to notify employees of forthcoming immigration-agent inspections of I-9 Forms or other employment records,

- poster entitled “Safety and Health Protection on the Job,” available from the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health,

- poster S-500, on Emergency Phone Numbers, available from the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health,

- poster DFEH 100-20 (called “Your Rights and Obligations as a Pregnant Employee”) (applying to employers with five or more employees), available from the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which must be posted in English and translated into any other language spoken by at least 10% of the workforce,

- poster DFEH 100-21 (called “Family Care and Medical Leave (CFRA Leave) and Pregnancy Disability Leave”) (applying to employers with 50 or more employees and all public employers), available from the Fair Employment and Housing Council, which must be posted in English and translated into any other languages spoken by at least 10% of the workforce,

- poster DFEH-EO4P (called “Transgender Rights in the Workplace”) (applying to employers with five or more employees), available from the Department of Fair Employment and Housing,

- poster entitled “Healthy Workplaces/Healthy Family Act of 2014 Paid Sick Leave,” which is available from the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement, or a poster that includes all of the information contained in the DLSE Paid Sick Leave Posting,

- poster DWC 7 on Notice to Employees—Injuries Caused by Work, revised 2016, which must be posted in both English and Spanish where there are Spanish-speaking employees,

- poster on notice of workers’ compensation carrier and coverage, which must be posted in both English and Spanish where there are Spanish-speaking employees, obtained from the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier,

- poster on human trafficking for employers in certain industries, including transportation and some healthcare, available from the Department of Justice,
• poster DFEH 162 (called “California Law Prohibits Workplace Discrimination and Harassment”), available from the Department of Fair Employment and Housing,

• poster entitled “Payday Notice,” available from the Department of Industrial Relations,

• poster on Time Off to Vote, available from the Secretary of State’s Office, Election Division,

• posters DE 1857A and DE 1857D, on Notice to Employees: Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance and Family Temporary Disability Insurance Benefits (also called Paid Family Leave Insurance Benefits), available from the Employment Development Department,

• poster entitled “California Minimum Wage,” available from the Department of Industrial Relations,

• a list of employee rights and responsibilities under the whistleblower laws, including the telephone number of the whistleblower hotline for the Office of the Attorney General, all in lettering larger than 14-point type, a sample of which is available from the Department of Industrial Relations,9

• no-smoking signage,10 and

• the applicable wage order, available from the Department of Industrial Relations, see www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/WageOrderIndustries.htm. Employers must post the wage order most recently amended to increase the minimum wage. (See § 7.1.4.)

California municipalities may impose their own special posting requirements. For example, the City of San Francisco requires these posters:

• San Francisco Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance Poster (applies to all employers with 20 or more employees—including part-time employees—who work within the City and County of San Francisco), to be displayed at each San Francisco workplace or job site,11

• San Francisco Health Security Ordinance Poster (applies to all businesses with 20 or more employees working within the City and County of San Francisco and to nonprofit organizations with 50 or more employees), to be displayed at each San Francisco workplace or job site in English, Spanish, Chinese, and any other language spoken by at least five percent of the employees at the workplace or job site,12

• San Francisco Minimum Wage Poster (applies to all employers with employees working within the City and County of San Francisco), to be displayed at each San Francisco workplace or job site in English, Spanish, Chinese, and any other language spoken by at least five percent of the employees at the workplace or job site,13

• San Francisco Sick Leave Poster (applies to all employers with employees working within the City and County of San Francisco), to be displayed at each San Francisco workplace or job site in English, Spanish, Chinese, and any other language spoken by at least five percent of the employees at the workplace or job site.14
• San Francisco Paid Parental Leave Poster (applies to all employers with at least 20 employees as of January 2018, applies to all employers with at least 35 employees as of July 2017, and applies to all employers with at least 50 employees as of January 2017), to be displayed at each San Francisco workplace or job site in English, Spanish, Chinese, and any other language spoken by at least five percent of the employees at the workplace or job site,\textsuperscript{15}

• San Francisco Fair Chance Ordinance Poster (applying to employees and applicants for positions within the City and County of San Francisco, if the current or prospective employer has 20 or more employees worldwide), to be displayed at each San Francisco workplace, job site, or other location under the employer’s control frequently visited by its employees or applicants in English, Spanish, Chinese, and any other language spoken by at least five percent of the employees at the workplace, job site, or other location,\textsuperscript{16} and

• Consideration of Salary History Ordinance Poster (effective July 2018, applying to employers in the City and County of San Francisco), to be displayed at each San Francisco workplace, job site, or other location under the employer’s control frequently visited by its employees or applicants in English, Spanish, Chinese, and any other language spoken by at least five percent of the employees at the workplace, job site, or other location.\textsuperscript{17}

Other California cities with their own paid sick leave, minimum wage or other employee benefit statutes—such as Los Angeles, San Diego and Santa Monica, and other cities—require their own posting of rights information.

9.2 Distribution Requirements

9.2.1 Distribution required to all employees

California employers must give all employees

• a yearly notice about pregnancy disability leave, or update the employee handbook, to include all required information,\textsuperscript{18}

• a sexual harassment information sheet, available from the DFEH,\textsuperscript{19} and

• an annual notice that they may be eligible for the federal and California Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), with such notice to be provided within one week of when the company provides any worker with an annual income summary such as a Form W-2 or a Form 1099 (see § 16.6).\textsuperscript{20}

9.2.2 New hire distribution requirements

California employers must give new hires

• California Form DE-4 (Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate),

• a notice that California tendentiously calls a Wage Theft Notice, containing pay rates and other basic information, including information about the California Paid Sick Leave Law (see §§ 2.14,16.1),
a pamphlet DE 2515, on State Disability Insurance Provisions, which is available from the Employment Development Department,

a pamphlet describing workers’ compensation rights, available in both English and Spanish, by the end of the first pay period,

a form that the employee may use to notify the employer of the employee’s personal physician or personal chiropractor,

a pamphlet DE 2511, explaining Family Temporary Disability Insurance (see § 2.4) (which also must go to incumbent employees leaving work to attend to a sick relative), and

a form notifying each employee of the right to take protected leave for domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking and not to be discharged, discriminated, or retaliated against because of the employee’s status as a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking (this form also must also be provided to other employees upon request).

9.2.3 Special event distribution requirements

California employers must give:

- to any employee who informs the employer of her pregnancy (or sooner if the employee inquires about reasonable accommodation, transfer, or pregnancy disability leaves), poster DFEH 100-20 (called “Your Rights and Obligations as a Pregnant Employee”), and, for employers with 50 or more employees, 100-21 (called “Family Care and Medical Leave (CFRA Leave) and Pregnancy Disability Leave”), on Family Care/Medical Leave/Pregnancy Disability Leave,

- to any worker victimized by a workplace crime, a notice of eligibility for workers’ compensation for injuries resulting from the crime, including psychiatric injuries, either personally or by first-class mail within one working day of the place of employment crime, or within one working day of the date the employer reasonably should have known of the crime,

- to any employee who is unable to work because of illness, injury, or hospitalization because of conditions not related to work, or who is disabled because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions, Pamphlet DE 2515 (called “State Disability Insurance Provisions”) available from the Employment Development Department (even though the pamphlet was issued upon hire of the employee),

- to any employee placed on a leave of absence, Pamphlet DE 2320 (called “For Your Benefit”), available from the Employment Development Department,

- to any employee who takes time off work to care for a seriously ill child, parent, parent-in-law, grandparent, grandchild, sibling, spouse, or registered domestic partner, or to bond with a new child (either by birth, adoption, or foster care placement), Pamphlet DE 2511 (called “California Paid Family Leave”) available from the Employment Development Department, and
• notice to employees, before they enroll in certain employer-managed deferred compensation plans, of the reasonably foreseeable financial risk accompanying participation in the plan, and quarterly information about the performance of the plan.\textsuperscript{26}

9.2.4 Distribution requirements upon interruption of employment or benefits

Unemployment compensation information. California employers must give written notice of a change in employment status to employees whose continuous employment status is being disrupted because of dismissal, layoff, or leave of absence. The notice must contain (1) the employer’s name, (2) the employee’s name, (3) the last four digits of the employee’s social security number, (4) the type of action (e.g., termination, layoff, leave of absence, or a change in status from employee to independent contractor), and (5) date of the action. Additionally, when a California employer discharges, lays off, or places an employee on a leave of absence, the employer must provide the employee with Pamphlet DE 2320 (called “For Your Benefit”), available from the Employment Development Department.\textsuperscript{27} For forms, see www.edd.ca.gov/payroll_taxes/Required_Notices_and_Pamphlets.htm.

Health insurance information. California employers of 20 or more employees must provide, to terminating employees with health insurance, not only the federal COBRA notice but also a standardized written description of the Health Insurance Premium Program (HIPP), which is available from the State Department of Health Services.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{1} Lab. Code § 90.2(a)(1) (poster to contain the name of the immigration agency, the date the employer received the notice, the nature of the inspection to the extent known, and a copy of any Notice of Inspection of I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification form).
\textsuperscript{2} 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11049.
\textsuperscript{3} 2 Cal. Code Regs §§ 11095, 11096. Former “Notice A” and “Notice B” posters have been eliminated and replaced by the following: (1) “Your Rights and Obligations as a Pregnant Employee” notice (DFEH-100-20) replaces “Notice A” and addresses pregnancy disability leave as well as California Family Rights Act (CFRA); and (2) employers with 50 or more employees must replace “Notice B” with “Family Care and Medical Leave (CFRA Leave) and Pregnancy Disability Leave” notice (DFEH-100-21).
\textsuperscript{4} Govt. Code § 12950(a)(2).
\textsuperscript{5} Lab. Code §§ 247(a), (b). The poster must state all of the following: (1) an employee is entitled to accrue, request, and use paid sick days, (2) the amount of sick days provided for by the California Paid Sick Leave Law; (3) the terms of use of paid sick days, (4) that the employer must not retaliate or discriminate against an employee for requesting or using paid sick days, and (4) that an employee has the right under the California Paid Sick Leave Law to file a DLSE complaint against an employer that retaliates or discriminates against the employee. See Lab. Code § 247(b). See § 2.14.
\textsuperscript{6} 8 Cal. Code Regs § 9881.
\textsuperscript{7} Lab. Code § 3550.
\textsuperscript{8} Civ. Code § 52.6.
\textsuperscript{9} Lab. Code § 1102.8.
\textsuperscript{10} Lab. Code § 6404.5(c)(1).
\textsuperscript{11} San Francisco Admin Code § 12Z.8(b).
\textsuperscript{12} San Francisco Admin Code § 14.3(e)(2).
\textsuperscript{13} San Francisco Admin Code § 12R.5(b).
\textsuperscript{14} San Francisco Admin Code § 12W.5(b).
\textsuperscript{15} San Francisco Admin Code § 3300H.5.
\textsuperscript{16} San Francisco Police Code § 4905(c).
\textsuperscript{17} San Francisco Police Code § 3300J.5(b).
\textsuperscript{18} 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11049(d)(3).
\textsuperscript{19} Gov’t Code § 12950.
Rev. & Tax. Code § 19853. This notice requirement applies to any California employer that must provide unemployment insurance to employees under the Unemployment Insurance Code. See Rev. & Tax. Code § 19852(a). A sample notice appears on the EDD website at www.edd.ca.gov.

Lab. Code § 3551.

Lab. Code § 3551.

Lab. Code § 230.1(h). The Labor Commissioner shall develop a form that an employer may use to comply with the notice requirements by July 2017. If an employer elects not to use the form developed by the Labor Commissioner, the notice provided by the employer to the employees shall be substantially similar in content and clarity to the form developed by the Labor Commissioner. Employers are not required to comply with this notice requirement until the Labor Commissioner posts the form on its website.

2 Cal. Code Regs § 11049.

Lab. Code § 3553.

Lab. Code § 2809.


Lab. Code § 2807.
10. Employee Access to Personnel Records

10.1 Personnel Records

California employers must permit current and former employees or their representatives to inspect and receive a copy of the “personnel records” that the employer maintains relating to the employee’s performance or to any grievance concerning the employee. The deadline is 30 days from receipt of the employee’s written request, although the employee (or the representative) and the employer may agree to extend this deadline to 35 days.¹ The request must be in writing, and employers may create a request form that employees can choose to use.² The form must be made available to employees or to a person acting on his or her behalf upon a verbal request.³

For current employees, the employer must—within 30 days, or 35 days by mutual agreement—(a) make the personnel records available at the place where the employee reports to work, or (b) permit the employee to inspect the personnel records where the employer stores the personnel records, with no loss of compensation to the employee.⁴

For former employees, employers must maintain personnel records for at least three years after the termination of employment.⁵ To make records available for former employees, employers may use the location where records are stored, use a mutually agreed-upon location, use the mail (and be reimbursed for postage), or—for employees terminated for harassment or workplace violence—use a location within a reasonable driving distance from the employee’s residence.⁶

As to each former employee, the employer need only comply with one yearly request to inspect or copy; and as to an employee representative, the employer need only comply with 50 requests per month.⁷ The employer’s obligations do not apply during an employee’s lawsuit against the employer, or to an employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement with specified provisions.⁸

“Personnel records” do not include records relating to an investigation of criminal conduct, letters of reference, ratings, reports, or records obtained before the employee’s employment,⁹ and employers can redact names of nonsupervisory employees from personnel records before submitting a copy or permitting an inspection.¹⁰ Failure to timely comply entitles the employee or the Labor Commissioner to recover a penalty of $750, plus injunctive relief and attorney fees.¹¹

10.2 Signed Employee Instruments

California employers must provide to an employee, upon request, a copy of any document that the employee has signed concerning the employee’s employment.¹²

10.3 Shopping Investigator’s Report

An employee disciplined on the basis of a report by a shopping investigator must be given a copy of the report before the discipline is imposed.¹³
10.4 Payroll Records

California employers must comply with oral or written requests from current or former employees to inspect and copy their payroll records within 21 calendar days. Failure to comply entitles the current or former employee, or the Labor Commissioner, to recover a $750 penalty from the employer, and injunctive relief and attorney fees are also available to ensure compliance.

California employers must provide itemized wage statements to employees, and permit employees to inspect those records and receive a copy. (See § 16.3.)

California employers must make work records available to state inspectors.

1 Lab. Code § 1198.5(a), (b)(1).
2 Lab. Code § 1198.5(b)(2).
3 Lab. Code § 1198.5(b)(2).
4 Lab. Code § 1198.5(c)(2), (3).
5 Lab. Code § 1198.5(c)(1).
6 Lab. Code § 1198.5(c)(3)(A), (B). Subsection (c)(3)(B) enables employers to keep away from the premises those former employees who are deemed threatening or who otherwise pose a liability risk.
7 Lab. Code § 1198.5(d), (p).
8 Lab. Code § 1198.5(m), (q)(1)-(4).
9 Lab. Code § 1198.5(h).
10 Lab. Code § 1198.5(g).
11 Lab. Code § 1198.5(k)-(m).
12 Lab. Code § 432.
13 Lab. Code § 2930(a).
14 Lab. Code § 226(c).
15 Lab. Code § 226(f),(h).
16 Lab. Code § 226(a), (b). Labor Code section 226.6 imposes criminal liability on “any employer … or any officer, agent, employee, fiduciary, or other person” who violates this requirement.
17 Lab. Code § 1174. Section 1175 imposes criminal liability on “[a]ny person, or officer or agent thereof” who violates this requirement.
11. Employer Retention of Records

California employers must retain certain records that are not addressed by federal law and certain records must be retained for periods longer than federal law requires. Listed below are peculiar California legal requirements. Recommended retention periods may be even longer than the legal requirements below because of federal laws and longer statutes of limitation. California retention requirements include:

- wage statements (pay stubs) (three years),¹
- job applicant records (two years), those records to include “data regarding the race, sex, and national origin of each applicant and for the job for which he or she applied,”²
- help wanted ads (two years)³
- wage (payroll) records (three years)⁴
- child labor certificates (three years)⁵
- personnel records (three years),⁶
- employee health records (for hospitals, three years after termination of employment; 30 years for toxic exposure related records),⁷
- pension and welfare plan information (two years),⁸
- employee contracts (four years for written contracts), and
- business records regarding total annual sales volume and goods purchased (two years).⁹

¹ Lab. Code § 226(a). Although the legal requirement is three years, the California statute of limitations governing claims of unfair business practices (which can include unpaid wages) suggests that a retention period of at least four years would be prudent. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208.
² 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11013 (b),(c) (DFEH regulations on recordkeeping and applicant data).
³ 2 Cal. Code Regs §11013(c)(requiring employers to keep for two years “[a]ny personnel or other employment records made or kept by any employer or other covered entity dealing with any employment practice and affecting any employment benefit of any applicant or employee.”)
⁴ Lab. Code § 1174(d); Lab. Code § 1197.5 (e) (both three years). However, California Unemployment Insurance regulations require retention of wage records for 4 years after a wage payment on which UI contributions are due. 22 Cal. Code Regs § 1085-2(c). ⁴ Lab. Code § 1174(d).
⁵ Lab. Code § 1198.5(c)(1) (three years); 22 Cal. Code Regs § 70725 (hospitals must keep personnel files for three years after termination).
⁶ 22 Cal. Code Regs § 70723(c) (hospital employee health records must be kept for three years). Medical records related to chemical and toxics exposure must be kept for duration of employment plus 30 years. 8 Cal. Code Regs § 3204(d)(1)(a).
⁷ 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11013(c).
⁸ 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11013(a) (California employers of 100 or more employees and certain apprenticeship programs must prepare a California Employer Information Report—or substitute a federal report such as an EEO-1—containing information about dollar volume of the business and retain the information for two years from the date of preparation.)
12. Covenants Not to Compete

12.1 General Prohibition

12.1.1 The broad statutory language

Most states enforce agreements by which employees agree not to compete with the employer for a reasonable period after employment, within a reasonable geographical area. California is different. Section 16600 of its Business and Professions Code states that, with a few narrow exceptions, “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”

12.1.2 The literal judicial interpretation

This broad statutory language notwithstanding, some courts once upheld contractual restrictions that did not totally restrain trade but rather simply limited how trade could be pursued. In 2008, however, the California Supreme Court, in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, ruled that even narrowly drawn restraints are contractually invalid, unless they fall within a specific statutory exception, e.g., an agreement in connection with the sale or dissolution of a business organization. The Supreme Court thus struck down a provision in an employment agreement restricting a departing employee from serving the employer’s customers. The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view that California law permits agreements that only “partially” or “narrowly” restrict an employee’s ability to practice a trade or profession.

12.1.3 Disregard for “blue penciling” and other approaches used in other states

In some states, courts can “blue pencil” (redraw) an overly broad noncompete covenant to save the covenant’s lawful portions. California courts, however, refuse to enforce agreements with an anti-competitive effect even if the parties have agreed to “save” the clause to the extent possible. In a case where former employees challenged the enforceability of their agreement not to solicit the employer’s customers, the Court of Appeal declared the agreement invalid under California law, even though the agreement called for New Jersey law to apply. The Court of Appeal concluded that the agreement ran afoul of California law because the non-solicitation provision was “not narrowly tailored to protect trade secrets and confidential information.”

In another customer solicitation case, the Court of Appeal overturned a preliminary injunction against former employees soliciting customers, because California law “bars a court from specifically enforcing (by way of injunctive relief) a contractual clause purporting to ban a former employee from soliciting former customers to transfer their business away from the former employer to the employee’s new business.” At the same time, the Court of Appeal said that a trial court could enjoin “tortious conduct (as violative of either the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and/or the Unfair Competition Law) by banning the former employee[s] from using trade secret information to identify existing customers, to facilitate the solicitation of such customers, or to otherwise unfairly compete with the former employer.” Accordingly, California seems to make solicitation of customers by a former employee in California enjoinable only where the solicitation involves misappropriation of trade secrets.

California’s broad ban on covenants restraining trade can apply even if the parties entered into the covenant in a state where such covenants are lawful. This peculiar hostility to noncompete covenants has encouraged a “race to the courthouse” to get a dispute heard in the state most congenial to a party’s litigation interest. So it is that
California has become a favored forum for parties seeking judicial declarations that covenants not to compete are invalid.¹⁰

### 12.1.4 The limited effectiveness of forum-selection provisions

Some employers have sought to avoid California determinations of their employment agreements by convincing federal courts to enforce forum-selection clauses that call for litigation to occur exclusively in some other designated state.¹¹ But a forum-selection clause addresses only the site of the adjudication, not the choice of which state's law to apply, so that an out-of-state court could still apply California law.¹²

In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of forum-selection clauses.¹³ This decision, although not involving an employment dispute, could be used to support arguments that (1) forum-selection clauses calling for litigation to occur exclusively in a state other than California are valid, and (2) such clauses can require that, upon transfer of a California-based action to the non-California jurisdiction, the law of that jurisdiction should apply.¹⁴

In 2016, however, the California Legislature further hindered an employers’ ability to leverage forum-selection clauses. Labor Code section 925 dramatically reduces the reach of forum-selection clauses. The new law forbids employers to require an employee “who primarily resides and works in California” to agree to a contractual provision that would either “[r]equire the employee to adjudicate outside of California a claim arising in California,” or “[d]eprive the employee of the substantive protection of California law with respect to a controversy arising in California.” The principal loophole is for contracts where the employee is represented by legal counsel in negotiating the contract. Section 925, obviously, greatly curtails an employer’s ability to use non-California courts to enforce noncompete covenants.

### 12.1.5 The ban on noncompete covenants as applied to buy-sell contracts

Section 16600’s ban on noncompete covenants is subject to a statutory exception applying upon the sale of all or substantially all of a business, including its goodwill.¹⁵ But the Court of Appeal has held that when the sale involves two separate agreements—a stock purchase agreement and an employment agreement—the agreements must be read together. The Court of Appeal concluded that the employment agreement’s covenant not to compete or solicit, which was not designed to protect the acquired company’s goodwill, failed to qualify under the “sale of business” exception.¹⁶

### 12.1.6 The ban as applied to settlement agreements

Settlement agreements, like agreements generally, are enforceable, notwithstanding California’s ban on noncompete covenants, to the extent that the settlement agreement protects trade secrets. In a settlement of a trade-secret lawsuit, the parties agreed to a stipulated injunction by which defendants would refrain from contacting customers on plaintiff’s customer list (allegedly including trade secrets). When a dispute arose about compliance with this stipulated injunction, the plaintiff successfully moved for an order of contempt. The Court of Appeal held that the stipulated injunction was facially valid, as it existed to protect trade secrets.¹⁷
12.1.7 The ban as applied to third-party contracts

The California ban on noncompete covenants can extend even to contracts to which an employee is not a party, such as “no hire” contracts between two businesses. At issue in one case was a provision in a contract between a consulting firm and its customer that the customer would not hire the consulting firm’s employees for 12 months following the contract’s termination. This provision aimed to protect the consulting firm’s key asset—the expertise of its consultants—by discouraging the firm’s customers from hiring away the firm’s consultants. When the customer breached this provision, the consulting firm successfully sued its customer to recover damages. On appeal, however, the judgment was reversed, with the Court of Appeal reasoning that because “the interests of the employee trump the interests of the employers as a matter of public policy,” “it logically follows that a broad-ranging contractual provision such as the one at issue here cannot stand.” The Court of Appeal concluded that “enforcing this clause would present many of the same problems as covenants not to compete and unfairly limit the mobility of an employee who actively sought an opportunity with [the customer].” The Court of Appeal allowed that a “more narrowly drawn and limited no-hire provision” might be permissible under California law, but noted that the provision in question covered all hiring (not just solicitation by the customer) and covered all of the consultant firm’s employees (not just those who worked for the customer or those whom the consulting firm even employed at the time). Outweighing this “broad provision” was “the policy favoring freedom of mobility for employees.”

12.2 Implications for Wrongful Termination

California courts have held that where an employee refuses to sign a document containing an unlawful covenant not to compete, the employer violates public policy and incurs tort liability if the employer responds by firing the employee. The Court of Appeal has extended that principle to hold that an employer could be liable for wrongful termination if it fired an employee for breaching a noncompete covenant that the employee had entered into with a former employer. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the new employer’s decision to fire the employee in those circumstances amounted to enforcing a no-hire agreement between the old and new employers—an agreement that was void as an unlawful noncompete agreement.

12.3 Permissible Contractual Restrictions

12.3.1 Covenants not to solicit or raid employees

During employment, an employee, even in California, owes a duty of loyalty to the employer—which can include a duty not to solicit co-workers to leave employment.

A 1985 Court of Appeal decision in Loral v. Moyes upheld a limited agreement by an executive not to solicit his former co-workers for a period of time after his employment. Whether such an agreement is valid after the California Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen is unclear. A federal court case applying California law, however, held that provisions forbidding solicitation of employees would remain enforceable if they were limited in duration and scope. (Of course, an anti-raiding provision may be of scant practical comfort to many employers, because former employees—or their new employers—are free to hire people who make unsolicited requests to join the new employer.)
A 2018 Court of Appeal decision dealt a new blow to employee non-solicitation agreements, however. An employer had its travel nurse recruiters agree that during their employment and for one year thereafter they would not “directly or indirectly solicit or induce, or cause others to solicit or induce, any employee of the Company … to leave the service of the Company.” The employer then sued the former nurse recruiters for breach of contract when they invited their former co-workers to join a competing company. The Court of Appeal, doubting the “continuing viability” of Loral v. Moyes, held that this non-solicitation provision was invalid under Section 16600. The Court of Appeal reasoned that even if Loral did survive Edwards’s broad interpretation of Section 16600, the restriction here was not a reasonably narrow restriction with slight effect, but rather would keep the recruiting nurses from competing in their chosen profession. While this decision might be limited to its facts, employers should carefully consider whether it puts an end to traditional employee non-solicitation agreements.

12.3.2 Protection of trade secrets

Employers remain free, of course, to contract with their employees to protect employer trade secrets. It may seem superfluous for an employer to contract for protection of trade secrets, when statutory protection for those trade secrets already exists (see § 12.4). But formal employment agreements could help define trade secrets, provide additional deterrents to misappropriation of trade secrets, provide contractual remedies, and call for special procedures to seek trade-secret protection, such as a provision for private arbitration and a provision for prevailing-party attorney fees, at least for certain employees.

12.3.3 “No rehire” clauses

Employment settlement agreements commonly provide that the defendant will never re-hire the plaintiff, a former employee. Yet, under California’s peculiar law, a “no rehire” clause conceivably might implicate an unlawful restraint of the former employee’s right to engage in a lawful profession, trade, or business. In a 2015 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court, which had enforced a settlement agreement with a “no rehire” clause, had abused its discretion by narrowly characterizing Section 16600 as applying only to “covenants not to compete,” when Section 16600 actually applies more broadly to any contractual “‘restraint of a substantial character,’ no matter its form or scope.”

The case involved unusual facts, arising in an usual procedural posture. The plaintiff was an emergency medicine physician who sued for unlawful termination of his staff privileges at a medical facility. The parties negotiated a settlement agreement that contained a no-rehire clause but then the plaintiff sought to renege on the basis that the no-rehire clause was contrary to public policy as expressed in Section 16600. The district court rejected this concern, reasoning that Section 16600 addresses only “covenants not to compete.” But the Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the no-rehire clause might constitute a substantial restraint of trade, depending on whether the former employer so dominated emergency medicine in California that the no-rehire clause could effectively constrain the plaintiff’s freedom to practice medicine. The Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the merits, remanding the case for further factual development.

On remand, the district court again found that the “no rehire” provision was not a restraint of a substantial character, and ordered enforcement of the agreement. The plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed. Reasoning that “a contractual provision imposes a restraint of a substantial character if it significantly or materially impedes a person’s lawful profession, trade, or business,” the Ninth Circuit held that the provision at issue— forbidding the plaintiff from working at “any [defendant]-contracted facility”—went too far, considering the
defendant’s large footprint in the relevant market. Thus, “no re-hire” provisions of the sort traditionally found in settlement agreements now must be drafted carefully to avoid imposing any substantial restraint on the former employee’s profession, trade, or business.

12.4 Protection of Trade Secrets

Virtually every state, including California, has enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The UTSA could forbid a former employee to use the former employer’s trade secrets, such as confidential client lists, to solicit clients.

12.4.1 Application to customer lists

Some but not all customer lists qualify for protection as trade secrets. Important factors to consider are whether the names are generally known or readily ascertainable to others in the same business, and how much effort one would need to compile the list.

12.4.2 Application to employee identities

A 2018 Court of Appeal decision rejected an employer’s effort to sue its former employees (certain traveling nurses) for raiding the employer’s employees; the employer claimed that the names and contact information were trade secrets. This information was not a trade secret, the Court of Appeal held, because the traveling nurses at issue had applied for employment elsewhere before they were recruited by the former-employee-defendants, and their identities were widely known within the industry.

12.4.3 Inapplicability of “inevitable disclosure” doctrine

In many jurisdictions, courts help employers victimized by disloyal departing employees by applying the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine, which holds that an employer can enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor where the employee’s duties with the competing employer are such that the employee would inevitably disclose the former employer’s trade secrets. California is different. The Court of Appeal has rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Employers concerned about theft of trade secrets can, however, use California’s version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which authorizes injunctions against threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.

12.4.4 Preemption of common law claims premised on trade secret misappropriation theory?

Employers once clearly could pursue tort claims for employee theft or misuse of company information, even if the misappropriated information was not a trade secret. But California courts have held that the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) preempts tort claims—such as conversion, breach of loyalty, and tortious interference—that rely on the same nucleus of facts as a trade secret misappropriation claim.

Some federal court decisions have been more kind to employers, holding that the CUTSA does not preempt a tort claim when the claim relies on different facts or theories of liability than those supporting a trade secret claim, and that a CUTSA defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of CUTSA preemption “cannot be addressed until it is determined whether the allegedly misappropriated information constitutes a trade secret.” But a federal district court has held that the trade-secret status of allegedly misappropriated information can be determined on a
motion to dismiss, and that the CUTSA preempts an employer’s claims for misappropriation of proprietary non-trade secret information unless (1) the information was “made property by some provision of positive law” or (2) the non-trade secret claims allege “wrongdoing that is materially distinct [from] the wrongdoing alleged in a [C]UTSA claim.” The Court of Appeal has provided a narrower interpretation of the CUTSA’s preemptive effect, by finding that claims for breach of fiduciary duty, unfair competition, interference with business relations and conversion were not preempted by the CUTSA.

12.4.5 Additional remedy under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act?

The federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) creates a new cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. The DTSA shares some features with the CUTSA, but does not preempt the CUTSA. Among the differences between the DTSA and the CUTSA is that the DTSA does not contain an express preemption provision displacing common law claims based on the misappropriation of trade secrets. But it remains questionable that a California DTSA plaintiff could pursue state tort claims based on taking confidential information, because tort claims may be preempted by the CUTSA, regardless of whether a CUTSA claim is actually pleaded.

12.5 Preventing Data Theft with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act?

Until recently, California employers could augment trade secret claims against former employees with claims brought under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”). Although a criminal statute, the CFAA authorizes civil remedies for certain violations, including unauthorized access of computer systems to steal company data. The CFAA has enabled employers to obtain injunctions requiring the return of stolen data and the recovery of the employer’s investigation costs, regardless of whether the misappropriated information was a trade secret. So it was that a Ninth Circuit panel, in United States v. Nosal, held that a former employee “exceeds authorized access” to data on the employer’s computer system under the CFAA where the employee takes actions on the computer that are contrary to the employer’s written policies on acceptable use, such as prohibitions against copying files to help a third party compete with the employer.

But then the Ninth Circuit, en banc, held that so long as the employer has authorized an employee to use the computer, there is no CFAA liability for taking information from the company database, even if that action violated company policy. Nosal makes California and other states within the Ninth Circuit peculiar in that Nosal rejects the views of three other circuits that have permitted employers to pursue CFAA claims against employees who violate computer-use policies or who violate their duties of loyalty.

But Nosal left open the possibility of viable claims against former employees who, after leaving the company’s employ, have gained gain unauthorized access to company computers. A federal jury eventually convicted Nosal under the CFAA for conspiring with other former employees to use the password of a current company employee (Nosal’s former secretary) to access his former employer’s computers. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that the statutory definition of “without authorization” was unambiguous, and that “[u]nequivocal revocation of computer access closes both the front door and the back door” to protected computers, thus making use of a password shared by an authorized system user to circumvent the revocation of the former employee’s access a crime.
12.6 California Penal Code Section 502: An Alternative to the CFAA

In 2015, the Ninth Circuit, while remaining hostile to CFAA claims against employees who have “exceeded authorized access” to employer computers, identified an alternative to the CFAA. In United States v. Christensen,52 six individuals, convicted of computer fraud, bribery, racketeering, wiretapping, and identity theft, got their CFAA convictions vacated on the ground that the CFAA addresses restrictions on access to information, not restrictions on use. But Christensen also analyzed Penal Code section 502, essentially the state law equivalent to the CFAA. The Ninth Circuit noted that section 502 “does not require unauthorized access. It merely requires knowing access.”53 The Ninth Circuit noted that “the term access … includes logging into a database with a valid password and subsequently taking, copying, or using the information in the database improperly.”54 Like the CFAA, Penal Code section 502 provides for a civil remedy.55

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1 Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600. The narrow statutory exceptions pertain to limited transactions described in Business & Profession Code sections 16601 (sale of a business), 16602 (departure of a partner from a partnership), and 16602.5 (termination of interest in a limited liability company).
2 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937 (2008) (invalidating provision in employer’s proposed separation agreement that would have prohibited former employee from performing services for certain clients, because that restraint—even though narrow and leaving a substantial portion of the market open to the former employee—exceeded statutory protections for trade secrets, and rejecting “narrow restraint” exception articulated by Ninth Circuit as a misreading of California law).
3 Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16601 (corporations), 16602 (partnerships), 16602.5 (limited liability corporations).
4 Kolani v. Gluska, 64 Cal. App. 4th 402 (1998) (broad covenant not to compete cannot be saved from illegality by giving it a narrowed construction).
7 Id.
8 Application Group Inc. v. Hunter Group Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 885 (1998) (permitting employee signing covenant in Maryland to challenge the covenant upon moving to California while working for same employer, because California’s strong policy in protecting movement of employees invalidates noncompete covenant even though it was valid under Maryland law).
9 See Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 697 (2002) (former employee moved to California to work for California employer and sued in California court one day before former employer sued in Minnesota);
11 See, e.g., Harstein v. Rembrandt IP Solutions, 2012 WL 3075084 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue, even if the Pennsylvania forum called for in the employment agreement could cause a different legal outcome in the plaintiff’s action for declaratory relief to invalidate a covenant to compete); AJZN, Inc. v. Yu, 2013 WL 97916 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
14 Id. at 583.
15 Bus. & Prof. Code § 16601 (“sale of a business” exception).
19 Id. at 716.
20 Id. at 718. See also Siricom v. Ebislogic, Inc., 2012 WL 4051222 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2012) (Section 16600 voids contract by which one company agreed not to solicit employees working for the other contracting company; Supreme Court’s Edwards decision forecloses continued reliance on Webb v. West Side District Hosp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 946, 951 (1983), which upheld, under a “rule of reason,” an agreement that required a hospital to pay an additional fee if directly hired any doctor originally placed there by a staffing company).
23 Id. at 70.
25 Loral v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 275, 279 (1985) (employer could not keep departing employee from competing, but could reasonably limit how he can compete; the contractual “restriction only slightly affects employees. They are not hampered from seeking employment with [the defendant’s new employer] nor from contacting [the defendant]. All they lose is the option of being contacted by him first.”).
26 Thomas Weisel Partners LLC v. BNP Paribas, 2010 WL 546497, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
27 AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc., 2018 WL 5669154 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2018) (Loral’s “use of a reasonableness standard to analyze a non-solicitation clause appears to conflict with Edwards’s interpretation of Section 16600, which reads the plain language of the statute to prevent a former employer from restraining a former employee from engaging in the employee’s “lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind,” absent statutory exceptions not germane here).
28 Id. (unlike the former employee in Loral—an executive officer—the individual defendants in AMN Healthcare were nurse recruiters, so that the effect of the non-solicitation clause would not just restrict competition in a limited way but would restrain former employees from engaging in their chosen profession).
30 Golden v. California Emergency Physicians Medical Group, 782 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015).
31 Id. at 1092-93.
32 Golden v. California Emergency Physicians Medical Group, 896 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2018).
33 Id. at 1026 (“This interference with Dr. Golden’s ability to seek or maintain employment with third parties easily rises to the level of a substantial restraint, especially given the size of CEP’s business in California.”).
34 Civ. Code § 3426 et seq.
40 Courtesy Temp. Serv., Inc. v. Camacho, 222 Cal. App. 2d 1278, 1292 (1990) (“cases are legion holding that a former employee’s use of confidential information obtained from his former employer to compete with him and to solicit the business of his former employer’s customers is regarded as unfair competition”); Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 351 (1966) (unfair competition and breach of fiduciary duty claims involving disclosure of employee’s salary to competitor are actionable “even if the information regarding salaries is not deemed to be confidential”).
46 See, e.g., Total Recall Techs. v. Luckey, 2016 WL 19976, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2016) (granting 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss common law claims as preempted, notwithstanding that plaintiff “[b]y strategy … has studiously avoided assertion of any trade secret claims”).
47 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq.
48 642 F.3d 781, 785, 787-89 (9th Cir. 2011). The defendant was a former employee of an executive search company who left to start a competitor, and then convinced former co-workers—still with the company—to access the company’s confidential database to send him client information. These co-workers had authorized access to the database, but in forwarding the information were violating a company policy against disclosing confidential information.
50 The court stated: “We remain unpersuaded by the decisions of our sister circuits [the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh] that interpret the CFAA broadly to cover violations of corporate computer use restrictions or violations of a duty of loyalty.”
51 United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016).
52 United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2015).
53 Id. at 789 (emphasis in original).
54 Id.
13. Procedural Quirks Regarding Termination of Employment and Post-Termination

13.1 Cal-WARN Act

The federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 requires employers to provide 60 calendar days of notice regarding plant closings and mass layoffs. Not to be outdone, California in 2002 enacted its own WARN act. The scope of Cal-WARN exceeds the scope of federal WARN in two major respects: (1) Cal-WARN applies to companies that are too small to be covered by WARN, and (2) Cal-WARN applies to business decisions affecting groups of employees that are too small to be covered by WARN. (For a summary of these and other differences between California and federal WARN law, see § 13.1.4.)

California employers who implement a mass layoff or relocate or terminate operations at any industrial or commercial facility at which they have employed 75 or more persons within the preceding 12 months must first give the affected employees 60 days of notice. "Employees" includes some temporary and seasonal as well as part-time employees. An "employee" is one who has been employed for at least six of the 12 months preceding the triggering event.

A "mass layoff" means a layoff during any 30-day period of 50 or more employees at a covered establishment. A "relocation" is the removal of all or substantially all of the operations at the facility to a different location 100 miles or more away. "Termination" is the cessation or substantial cessation of the operations of the facility.

Does the mass transfer of employees from one employer to another, with no other change in the terms and conditions of employment, constitute a "layoff"? One California appellate court has said no: a layoff under Cal-WARN is "a separation from a position for lack of funds or lack of work," and that language did not apply where employees continued to work as they had before.

A 2017 Court of Appeal decision, upholding a judgment against an employer for more than $200,000, held that "mass layoffs" could include four- to five-week furloughs, even though the term "mass layoff" in the federal WARN statute includes only layoffs that involve employment losses exceeding six months.

13.1.1 Recipients of notice

The notice must go to (a) the affected employees, (b) the EDD, (c) the local workforce investment board, and (d) the chief elected officer of each city and county government within which the triggering event occurs. The notice should also include the elements required under the federal WARN Act.

13.1.2 Exemptions

Cal-WARN exempts employees in the broadcasting, motion picture industries, and certain occupations in the drilling, logging, and mining industries, if those employees were hired with the understanding that their employment was limited to the duration of a particular project. The law also does not apply to those employed in seasonal jobs, if they were hired with the understanding that the job was seasonal and temporary.
Beyond “physical calamity” and “act of war,” the only exigent-circumstances exception to the law’s requirements applies where the employer is actively seeking capital or business that would enable it to avoid or postpone a relocation or termination, and where it reasonably and in good faith believed that giving 60 days’ notice would preclude the employer from obtaining the capital or business. This exception applies only to relocations and terminations, not mass layoffs. To claim this exemption, the employer must give the EDD documentation under penalty of perjury.

13.1.3 Remedies for violation

A non-complying employer is liable to each affected employee for back pay and the value of benefits lost, for a period of up to 60 days. This liability is subject to offsets for payments made by the employer as separation wages or continued benefits during the period. The employer is also subject to a civil penalty of not more than $500 for each day of the violation, but this penalty is not imposed if the employer pays the employees what is due within three weeks of the triggering event. The penalty may also be reduced if the employer can prove that it acted in good faith.

An affected employee, a local government, or an employee representative may sue the employer for violation of Cal-WARN, and a prevailing plaintiff may recovery attorney fees.

13.1.4 Comparing Cal-WARN with federal law

Cal-WARN differs in some material respects from the federal WARN Act, creating compliance traps for employers that plan reductions in force while having only federal law in mind.

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<td>The employer</td>
<td>The company and any parent corporation ordering the reduction in force</td>
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<td>Employer of 100 full-time employees or full- and part-time employees who work 40 or more hours weekly</td>
<td>Employer of 75 full- or part-time employees at establishment (any industrial or commercial facility) during the 12 months preceding the date on which notice is required</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triggering event</td>
<td>Plant closing affecting 50+ employees during a 30-day period; mass layoff of 500+ employees during a 30-day period, or layoff of 50+ employees constituting at least one-third of the active workforce; or, if employment losses during a 30-day period fail to meet those thresholds, employment losses for multiple groups of workers that, when aggregated, meet the threshold level during any 90-day period through either a plant closing or mass layoff, unless employment losses during the 90-day period resulted from separate and distinct actions and causes.</td>
<td>Layoff within any 30-day period of 50 or more employees, or cessation (or substantial cessation) of all (or substantially all) operations of a covered establishment, or relocation of operations of a covered establishment to a different location 100 or more miles away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of “employment loss”</td>
<td>An employment termination other than a discharge for cause, a quit, or a retirement; a layoff exceeding six months; or a reduction in work hours of a specified amount.</td>
<td>For a mass layoff, a separation from a position for lack of funds or lack of work, with no stated minimum length of separation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptions</td>
<td>Exceptions include business circumstances “not reasonably foreseeable” and the sale of going business.</td>
<td>No exception for business circumstances “not reasonably foreseeable” or for sale of business (except as interpreted under case law).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those to be notified</td>
<td>Affected employees, union representative, state displaced worker’s unit, local government.</td>
<td>Affected employees, EDD, local work force investment board, city elected official, chief county elected official.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 13.2 Notices Required

#### 13.2.1 Health insurance continuation

California requires, in addition to a COBRA notice, a notice of the right to continued health insurance benefits beyond the COBRA period. (See § 8, Employee Benefits.) In the event of a “qualifying event,” such as a termination, employers must also notify “qualified beneficiaries” of their Cal-COBRA continuation rights (which can include notice to former employee spouses, dependents, and former spouses). Qualified beneficiaries electing coverage are considered “similarly situated” to employees for contract purposes.
13.2.2 EDD rights

California employers must provide employees who are terminating employment, either voluntarily or involuntarily, with written notice of the change of employment relationship and the employee’s potential entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits. This form must be provided immediately upon termination.

13.2.3 HIPP rights

Under the California Health Insurance Premium Program (HIPP), California employers with 20 or more employees must give a HIPP notice to terminating employees with health insurance. The form is available from the State Department of Health Services.

13.2.4 Disability-extension and conversion-coverage rights

An employer must notify a terminating employee of all continuation, disability extension, and conversion coverage options under any employer-sponsored coverage for which the terminating employee may remain eligible after employment ends.

13.3 Final Pay Checks

13.3.1 Time of payment

California employers generally must pay discharged employees in full on the day of discharge. An employee without a written contract for a definite period who resigns must be paid within 72 hours of the notice of resignation. (See § 7.5.)

13.3.2 Wages due

The final check must include all wages earned and unpaid. “Wages” includes all amounts for labor performed by employees of every description, whether the amount is determined by time, task, piece, commission, or other method of calculation. Vested vacation is paid “as wages” to the terminating employee. Wages do not include employee business expenses. Where wages are not calculable until after termination, the employer must pay the wages as soon as the amount is ascertainable.

13.3.3 Paying all accrued vacation pay

See § 7.18, Vacation Pay.

13.3.4 Penalties

Willful failure to fully pay a discharged or resigning employee can result in substantial “waiting time” penalties under Labor Code section 203. As to any amount owed but unpaid, the employer’s defense for failure to pay promptly is limited. “Willful” for the purpose of assessing a penalty does not require a refusal to pay, an evil motive, or a purpose to defraud workers; “willful” merely means that there was a failure to pay that was within the employer’s control. Inability to pay is not a defense. The employer’s ignorance of the requirement to pay is also not a defense. Where the wages are not calculable until after termination, waiting-time penalties would begin to run when the employer knows the ascertainable amount and fails to pay.
If demand is made and the amount is not in dispute, then Section 203 penalties are due. Courts and the DLSE have rejected a defense of “conditional payment” (i.e., an employer promises to pay the employee as soon as the employer is paid from another source, such as a general contractor). The penalty imposed is an amount not exceeding 30 working days of pay. (See § 7.5.)

Further penalties may be due if the employer fails to pay after a Labor Commissioner hearing. If the Labor Commissioner finds that the employee’s claim for wages is valid, then the claim is due and payable within ten days after receipt of notice by the employer that the wages are due. An employer who has the ability to pay and who willfully refuses to pay those wages within ten days will be subject to an additional penalty of treble the amount of damages owed.

13.4 Separation Agreements

13.4.1 Limitations on broad releases of claims

Settlement agreements, including severance or separation agreements presented to some employees upon termination of employment, typically provide for a general release of any claims the former employee may have against the employer. California imposes obstacles to the use of broad release language.

Waiver of unknown claims. A California statute provides that a general release does not include unknown claims. That is why California settlement agreements often contain explicit language purporting to waive the protection of this statutory provision.

Waiver of unwaivable statutory protections. Courts often uphold a general release of “any and all claims and causes of action” as not applying to claims that, as a matter of law, cannot be waived. The Court of Appeal held that this kind of language impermissibly purports to waive a former employee’s unwaivable right to indemnification, and that the employer’s insistence on this general release, with no appropriate carve-out, violated public policy. The California Supreme Court, fortunately, ruled that such a carve-out was unnecessary: a contract provision whereby an employee releases “any and all” claims does not encompass nonwaivable statutory protections. Employers generally have finessed the issue with release language specifying what had always seemed obvious—that the release agreement does not cover any right that, as a matter of law, cannot be waived.

13.4.2 Release of claims for wages

Employers settling accounts with a departing employee often consider making the payment of a bonus, or other deferred compensation, a part of the settlement package, in an effort to gain additional leverage over the employee. This practice can backfire in California. Labor Code section 206.5 makes it a misdemeanor for an employer to “require the execution of any release of any claim or right on account of wages due, or to become due, or made as an advance on wages to be earned, unless payment of such wages has been made.” Any such release is null and void.

The Court of Appeal has recognized, however, that enforceable agreements can settle wage claims so long as there was a “good faith dispute” as to whether the wages were owed.
13.4.3 Release of USERRA claims

Federal USERRA claims can be released, much like other statutory claims, so long as the release of the USERRA claim is “clear, convincing, specific, unequivocal, and not under duress.” But not in California. One appellate decision ruled, without careful analysis, that a broad release of state and federal claims was unenforceable as to USERRA claims. The plaintiff learned of his dismissal upon returning to work from a military leave. He signed an agreement that promised him six weeks’ salary in exchange for his release of claims under any “federal or state law … relating to claims or rights of employees.” The plaintiff signed the agreement to get the money and then sued under USERRA. Although the trial court found that he had released his USERRA-based wrongful termination and contract claims, the Court of Appeal reversed, relying on no authority other than a mechanical reading of the statutory language that USERRA “supersedes any … contract, agreement … or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any [USERRA] right or benefit.”

13.5 Worker Retention Laws

Grocery store employers are subject to certain 90-day employee-retention requirements in the event a change in control of a grocery store. (See § 7.22.)

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2. Lab. Code § 1400(d).
4. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Nassco Holdings, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 5th 1105 (2017) (“the entire thrust of the legislative effort in enacting the California WARN Act was to provide greater protection to California workers than was afforded under the federal law”).
6. Lab. Code § 2807; see also Lab. Code § 2800.2 (employer solely responsible for giving notice of conversion coverage).
10. Lab. Code § 2807(b).
12. Lab. Code §§ 201(a), 227.3.
23. Civ. Code § 1542: “A general release does not extend to claims that the creditor or releasing party does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release and that, if known by him or her, would have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor or released party.”
24. Lab. Code § 2804 (any express or implied agreement to waive benefits of Section 2802—requiring employer indemnification of expenditures or losses employee incurs in direct consequence of job duties—is “null and void”).
25. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 142 Cal. App. 4th 603 (2006) (employer’s insistence on invalid release was wrongful act supporting former employee’s action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, consisting here of employee’s desire to join a new employer who required employee to obtain a release from the former employee), rev. granted, No. S147190 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006).

27 Lab. Code § 206.5.

28 *Chindarah v. Pick Up Stix, Inc.*, 171 Cal. App. 4th 796, 803 (2009). See also *Aleman v. AirTouch Cellular*, 209 Cal. App. 4th 556, 577-78 (2012) (release of wage claim was enforceable, notwithstanding Section 206.5, because a bona fide dispute existed as to whether wages were owed, and because the plaintiff received extra payment for releasing the disputed claim); *Watkins v. Wachovia Corp.*, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1576, 1587 (2009) (when bona fide wage dispute exists, disputed amounts are not due, so dispute can be settled with a release and a payment, even if the payment is for less than the total wages claimed).

29 The USERRA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of their military service. 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a). Section 4311(a) of the USERRA also forbids employers to deny re-employment or retention in employment based on employees’ military service.


31 *Perez v. Uline, Inc.*, 157 Cal. App. 4th 953 (2007) (“The statute plainly states that a contract may not limit the protections of USERRA, which prohibits termination of employment based on membership in the military or performance of military service. Thus, defendant’s assertion that the agreement waived the protections of USERRA cannot be sustained.”).

32 *Id.* at 957-58 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b)).
14. Health and Safety Legislation

14.1 Injury and Illness Prevention Program

California employers must prepare a comprehensive written injury and illness prevention program\(^1\) and keep records of the steps taken to maintain the program.\(^2\) The program must include (a) name(s) of the person(s) responsible for implementing the program, (b) a system to identify and evaluate workplace hazards, including scheduled periodic inspections to identify unsafe conditions and work practices, (c) the methods and procedures for correcting unsafe or unhealthy conditions and work practices in a timely manner, (d) an occupational health and safety training program, (e) a system for communicating with employees on occupational health and safety matters, and (f) a system to ensure that employees comply with safe and healthy work practices.

Employers that operate healthcare facilities must include within their prevention programs a “patient protection and healthcare worker back and musculoskeletal injury prevention plan,” which includes a “safe patient handling policy” for all patient care units.\(^3\)

In 2018 the Occupational Safety & Health Standards Board, responding to a petition by the union UNITE HERE, proposed a standard for Hotel Housekeeping Musculoskeletal Injury Prevention that became effective in July 2018. The new standard requires hotels and other lodging establishments to develop a musculoskeletal injury prevention program that addresses the risks of musculoskeletal injuries and disorders to housekeepers, to provide employee training, and to keep records.\(^4\)

14.2 “Be a Manager, Go to Jail” Act

The Corporate Criminal Liability Act of 1989 makes individual managers liable criminally for failing to disclose “a serious concealed danger.”\(^5\) Any employer who fails to report a fatal injury or the serious injury or illness of an employee to Cal/OSHA within 8 hours of its occurrence faces a mandatory penalty of $5,000. A serious injury or illness is defined as amputation of a member of the body, disfigurement, or in-patient hospitalization for more than 24 hours for other than observation.\(^6\)

14.3 Proposition 65

The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Initiative of 1986 (aka Proposition 65) requires that businesses with 10 or more employees give clear warning to anyone they knowingly expose to a toxic chemical. (Hence the cryptic messages puzzling restaurant patrons regarding the toxic dangers of the wine they might be drinking.) As of August 2018, businesses must provide “clear and reasonable” warnings regarding Proposition 65 listed chemicals.\(^7\) For businesses in general, this new requirement typically will mean displaying signs advising of known carcinogens on site. Many California employers will comply with the new requirements through the Cal/OSHA-required workplace hazardous communication program. For occupational exposures that do not meet the thresholds for HazMat communications, posting new signs will meet the requirements.
14.4 Cal OSHA Hazardous Substance Communication Standards

California employers whose employees may be exposed to hazardous substances must identify the substances and maintain a communication and training program for employees at the time of their initial assignment and whenever a new chemical hazard is introduced into their work area.\(^8\)

14.5 Anti-Retaliation Provisions

Employees may file complaints of discrimination with the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH), alleging retaliation for complaining about unsafe working conditions. Employees may also sue.\(^9\) For employees who complain about unsafe patient care and conditions at a health care facility, there is a rebuttable presumption that any adverse employment action that occurs within 120 days of the complaint was in retaliation for the complaint.\(^10\)

14.6 Tobacco Smoking

Smoking is forbidden in enclosed spaces in nearly all California workplaces, and employers are prohibited from having designated smoking break rooms for employees.\(^11\) A few workplaces are exempted, such as smoking guestrooms in hotels (limited to 20% of the rooms), tobacco shops and smokers' lounges, theatrical production sites (if smoking is an integral part of the story), certain medical research or smoking treatment sites, private residences (except for family day care homes), and patient smoking areas in long-term health care facilities.\(^12\) The smoking ban includes the use of e-cigarettes and vaping devices that contain nicotine.

14.7 Drug-free Workplace

California employers that receive state government contracts or grants must (1) publish and provide to each employee a statement that prohibits the unlawful manufacture, sale, distribution, dispensation, possession, or use of controlled substances, and lists the actions to be taken against employees who violate that prohibition, and (2) establish a drug-free awareness program.\(^13\) California’s 2018 legalization of recreational marijuana has not impaired an employer’s legal ability to enforce a drug-free workplace.

14.8 Repetitive Motion Injuries (RMIs)

Under California’s first-in-the nation ergonomics regulation, employers with 10 or more employees must create a program to minimize RMIs if (a) two or more employees suffer RMIs within the previous 12 months, (b) the injuries occur in jobs requiring the same repetitive motion, such as word processing, assembly, or loading, (c) the injuries result predominantly (more than 50%) from the repetitive job, and (d) a licensed physician diagnoses the injury as a musculoskeletal injury.\(^14\) The prevention program must consist of (1) worksite evaluation of each job similar to the one where the injury occurred, to reduce exposures that have caused RMIs, and (2) training employees regarding the exposures, methods employed to reduce exposures, symptoms and consequences associated with RMIs, and the importance of reporting them.
14.9 “Hands off that Smartphone!”

California drivers operating a moving vehicle must not use a cell phone unless the phone permits hands-free listening and talking and is so used while driving, and must not hold or operate any electronic wireless communication device unless the device is designed and configured to allow voice-operated and hands-free operation, and it is so used while driving. Employers whose employees drive on duty should have policies prohibiting unlawful use of electronic devices, to minimize the prospect that related employee-committed torts will be considered a predictable risk of employment (see § 5.10).

14.10 UCL Actions for Cal-OSHA Violations

Employer facing a workplace accident can expect to face the wrath of administrative agencies and even criminal prosecutors. And now, as a result of a 2018 California Supreme Court decision, there is still more: the prospect of civil actions under the Unfair Competition Law. A water heater explosion at Solus Industrial Innovations, Inc. left two employees dead. The Division of Occupational Safety and Health issued citations for alleged Cal-OSHA violations. While Solus appealed to the Cal-OSHA Appeals Board, the California Bureau of Investigations investigated and forwarded its findings to the Orange County district attorney, who filed criminal charges against the plant manager and maintenance supervisor for felony violations of the Labor Code.

The district attorney also sued Solus under the UCL law and the Fair Advertising Law, alleging that maintaining an unsafe work environment amounted to an unfair business practice and that stating commitments to workplace safety standards amounted to false advertising. Solus convinced the Court of Appeal that these claims were preempted by the federal OSHA statute, but then the district attorney obtained review by the California Supreme Court.

A unanimous California Supreme Court reversed, in Solus Industrial Innovations v. Superior Court. Solus held that federal OSHA did not preempt a civil action. Rather, California law preempted federal OSHA—a sort of reverse preemption. Solus explained federal OSHA occupies the field of workplace safety and health, but permits states to create their own regulatory plans subject to federal review and approval. Federal OSHA thus provides a regulatory “floor” under which state plans may not fall, but states may enact broader workplace safety protection than found under federal OSHA.

And California, of course, has done that. According to Solus, federal OSHA, by allowing states to provide broader protections, anticipates that states may use enforcement mechanisms other than administrative litigation under the state plans to further their aims. Solus concluded that civil litigation is not foreclosed by the federal statutory scheme. To make the employers’ plight more precarious still, Solus noted that UCL and unfair-advertising actions may be brought by both government officials and by persons who have suffered an “injury in fact.”

14.11 Injury & Illness Recordkeeping and Reporting

California employers must report “any serious injury or illness, or death” of any employee to the nearest Cal/OSHA District Office within eight hours. Serious injury or illness means any incident requiring inpatient hospitalization in excess of 24 hours (for other than medical observation) or in which an employee suffers a loss of any member of the body or any serious degree of permanent disfigurement. This reporting rule applies...
regardless of whether the injury, illness, or death was work-related. Therefore, employers must report even
incidents such as heart attacks or brain aneurisms that have no relation to the work-environment.

Legislation effective January 2019 is another example of California being determined to be peculiar and at
variance with federal standards. Cal-OSHA now may issue recordkeeping citations for errors to Cal/OSHA forms
for up to five years, \(^\text{21}\) as opposed to the six-month limitations period endorsed by federal OSHA.

### 14.12 Single-User Restrooms

An FEHC regulation requires that all single-user toilet facilities in any California business establishment, place of
public accommodation, or government agency be identified as all-gender facilities. \(^\text{22}\) Specific signage
requirements apply. \(^\text{23}\) But companies in certain industries covered by Cal-OSHA must still separately mark non-
flushing toilet facilities for men and women. \(^\text{24}\)

### 14.13 Workplace Violence Requirements for Health Care Providers

California health-care employers, home health and hospice providers, and emergency responders have specific
requirements related to the prevention of workplace violence for their employees. They are required to develop
workplace violence-prevention plans, train their employees, and keep records related to workplace violence
incidents. \(^\text{25}\) The violence prevention plans must be in writing, must be specific to the hazards and corrective
measures for the unit, service, or operation, and must be available to employees at all times.

These employers are required to report incidents involving the use of physical force against an employee by a
patient (or a person accompanying a patient). This is true where the use of force results in, or has a high
likelihood of resulting in, injury, psychological trauma, or stress, or the incident involved the use of a firearm or
other dangerous weapon. The regulations further require the employers to take immediate corrective action where
a hazard was imminent and take measures to protect employees from identified serious workplace violence
hazards within seven days of the discovery of the hazard. Additionally, the employers are required to maintain a
“Violent Incident Log.”

Certain acute care and special hospitals are also required to report violent incidents that resulted in an injury,
involved the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, or present an urgent or emergent threat to the welfare,
health or safety within 24 hours and all incidents within 72 hours.

### 14.14 Electronic Submission of Cal/OSHA Forms

Certain California employers must electronically submit annual Cal/OSHA 300A forms. This requirement applies
to most establishments with 20 or more employees. \(^\text{26}\) Cal/OSHA plans in 2019 to convene an advisory committee
meeting to evaluate whether employers should also be required to electronically submit annual Cal/OSHA 300
and 301 forms.

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\(^1\) Lab. Code § 6401.7.

\(^2\) 8 Cal. Code Regs § 3203(b).

\(^3\) Lab. Code § 6403.5. The employer also must provide trained lift teams or staff trained in safe lifting techniques in each general acute care hospital (except for specified hospitals) as well as specified training to health care workers. \(\text{Id.}\)

Pen. Code § 387(a).

For more information, see www.dir.ca.gov/DOSH.


8 Cal. Code Regs § 5194(h).


Health & Safety Code § 1278.5.

Lab. Code § 6404.5(c).

Lab. Code § 6404.5(e)(1-7).

Gov’t Code § 8350 et seq.

8 Cal. Code Regs § 5110.

Veh. Code § 23123(a): “A person shall not drive a motor vehicle while using a wireless telephone unless that telephone is specifically designed and configured to allow hands-free listening and talking and is used in that manner while driving.”

Veh. Code § 23123.5(a): “A person shall not drive a motor vehicle while holding and operating a handheld wireless telephone or an electronic wireless communications device unless the wireless communications device is specifically designed and configured to allow voice-operated and hands-free operation, and it is used in that manner while driving.”

Cf. Ayon v. Esquire Deposition Solutions, LLC, 27 Cal. App. 5th 487 (2018) (affirming summary judgment for deposition service company whose employee, while using her cell phone, drove her vehicle into the plaintiff; her conversation was with a company court reporters, but the undisputed testimony was that the conversation was personal only and did not pertain to company business).

Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 316 (2018).

Id. at 340 (“Actions to enforce the UCL or FAL, which may be brought by government officials and by individuals who have suffered injury in fact …, address the overarching legislative concern … to provide a streamlined procedure for the prevention of ongoing or threatened acts of unfair competition.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

8 Cal. Code Regs § 342.

AB 2334 (resurrecting substance of suspended Obama Administration rule providing for longer statute of limitations for recordkeeping violations. The Trump Administration had suspended the rule. AB 2334 directs Cal/OSHA to “monitor” federal rulemaking and, if federal OSHA has “eliminated or substantially diminished” electronic recordkeeping requirements, Cal/OSHA must “evaluate how to implement changes necessary to protect the goals” of the proposed rule issued by the Obama Administration in May 2016. AB 2334 also revives an Obama Administration rule amounting to a five-year statute of limitations for recordkeeping violations, specifying that a violative recordkeeping “occurrence” continues until it is corrected, Cal/OSHA discovers the violation, or the duty to comply with the requirement no longer applies. California employers thus can expect to see citations issued by Cal/OSHA for violations going back beyond the normal six-month limitations period.

Health & Safety Code § 118600(a).


2 Cal. Code Regs § 11034.

8 Cal. Code Regs § 3342.

See 8 Cal. Code Regs § 14300.41, including Appendix H, for a list of specific covered employers.
15. Unemployment Compensation

15.1 Conditions for Eligibility

Both full-time and part-time employees may be eligible for unemployment compensation in California if they meet certain eligibility criteria.1 To be eligible for unemployment benefits, employees must have (1) earned more than a set amount in the past, (2) be unemployed (or have suffered a reduction in hours so that they earn less than their weekly benefit amount) through no fault of their own, and (3) be able, available and actively seeking work.2

Claimants for unemployment benefits cannot be disqualified solely because they are available for part-time work.3 If claimants restrict their availability to part-time work, they may still be considered able and available for work if all of the following conditions exist: (1) the claim is based on part-time employment, (2) the claimant is actively seeking and is willing to accept work under essentially the same conditions as existed while the wage credits were accrued, and (3) the claimant imposes no other restrictions and is in a labor market in which a reasonable demand exists for the part-time services that the claimant offers.4

15.2 Ineligibility and Disqualification

Discharge for misconduct results in disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits.5 But California creates a rebuttable presumption that the employee was discharged for reasons other than misconduct.6 The employer bears the overall burden of proving “misconduct.”7

Misconduct is conduct showing “willful or wanton disregard of the employer’s interest.”8 Mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, poor job performance, ordinary negligence, and good-faith errors in judgment are not misconduct.9 The California Supreme Court has concluded that an employee’s refusal to sign a disciplinary notice was not misconduct but, at most, a good faith error in judgment that did not disqualify him from unemployment benefits.10

Voluntary termination of employment also generally disqualifies an individual for unemployment compensation.11 And an employee can “constructively quit” by engaging in conduct that gives the employer no reasonable alternative but to discharge her.12 The Court of Appeal has considered a case in which an employee on leave had requested unacceptable assurances before she returned to work. The employer thus treated her as having quit and the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board upheld the denial of her claim for benefits. But the Court of Appeal ruled for the former employee, holding that the employer should have called her bluff and ordered her to return to work without her conditions being met, instead of preemptively dismissing her on an assumption that she would stick by her request for unacceptable conditions.13

Further, quitting does not disqualify the employee for unemployment benefits if the quitting was for good cause. A quit generally is for good cause for employees who leave because they have:

- suffered discrimination unlawful under the FEHA,14
- suffered sexual harassment,15
needed to accommodate the job relocation of a spouse or a domestic partner,\textsuperscript{16} or

left employment to protect their families or themselves from domestic violence.\textsuperscript{17}

15.3 The Claims Process

15.3.1 Determination of eligibility

The California Employment Development Department (EDD) makes its initial determination on the basis of the former employee’s claim and the employer’s response. A party dissatisfied with that determination can request a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The employer has the burden of proof to show that the employee was discharged for misconduct. The ALJ’s decision can be appealed to the UIAB. (See § 1.6.)

15.3.2 Responding to claims

Employers often have ignored EDD requests for information about an employee’s separation and sometimes have agreed not to respond to such requests as part of a separation agreement with the employee. A California employer that does so, however, potentially incurs significant penalties. While these penalties have long existed in California,\textsuperscript{18} they have not frequently been enforced.

To address the perceived problem of having unemployment insurance benefits paid in error, Congress passed the Federal Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011, which mandated that all states implement changes to unemployment insurance laws, including new “UI integrity” provisions to penalize employers (as well as their agents and third-party administrators) that (1) were at fault for failing to respond timely or adequately to agency requests for information about claimed unemployment compensation benefits that were subsequently overpaid, and (2) had engaged in a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to such requests.

The California Legislature thus amended the California Unemployment Insurance Code to provide that if an employer willfully makes a false statement or representation or willfully fails to report a material fact concerning a claimant’s employment termination, the employer is subject to a penalty of “an amount not less than 2 nor more than 10 times the weekly benefit amount of that claimant.”\textsuperscript{19} If both the employer and the employer’s agent engaged in such conduct, then separate penalties apply to each of them.\textsuperscript{20}

Accordingly, California employers must timely and adequately respond to initial requests for information from the EDD, and should no longer agree with employees to ignore those requests or to provide inaccurate information about the reasons for an employee’s separation. If the employer, as part of a separation agreement, does not want to protest the employee’s unemployment benefits claim, then the agreement should provide that while the employer will not protest any unemployment benefits claim, the employer will provide complete, truthful, and accurate information in response to any claim for unemployment insurance benefits.

15.3.3 No issue preclusion

The ALJ’s decision in an unemployment compensation proceeding is not admissible, at least in state court,\textsuperscript{21} and has no preclusive effect in a later proceeding.\textsuperscript{22}
15.3.4 Transcript provided

Witnesses before the ALJ give tape-recorded testimony under oath. Parties can obtain copies of the tape.

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4 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
9 Id.
10 Paratransit, Inc. v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Medeiros), 59 Cal. 4th 551, 559 (2014). The Supreme Court reversed a 2012 Court of Appeal decision that had found that the employee's refusal to sign a disciplinary action form was "misconduct" that justified the denial of unemployment benefits.
12 Regulation 1256–1(f).
13 Kelly v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 223 Cal. App. 4th 1067, 1077-79 (2014) (employer, to avoid liability for benefits, needs evidence that the employee took action that actually prevented the employer from retaining the employee, such as making an unequivocal demand that the employer meet some condition that it had no obligation to meet, and that the employees reasonably would have known to result in termination; employer cannot rely on the employee's mere request, however "irritating or ungracious" such a request may be).
14 Unempl. Ins. Code § 1256.2 provides:
1256.2. (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), an individual who terminates his or her employment shall not be deemed to have left his or her most recent work without good cause if his or her employer deprived the individual of equal employment opportunities on any basis listed in subdivision (a) of Section 12940 of the Government Code, as those bases are defined in Sections 12926 and 12926.1 of the Government Code.
(b) Subdivision (a) does not apply to the following: (1) A deprivation of equal employment opportunities that is based upon a bona fide occupational qualification or applicable security regulations established by the United States or this state, specifically, as provided in Section 12940 of the Government Code. (2) An individual who fails to make reasonable efforts to provide the employer with an opportunity to remove any unintentional deprivation of the individual's equal employment opportunities.
16 See generally Unempl. Ins. Code § 1256 (good cause to quit is real, substantial, compelling factor causing reasonable person genuinely desirous of retaining employment to leave work under same circumstances).
17 See id.
21 An administrative finding that an employee is entitled to benefits, or that an employer's explanation for firing the employee is dubious, still may be admissible in federal court. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Rice, 144 F.R.D. 102, 105-07 (E.D. Cal. 1992) ("a state legislature cannot purport to make binding pronouncements of law concerning what evidence may be privileged or otherwise inadmissible in a federal court action involving claims based on federal law").
22 Unempl. Ins. Code § 1960 ("Any finding of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made by a hearing officer, administrative law judge, or any person with the authority to make findings of fact or law in any action or proceeding before the appeals board, shall not be conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding, and shall not be used as evidence in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding, between an individual and his or her present or prior employer brought before an arbitrator, court, or judge of this state or the United States, regardless of whether the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts.").
16. Employer Reporting and Disclosure Requirements

16.1 New Hires

16.1.1 Reporting

Although the duty comes from federal law, all California employers must report to the California New Employee Registry, within 20 days of the start of work, the following information about each newly hired California employee (whether full-time, part-time, temporary, or seasonal): the employee’s first and last name and middle initial, social security number, home address, and start-of-work date. The employer must also report the employer’s business name and address, California employer payroll tax account number, Federal Employer Identification Number, and the contact person’s name and telephone number. This requirement applies to employees hired as part of the acquisition of an ongoing business. Form DE 34, fit for this purpose, can be found at https://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/de340.pdf. The penalty for failing to report is $24 per hire, and $490 if the failure to report is part of an agreement between the employer and the employee. Multistate employers that file electronically may elect to report all new hires to one state in which they have employees.

16.1.2 Disclosure

California’s self-righteously entitled Wage Theft Protection Act requires employers to notify employees, at the time of hire, of these facts: (1) the employee’s rate or rates of pay and the basis thereof (e.g., hourly, salary, commission, etc.), including any applicable overtime rates, (2) allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including meal or lodging allowances, (3) the regular payday designated by the employer, (4) the name, address, and telephone number of the employer, including any “doing business as” names used by the employer, (5) the name, address, and telephone number of the employer’s worker’s compensation insurance carrier, and (6) any other information the Labor Commissioner deems “material and necessary.” Employers must also give written notice of any changes to this information within seven calendar days, unless the changes are reflected in a timely itemized wage statement or other writing. The statute exempts government employees, employees who are exempt from the payment of overtime wages under California law, and employees covered by certain collective bargaining agreements.

Temporary services employers must include in the notice the name, the physical address of the main office, the mailing address (if different from the physical address) of the main office, and the telephone number of the legal entity for whom the employee will perform work, and any other information the Labor Commissioner deems “material and necessary.” Exempted from these requirements are security services companies that solely provide security services and that are licensed by the California Department of Consumer Affairs.

Employers must now include information about paid sick leave rights in the Wage Theft Prevention Act Notice that employers must provide to nonexempt employees upon hire (see § 2.14.1).

The Labor Commissioner has prepared a template notice that employers may use to fulfill their statutory obligations. See www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/LC_2810.5_Notice.pdf. The DLSE also has issued Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). See http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/FAQs-NoticeToEmployee.html. Employers must consider
whether to use the DLSE template or to use a customized notice while assuring that it is disclosing all the required information.

16.2 Retention of Independent Contractors

California businesses that must file federal Form 1099-MISC must give the EDD identifying information about individual independent contractors who perform work in California and receive payment exceeding $600 or contract for such a payment. The business must provide this information to the EDD within 20 days of engaging the independent contractor. The EDD provides a downloadable form, at www.edd.ca.gov/forms, to record basic information about the business and the independent contractor, including taxpayer identification number and the dates of the contract’s beginning and end or when calendar year payments reach $600. Because the law aims to enhance enforcement of child support obligations, its requirements do not apply to independent contractors that are corporations, general partnerships, or limited liability businesses. Failures to timely report this information trigger civil penalties, just as noted above with respect to the failure to report new hires, and the penalties are higher if the business and the contractor conspired not to report.

16.3 Itemized Wage Statements

16.3.1 Items the wage statement must record

General requirements. California employers must, when paying wages, provide employees with an “accurate itemized statement in writing,” listing “gross wages earned,” “total hours worked,” specified deductions, “net wages earned,” and certain other information. Employers need not report total hours worked by exempt employees.

Piece rates. Wage statements to piece-rate workers must disclose the number of piece-rate units and the piece-rate for all employees paid on that basis, as well as the total hours of compensable rest and recovery periods, the rate of compensation for those periods, and the gross wages paid for rest and recovery periods during the pay period. In addition, if the employer does not pay a piece-rate employee a base hourly rate (of at least minimum wage) for all hours worked, then the employer must separately record the total hours of “non-productive” (non-piece rate) time, the rate of compensation for such hours, and the gross wages paid for those hours during the pay period.

Employment agencies. Farm labor contractors that employers use must include in the itemized statement the name and address of the legal entity that secured the employer’s services. Temporary services employers must include the rate of pay and the total hours worked for each temporary services assignment.

Paid sick leave. Employers must show paid sick leave balances for employees on their itemized wage statements or in a separate document presented contemporaneously (see § 2.14.1).

Substantial compliance? Substantial compliance with this wage-itemization requirement is not necessarily a defense. A California appellate opinion has quoted with approval a DLSE opinion that “failure to list the precise number of hours worked during the pay period conflicts with the express language of the statute and stands in the way of the statutory purpose.” “If it is left to the employee to add up the daily hours shown on the time cards or
other records so that the employee must perform arithmetical computations to determine the total hours worked
during the pay period, the requirements of section 226 would not be met.”

Prominent among the hypertechnical complaints have been those seeking penalties for a wage statement’s failure
to state the “name and address of the legal entity that is the employer,” as required by Section 226(a)(8). Such
lawsuits have ensued when a wage statement for First Transit Transportation, LLC referred to “First Transit,”
when a wage statement for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. referred to “Walmart,” and when a wage statement for Longs
Drugs Stores California, Inc. referred to “Longs Drug Stores.” We are not making this up. Companies have also
been sued for failing to state the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid,” as required by
Section 226(a)(6), when the wage period stated only the first or last date of the pay period. Welcome to
California.

Some common sense nonetheless has appeared in judicial interpretation of wage-statement requirements. The
Court of Appeal has recognized that separately listing the total number of regular hours worked and the total
number of overtime hours, without separately summing up the two figures, complied with the requirement of
Section 226(a)(2) to list “total hours worked.”

16.3.2 Items the wage statement need not record

Statutory exemptions. An itemized wage statement need not show total hours worked by the employee if (1) the
employee is a salaried, exempt employee or (2) the employee is exempt from the payment of minimum wage and
overtime under any of these exemptions: (a) the exemption for persons employed in an executive, administrative,
or professional capacity, (b) the exemption for outside salespersons, (c) the exemption for computer software
professionals who are paid on a salaried basis, (d) the exemption for individuals who are parent, spouse, child, or
legally adopted child of the employer, (e) the exemption for participants, director, and staff of a live-in alternative
or incarceration rehabilitation program, (f) the exemption for any crew member employed on a commercial
passenger fishing boat, and (g) the exemption for any individual participating in a national service program
provided in any applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission.

Vacation pay. Employers need not record the accrued amount of vacation pay in an itemized wage statement.
Although in some contexts vacation pay is a “wage” that vests over time, unused vacation time does not become
a quantifiable way until the employee leaves employment. Thus, vacation pay is not “wages earned” until the
termination of employment. Further, since vacation pay is to be paid at the “final rate,” the amount of vacation
balance will depend on the particular circumstances surrounding the termination of employment.

Amounts that should have been paid. The Court of Appeal rejected an argument that an employer failing to pay
overtime premium pay thereby also issued inadequate wage statements. The wage statements did correctly
record the hours actually worked and the pay actually received. That was good enough. There was no further
requirement that the wage statement show the overtime premium pay that the employees should have been paid.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that if failure to pay overtime wages at the appropriate rate generates an injury that
justifies penalties for an inadequate wage statement, then there would be an apparent unintentional double
recovery.

Meal and rest and recovery pay? Does the wage statement have to record the premium pay that an employer
should have paid for a missed meal or rest or recovery break? The correct answer is No, because that premium
pay is not an “earned wage.” But the Supreme Court has created uncertainty as that sensible result by granting review of the question. The Supreme Court is expected to rule in 2019.

Events applying to prior pay period. A 2018 Court of Appeal decision rejected claims that wage statements must (1) record events occurring in a prior pay period and (2) deliver wage statements immediately to terminating employees, with the final paycheck. As to the first claim, the Court of Appeal held that a wage statement need not include the hourly rates and hours worked with respect to a bonus yet to calculated at the end of the month, quarter, or year: “there were no applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period which defendant was required to include in the wage statement.” As to the second claim, the Court of Appeal held that the final wage statements were timely by being mailed by the day after termination of employment, because Section 226 requires only that wage statements be furnished “semimonthly” or “at the time of each payment of wages.” This holding rejected the Labor Commissioner’s more restrictive interpretation of the statute as a “void underground regulation.”

Social Security numbers. Among the data originally required on the wage statement was the employee’s social security number. Realizing that this requirement created risks of identity theft, the California Legislature permitted employers to use alternatives to the SSN, such as an employee-identification number, which can include no more than the last four digits of the SSN. As of 2008, itemized wage statements must use such a number and can no longer use SSNs.

16.3.3 Large penalties and the “injury” requirement

Wage-statement violations can result in liability to injured employees in the amount of actual damages or a penalty of $50 per employee for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and $100 per employee for each subsequent pay period in which a violation occurs, up to a maximum of $4,000, plus costs and attorney fees. These penalties are available only if the employee receiving an inadequate wage statement has suffered an “injury” as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by the employer to comply with the statute. The “injury” requirement once meant that trivial imperfections did not create monetary employer liability. One Court of Appeal concluded that deprivation of information on a wage statement “standing alone is not a cognizable injury.” The former employee alleged that his wage statements failed to include the total hours worked, the net wages earned, and all applicable hourly rates of pay. Although the employee claimed that the lack of this wage-statement information “caused confusion and possible underpayment of wages due” and resulted in a “mathematical injury” requiring reconstruction of time and pay records, the Court of Appeal concluded that the deprivation of this information, standing alone, was not a cognizable injury, as it did not result in the type of injury that required “computations to analyze whether the wages paid in fact compensated [the employee] for all hours worked.”

Then the California Legislature got back to work, broadening the definition of what constitutes a wage-itemization injury. The Labor Code deems an injury to occur if the employer (a) fails to provide a wage statement or (b) fails to provide accurate and complete information and the employee cannot promptly determine, from the wage statement alone, the following items: (1) gross and net wages paid during the pay period, (2) total hours worked, except for any employee who is exempt from the payment of overtime under the administrative, professional, or executive exemptions, (3) the number of piece rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece rate basis, (4) all deductions, (5) the inclusive dates of the pay period, (6) hourly rates and corresponding hours worked at each rate (and, if the employer is a temporary services employer, the rate of pay and the total hours worked for each temporary services assignment), (7) the employer’s name and address,
(8) the employee’s name, and (9) the last four digits (only) of the employee’s social security number or the employee’s identification number.\textsuperscript{30} The Legislature clarified that a “knowing and intentional failure” does not include an isolated and unintentional payroll error due to a clerical or inadvertent mistake.\textsuperscript{31}

**PAGA pile-on penalties.** And it gets worse. Under a 2017 Court of Appeal decision, an employee aggrieved by an inadequate wage statement is not limited to statutory penalties. The employee can also invoke PAGA,\textsuperscript{32} to seek civil penalties of $100 per aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and $200 per aggrieved employee per pay period for each further violation.\textsuperscript{33} A PAGA plaintiff need not show that the wage-statement violation was “knowing and intentional” or that it caused any employee any injury. Rather, the PAGA plaintiff need only show that the employer failed to provide an accurate or itemized statement that contained the nine pieces of information set forth in Labor Code section 226(a).\textsuperscript{34}

### 16.3.4 Labor Commissioner penalties

Even if the employee does not suffer injury, the Labor Commissioner can pursue a California employer for additional penalties, absent a clerical error or inadvertent mistake, in the amount of $250 per employee for each violation in an initial citation and $1,000 per employee for each violation in a further citation.\textsuperscript{35} The Court of Appeal has held that an employer’s misunderstanding of the law is not “inadvertent” and thus cannot shield the employer from the imposition of penalties.\textsuperscript{36}

### 16.3.5 Electronic wage statements

The DLSE has advised that even though the statute refers to the wage statement as a “detachable part of the check,” employers can meet wage itemization requirements by giving employees access to electronic wage statements, provided that employees can print hard copies at no cost at nearby locations and that wage statements are electronically stored for at least three years.\textsuperscript{37}

### 16.3.6 Special record retention requirement and employee right to a copy

Many employers traditionally did not keep copies of wage statements provided to employees, because distributing those copies was the role of a third-party payroll administrator retained for that purpose. Employers now, however, must maintain copies of wage statements for up to three years.\textsuperscript{38} A copy can include a computer-generated record rather than an actual duplicate copy.\textsuperscript{39} Legislation enacted in 2018, purporting to state existing law, provides that employees have the right “to receive” a copy of—not just inspect or copy—their pay statements.\textsuperscript{40}

### 16.3.7 Liability for payroll companies?

Employers often contract out certain payroll functions to companies that hold themselves out as experts in the field. These payroll companies thus prepare wage statements and perform related payroll functions on behalf of the employer. In one case, an employee sued the payroll company (as well as her employer) for failing to break down her regular, overtime, and doubletime hours, and for failing to provide for proper payment of her wages. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff could sue the payroll company on theories of contract (the employee was a third-party beneficiary of the payroll company’s contract with the employer), negligent misrepresentation (the employee reasonably relied on wage statements the payroll company prepared), and professional negligence (in that the employer had retained the payroll company to assist in discharging its legal duties to the employee).\textsuperscript{41}
The Supreme Court took review of this decision and held that “a payroll company cannot properly be considered an employer of the hiring business’s employee that may be liable under the applicable labor statutes for failure to pay wages that are due.” 42 The Supreme Court also rejected all three of the plaintiff’s common law theories of liability: (1) liability to the employee, as a third-party beneficiary, for breach of the payroll company’s contract with the employer, (2) negligent calculation of wages, in breach of the payroll company’s duty of care to the employee, and (3) negligent misrepresentation to the employee by the payroll company. The contract claim failed because a third party can sue for breach of contract only if (a) the third party is likely to benefit from the contract, (b) the contracting parties intended to provide a benefit to the third party, and (c) permitting the third party to sue for breach is consistent with the contractual objectives and the contracting parties’ reasonable expectations. Applying this framework, the Supreme Court determined that a contract between an employer and a payroll company aims to benefit the employer, not its employees, no matter that employees will benefit in receiving proper wages. Further, having payroll companies defend wage suits, with the costs of defense passed on to employers, would conflict with the contractual objectives and the reasonable expectations of the employer and the payroll company. 43

The negligence claims also failed because, for various reasons, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to impose on payroll companies a tort duty of care as to obligations owed to an employee under the Labor Code and Wage Orders. First, the law already provides employees with complete remedies against the employer for any wage loss. Second, a deterrent against payroll company misconduct already exists in the contractual obligations owed to the employer. Third, the payroll company has no special relationship with the employee. Fourth, imposing a duty of care on the payroll company could induce it to place the employee’s interests above those of the employer with whom the payroll company has contracted. Fifth, imposing such a duty of care would complicate wage and hour litigation and make it harder to settle. 44

16.4 Executive Compensation

Under the California Corporate Disclosure Act, publicly traded corporations must report to the Secretary of State the salary and certain stock option rights of the five most highly compensated executives who are not on the board of directors. 45

16.5 Filing Job Applications

California once required employers that require job applicants to sign an application for employment to file the application form with the DLSE. 46 That provision was repealed in 2004.

16.6 EITC Information

All California employers must notify employees of both the federal and state Earned Income Tax Credit. Specifically, employers must, within a week of providing an employee any annual wage summary (e.g., Form W-2), deliver to or mail the employee written notice regarding the employee’s possible eligibility for earned income tax credit under federal and state law. 47 Merely posting this information on an employee bulletin board would not satisfy this notification duty.

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1 See [http://www.edd.ca.gov/payroll_taxes/new_hire_reporting.htm](http://www.edd.ca.gov/payroll_taxes/new_hire_reporting.htm) (visited Feb. 14, 2019); see also Unemp. Ins. Code. § 1088.5.

2 Unemp. Ins. Code § 1088.5(e).
The nine required items are “(1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee, except as provided in subdivision (j) [for exempt employees], (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece-rate basis, (4) all deductions, provided that all deductions made on written orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee and only the last four digits of his or her social security number or an employee identification number other than a social security number, (8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer and, if the employer is a farm labor contractor, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1682, the name and address of the legal entity that secured the services of the employer, and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee and, … if the employer is a temporary services employer as defined in Section 201.3, the rate of pay and the total hours worked for each temporary services assignment.”


14. Lab. Code § 226(a). A “farm labor contractor” is defined as “any person who, for a fee, employs workers to render personal services in connection with the production of any farm products to, for, or under the direction of a third person, or who recruits, solicits, supplies, or hires workers on behalf of an employer engaged in the growing or producing of farm products, and who, for a fee, provides in connection therewith one or more of the following services: furnishes board, lodging, or transportation for those workers; supervises, times, checks, counts, weighs, or otherwise directs or measures their work; or disburses wage payments to these persons.” See id.; see also Lab. Code § 1682(b).


19. Morgan v. United Retail Inc., 186 Cal. App. 4th 1136, 1147, 1149 (2010) (reasoning that the wage statements accurately listed the total number of regular hours and the total number of overtime hours worked during the pay period, permitting the employee to determine the sum of all hours worked without referring to time records or other documents).

20. Soto v. Motel 6 Operating, LP, 4 Cal. App. 5th 385, 391-92 (2016) (affirming dismissal of complaint: “vacation pay cannot be fairly defined as ‘gross wages earned’ or ‘net wages earned’ under section 226, subd. (a)(1) or (5) until the termination of the employment relationship. The employee has vested rights to paid vacation or vacation wages during the time of his employment, but these rights do not ripen and become an entitlement to receive the monetary value of the benefit as wages until the separation date.”). See also Mora v. Webcor Construction, L.P., 20 Cal. App. 5th 211 (2018) (employer need not record on wage statements any payment to a union vacation trust fund; the plaintiff did not exercise any control over this money, which was transferred to a trust).


22. In Stewart v. San Luis Ambulance, Inc., No. S246255 (Cal. Jan. 3, 2018), the Supreme Court accepted a request from the Ninth Circuit, 878 F.3d 883 (certifying question), to decide this issue: “Do violations of meal period regulations, which require payment of a ‘premium wage’ for each improper meal period, give rise to claims under section … 226 of the California Labor Code where the employer does not include the premium wage in the employee’s pay or pay statements during the course of the violations?”


28. Id. at 1143.
29. Id. (distinguishing cases where injury arose from inadequate wage statements that required employees to engage in discovery and mathematical computations to reconstruct time records to see if they were correctly paid); cf. Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 623 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2010) (wage statements inaccurately listed hours worked and omitted hourly wage); Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 4th 949, 956 (2005) (inaccurate hours on wage statements).
31 Lab. Code § 226(e)(3). In reviewing compliance with these provisions, the factfinder can consider whether the employer, before an alleged violation, adopted and complied with a set of policies, procedures, and practices that fully comply with section 226. The amendment deeming technical violations to cause “injury” were held to “clarify” rather than change the law and thus the amendment could apply retroactively. Lubin v. Wackenhut Corp., 5 Cal. App. 5th 926, 959 (2016) (“Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e)(2)(B)(i) clarifies that injury arises from defects in the wage statement, rather than from a showing that an individual experienced harm as a result of the defect.”).

32 Lab. Code § 2699.5.


34 Lopez v. Friant & Assocs., LLC, 15 Cal. App. 5th 773, 784 (2017) (“Because section 226(e)(1) sets forth the elements of a private cause of action for damages and statutory penalties, its requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate ‘injury’ resulting from a ‘knowing and intentional’ violation of section 226(a) is not applicable to a PAGA claim for recovery of civil penalties.”). See also Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 5th 667, 676-77, 679-80, 681 (2018) (where wage statement shows overtime hours and total overtime payment, plaintiff could use simple arithmetic to derive the missing hourly rate, satisfying the statutory exception to the “deemed to suffer injury” provision that applies where “a reasonable person would be able to readily ascertain the information without reference to other documents or information”; but PAGA has no “injury” requirement and so plaintiff could proceed with her PAGA claim; noting that trial court has discretion to reduce PAGA penalties for technical violations).

35 Lab. Code § 226.3.

36 Heritage Residential Care, Inc. v. Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, 192 Cal. App. 4th 75 (2011) (“inadvertent” is not defined in the statute, it should receive its “plain and commonsense meaning”—unintentional, accidental, or not deliberate).

37 DLSE Opinion Letter 2006.07.06.

38 Lab. Code § 226(a) (“a copy of the [wage] statement and the record of the deductions shall be kept on file by the employer for at least three years at the place of employment or at a central location within the State of California”).


42 Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC, — Cal. 5th —, 2019 WL 470963, at *1 (Feb. 7, 2019).

43 Id. at *1-2.

44 Id.

45 Corp. Code §§ 1502 and 2117.

46 Lab. Code § 431.

47 Sample language might be:

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES (Required by the California Earned Income Tax Credit Information Act, as amended in 2016 by AB 1847. Your eligibility for EITC depends on your personal circumstances. This notice is not tax advice.)

Based on your annual earnings, you may be eligible to receive the earned income tax credit from the federal government (federal eitc). The federal eitc is a refundable federal income tax credit for low-income working individuals and families. The federal eitc has no effect on certain welfare benefits. In most cases, federal eitc payments will not be used to determine eligibility for medicaid, supplemental security income, food stamps, low-income housing, or most temporary assistance for needy families payments. Even if you do not owe federal taxes, you must file a federal tax return to receive the federal eitc. Be sure to fill out the federal eitc form in the federal income tax return booklet. For information regarding your eligibility to receive the federal eitc, including information on how to obtain the irs notice 797 or any other necessary forms and instructions, contact the internal revenue service by calling 1-800-829-3676 or through its web site at www.irs.gov.

You also may be eligible to receive the california earned income tax credit (california eitc) starting with the calendar year 2015 tax year. The california eitc is a refundable state income tax credit for low-income working individuals and families. The california eitc is treated in the same manner as the federal eitc and generally will not be used to determine eligibility for welfare benefits under california law. To claim the california eitc, even if you do not owe california taxes, you must file a california income tax return and complete and attach the california eitc form (ftb 3514). For information on the availability of the credit, eligibility requirements, and how to obtain the necessary california forms and get help filing, contact the franchise tax board at 1-800-852-5711 or through its web site at www.ftb.ca.gov. (visited Jan. 25, 2019).
17. Workers’ Compensation Laws

The California workers’ compensation system, since the early 1900s, has compensated employees for work-related injuries. It is a no-fault system, entitling injured workers to benefits without having to prove that the injury was the employer’s fault. The system is a tradeoff: while injured workers get benefits without proof of employer negligence, generally those benefits are the exclusive remedy. The workers’ compensation benefits are paid by either the employer (if the employer is authorized to self-insure) or by the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier.¹

While comprehensive details of California’s workers’ compensation system² are beyond the scope of this modest monograph, that system intersects with employment law generally at various points, discussed briefly below.

17.1 Jurisdiction

California will take workers’ compensation jurisdiction over any injury wherever it occurs, if the contract of hire was made in California. More problematic has been the case where an out-of-state worker suffers an injury (or part of a continuous trauma) in California. Traditionally, California, with its generous workers’ compensation benefits, has been a favorite forum for out-of-state workers, because California would take jurisdiction over injuries occurring in California even if the employee was in California only temporarily or only in a way that was incidental to work primarily done outside of California. During 2015, however, statutory and case law developments reversed that trend, resulting in a significant restriction of California’s exercise of jurisdiction over claims by out-of-state employees. California now will decline jurisdiction if an out-of-state employee of an out-of-state employer has executed a contract of hire designating choice of law and venue for another state for purposes of workers’ compensation benefits. Furthermore, California in any event will not exercise jurisdiction without a showing of minimum contacts and a state interest in the claimed injury in California.³

17.2 Disability Discrimination

Under California’s very liberal definition of “disability,” virtually all job-related injuries will entitle the worker not only to compensation benefits but to protection as a disabled worker.⁴

17.3 Privacy Implications

Medical information regarding an injured worker that an insurance carrier obtains during workers’ compensation proceedings may be shielded from disclosure to the employer except insofar as the information is related to diagnosis of the condition for which compensation is claimed or is needed for the employer to modify the employee’s work duties (see § 4.7.2).

17.4 Workers’ Compensation Preemption

Remedies obtained through administrative agencies (see §§ 1.7, 1.8), may provide the exclusive remedy with respect to certain theories of liability that would otherwise be available to an employee suing an employer, although the scope of workers’ compensation preemption in California is very narrow compared to that of most states (see § 5.7.1).
17.5 Compensation Implications

California employers must not deduct the cost of workers’ compensation from employee earnings.\(^5\)

17.6 Good Faith Personnel Actions

While California workers’ compensation broadly covers any injury arising out of employment, including psychiatric illness or injury, compensation for psychiatric injury may be denied when the employee has been employed less than six months (unless the stress resulted from “sudden and extraordinary” conditions, as opposed to “regular and routine” employment events), when the injury resulted from lawful, non-discriminatory, good faith personnel actions, or when the psychiatric claim was first made after notice of the employee’s dismissal.\(^6\)

17.7 Temporary Labor

To protect employers that use a temporary employment agency or that join with another employer to perform work under their dominion and control, one party may assume all responsibility for the provision of workers’ compensation benefits to those workers. The agreement has to be in writing, expressly stating which entity will provide the benefit. The responsible entity then must purchase or provide for the benefits for the protection to be implemented.\(^7\)

17.8 Coverage of Employees Only

17.8.1 Workers covered

Any person rendering service for another, other than an independent contractor, is presumed to be an employee for purposes of workers’ compensation liability.\(^8\)

As of 2017, the definition of employees subject to coverage changed.\(^9\) Now, unless they affirmatively opt out, coverage is extended to “working members of a company.” Previously any working officer or director of a privately held corporation or partner or managing member of a partnership or limited liability company was automatically excluded from coverage unless he or she affirmatively elected coverage. Under the new rule, to avoid coverage, any officer, director, or partner owning 15% of issued and outstanding stock, or an individual who is a general partner of a partnership, or managing member of a limited liability company must affirmatively opt out of coverage by signing a waiver under penalty of perjury confirming that he or she meets at least one of the qualifications and elects to waive coverage. This rule applies to “in force” policies, as well as to new policies.

17.8.2 Independent contractors

Workers’ compensation insurance is not required for independent contractors who work for a California employer. Some businesses buy services from independent contractors to save money on workers’ compensation insurance as well as taxes and other expenses normally associated with employment. Correct classification of a worker as an independent contractor is essential, because if a person improperly labeled as an independent contractor is injured while doing work for an employer’s business, then the employer may have to pay for the medical bills for the injured worker. Similarly, if an employee hired by an improperly classified independent contractor to do some
work is hurt, and the “independent contractor” does not carry workers’ compensation insurance, then the employer may have to cover medical bills and compensation for the injured worker.

A California employer engaging an independent contractor should ask to see an insurance certificate establishing that the independent contractor’s employees have workers’ compensation insurance. For good measure, the employer should also ensure that the independent contractor has general liability insurance.

17.9 Discrimination Against Injured Workers—Labor Code § 132a

Section 132a makes it unlawful to discharge, to threaten to discharge, or to discriminate “in any manner” against a California worker who has made known any intent to file for workers’ compensation benefits or who has received a workers’ compensation rating, award, or settlement. This prohibition extends to protect workers were injured in jobs for a prior employer. Section 132a has been interpreted liberally, so that even a uniformly administered rule regarding termination of employment (e.g., a rule that anyone on disability leave for more than a year will be dismissed) can be unlawful, unless the employer shows that its discharge of the injured worker was based on “business necessity.” A violation is a misdemeanor. Civil remedies include reinstatement, back pay, and an increase by one-half in the employee’s workers’ compensation benefits, or $10,000, whichever is less.

While civil remedies are available under Section 132a, a violation of this statute does not give rise to a common law wrongful termination claim, since the statute contains limitations in scope and remedy.

The logical sweep of Section 132a, as interpreted, arguably might reach even the continuation of medical benefits for an injured worker on leave. But the WCAB has held that an employer may discontinue medical benefits for employees on leave because of work-related injury, provided that the discontinuation was pursuant to an ERISA benefit plan. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has held that, beyond the termination context, the antidiscrimination rule of Section 132a simply requires that workers with industrial injuries be treated no worse than their co-workers.

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1. Lab. Code § 3700 (employer may secure coverage by buying insurance coverage or securing state certificate of consent to self-insure).
2. Lab. Code §§ 3751. See also § 7.7.1.
4. See generally § 3.4 (interactive process required for worker with job-related injury), § 6.3 (broad definition of “disability”).
6. Lab. Code § 3208.3(d) (employee must have been employed for at least six months to obtain compensation for psychiatric injury); Lab. Code § 3208.3(h) (no compensation for psychiatric injury payable if injury “substantially caused by a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action, with employer to bear the burden of proof). See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. WCAB, 190 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2010) (“substantially caused” means that the personnel action was responsible for “at least 35 to 40 percent of the causation from all sources combined,” and both industrial and nonindustrial causes make up the total causation); Northrop Grumman Corp. v. WCAB, 103 Cal. App. 4th 1021 (2002) (reversing award to worker psychiatrically injured by investigation that was lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action under Lab. Code § 3208.3(h)).
7. Lab Code § 3602(d).
9. In 2016, the Legislature amended Labor Code sections 3351 and 3352 and repealed Section 6354.7
11. Dutra v. Mercy Medical Center, Mount Shasta, 209 Cal. App. 4th 750, 754 (2012) (distinguishing City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1158 (1998), which held that Section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy for employee suing under the FEHA for disability discrimination under the common for wrongful termination; “section 132a does not qualify under case authority as the type of policy that can support a common law action for wrongful termination”).

13 State Department of Rehabilitation v. WCAB, 30 Cal. 4th 1281 (2003) (not unlawful to require injured employees to use sick and vacation leave when away from the workplace seeking medical treatment for workplace injuries, where other, non-injured employees likewise must use leave time to seek medical care).
18. Rights of Organized Labor

18.1 Agricultural Workers

In America generally, collective bargaining laws do not protect farm workers, as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) exempts agricultural labor. California, the home of Cesar Chavez, is different. Since 1975, the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) has given farm workers the right to be recognized at the bargaining table, under state procedures similar to those used under the NLRA. But the ALRA goes a big step further. While the NLRA simply requires employers to bargain, and does not mandate results, the California Legislature, in 2002, amended the ALRA to add provisions on “mandatory mediation and conciliation.”¹ Under the MMC provisions, the ALRA imposes, on growers who refuse to meet union demands, a neutral mediator who can decree the terms of a binding contract, subject to final approval by the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB).

A grower successfully challenged the MMC process in 2015. In 1992, the United Farm Workers of America (UFW) had been certified as the union for the grower’s agricultural employees. The parties held an introductory negotiating session in early 1995. The UFW then disappeared, only to reassert its status as the employees’ certified bargaining representative 17 years later, in 2012. The grower asserted that the UFW, by its lengthy absence, had abandoned its status as bargaining representative. The ALRB ruled against the grower and ordered it to submit to the MMC process, and then adopted the mediator’s proposed collective bargaining agreement in a final order. The Court of Appeal held that the ALRB had abused its discretion in rejecting the grower’s claim that a union’s abandonment of its members barred the union’s MMC request. The Court of Appeal held further that the MMC process both violated equal protection and invalidly delegated legislative authority, in violation of the California Constitution.

But then the California Supreme Court granted review of this decision² and, in 2017, ruled in the UFW’s favor on all issues. First, the high court held that the MMC provisions are constitutional. Second, the high court held that an employer may not refuse to bargain with a union, whether during the ordinary bargaining process or during MMC, on the basis that the union has abandoned its representative status. The high court reasoned that the Legislature intended to reserve the power to decertify unions to employees and labor organizations alone. Allowing employers to raise an abandonment defense, the high court concluded, would frustrate that intent and undermine the ALRA’s comprehensive scheme of labor protections for agricultural employees.³

18.2 Anti-Injunction Laws re Mass Picketing

In America generally, employers can obtain injunctions against union-generated mass picketing that disrupts with business operations. California is different. California favors union speech. The 1975 Moscone Act limits the equity jurisdiction of courts with respect to labor disputes by declaring that conduct relating to a “labor dispute,” such as peaceful picketing, “shall be legal, and no court … shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or preliminary or permanent injunction which, in specific or general terms, prohibits any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from [engaging in the specified conduct].”⁴

Further favoring unions is California Labor Code section 1138.1, which creates virtually insurmountable obstacles to any employer trying to enjoin union interference with business operations during a labor dispute. Section 1138.1 requires that employers seeking a temporary restraining order as to a labor dispute must produce live
witnesses at a hearing (not just written declarations under oath), must prove that law enforcement is unable or unwilling to protect the employer’s property, and must furnish “clear proof” (instead of the traditional “preponderance of the evidence”) that the defendant union actually participated in or authorized unlawful acts.5

These pro-union statutes attracted serious constitutional scrutiny in 2010 and 2011, when two Court of Appeal decisions struck them down as unconstitutional because their pro-union favoritism discriminates on the basis of the content of speech. In one case, a trial court relied on these statutes to deny an injunction against union agents trespassing on store premises to distribute flyers urging shoppers to boycott the store for failing to employ union workers. The Court of Appeal held that the statutes unconstitutionally favor speech related to a labor dispute over speech related to other issues: California could not constitutionally keep courts from exercising their equity jurisdiction to enjoin trespassing union agents just as they enjoin other trespassers.6

In the other case, involving the same union and the same store employer, but in a different judicial district, the union used an “informational picket line” to tell shoppers that store workers were not unionized. Again, the statutes in question tied the hands of a judge who otherwise could enjoin the trespassing. The Court of Appeal in this second case also held the statutes unconstitutional, reasoning that there “is no compelling reason for the state to single [pro-union speech] out as the only form of speech that can be exercised despite the objection of the owner of private property upon which the speech activity occurs.”7

But then the California Supreme Court, in 2012, re-tilted the playing field in favor of unions by invalidating these appellate decisions and issuing its own decision.8 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Moscone Act and Section 1138.1 as being “justified by the state’s interest in promoting collective bargaining to resolve labor disputes, the recognition that union picketing is a component of the collective bargaining process, and the understanding that the area outside the entrance of the targeted business is ‘the most effective point of persuasion.’” For support, the Supreme Court cited other laws protecting labor-related speech in the context of economic regulations, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions that “support the proposition that labor-related speech may be treated differently than speech on other topics.”

A concurring opinion cited the portion of the Moscone Act that proscribes unlawful conduct—such as breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, and blocking of ingress and egress—to stress that the Moscone Act and Section 1138.1 do not protect union conduct that involves violence or aims to harm businesses by using tactics that go beyond “persuasion of patrons to labor’s position.” The concurring opinion stated that using more signs or individuals in a small area than reasonably required to publicize a dispute would be unlawful. But since these legal interpretations are not part of the majority opinion, it is unclear how much weight lower courts will give them.

In another development related to the privileged nature that California has conferred upon pro-union activities, the Court of Appeal, applying California’s constitutional protection of free speech to a private shopping mall, has held it was unconstitutional for the mall, having permitted union picketing of mall premises, to prohibit picketing by an animal rights’ organization that was protesting the practices of a pet shop located within the mall.9

18.3 Advertising for Strike-Breakers

Any advertisement seeking persons to work during a California trade dispute must contain certain disclosures, such as the fact of a dispute and the name of the advertiser and the employer who is represented.10
18.4 Gag Orders for State Government Contractors

A union-inspired statute provided that employers contracting with or providing services to the state must not use state money to assist, promote, or deter union organization. State contractors were also forbidden to hold meetings on state property to assist, promote, or deter union organizing. Employers subject to this law had to certify in writing and maintain accounting records to prove that there had been no misuse of funds. Among the penalties for violation were a fine of repayment of the state funds plus a penalty equal to twice the amount of repayment. Taxpayers could sue to enforce this law, and prevailing plaintiffs could recover attorney fees.\textsuperscript{11}

When California employers challenged this restriction on employer speech as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, the Ninth Circuit, in a 2006 \textit{en banc} decision, ruled 12-3 that the legislation was valid.\textsuperscript{12} The U.S. Supreme Court then held otherwise, ruling, 7-2, that federal labor law preempts the California legislation, because that legislation impermissibly regulated within “a zone protected and reserved for market freedom.”\textsuperscript{13}

18.5 Right to Leaflet in Private Shopping Malls

In America generally, the property rights of shopping mall owners permit them to exclude leafleting, as the constitutional right of free speech applies only against governmental, not private, action. California is different. In a 2007 case, the California Supreme Court, ruling in favor of labor organizers, held that the right to free speech under the California Constitution “includes the right to urge customers in a shopping mall to boycott one of the stores in the mall.”\textsuperscript{14} Thus, a union may intrude upon the premises of a private shopping mall to urge a boycott of tenant stores, even though that activity interferes with the store’s business.

In the underlying case, a union having a labor dispute with a newspaper prepared leaflets describing the newspaper’s mistreatment of workers and distributed the leaflets outside a department store, because the store advertised in the newspaper. Mall officials told the union members, who were breaking a mall rule against urging boycotts of mall stores, that they were trespassing. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the mall with the NLRB. When the NLRB held that the mall’s rules violated the NLRA, the mall appealed to the D.C. Circuit. Because “no California court has squarely decided whether a shopping center may lawfully ban from its premises speech urging the public to boycott a tenant,” that court asked the California Supreme Court to decide whether the mall’s rule was lawful.

The California Supreme Court ruled for the labor organizers and against the shopping mall. The Supreme Court first found that “[l]isteners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.” Accordingly, the mall’s content-based restriction on constitutionally protected speech required a “compelling interest” under the “strict scrutiny” test. Brushing aside the mall’s concern that encouraging a boycott interferes with the store’s business operation, the Supreme Court concluded that the mall’s anti-boycott rule was invalid: “[t]he Mall’s purpose to maximize profits of its merchants is not compelling compared to the Union’s right to free expression.”\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, the mall could not enforce its anti-boycotting rule against the union.

A strong dissenting opinion urged the California Supreme Court to join the “judicial mainstream” by overruling California precedent that the property rights of shopping malls must yield to free-speech considerations. The dissent observed that California’s peculiar law in this respect “has received scant support and overwhelming rejection around the country”; indeed, 14 states with free speech-provisions in their constitutions almost identical
to California’s had rejected the peculiar California rule. And four states that previously had adopted a similar approach to California’s (Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington) were “generally retreating.”

Thus, while courts generally respect property rights in the context of private sidewalks or private parking lots of stand-alone stores, California, in peculiar fashion, holds that shopping malls must remain open to the public for general speech purposes, subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, meaning that unions in California have free rein to urge primary or secondary boycotts of stores inside privately owned shopping malls.

18.6 Access To Private Employee Information

Although employees generally have a strong privacy interest in their home addresses and telephone numbers, the California Supreme Court has ruled that the County of Los Angeles must provide that information for its employees, including its non-union employees, to the union representing county employees. The Supreme Court acknowledged that this disclosure would amount to a serious invasion of privacy but felt that the invasion was justified on the basis that the union owed a duty of fair representation to all employees in the bargaining unit, and needed the requested information to communicate fully with the employees.

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2 Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. ALRB (United Farm Workers), 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261 (2015), rev. granted, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (Cal. Aug. 19, 2015). The Supreme Court agreed to decide whether (1) the MMC process violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions, (2) the MMC process effects an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, (3) an employer can oppose a certified union’s request for referral to the MMC process by asserting that the union has abandoned the bargaining unit.
3 Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. ALRB (United Farm Workers), 3 Cal. 5th 1118 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 60 (2018).
4 Code Civ. Proc. § 527.3(b).
5 Lab. Code § 1138.1.
8 Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 55 Cal. 4th 1083 (2012).
10 Lab. Code § 973.
11 Gov’t Code §§ 16645-16649.
12 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
13 Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008). But see California Grocers Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 4th 177 (2011) (upholding ordinance requiring grocery stores to retain their former staff for 90 days after a change in ownership; ordinance was not preempted by the California Retail Food Code or the NLRA).
14 Fashion Valley Mall v. NLRB (Graphics Communications Int’l Union, Local 432-M), 42 Cal. 4th 850 (2007).
15 Id. at 869.
16 Id. at 874-75 (Chin, J., dissenting).
18 County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission, 56 Cal. 4th 905 (2013).
19. Independent Contractors

California is generally hostile to the efforts of businesses to characterize their workers as independent contractors instead of employees. This hostility undermines the interests of workers who prefer independent status to employee status for reasons related to their personal autonomy. Workers in many situations instead may prefer employee status, however, and classifying workers as employees instead of independent contractors serves the interests of labor unions, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and governmental taxing authorities. As the power of these interests has grown, California has increasingly made it more difficult for businesses to maintain their treatment of workers as independent contractors.

19.1 The Plaintiff’s Preference for Employee Status

19.1.1 The individual who wants wages, benefits, penalties

People who provide services as independent contractors enjoy many advantages over similarly situated employees. The advantages include lack of supervision, the freedom to schedule work, the ability to contract the work out, the avoidance of tax withholding, and the ability to make operational choices to maximize profit.

Once a dispute arises between a business and its independent contractors, however, individuals who once bargained for the advantages that an independent contractor enjoys may seek to recharacterize themselves as employees. Individuals can engage in this tactic because their signed agreements—describing them as independent contractors—are not conclusive of their status. And these individuals will be tempted to engage in this tactic because employees, unlike independent contractors, can

- seek reimbursement of expenses they necessarily incurred in discharging their duties,
- challenge requirements to buy supplies from the principal,
- challenge, as unlawful payroll deductions, deductions made for expenses advanced,
- sue for payments an employer would owe for denying meal or rest breaks,
- seek penalties incurred for the absence of accurate wage-itemization statements,
- seek money payable under employee benefit plans,
- sue in tort for wrongful termination in violation of public policy,
- sue for violation of minimum-wage and overtime-pay laws,
- seek contractually owed payments as unpaid wages, while seeking attorney fees,
- sue for waiting-time penalties for failing to pay timely termination wages,¹
- sue for violation of antidiscrimination and retaliation laws,
• seek workers’ compensation benefits,
• seek unemployment compensation benefits, and
• have the DLSE act on their behalf to seek statutory and contractual remedies.

19.1.2 The government official who wants taxes and penalties

Taxing authorities prefer that workers be characterized as employees rather than independent contractors, because employers owe payroll taxes for employees and owe no similar taxes with respect to their independent contractors (see § 1.6.2 above).

19.1.3 The tort plaintiff who wants damages

Third parties injured by an organization’s independent contractor will try to re-characterize the independent contractor as an employee, to argue that the third party’s injuries were inflicted within the scope of the alleged employee’s employment, thereby triggering the organization’s liability as an employer.

19.2 Presumptions of Employment in Various Contexts

Ordinarily, individuals who sue to obtain the benefits of employee status bear the burden to prove that they are actually employees. In various California contexts, however, the standard of proof shifts in favor of the person claiming employment status and suing for benefits or wages.

19.2.1 Workers’ compensation

For purposes of workers’ compensation coverage, the Labor Code presumes that an individual retained to provide services for a fee is an employee, even if the individual has agreed in writing to be an independent contractor.²

19.2.2 Unemployment compensation

California courts have held that, in unemployment insurance cases, public policy prefers that the organization rather than the individual shoulder the cost of social insurance.³ The law therefore requires organizations to prove independent-contractor status instead of requiring individuals to prove employee status.⁴

19.2.3 Providing services under a license

California law presumes that a worker who provides services pursuant to a business license or for a person required to have such a license is an employee.⁵

19.2.4 DLSE’s presumption of employment where services provided

The DLSE has adopted a presumption of employment where an individual has provided services to an employer: “where employment status is at issue, that is, employee or independent contractor, DLSE starts with the presumption that the worker is an employee.”⁶
19.2.5 Labor Code claims

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that California law presumes workers to be employees, not independent contractors—even where workers have agreed in writing that they are independent contractors—and has rejected defendants’ attempts rely on contractual choice-of-law provisions that call for applying the law of another state, such as Texas or Georgia.7

An illustration of how California employment law can differ from other law appears in the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc.8 Although FedEx’s elaborate operating agreement described FedEx delivery drivers as independent contractors, and although the D.C. Circuit had upheld that classification, the Ninth Circuit held that FedEx drivers in California were employees as a matter of law: “There is no indication that California has replaced its longstanding right-to-control test with the new entrepreneurial-opportunities test developed by the D.C. Circuit. Instead, California cases indicate that entrepreneurial opportunities do not undermine a finding of employee status.”9

19.2.6 Wage Order claims

A company’s ability to defend its classification of workers as independent contractors is even weaker regarding claims that invoke the wage orders, which define employment more broadly than does the common law. (See § 19.6 below.)

19.3 Inversion of Common Law Standards in Standard Jury Instruction

Under the common law, as restated in the Restatement of Agency, the question of employee status versus independent contractor depends on various factors, the most important of which is whether the principal has the right to control the manner and means of performing the services that the individual was retained to provide.10 The California Judicial Council has approved a standard instruction by which a jury is to consider the principal’s the right to control the manner and means of performance (even if it is not exercised) and is also to consider secondary factors, such as the whether the principal supplied equipment or tools or the place of work, paid by the hour instead of the job, supervised the work, had a long-term relationship with the worker, etc.11

One basis for this jury instruction may be decisions involving the workers’ compensation statute, which advances special social policies that are not present every time employee status is disputed.12 But the Court of Appeal has advanced the pro-plaintiff proposition that even where control factors indicate the plaintiff is an independent contractor, the plaintiff can still present a triable issue of employee status by citing secondary factors. Thus, even where plaintiff truck drivers were owner-operators who controlled their own delivery operations, and thus seemed to be independent contractors under the primary factor of “right to control,” the drivers could go to trial on their employee-status claim by citing such secondary factors as the W-2 forms they received, their tax withholding, their health plan benefits, their hourly rates for certain activities, the 24 hour termination provision in their contracts, and their function as a part of the defendant’s regular business of providing transportation of property.13

19.4 Absence of Statutory Protection as to Newspaper Carriers

For well over a century, the newspaper industry has regarded individuals contracting to provide home delivery of papers as independent contractors, not employees. Federal wage and hour law honors this characterization; the
FLSA expressly exempts from its requirements “carriers engaged in making deliveries to the home or subscribers or other consumers of newspapers.” Yet California is different. Unlike many other states, California has failed to adopt the newspaper-carrier exemption in its Labor Code.

In 2014, the California Supreme Court, in Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, clarified its view regarding the relevant test to determine whether a particular individual is an employee or an independent contractor. The case involved newspaper carriers who contracted to provide delivery to home subscribers. Ayala held that the existence of an employment relationship depends, in part, on “whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.” Ayala held that, for purposes of class certification, the relevant inquiry is not whether the hirer’s degree of control exercised over hires was sufficiently uniform, but whether the hirer’s legal right to control how the end result was achieved was sufficiently uniform. Because the newspaper carriers entered standard contracts with the defendant, Ayala found there could be sufficient uniform evidence of the right to control to support certification as to whether the carriers were in fact employees.

19.5 California’s Judicial Revolution Against Independent Contracting

Until relatively recently, in California, as elsewhere, courts generally respected decisions to classify service providers as independent contractors. But in recent years federal and California courts applying California law have repeatedly issued decisions holding that classes of individuals classified as independent contractors—often delivery drivers—can contend they are employees (sometimes as a matter of law) who are entitled to the overtime pay, wage-itemization statements, timely termination wages, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement of business expenses, and other items of pay and benefits that generally are uniquely available to employees.

Here are some examples illustrating this trend. In 2014, in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal partially upheld a class certification of package delivery service drivers, for purposes of their claims brought under Wage Order No. 9 (governing transportation workers). The Court of Appeal endorsed the trial court’s use of a broader definition of “employee” to see if an individual is misclassified as an independent contractor under the IWC wage orders. Also in 2014, in Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., the Ninth Circuit held as a matter of law that a class of delivery drivers had been improperly classified as independent contractors, even though the trial court had found them to be independent contractors. Also in 2014, in Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, the Ninth Circuit considered the status of package delivery drivers who claimed to be employees misclassified as independent contractors. The trial court had granted summary judgment against the drivers on the ground that they were independent contractors, as a matter of law, but the Ninth Circuit, on the same facts, held that the drivers were employees, as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the drivers had to wear FedEx uniforms, drive FedEx-approved vehicles, and groom themselves according to FedEx appearance standards, and that FedEx told drivers what packages to deliver, on what days, and at what times. Although drivers could operate multiple delivery routes and hire helpers to get the work done, they could do so only with FedEx’s consent. In 2015, in Garcia v. Seacon Logix, Inc., the Court of Appeal affirmed a bench trial ruling that truck drivers classified as independent contractors were really employees who were entitled to reimbursement of their expenses. And again in 2015, in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., a federal district court held that on-call personal transportation drivers could proceed with a class action arguing that they were employees misclassified as independent contractors.
19.6 The California Supreme Court Rewrites the Law In Dynamex Operations

In 2018 the California Supreme Court, in *Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court*, invented new law on whether companies can contract with workers as independent contractors instead of employees. Truck drivers sued Dynamex on wage and hour claims, contending that they were employees misclassified as independent contractors. At issue was whether their status should be determined under the common law test the California Supreme Court applied in *S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations* (emphasizing the right to control manner and means of performance and some secondary factors) or under a broader test of employment found in the wage orders (“engage, suffer or permit to work”). *Dynamex* took this opportunity to rewrite California law without the need for any new legislation. *Dynamex* held that “engage, suffer or permit to work” determines employee status for Wage Order claims, requiring a defendant disputing employee status to prove (A) the worker is free from control and direction of the hirer in connection with performing the work, both under contract and in fact, (B) the worker performs work outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business, and (C) the worker customarily engages in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hirer.

A fair-minded person might think that, as a matter of due process, *Dynamex* would apply prospectively only, as businesses lacked notice that the Supreme Court would rewrite the law in such a radical fashion. But *Dynamex* itself failed to provide for prospective application only, and lower courts have struggled with the issue of retroactivity.

An early, especially disappointing, application of *Dynamex* came in *Garcia v. Border Transportation Group, LLC*. *Garcia* reversed a summary judgment against wage order claims by a taxi driver who alleged that Border Transportation had misclassified him as an independent contractor. *Garcia* held that, for purposes of seeking summary judgment, Border had failed to satisfy part C of the ABC test. *Garcia* stated that *Dynamex* adopted a “stringent” version of part C, requiring “an existing, not potential, showing of independent business operation.” The plaintiff taxi driver, in signing up with Border, had obtained a driver’s permit that was limited to work for Border, and California’s stringent part C “requires more than mere capability to engage in an independent business”; rather, part C requires evidence that the plaintiff “in fact provided services for other entities ‘independently’ of his relationship with [the defendant].”

19.7 Professional Cheerleaders Must Be Employees

California-based professional major and minor league baseball, basketball, football, ice hockey, and soccer teams must treat as employees—not independent contractors—the cheerleaders who perform during the teams’ exhibitions, events, and games.

19.8 Special Reporting Requirements

Businesses that retain independent contractors must report them to the EDD (see § 16.2).

19.9 Administrative Enforcement

The EDD administers California’s employment tax laws. The California Code of Regulations lists the rules generally applicable to common law determinations of employment.
19.10 Special Penalties for Willful Misclassification

Labor Code section 226.8 provides that California employers must not willfully misclassify any individual as an employee or assess against such an individual a deduction or fee that an employer could not lawfully assess against an employee. Penalties range from $5,000 to $25,000 per violation. Violators are also subject to an electronic Scarlett Letter: any entity found to have so willfully misclassified must “display prominently on its Internet Web site” a notice confessing it “committed a serious violation of the law by engaging in that willful misclassification of employees” and declaring that it has changed its business practices to avoid further violations. Moreover, liability attaches to any “person who, for money or other valuable consideration, knowingly advises an employer to treat an individual as an independent contractor to avoid employee status for that individual.”

There is no private right of action under Section 226.8.

19.11 Dealing with Certain Labor Contractors

A California business must not enter an agreement for labor or services with certain contractors if the business knows or should know that the agreement fails to provide enough funds to allow the contractor to satisfy labor laws. Contractors affected include construction, farm-labor, garment, janitorial, security-guard, and warehouse contractors. Organizations that breach this obligation can be liable for actual damages or statutory penalties to workers who suffer injury from labor-law violations. The business must, upon request, give the Labor Commissioner a copy of the contractor agreement and other related documentation.

A claim brought under this statute (against airlines that had contracted with a security company) failed because the plaintiff had failed to allege that the airlines had knowingly underfunded the contracts.

Employers that use labor contractors are jointly liable with the contractor for paying wages to all workers whom the labor contractor supplies, and for the contractor’s failure to obtain valid workers’ compensation coverage.

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2 Lab. Code § 3357 ("Any person rendering service for another, other than as an independent contractor, or unless expressly excluded herein, is presumed to be an employee.") See also Lab. Code § 5705(a) (employer has burden to prove “affirmative defense” that “injured person claiming to be an employee was an independent contractor”); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 349 (1989) (“One seeking to avoid [workers’ compensation] liability has the burden of proving that persons whose services he has retained are independent contractors rather than employees.”); Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, 162 Cal. App. 4th 839, 855 (2008) (for purposes of worker’s compensation insurance, persons who delivered newspapers to daily subscribers were employees of the publisher, not independent contractors, where publisher maintained significant supervision over the carriers, controlled the price paid by subscribers, based payment for carriers on the number of papers delivered per day, supplied materials and facilities the carriers used, did not hire the carriers to achieve a specific result attainable within a finite period, and was better suited than the carriers were to distribute the cost of on-the-job injuries as a business expense).

3 See, e.g., Grant v. Woods, 71 Cal. App. 3d 647, 652 (1977) (focusing on whether individual was employee “for purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Act” and demanding “[c]lear evidence … to defeat the beneficent purposes of the legislature established in the [Unemployment Insurance] code”).


5 Lab. Code § 2750.5 provides in part: “There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that a worker performing services for which a license is required pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code, or who is performing such services for a person who is required to obtain such a license is an employee rather than an independent contractor.”; see also Blackwell v. Vasilas, 244 Cal. App. 4th 160, 172 (2016) (reversing summary judgment for property owner/hirer upon,
holding that to establish independent contractor status of stucco contractor, in addition to presenting evidence of the requisite factors to determine said status under Labor Code section 2750.5(a), (b) and (c), property owner/hirer also was required to present evidence that stucco contractor was licensed, or alternatively, that the services stucco contractor performed did not require a license).

6 www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/FAQ_independentcontractor.htm (visited Feb. 14, 2019) (‘In handling a matter where employment status is an issue, that is, employee or independent contractor, DLSE starts with the presumption that the worker is an employee.’). For this global proposition the DLSE cites only Labor Code section 3357, which applies in workers’ compensation cases. The Court of Appeal in Lujan v. Minagar, 124 Cal. App. 4th 1040 (2004), however, stated more broadly, in a retaliatory dismissal suit alleging a violation of Labor Code section 6310, that “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that one who furnishes services for an employer is an employee.” Id. at 1045.

7 In Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 898-99, 904 (9th Cir. 2010), where delivery drivers classified as independent contractors sued for Labor Code benefits, the Ninth Circuit reversed a summary judgment that the trial court had granted to the defendant. The Ninth Circuit stated that California law rather than Texas law applied, and that, under California law, “once a plaintiff comes forward with evidence that he provided services for an employer, the employee has established a prima facie case that the relationship was one of employer/employee.” Id. at 900. Reprising that theme, the Ninth Circuit, in Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318, 1325 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated a judgment for a Georgia-based delivery company whose California drivers, subject to written “independent contractor” agreements, were suing for unpaid wages. The trial court had applied Georgia law, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the contracting parties’ designation of an independent-contractor relationship is true. Id. at 1321. The Ninth Circuit held that California law should apply instead, because even though Georgia had a substantial relationship to the parties, California “fundamental policy” was at stake and California had a materially greater interest than Georgia in resolving an employment dispute arising in California. Id. at 1324. And under California law, the Ninth Circuit stated, “the presumption is that the drivers are employees and the burden is on Affinity to demonstrate that the drivers are independent contractors.” Id. at 1323. The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case for a bench trial, in which the trial court once again ruled for the company. Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2014). In the drivers’ appeal, the Ninth Circuit once again reversed, holding now that the drivers, as a matter of California law, were employees rather than independent contractors: “The undisputed facts indicate that Affinity had the right to control the details of the drivers’ work, and the application of the secondary factors weigh in favor of a finding that the drivers were employees. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision that the drivers were independent contractors and hold that they were Affinity’s employees under California law.” Id. at 1101, 1105.

8 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2014) (awarding summary judgment to class of delivery drivers on the basis that they, as a matter of California law, were employees who had been misclassified as independent contractors).

9 Id. at 993-94.

10 The Restatement Second of Agency § 220 (1958) identifies these factors: (a) the extent of control that, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.

11 The California Civil Jury Instructions, CACI 3704, provides:

In deciding whether [name of agent] was [name of defendant]’s employee, the most important factor is whether [name of defendant] had the right to control how [name of agent] performed the work, rather than just the right to specify the result. One indication of the right to control is that the hirer can discharge the worker [without cause]. It does not matter whether [name of defendant] exercised the right to control.

In deciding whether [name of defendant] was [name of agent]’s employer, in addition to the right of control, you must consider the full nature of their relationship. You should take into account the following additional factors, which, if true, may show that [name of defendant] was the employer of [name of agent]. No one factor is necessarily decisive. Do not simply count the number of applicable factors and use the larger number to make your decision. It is for you to determine the weight and importance to give to each of these additional factors based on all of the evidence.

(a) [Name of defendant] supplied the equipment, tools, and place of work;
(b) [Name of agent] was paid by the hour rather than by the job;
(c) [Name of defendant] was in business;
(d) The work being done by [name of agent] was part of the regular business of [name of defendant];
(e) [Name of agent] was not engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(f) The kind of work performed by [name of agent] is usually done under the direction of a supervisor rather than by a specialist working without supervision;
(g) The kind of work performed by [name of agent] does not require specialized or professional skill;
(h) The services performed by [name of agent] were to be performed over a long period of time; [and]
(i) [Name of defendant] and [name of agent] believed that they had an employer-employee relationship [and]
(j) [Specify other factor].

12 See Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Board, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1288, 1301 (1991) (‘The Supreme Court pointed out in Borello that the Workers’ Compensation Act serves public as well as private interests and that a waiver of its protections is not to be lightly inferred.’). Among other things, the statute represents society’s recognition that if the financial risk of job injuries is not placed upon the businesses which produce them, it may fall upon the public treasury.) (quoting Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 358).

13 Arzate v. Bridge Terminal Transport, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 419, 426 (2011) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant; secondary factors could sustain finding that plaintiffs were employees even if control factors indicated that plaintiffs were independent contractors).

14 The FLSA exemption appears in section 213(d), 29 U.S.C. § 213(d); many states, but not California, adopt this exemption for purposes of state wage and hour law.
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522 (2014) (“Whether a common law employer-employee relationship exists turns foremost on the degree of a hirer’s right to control how the end result is achieved. In turn, whether the hirer’s right to control can be shown on a classwide basis will depend on the extent to which individual variations in the hirer’s rights vis-à-vis each putative class member exist, and whether such variations, if any, are manageable.”; “Significantly, what matters under the common law is not how much control a hirer exercises, but how much control the hirer retains the right to exercise.”). The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred in denying certification based on an analysis of the actual control the newspaper asserted over the carriers. The Supreme Court also noted, however, that class certification might be denied if there were significant variations among the class members as to various secondary factors of employment (which are to be considered in addition to the primary “right to control” factor). The Supreme Court left undisturbed another appellate decision, Sotelo v. Medianewsgroup, 207 Cal. App. 4th 639 (2012), which affirmed the denial of class certification to another group of newspaper carriers, given the variations among carriers that existed regarding factors that one considers in deciding whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor: “Even though the court found variability among the class in only a few of the factors, the court observed that the multifactor test ‘requires that the factors be examined together.’ Thus, even if other factors were able to be determined on a classwide basis, those factors would still need to be weighed individually, along with the factors for which individual testimony would be required. We find no failure to use proper criteria or improper legal assumptions in this determination.” Id. at 660.


Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1103-05 (9th Cir. 2014).


An order of class certification in that case was reversed because certain arbitration agreements were enforceable. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The class as certified includes drivers who entered into agreements to arbitrate their claims and to waive their right to participate in a class action with regard to those claims. … [T]he question whether those agreements were enforceable was not properly for the district court to answer. The question of arbitrability was designated to the arbitrator.”). Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018).


Lab. Code § 2754.

See § 1.5. For the standard that the EDD applies, see the Employment Determination Guide, https://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/de38.pdf (visited Feb. 14, 2019) (listing multiple elements to consider: instructions, training, integration, personal services, use of assistants, continuing relationship, hours of work, full-time work, work done on premises, sequence of work, reports, payments, expenses, tools and materials, investment, profit or loss, work for multiple firms, services offered to general public, right to fire, right to quit, custom in industry, level of skill required, beliefs of the parties, and business decisions).


Lab. Code § 226.8(a)(1).

Lab. Code § 226.8(a)(2).

Lab. Code § 226.8(b).

Lab. Code § 226.8(e)(1).

Lab. Code § 226.8(e)(2).

Lab. Code § 2753(a). Liability does not extend to persons who are advising their employer or to licensed attorneys who are providing legal advice to their clients. Lab. Code § 2753(b).

Noe v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 4th 316, 334-41 (2015). There may, however, be a UCL claim for conduct made unlawful by Section 226.8. See id. at 326 (“UCL … might provide some form of remedy for a violation of section 226.8”).

Lab. Code § 2810(a).

Lab. Code § 2810(g).

Lab. Code § 2810(t).


Lab. Code § 2810.3(b).

20.1 Agreement to Illegal Terms of Employment

California outlaws various provisions in employment-related agreements, including:

- any settlement agreement provision that prevents the disclosure of “factual information related to a claim” filed in court or in an administrative action and regarding sexual harassment or retaliation for reporting harassment or discrimination,\(^1\)

- any contractual provision that waives a party’s right to testify in a legal proceeding (if required or requested by court order, subpoena or written administrative or legislative request) regarding criminal conduct or sexual harassment on the part of the other contracting party, or the other party’s agents or employees,\(^2\)

- any mandatory term of employment that has the employee release any FEHA claim,\(^3\)

- various covenants not to compete,\(^4\)

- any agreement to have a dispute decided in a non-California forum under non-California law,\(^5\) and

- releases of wage claims as to wages due but not yet paid.\(^6\)

California employers must not require employees or applicants to agree in writing to any condition the employer knows to be unlawful.\(^7\)

20.2 Choice of Non-California Law or Non-California Forum in Employment Contracts

Employers cannot require employees, who reside and work in California, as a condition of employment, to agree to a contract provision that would either (1) “[r]equire the employee to adjudicate outside of California a claim arising in California” or (2) “[d]eprive the employee of the substantive protection of California law with respect to a controversy arising in California.”\(^8\) This law effectively forbids employers from contractually requiring California employees to adjudicate claims outside of California or to submit to the laws of another state, and makes any such provisions voidable by employee.\(^9\)

The only exception is where the employee was individually represented by a lawyer in negotiating an employment contract.\(^10\) The law provides that any contract that violates these provisions is voidable by the employee. A court may award an employee reasonable attorney’s fees, among other remedies, for enforcing rights under the act.\(^11\)

Section 925 does not affect employment agreements already in effect. The law applies to contracts entered into, modified, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.\(^12\)
20.3 Forced Patronage

Some companies require their employees to patronize company products or services. Thus, for example, employees of the Brand X department store might be expected to wear Brand X clothes. Not so in California, which forbids employers to require employees to purchase “anything of value” (e.g., safety training, auto insurance, banking services) from the employer or any particular vendor.\textsuperscript{13}

California also forbids employers to require an employee to buy or sell stock in order to secure a job. The relevant provision states: “Investments and the sale of stock or an interest in a business in connection with the securing of a position are illegal as against the public policy of the State and shall not be advertised or held out in any way as a part of the consideration for any employment.”\textsuperscript{14}

For rules on company-required uniforms, see § 7.1.8.

20.4 Restrictions on Employer Rights to Employee Inventions

An employer may provide in its employment contracts for confidential disclosure of all of an employee’s inventions made individually or jointly with others during the term of employment.\textsuperscript{15} But California employers must not require an employee to assign rights to an invention that the employee has developed on his or her own time without using the employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade-secret information, unless the invention results from work for the employer or relates to the employer’s business when the invention was developed.\textsuperscript{16} Further, any agreement requiring a California employee to assign invention rights must notify the employee of these limitations.\textsuperscript{17}

20.5 Child Labor

California’s numerous and complicated child labor laws are generally beyond the scope of this discussion. For a summary, see www.dir.ca.gov/DLSE/ChildLaborPamphlet2000.html.

Let’s note, though, that even here, California goes to peculiar lengths. It forbids employment on a motion picture set or location of an infant under the age of one month, unless a board-certified pediatric physician and surgeon certifies that the infant is at least 15 days old, was carried to full term, was of normal birth weight, and has the lungs, eyes, heart, and immune system that one needs to handle the stress and potential risks of filmmaking. Violation of this provision is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $2,500 to $5,000, 60-day jail term, or both. The medical certification must be provided in advance to the Labor Commissioner, who will consent to the minor’s employment through issuance of a permit.\textsuperscript{18} (Some have cited this provision in trying to explain why viewers were shown a doll appearing to be a baby, instead of a real baby, during a scene in the 2014 movie American Sniper.)

Aggrieved individuals can seek treble damages claims for child-labor violations, and their claims are tolled during the time that they remain a minor. Moreover, certain violations involving a minor 12 years of age or younger are now subject to civil penalties of $25,000 to $50,000 per violation.\textsuperscript{19}

Just when you thought California could not get more peculiar in this area: Agricultural packing plants in Lake County get a unique exemption from child labor laws until January 1, 2022. This exemption allows minors ages 16 and 17 to work during the peak agricultural season, so long as school is not in session.\textsuperscript{20}
20.6 Human Trafficking

A non-traditional employment law is the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, which requires retail sellers and manufacturers doing business in California and having at least $100 million in annual worldwide gross receipts to disclose, on their website, their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their direct supply chains for tangible goods offered for sale. The exclusive remedy for a violation (so far) is an injunctive action by the California Attorney General. The California Attorney General has issued a detailed 50-page resource guide. Further, certain businesses (e.g., truck stops, bus stations) must post notices providing hotline numbers to use to report incidents of human trafficking.

In 2018 the Legislature amended the FEHA to require hotel and motel employers to provide 20 minutes of human trafficking awareness training to employees likely to come into contact with victims of human trafficking (including those who work in a reception area, perform housekeeping duties, help customers in moving possessions, or drive customers). Employees hired before July 2019 must be trained by January 2020 and every two years thereafter. For new employees hired after July 1, 2019, training must be completed within six months after hire. The training must prepare employees to recognize the signs of human trafficking, to distinguish between labor and sex trafficking, and to report suspected trafficking to the appropriate law enforcement agencies.

Amendments to the Civil Code require operators of mass transit intercity passenger rail systems, light rail systems, and bus stations to provide 20 minutes of training to employees who may interact with victims of human trafficking or who are likely to receive reports about suspected human trafficking. The training must include (1) the definition of human trafficking, including sex trafficking and labor trafficking, (2) myths and misconceptions about human trafficking, (3) physical and mental signs that may indicate that human trafficking is occurring, (4) guidance on how to identify individuals who are most at risk for human trafficking, (5) guidance on how to report human trafficking, including, but not limited to, national hotlines and contact information for local law enforcement agencies, and (6) protocols for reporting human trafficking when on the job.

While the failure to report human trafficking does not itself cause liability for the business, an establishment that fails to comply after notice of non-compliance is liable for a $500 civil penalty for a first offense and a $1,000 civil penalty for each further offense.

20.7 Garnishments

California employers must not discharge an employee for being subject to garnishment for the payment of one judgment. Under Family Code provisions, California employers must not rely on a wage-assignment support order to deny hire, to discharge, to discipline, to deny a promotion, or to taking any other adverse employment action. Violations of this prohibition subject the employer to a civil penalty up to $500.

Historically, the amount of California wages protected from garnishment reflected the federal minimum wage. But now the amount of California wages that are exempt from garnishment must reflect either the state minimum wage or the local minimum wage, whichever is higher. The amount of weekly wages subject to levy under an earnings withholding order cannot exceed either 25% of the debtor’s disposable earnings or one-half of the debtor’s weekly disposable earnings exceeding 40 times the applicable minimum wage.
20.8 Female Corporate Directors

By dint of 2018 legislation, every publicly held corporation incorporated or headquartered in California must have women on its board of directors. By the end of 2019, such a corporation must have at least one female director, and by the end of 2021 the corporation must have a minimum number of board seats filled by women in proportion to the total number of seats. The Secretary of State must, by July 2019, publish a report of the number of corporations that have principal executive offices in California and that have at least one female director, and must publish annual reports, beginning March 1, 2020, detailing how many corporations (1) complied with requirements in 2019, (2) moved their headquarters in or out of California, and (3) were subject to these provisions during 2019 but are no longer publicly traded. For each director’s seat not held by a female when by law it should have been, the corporation will be subject to a $100,000 fine for the first violation and a $300,000 fine for further violations. Corporations that fail to timely file relevant information with the Secretary of State will also be subject to a $100,000 fine.32

1 Code Civ. Proc. § 1001. The section does not prohibit confidentiality as to the amount paid in settlement or the identity of the claimant—if the claimant so requests and if no party is a government agency or official.
2 AB 3109, 2018 bill adding Civil Code § 1670.11.
3 SB 1300, 2018 bill adding Gov’t Code § 12964.5(a). This prohibition does not apply to any negotiated agreement to settle a FEHA claim filed in a legal proceeding or through the employer’s internal complaint process.
4 Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600.
5 Lab. Code § 925. This prohibition does not apply to agreements the employer negotiates with individuals represented by legal counsel.
6 Lab. Code § 206.5. Parties can, however, enter into enforceable agreements to settle wage claims that the employer disputes in good faith.
7 Lab. Code § 432.5.
8 Lab. Code § 925(a), (d).
9 Lab. Code § 925(a), (b).
10 Lab. Code § 925(e).
11 Lab. Code § 925(c).
12 Lab. Code § 925(f).
13 Lab. Code § 450. Although employees may lack a private right of action under Section 450, Sanchez v. Aerogroup Retail Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 1942166, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2013) (Section 450 does not create private right of action); Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 2010 WL 2077015, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2010) (same), employees might still seek civil penalties under PAGA. See § 5.11. In some cases, federal law may preempt the forced patronage statute. McDaniel v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC, 717 F.3d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[F]ederal securities law preempts the enforcement of California’s forced-patronage statute against brokerage houses that forbid their employees from opening outside trading accounts.”).
14 Lab. Code § 407. Corporation Code section 408 provides an exception to Labor Code section 407 with respect to (a) a stock purchase plan or stock option plan or (b) securing the employment of someone to be an officer of the corporation or any parent or subsidiary thereof.
15 Lab. Code § 2871.
16 Lab. Code § 2870.
17 Lab. Code § 2872.
18 Lab. Code § 1308.10.
19 Lab. Code § 1311.5.
20 Lab. Code § 1393.5(f).
21 Civ. Code § 1714.43(a), (c).
22 Civ. Code § 1714.43(d).
24 Civ. Code § 52.6.
25 Gov’t Code § 12950.3 (b)(3). See SB 970, 2018 bill adding Gov’t Code § 12950.3. The requirement does not apply to bed and breakfast inns as defined in Business and Professions Code section 24045.12(b) are excluded.
27 Civ. Code § 52.6(f)(1)-(6).
28 Civ. Code § 52.6(h).
29 Lab. Code § 2929.
30 Fam. Code § 5290.
32 SB 826, 2018 bill adding Corp. Code §§ 301.3, 2115.5.
21. Some Provisions Favoring California Employers

To keep our overall presentation fair and balanced, this section lists some provisions of California law that can benefit employers (even if that was not their primary intent).

21.1 Claims for Unlawful Tape Recording

Corporate employers as well as individuals can sue for civil penalties when an employee surreptitiously tape-records confidential communications.\(^1\) Thus, wrongful termination plaintiffs who have secretly tape recorded disciplinary meetings with their supervisors have found themselves facing an employer’s cross-complaint.\(^2\)

21.2 Civil Harassment Actions

Employers can act on behalf of their employees to obtain injunctive relief against unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence that reasonably implicates the workplace.\(^3\) One California appellate court has ruled that an employer’s unsuccessful petition for an injunction would not support a malicious prosecution suit by the employee who had been the target of the petition.\(^4\)

21.3 Anti-SLAPP Motions

California’s “anti-SLAPP” statute permits defendants to move to strike meritless claims that are based upon the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights.\(^5\) While this statute aims to protect public interest groups sued for defamation by corporate developers and other organizations, corporate employers have used this statute when sued for statements made to the government, such as the employers’ position statements to the EDD or the EEOC or the tax forms that the employers have filed with the IRS.

A 2016 Court of Appeal decision held that CNN, sued by a news producer for race discrimination, went too far when it filed an anti-SLAPP motion claiming that it had fired its news producer as a part of a “staffing decision” reflecting its “editorial discretion.” CNN argued that its action was “so inextricably linked with the content of the news” that it was in furtherance of free speech on a matter of public interest, and thus protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. While the trial court agreed with that argument, the Court of Appeal did not, reasoning: “This is a private employment discrimination and retaliation case, not an action designed to prevent defendants from exercising their First Amendment rights.”\(^6\) The California Supreme Court granted review of this decision in 2017 and is expected to rule in 2019.

21.4 Special Proof Required to Impose Punitive Damages

California law provides corporate defendants with special protections against the imposition of punitive damages. The plaintiff must prove by “clear and convincing” evidence (not merely “the preponderance of the evidence”) that she suffered from the fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive conduct of a corporate officer, director, or “managing agent,” or that an officer, director, or managing agent knowingly ratified the relevant wrongful conduct or had advance knowledge of the wrongdoing employee’s unfitness for employment.\(^7\) The “clear and convincing” standard of proof applies not only to whether the conduct was fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive but also to whether the corporate wrongdoer or ratifier was a managing agent.\(^8\) Another pro-defendant aspect of California
law in this regard is that no award of punitive damages is valid absent proof of the defendant's net worth, and discovery into that net worth is forbidden unless the plaintiff first shows a likelihood that punitive damages will be awarded on the facts of the case.

And more good news for corporate employers on this front: punitive damages are not available for Labor Code violations.

21.5 Relatively Short Statute of Limitations

California once had an unusually short statute of limitations for personal injury claims—just one year. This statute applied to most employment-related torts, including wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The statute of limitations for those claims now is two years.

21.6 Contractually Authorized Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards

The California Supreme Court has held that California employers invoking the California arbitration statute (but not the Federal Arbitration Act) can enforce agreements by which arbitral awards can be reviewed for errors of law. (See § 5.2.5)

21.7 Use of E-Verify

Some states and municipalities, concerned about unlawful immigration, required employers to use the otherwise optional E-Verify electronic employment verification system (administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) when considering job applications. Arizona enacted such a law, and the City of Lancaster, California enacted a similar ordinance. When the U.S. Chamber of Commerce challenged the Arizona statute, arguing that it was preempted by federal immigration law, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute.

California, however, differs from Arizona. Its Employment Acceleration Act of 2011—legislation sponsored by both business groups and the ACLU—forbids state and local governments from requiring employers to use electronic employment verification systems, except as required by federal law or as a condition of receiving federal funds.

California took its aversion to E-Verify a step further in 2015, forbidding employers and other persons—except as required by federal law or as a condition of receiving federal funds—to use E-Verify to check the employment authorization status of an applicant or an employee. The law imposes a $10,000 civil penalty for each violation. In addition, as of 2017, California employers must not request documents not required by federal law and must honor documents that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine. A similarly draconian penalty applies.

21.8 Non-Signatories Can Enforce Arbitration Agreements

Some companies contract with staffing agencies or other independent contractors to provide services to the company. While the company might have arbitration agreements with its own employees, the company typically would not have an arbitration agreement with the workers retained by the contractor. Under certain circumstances, however, the company can respond to a worker's lawsuit by invoking an arbitration agreement that the worker entered into with the contractor. While the general rule is that only the parties to an arbitration agreement can seek to enforce it, several exceptions apply. One exception is equitable estoppel, which applies.
when the claims against a nonsignatory defendant arise from the same facts and are inherently inseparable from arbitrable claims against a signatory defendant. Another exception applies when the nonsignatory defendant is being sued for its acts as an agent of the signatory defendant. And a third exception applies when the arbitration agreement identifies the nonsignatory defendant as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement.

The Court of Appeal, in *Garcia v. Pexco, LLC*, addressed a case involving the first two exceptions. Narciso Garcia, who worked for Real Time Staffing Services, sued Real Time for Labor Code violations and also sued Pexco, the firm where Real Time had assigned Garcia to work. Although Garcia and Real Time had an arbitration agreement, which waived class claims, there was no arbitration agreement between Garcia and Pexco. Pexco nonetheless successfully compelled individual arbitration of Garcia’s Labor Code claims against Pexco. The Court of Appeal reasoned that “Garcia’s claims against Pexco are rooted in his employment relationship with Real Time, and the governing arbitration agreement expressly includes statutory wage and hour claims.” The Court of Appeal concluded: “Garcia agreed to arbitrate his wage and hour claims against his employer, and Garcia alleges Pexco and Real Time were his joint employers. Because the arbitration agreement controls Garcia’s employment, he is equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate his claims with Pexco.”

The Court of Appeal independently relied on the “agency” exception to the rule that only signatory parties can invoke an arbitration agreement. Pexco could invoke that exception because Garcia had alleged that each defendant was the agent of the other, and because Garcia had alleged that “the two defendants were joint employers fulfilling the same role.”

A Court of Appeal decision published in 2019 addressed another Labor Code lawsuit by an employee who had an arbitration agreement with his staffing agency employer. The employee chose to sue only the worksite employer where he had worked. The worksite employer cross-complained against the staffing agency, and both companies moved to compel arbitration. The employee distinguished *Garcia v. Pexco, LLC* by arguing that his staffing agency could not compel arbitration because he had not sued the staffing agency, and that the worksite employer could not compel arbitration because the worksite employer had not signed the arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal disagreed: the plaintiff’s decision not to sue the staffing agency presented “a distinction without a difference,” because the staffing agency (being a cross-defendant) was a party to the litigation, and because “this entire dispute arose” from the employee’s employment with the staffing agency.

21.9 PAGA claims have their limits

**Employees must arbitrate claim for statutory damages brought in actions also seeking civil penalties under PAGA.** In a PAGA action claiming civil penalties and unpaid wages, the Court of Appeal clarified that while claims for PAGA penalties were exempt from an arbitration agreement, claims for statutory damages payable only to the employee were subject to a valid arbitration agreement. But a later Court of Appeal cast doubt on this sensible result, holding that when an employee sues under Labor Code section 558 for unpaid wages—an action previously available only to the Labor Commission—the entire action, including the part for unpaid wages, is immune from an arbitration agreement.

**Employee who settled his individual Labor Code claim could not continue his PAGA claim on behalf of others.** The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a PAGA claim when the plaintiff, whose individual claims had been directed to arbitration, ended the arbitration by settling his individual claims. At that point, the Court of Appeal held, he was no longer an “aggrieved employee” and thus could not proceed with the PAGA claim that he had pending in state court during the arbitration. The California Supreme Court then upset this sensible result by granting review of the case. The Supreme Court is expected to rule in 2019.
21.10 Sometimes a quit is just a quit

An employee phoned in her resignation and a few days later confirmed her resignation in an email to her supervisor. When she asked her employer to allow her to rescind her resignation, the employer refused to do. She then sued for discriminatory discharge. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the employer, reasoning that refusing to allow an employee to rescind a resignation is not an adverse employment action.24

Conclusion

Whether or not you consider California a leader in “progressive” employment laws likely will depend on whether you are a plaintiff’s attorney or an employer. Something that any objective observer must acknowledge, however, is that California employment law often is peculiar.

1 See Pen. Code §§ 631, 637.2.
3 Code Civ. Proc. § 527.8. See USS-Posco Industries v. Edwards, 111 Cal. App. 4th 436 (2003) (affirming three-year injunction against former employee who made generalized threats of workplace violence while still employed; employer may obtain injunction on behalf of employee who is logical target of threats, even if not specifically identified by the harasser).
4 Robinzine v. Vicory, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1416 (2006) (employer’s petition under the Workplace Violence Safety Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8, cannot, as a matter of law, support a claim for malicious prosecution; thus employee’s malicious prosecution suit must fail and employee is vulnerable to an anti-SLAPP motion).
6 Wilson v. Cable News Network, 6 Cal. App. 5th 822 (2016), rev. granted, No. S239686 (Cal. March 1, 2017), to decide: “In deciding whether an employee’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination, and defamation arise from protected activity for purposes of a special motion to strike, what is the relevance of an allegation that the employer acted with a discriminatory or retaliatory motive?.
7 Civ. Code § 3294.
9 Kelly v. Haag, 145 Cal. App. 4th 910 (2006) (substantial evidence did not support $75,000 punitive damages award against defendants in fraud action where plaintiff did not present evidence of defendant’s net worth or ability to pay; plaintiff on remand is not entitled to a retrial on punitive damages, because plaintiff had full and fair opportunity to establish defendant’s financial condition but failed to do so).
11 Brewer v. Premier Golf Properties, 168 Cal. App. 4th 1243 (2008) (plaintiff may not recover punitive damages for Labor Code violations regarding meal and rest breaks, pay stubs, or minimum wage, because (1) the express statutory remedies are exclusive absent evidence that they are inadequate and (2) the statutory provisions on these subjects arise from a contractual employment relationship, thereby precluding punitive recoveries).
13 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011) (federal immigration law did not preempt the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which required that all Arizona employers use E-Verify to confirm that the workers they employ are legally authorized workers).
14 Lab. Code § 2812 (“Except as required by federal law, or as a condition of receiving federal funds, neither the state nor a city, county, and special district shall require an employer to use an electronic employment verification system, including under the following circumstances: (a) As a condition of receiving a government contract. (b) As a condition of applying for or maintaining a business license. (c) As a penalty for violating licensing or other similar laws.”).
15 Lab. Code § 2814.
18 Id. at 788.
19 Id. For an example of a third-party beneficiary successfully invoking an arbitration agreement, see Selby v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, No. 12-01562 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013). The arbitration clause at issue—a credit card agreement—permitted “any involved third
party” to elect binding arbitration.” Accordingly, successor servicers to the signatory bank could compel arbitration of plaintiff’s claim, even though they did not sign the arbitration agreement.


22 *Kim v. Reins Int’l California, Inc.*, 18 Cal. App. 5th 1052 (2017) (PAGA suit can’t continue if underlying claim settled; by accepting a settlement and dismissing his individual claims with prejudice, the plaintiff “essentially acknowledged that he no longer maintained any viable Labor Code-based claims against” the employer and therefore lacked standing to maintain a PAGA action as an “aggrieved employee”), rev. granted, No. S 246999 (Cal. March 28, 2018).


24 *Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group*, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1150, 1163 (2017) (absent a constructive discharge or a contractual obligation, refusing to accept rescission of a resignation is not an adverse employment action, because “the employment relationship has ended”).
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